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Alert (AA22-277A) Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization

Summary

Actions to Help Protect Against APT Cyber Activity:

• Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on all user accounts.
• Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality.
• Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on network assets.
• Audit account usage.

From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization’s enterprise network. During incident response activities, CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization’s network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim’s sensitive data.

This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides APT actors tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) identified during the incident response activities by CISA and a third-party incident response organization. The CSA includes detection and mitigation actions to help organizations detect and prevent related APT activity. CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend DIB sector and other critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations in this CSA to ensure they are managing and reducing the impact of cyber threats to their networks.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 692 KB

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see the following files:

Technical Details

Threat Actor Activity

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the APT cyber activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework.

From November 2021 through January 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement on a DIB Sector organization’s enterprise network. The victim organization also engaged a third-party incident response organization for assistance. During incident response activities, CISA and the trusted –third-party identified APT activity on the victim’s network.

Some APT actors gained initial access to the organization’s Microsoft Exchange Server as early as mid-January 2021. The initial access vector is unknown. Based on log analysis, the actors gathered information about the exchange environment and performed mailbox searches within a four-hour period after gaining access. In the same period, these actors used a compromised administrator account (“Admin 1”) to access the EWS Application Programming Interface (API). In early February 2021, the actors returned to the network and used Admin 1 to access EWS API again. In both instances, the actors used a virtual private network (VPN).

Four days later, the APT actors used Windows Command Shell over a three-day period to interact with the victim’s network. The actors used Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data, including sensitive contract-related information from shared drives, for eventual exfiltration. The actors manually collected files using the command-line tool, WinRAR. These files were split into approximately 3MB chunks located on the Microsoft Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.

During the same period, APT actors implanted Impacket, a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols, on another system. The actors used Impacket to attempt to move laterally to another system.

In early March 2021, APT actors exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to install 17 China Chopper webshells on the Exchange Server. Later in March, APT actors installed HyperBro on the Exchange Server and two other systems. For more information on the HyperBro and webshell samples, see CISA MAR-10365227-2 and -3.

In April 2021, APT actors used Impacket for network exploitation activities. See the Use of Impacket section for additional information. From late July through mid-October 2021, APT actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate the remaining sensitive files. See the Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer section for additional information.

APT actors maintained access through mid-January 2022, likely by relying on legitimate credentials.

Use of Impacket

CISA discovered activity indicating the use of two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py. These tools use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, respectively, for creating a semi-interactive shell with the target device. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on the remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network.

The APT cyber actors used existing, compromised credentials with Impacket to access a higher privileged service account used by the organization’s multifunctional devices. The threat actors first used the service account to remotely access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via Outlook Web Access (OWA) from multiple external IP addresses; shortly afterwards, the actors assigned the Application Impersonation role to the service account by running the following PowerShell command for managing Exchange:

powershell add-pssnapin *exchange*;New-ManagementRoleAssignment – name:”Journaling-Logs” -Role:ApplicationImpersonation -User:<account>

This command gave the service account the ability to access other users’ mailboxes.

The APT cyber actors used virtual private network (VPN) and virtual private server (VPS) providers, M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to remotely access the Microsoft Exchange server. Use of these hosting providers, which serves to conceal interaction with victim networks, are common for these threat actors. According to CISA’s analysis of the victim’s Microsoft Exchange server Internet Information Services (IIS) logs, the actors used the account of a former employee to access the EWS. EWS enables access to mailbox items such as email messages, meetings, and contacts. The source IP address for these connections is mostly from the VPS hosting provider, M247.

Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer

The threat actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate sensitive files.

CovalentStealer is designed to identify file shares on a system, categorize the files, and upload the files to a remote server. CovalentStealer includes two configurations that specifically target the victim’s documents using predetermined files paths and user credentials. CovalentStealer stores the collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder, includes a configuration file to specify the types of files to collect at specified times and uses a 256-bit AES key for encryption. See CISA MAR-10365227-1 for additional technical details, including IOCs and detection signatures.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. CISA uses the ATT&CK Framework as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies. Table 1 lists the ATT&CK techniques employed by the APT actors.

Initial Access
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Execution
Technique TitleIDUse
Windows Management InstrumentationT1047Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands.
Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059Actors abused command and script interpreters to execute commands.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellT1059.001Actors abused PowerShell commands and scripts to map shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command ShellT1059.003Actors abused the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.The actors used Impacket tools, which enable a user with credentials to run commands on the remote device through the Command Shell.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PythonT1059.006The actors used two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py.
Shared ModulesT1129Actors executed malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths.
System ServicesT1569Actors abused system services to execute commands or programs on the victim’s network.
Persistence
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.
Create or Modify System ProcessT1543Actors were observed creating or modifying system processes.
Privilege Escalation
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Defense Evasion
Technique TitleIDUse
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005Actors masqueraded the archive utility WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe to evade defenses and observation.
Indicator Removal on HostT1070Actors deleted or modified artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses.
Indicator Removal on Host: File DeletionT1070.004Actors used the del.exe command with the /f parameter to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System ChecksT1497.001Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify ToolsT1562.001Actors used the taskkill command to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine which application was associated with the Process ID.
Hijack Execution FlowT1574Actors were observed using hijack execution flow.
Discovery
Technique TitleIDUse
System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016Actors used the systeminfo command to look for details about the network configurations and settings and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.The threat actor used route print to display the entries in the local IP routing table.
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection DiscoveryT1016.001Actors checked for internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways.
System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033Actors attempted to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly use a system, or whether a user is actively using the system.
System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049Actors used the netstat command to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP.
Process DiscoveryT1057Actors used the tasklist command to get information about running processes on a system and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.The actors used tasklist.exe and find.exe to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers.”
System Information DiscoveryT1082Actors used the ipconfig command to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.
File and Directory DiscoveryT1083Actors enumerated files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System ChecksT1497.001Actors used Windows command shellcommands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments.
Lateral Movement
Technique TitleIDUse
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.002Actors used Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB) and then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Collection
Technique TitleIDUse
Archive Collected Data: Archive via UtilityT1560.001Actor used PowerShell commands and WinRAR to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration.
Data from Network Shared DriveT1039Actors likely used net share command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit, the powershell dircommand to map shared drives to a specified path and retrieve items from another, and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest.The actors used dir.exe to display a list of a directory’s files and subdirectories matching a certain text string.
Data Staged: Remote Data StagingT1074.002The actors split collected files into approximately
3 MB chunks located on the Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory.
Command and Control
Technique TitleIDUse
Non-Application Layer ProtocolT1095Actors used a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and Command and Control (C2) server or among infected hosts within a network.
Ingress Tool TransferT1105Actors used the certutil command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet.The actors employed CovalentStealer to exfiltrate the files.
ProxyT1090Actors are known to use VPN and VPS providers, namely M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to access a network remotely.
Exfiltration
Technique TitleIDUse
Schedule TransferT1029Actors scheduled data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals and blend traffic patterns with normal activity.
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageT1567.002The actor’s CovalentStealer tool stores collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder.

DETECTION

Given the actors’ demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise environments, CISA, FBI, and NSA encourage organizations to:

  • Monitor logs for connections from unusual VPSs and VPNs. Examine connection logs for access from unexpected ranges, particularly from machines hosted by SurfShark and M247.
  • Monitor for suspicious account use (e.g., inappropriate or unauthorized use of administrator accounts, service accounts, or third-party accounts). To detect use of compromised credentials in combination with a VPS, follow the steps below:
    • Review logs for “impossible logins,” such as logins with changing username, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP addresses do not align to the expected user’s geographic location.
    • Search for “impossible travel,” which occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses that are a significant geographic distance apart (i.e., a person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two IP addresses in the time between logins). Note: This detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply VPN solutions before connecting to networks.
    • Search for one IP used across multiple accounts, excluding expected logins.
      • Take note of any M247-associated IP addresses used along with VPN providers (e.g., SurfShark). Look for successful remote logins (e.g., VPN, OWA) for IPs coming from M247- or using SurfShark-registered IP addresses.
    • Identify suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or applying user account mitigations.
    • Search for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts.
    • Search for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity.
  • Review the YARA rules provided in MAR-10365227-1 to assist in determining whether malicious activity has been observed.
  • Monitor for the installation of unauthorized software, including Remote Server Administration Tools (e.g., psexec, RdClient, VNC, and ScreenConnect).
  • Monitor for anomalous and known malicious command-line use. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for commands used by the actors to interact with the victim’s environment.
  • Monitor for unauthorized changes to user accounts (e.g., creation, permission changes, and enabling a previously disabled account).

CONTAINMENT AND REMEDIATION

Organizations affected by active or recently active threat actors in their environment can take the following initial steps to aid in eviction efforts and prevent re-entry:

  • Report the incident. Report the incident to U.S. Government authorities and follow your organization’s incident response plan.
  • Reset all login accounts. Reset all accounts used for authentication since it is possible that the threat actors have additional stolen credentials. Password resets should also include accounts outside of Microsoft Active Directory, such as network infrastructure devices and other non-domain joined devices (e.g., IoT devices).
  • Monitor SIEM logs and build detections. Create signatures based on the threat actor TTPs and use these signatures to monitor security logs for any signs of threat actor re-entry.
  • Enforce MFA on all user accounts. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all accounts without exception to the greatest extent possible.
  • Follow Microsoft’s security guidance for Active Directory—Best Practices for Securing Active Directory.
  • Audit accounts and permissions. Audit all accounts to ensure all unused accounts are disabled or removed and active accounts do not have excessive privileges. Monitor SIEM logs for any changes to accounts, such as permission changes or enabling a previously disabled account, as this might indicate a threat actor using these accounts.
  • Harden and monitor PowerShell by reviewing guidance in the joint Cybersecurity Information Sheet—Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace.

Mitigations

Mitigation recommendations are usually longer-term efforts that take place before a compromise as part of risk management efforts, or after the threat actors have been evicted from the environment and the immediate response actions are complete. While some may be tailored to the TTPs used by the threat actor, recovery recommendations are largely general best practices and industry standards aimed at bolstering overall cybersecurity posture.

Segment Networks Based on Function

  • Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Proper network segmentation significantly reduces the ability for ransomware and other threat actor lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks. (See CISA’s Infographic on Layering Network Security Through Segmentation and NSA’s Segment Networks and Deploy Application-Aware Defenses.)
  • Isolate similar systems and implement micro-segmentation with granular access and policy restrictions to modernize cybersecurity and adopt Zero Trust (ZT) principles for both network perimeter and internal devices. Logical and physical segmentation are critical to limiting and preventing lateral movement, privilege escalation, and exfiltration.

Manage Vulnerabilities and Configurations

  • Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on network assets. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities and critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment.
  • Implement a configuration change control process that securely creates device configuration backups to detect unauthorized modifications. When a configuration change is needed, document the change, and include the authorization, purpose, and mission justification. Periodically verify that modifications have not been applied by comparing current device configurations with the most recent backups. If suspicious changes are observed, verify the change was authorized.

Search for Anomalous Behavior

  • Use cybersecurity visibility and analytics tools to improve detection of anomalous behavior and enable dynamic changes to policy and other response actions. Visibility tools include network monitoring tools and host-based logs and monitoring tools, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool. EDR tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
  • Monitor the use of scripting languages (e.g., Python, Powershell) by authorized and unauthorized users. Anomalous use by either group may be indicative of malicious activity, intentional or otherwise.

Restrict and Secure Use of Remote Admin Tools

  • Limit the number of remote access tools as well as who and what can be accessed using them. Reducing the number of remote admin tools and their allowed access will increase visibility of unauthorized use of these tools.
  • Use encrypted services to protect network communications and disable all clear text administration services(e.g., Telnet, HTTP, FTP, SNMP 1/2c). This ensures that sensitive information cannot be easily obtained by a threat actor capturing network traffic.

Implement a Mandatory Access Control Model

  • Implement stringent access controls to sensitive data and resources. Access should be restricted to those users who require access and to the minimal level of access needed.

Audit Account Usage

  • Monitor VPN logins to look for suspicious access (e.g., logins from unusual geo locations, remote logins from accounts not normally used for remote access, concurrent logins for the same account from different locations, unusual times of the day).
  • Closely monitor the use of administrative accounts. Admin accounts should be used sparingly and only when necessary, such as installing new software or patches. Any use of admin accounts should be reviewed to determine if the activity is legitimate.
  • Ensure standard user accounts do not have elevated privileges Any attempt to increase permissions on standard user accounts should be investigated as a potential compromise.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze the performance of your detection and prevention technologies.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

RESOURCES

CISA offers several no-cost scanning and testing services to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. See cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services.

U.S. DIB sector organizations may consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration for eligible organizations. For more information on how to enroll in these services, email dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CISA, FBI, and NSA acknowledge Mandiant for its contributions to this CSA.

APPENDIX: WINDOWS COMMAND SHELL ACTIVITY

Over a three-day period in February 2021, APT cyber actors used Windows Command Shell to interact with the victim’s environment. When interacting with the victim’s system and executing commands, the threat actors used /q and /c parameters to turn the echo off, carry out the command specified by a string, and stop its execution once completed.

On the first day, the threat actors consecutively executed many commands within the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data for eventual exfiltration (see Table 2).

CommandDescription / Use
net shareUsed to create, configure, and delete network shares from the command-line.[1] The threat actor likely used this command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit.
powershell dirAn alias (shorthand) for the PowerShell Get-ChildItem cmdlet. This command maps shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another.[2] The threat actor added additional switches (aka options, parameters, or flags) to form a “one liner,” an expression to describe commonly used commands used in exploitation: powershell dir -recurse -path e:\<redacted>|select fullname,length|export-csv c:\windows\temp\temp.txt. This particular command lists subdirectories of the target environment when.
systeminfoDisplays detailed configuration information [3], tasklist – lists currently running processes [4], and ipconfig – displays all current Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP network configuration values and refreshes Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Domain Name System (DNS) settings, respectively [5]. The threat actor used these commands with specific switches to determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine: systeminfo > vmware & date /T, tasklist /v > vmware & date /T, and ipconfig /all >> vmware & date /.
route printUsed to display and modify the entries in the local IP routing table. [6] The threat actor used this command to display the entries in the local IP routing table.
netstatUsed to display active TCP connections, ports on which the computer is listening, Ethernet statistics, the IP routing table, IPv4 statistics, and IPv6 statistics.[7] The threat actor used this command with three switches to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP: netstat -anp tcp.
certutilUsed to dump and display certification authority (CA) configuration information, configure Certificate Services, backup and restore CA components, and verify certificates, key pairs, and certificate chains.[8] The threat actor used this command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet: certutil -urlcache -split -f https://microsoft.com temp.html.
pingSends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echoes to verify connectivity to another TCP/IP computer.[9] The threat actor used ping -n 2 apple.com to either test their internet connection or to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments or network restrictions.
taskkillUsed to end tasks or processes.[10] The threat actor used taskkill /F /PID 8952 to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine what this process was as the process identifier (PID) numbers are dynamic.
PowerShell Compress-Archive cmdletUsed to create a compressed archive or to zip files from specified files and directories.[11] The threat actor used parameters indicating shared drives as file and folder sources and the destination archive as zipped files. Specifically, they collected sensitive contract-related information from the shared drives.

On the second day, the APT cyber actors executed the commands in Table 3 to perform discovery as well as collect and archive data.

CommandDescription / Use
ntfsinfo.exeUsed to obtain volume information from the New Technology File System (NTFS) and to print it along with a directory dump of NTFS meta-data files.[12]
WinRAR.exeUsed to compress files and subsequently masqueraded WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe.[13]

On the third day, the APT cyber actors returned to the organization’s network and executed the commands in Table 4.

CommandDescription / Use
powershell -ep bypass import-module .\vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume eThreat actors ran a PowerShell command with parameters to change the execution mode and bypass the Execution Policy to run the script from PowerShell and add a module to the current section: powershell -ep bypass import-module .\vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume e. This module appears to acquire and export the Master File Table (MFT) for volume E for further analysis by the cyber actor.[14]
set.exeUsed to display the current environment variable settings.[15] (An environment variable is a dynamic value pointing to system or user environments (folders) of the system. System environment variables are defined by the system and used globally by all users, while user environment variables are only used by the user who declared that variable and they override the system environment variables (even if the variables are named the same).
dir.exeUsed to display a list of a directory’s files and subdirectories matching the eagx* text string, likely to confirm the existence of such file.
tasklist.exe and find.exeUsed to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers”.[16][17][18]
ping.exeUsed to send two ICMP echos to amazon.com. This could have been to detect or avoid virtualization and analysis environments, circumvent network restrictions, or test their internet connection.[19]
del.exe with the /f parameterUsed to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.[20]

References

[1] Microsoft Net Share

[2] Microsoft Get-ChildItem

[3] Microsoft systeminfo

[4] Microsoft tasklist

[5] Microsoft ipconfig

[6] Microsoft Route

[7] Microsoft netstat

[8] Microsoft certutil

[9] Microsoft ping

[10] Microsoft taskkill

[11] Microsoft Compress-Archive

[12] NTFSInfo v1.2

[13] rarlab

[14] Microsoft Import-Module

[15] Microsoft set (environment variable)

[16] Microsoft tasklist

[17] Mitre ATT&CK – Sofware: TaskList

[18] Microsoft find

[19] Microsoft ping

[20] Microsoft del

Revisions

October 4, 2022: Initial version

Source :
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-277a

Macros from the internet will be blocked by default in Office

VBA macros are a common way for malicious actors to gain access to deploy malware and ransomware. Therefore, to help improve security in Office, we’re changing the default behavior of Office applications to block macros in files from the internet.

With this change, when users open a file that came from the internet, such as an email attachment, and that file contains macros, the following message will be displayed:

Security risk banner about blocked macros with a Learn More button

The Learn More button goes to an article for end users and information workers that contains information about the security risk of bad actors using macros, safe practices to prevent phishing and malware, and instructions on how to enable these macros (if absolutely needed).

In some cases, users will also see the message if the file is from a location within your intranet that’s not identified as being trusted. For example, if users are accessing files on a network share by using the share’s IP address. For more information, see Files centrally located on a network share or trusted website.

 Important

Even before this change we’re introducing, organizations could use the Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet policy to prevent users from inadvertently opening files from the internet that contain macros. We recommend enabling this policy as part of the security baseline for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise. If you do configure the policy, your organization won’t be affected by this default change.

For more information, see Use policies to manage how Office handles macros.

Prepare for this change

To prepare for this change, we recommend that you work with the business units in your organization that use macros in Office files that are opened from locations such as intranet network shares or intranet websites. You’ll want to identify those macros and determine what steps to take to keep using those macros. You’ll also want to work with independent software vendors (ISVs) that provide macros in Office files from those locations. For example, to see if they can digitally sign their code and you can treat them as a trusted publisher.

Also, review the following information:

Preparation actionMore information
Understand which versions and which update channels have this change (as we roll out this change)Versions of Office affected by this change
See a flow chart of the process Office takes to determine whether to run macros in a fileHow Office determines whether to run macros in files from the internet
Identify files with VBA macros that might be blocked using the Readiness ToolkitUse the Readiness Toolkit to identify files with VBA macros that might be blocked
Learn about policies that you can use to control VBA macro executionUse policies to manage how Office handles macros

Steps to take to allow VBA macros to run in files that you trust

How you allow VBA macros to run in files that you trust depends on where those files are located or the type of file.

The following table list different common scenarios and possible approaches to take to unblock VBA macros and allow them to run. You don’t have to do all possible approaches for a given scenario. In the cases where we have listed multiple approaches, pick the one that best suits your organization.

ScenarioPossible approaches to take
Individual files• Select the Unblock checkbox on the General tab of the Properties dialog for the file
• Use the Unblock-File cmdlet in PowerShell

For more information, see Remove Mark of the Web from a file.
Files centrally located on a network share or trusted websiteUnblock the file using an approach listed under “Individual files.”

If there isn’t an Unblock checkbox and you want to trust all files in that network location:
• Designate the location as a Trusted site
• Add the location to the Local intranet zone

For more information, see Files centrally located on a network share or trusted website.
Files stored on OneDrive or SharePoint, including a site used by a Teams channel• Have users directly open the file by using the Open in Desktop App option
• If users download the file locally before opening it, remove Mark of the Web from the local copy of the file (see the approaches under “Individual files”)
• Designate the location as a Trusted site

For more information, see Files on OneDrive or SharePoint.
Macro-enabled template files for Word, PowerPoint, and ExcelIf the template file is stored on the user’s device:
• Remove Mark of the Web from the template file (see the approaches under “Individual files”)
• Save the template file to a Trusted Location

If the template file is stored on a network location:
• Use a digital signature and trust the publisher
• Trust the template file (see the approaches under “Files centrally located on a network share or trusted website”)

For more information, see Macro-enabled template files for Word, PowerPoint, and Excel.
Macro-enabled add-in files for PowerPoint• Remove Mark of the Web from the Add-in file
• Use a digital signature and trust the publisher
• Save the Add-in file to a Trusted Location

For more information, see Macro-enabled add-in files for PowerPoint and Excel.
Macro-enabled add-in files for Excel• Remove Mark of the Web from the Add-in file
• Save the Add-in file to a Trusted Location

For more information, see Macro-enabled add-in files for PowerPoint and Excel.
Macros that are signed by a trusted publisher• [recommended] Deploy the public code-signing certificate for the trusted publisher to your users and prevent your users from adding trusted publishers themselves.
• Remove Mark of the Web from the file, and have the user add the publisher of the macro as a trusted publisher.

For more information, see Macros that are signed by a trusted publisher		.
Groups of files saved to folders on the user’s deviceDesignate the folder a Trusted Location

For more information, see Trusted Locations.

Versions of Office affected by this change

This change only affects Office on devices running Windows and only affects the following applications: Access, Excel, PowerPoint, Visio, and Word.

The change began rolling out in Version 2203, starting with Current Channel (Preview) in early April 2022. Later, the change will be available in the other update channels, such as Monthly Enterprise Channel and Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel.

The following table shows the forecasted schedule of when this change will be available in each update channel. Information in italics is subject to change.

Update channelVersionDate
Current Channel (Preview)Version 2203Started rolling out on April 12, 2022
Current ChannelVersion 2206Started rolling out on July 27, 2022
Monthly Enterprise ChannelVersion 2208October 11, 2022
Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel (Preview)Version 2208October 11, 2022
Semi-Annual Enterprise ChannelVersion 2208January 10, 2023

 Note

As we roll out this change to Current Channel over the next few weeks, not all customers will see the change right away.

The change doesn’t affect Office on a Mac, Office on Android or iOS devices, or Office on the web.

How Office determines whether to run macros in files from the internet

The following flowchart graphic shows how Office determines whether to run macros in a file from the internet.

Flowchart that shows how Office determines whether to run macros in files from the internet

The following steps explain the information in the flowchart graphic, except for Excel Add-in files. For more information about those files, see Macro-enabled add-in files for PowerPoint and Excel. Also, if a file is located on a network share that isn’t in the Local intranet zone or isn’t a trusted site, macros will be blocked in that file.

  1. A user opens an Office file containing macros obtained from the internet. For example, an email attachment. The file has Mark of the Web (MOTW).

 Note

  • Mark of the Web is added by Windows to files from an untrusted location, such as the internet or Restricted Zone. For example, browser downloads or email attachments. For more information, see Mark of the Web and zones.
  • Mark of the Web only applies to files saved on an NTFS file system, not files saved to FAT32 formatted devices.
  1. If the file is from a Trusted Location, the file is opened with the macros enabled. If the file isn’t from a Trusted Location, the evaluation continues.
  2. If the macros are digitally signed and the matching Trusted Publisher certificate is installed on the device, the file is opened with the macros enabled. If not, then the evaluation continues.
  3. Policies are checked to see if macros are allowed or blocked. If the policies are set to Not Configured, the evaluation continues to Step 6.
  4. (a) If macros are blocked by policy, the macros are blocked.
    (b) If the macros are enabled by policy, the macros are enabled.
  5. If the user had previously opened the file, before this change in default behavior, and had selected Enable content from the Trust Bar, then the macros are enabled because the file is considered trusted.

 Note

  • For more information, see New security hardening policies for Trusted Documents.
  • For perpetual versions of Office, such as Office LTSC 2021 or Office 2019, this step occurs after Step 3 and before Step 4, and isn’t affected by the change coming to Current Channel.
  1. This step is where the change to the default behavior of Office takes effect. With this change, macros in files from the internet are blocked and users will see the Security Risk banner when they open the file.

 Note

Previously, before this change in default behavior, the app would check to see if the VBA Macro Notification Settings policy was enabled and how it was configured.

If the policy was set to Disabled or Not Configured, then the app would check the settings under File > Options > Trust Center > Trust Center Settings… > Macro Settings. The default is set to “Disable all macros with notification,” which allows users to enable content in the Trust Bar.

Guidance on allowing VBA macros to run in files you trust

Remove Mark of the Web from a file

For an individual file, such as a file downloaded from an internet location or an email attachment the user has saved to their local device, the simplest way to unblock macros is to remove Mark of the Web. To remove, right-click on the file, choose Properties, and then select the Unblock checkbox on the General tab.

File properties dialog showing the choice to unblock

 Note

  • In some cases, usually for files on a network share, users might not see the Unblock checkbox for a file where macros are being blocked. For those cases, see Files centrally located on a network share or trusted website.
  • Even if the Unblock checkbox is available for a file on a network share, selecting the checkbox won’t have any effect if the share is considered to be in the Internet zone. For more information, see Mark of the Web and zones.

You can also use the Unblock-File cmdlet in PowerShell to remove the ZoneId value from the file. Removing the ZoneId value will allow VBA macros to run by default. Using the cmdlet does the same thing as selecting the Unblock checkbox on the General tab of the Properties dialog for the file. For more information about the ZoneId value, see Mark of the Web and zones.

Files centrally located on a network share or trusted website

If you have your users access files from a trusted website or an internal file server, you can do either of the following steps so that macros from those locations won’t be blocked.

  • Designate the location as a Trusted site
  • If the network location is on the intranet, add the location to the Local intranet zone

 Note

  • If you add something as a trusted site, you’re also giving the entire site elevated permissions for scenarios not related to Office.
  • For the Local intranet zone approach, we recommend you save the files to a location that’s already considered part of the Local intranet zone, instead of adding new locations to that zone.
  • In general, we recommend that you use trusted sites, because they have some additional security compared to the Local intranet zone.

For example, if users are accessing a network share by using its IP address, macros in those files will be blocked unless the file share is in the Trusted sites or the Local intranet zone.

 Tip

  • To see a list of trusted sites or what’s in the Local intranet zone, go to Control Panel > Internet Options > Change security settings on a Windows device.
  • To check if an individual file is from a trusted site or local intranet location, see Mark of the Web and zones.

For example, you could add a file server or network share as a trusted site, by adding its FQDN or IP address to the list of trusted sites.

Trusted sites dialog

If you want to add URLs that begin with http:// or network shares, clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone checkbox.

 Important

Because macros aren’t blocked in files from these locations, you should manage these locations carefully. Be sure you control who is allowed to save files to these locations.

You can use Group Policy and the “Site to Zone Assignment List” policy to add locations as trusted sites or to the Local intranet zone for Windows devices in your organization. This policy is found under Windows Components\Internet Explorer\Internet Control Panel\Security Page in the Group Policy Management Console. It’s available under both Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates and User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates.

Files on OneDrive or SharePoint

  • If a user downloads a file on OneDrive or SharePoint by using a web browser, the configuration of the Windows internet security zone (Control Panel > Internet Options > Security) will determine whether the browser sets Mark of the Web. For example, Microsoft Edge sets Mark of the Web on a file if it’s determined to be from the Internet zone.
  • If a user selects Open in Desktop App in a file opened from the OneDrive website or from a SharePoint site (including a site used by a Teams channel), then the file won’t have Mark of the Web.
  • If a user has the OneDrive sync client running and the sync client downloads a file, then the file won’t have Mark of the Web.
  • Files that are in Windows known folders (Desktop, Documents, Pictures, Screenshots, and Camera Roll), and are synced to OneDrive, don’t have Mark of the Web.
  • If you have a group of users, such as the Finance department, that need to use files from OneDrive or SharePoint without macros being blocked, here are some possible options:
    • Have them open the file by using the Open in Desktop App option
    • Have them download the file to a Trusted Location.
    • Set the Windows internet security zone assignment for OneDrive or SharePoint domains to Trusted Sites. Admins can use the “Site to Zone Assignment List” policy and configure the policy to place https://{your-domain-name}.sharepoint.com (for SharePoint) or https://{your-domain-name}-my.sharepoint.com (for OneDrive) into the Trusted Sites zone.
      • This policy is found under Windows Components\Internet Explorer\Internet Control Panel\Security Page in the Group Policy Management Console. It’s available under both Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates and User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates.
      • SharePoint permissions and OneDrive sharing aren’t changed by adding these locations to Trusted Sites. Maintaining access control is important. Anyone with permissions to add files to SharePoint could add files with active content, such as macros. Users who download files from domains in the Trusted Sites zone will bypass the default to block macros.

Macro-enabled template files for Word, PowerPoint, and Excel

Macro-enabled template files for Word, PowerPoint, and Excel that are downloaded from the internet will have Mark of the Web. For example, template files with the following extensions:

  • .dot
  • .dotm
  • .pot
  • .potm
  • .xlt
  • .xltm

When the user opens the macro-enabled template file, the user will be blocked from running the macros in the template file. If the user trusts the source of the template file, they can remove Mark of the Web from the template file, and then reopen the template file in the Office app.

If you have a group of users that need to use macro-enabled templates without macros being blocked, you can take either of the following actions:

  • Use a digital signature and trust the publisher.
  • If you’re not using digital signatures, you can save the template file to a Trusted Location and have users get the template file from that location.

Macro-enabled add-in files for PowerPoint and Excel

Macro-enabled Add-in files for PowerPoint and Excel that are downloaded from the internet will have Mark of the Web. For example, Add-in files with the following extensions:

  • .ppa
  • .ppam
  • .xla
  • .xlam

When the user tries to install the macro-enabled Add-in, by using File > Options > Add-ins or by using the Developer ribbon, the Add-in will be loaded in a disabled state and the user will be blocked from using the Add-in. If the user trusts the source of the Add-in file, they can remove Mark of the Web from the Add-in file, and then reopen PowerPoint or Excel to use the Add-in.

If you have a group of users that need to use macro-enabled Add-in files without macros being blocked, you can take the following actions.

For PowerPoint Add-in files:

  • Remove Mark of the Web from the .ppa or .ppam file.
  • Use a digital signature and trust the publisher.
  • Save the Add-in file to a Trusted Location for users to retrieve.

For Excel Add-in files:

  • Remove Mark of the Web from the .xla or .xlam file.
  • Save the Add-in file to a Trusted Location for users to retrieve.

 Note

Using a digital signature and trusting the publisher doesn’t work for Excel Add-in files that have Mark of the Web. This behavior isn’t new for Excel Add-in files that have Mark of the Web. It’s worked this way since 2016, as a result of a previous security hardening effort (related to Microsoft Security Bulletin MS16-088).

Macros that are signed by a trusted publisher

If the macro is signed and you’ve validated the certificate and trust the source, you can make that source a trusted publisher. We recommend, if possible, that you manage trusted publishers for your users. For more information, see Trusted publishers for Office files.

If you have just a few users, you can have them remove Mark of the Web from the file and then add the source of the macro as a trusted publisher on their devices.

 Warning

  • All macros validly signed with the same certificate are recognized as coming from a trusted publisher and are run.
  • Adding a trusted publisher could affect scenarios beyond those related to Office, because a trusted publisher is a Windows-wide setting, not just an Office-specific setting.

Trusted Locations

Saving files from the internet to a Trusted Location on a user’s device ignores the check for Mark of the Web and opens with VBA macros enabled. For example, a line of business application could send reports with macros on a recurring basis. If files with macros are saved to a Trusted Location, users won’t need to go to the Properties for the file, and select Unblock to allow the macros to run.

Because macros aren’t blocked in files saved to a Trusted Location, you should manage Trusted Locations carefully and use them sparingly. Network locations can also be set as a Trusted Location, but it’s not recommended. For more information, see Trusted Locations for Office files.

Additional information about Mark of the Web

Mark of the Web and Trusted Documents

When a file is downloaded to a device running Windows, Mark of the Web is added to the file, identifying its source as being from the internet. Currently, when a user opens a file with Mark of the Web, a SECURITY WARNING banner appears, with an Enable content button. If the user selects Enable content, the file is considered a Trusted Document, and macros are allowed to run. The macros will continue to run even after the change of default behavior to block macros in files from the internet is implemented, because the file is still considered a Trusted Document.

After the change of default behavior to block macros in files from the internet, users will see a different banner the first time they open a file with macros from the internet. This SECURITY RISK banner doesn’t have the option to Enable content. But users will be able to go to the Properties dialog for the file, and select Unblock, which will remove Mark of the Web from the file and allow the macros to run, as long as no policy or Trust Center setting is blocking.

Mark of the Web and zones

By default, Mark of the Web is added to files only from the Internet or Restricted sites zones.

 Tip

To see these zones on a Windows device, go to Control Panel > Internet Options > Change security settings.

You can view the ZoneId value for a file by running the following command at a command prompt, and replacing {name of file} with your file name.

ConsoleCopy

notepad {name of file}:Zone.Identifier

When you run this command, Notepad will open and display the ZoneId under the [ZoneTransfer] section.

Here’s a list of ZoneId values and what zone they map to.

  • 0 = My Computer
  • 1 = Local intranet
  • 2 = Trusted sites
  • 3 = Internet
  • 4 = Restricted sites

For example, if the ZoneId is 2, VBA macros in that file won’t be blocked by default. But if the ZoneId is 3, macros in that file will be blocked by default.

You can use the Unblock-File cmdlet in PowerShell to remove the ZoneId value from the file. Removing the ZoneId value will allow VBA macros to run by default. Using the cmdlet does the same thing as selecting the Unblock checkbox on the General tab of the Properties dialog for the file.

Use the Readiness Toolkit to identify files with VBA macros that might be blocked

To identify files that have VBA macros that might be blocked from running, you can use the Readiness Toolkit for Office add-ins and VBA, which is a free download from Microsoft.

The Readiness Toolkit includes a standalone executable that can be run from a command line or from within a script. You can run the Readiness Toolkit on a user’s device to look at files on the user’s device. Or you can run it from your device to look at files on a network share.

When you run the standalone executable version of the Readiness Toolkit, a JSON file is created with the information collected. You’ll want to save the JSON files in a central location, such as a network share. Then you’ll run the Readiness Report Creator, which is a UI wizard version of the Readiness Toolkit. This wizard will consolidate the information in the separate JSON files into a single report in the form of an Excel file.

To identify files that might be impacted by using the Readiness Toolkit, follow these basic steps:

  1. Download the most current version of the Readiness Toolkit from the Microsoft Download Center. Make sure you’re using at least Version 1.2.22161, which was released on June 14, 2022.
  2. Install the Readiness Toolkit.
  3. From a command prompt, go to the folder where you installed the Readiness Toolkit and run the ReadinessReportCreator.exe command with the blockinternetscan option.For example, if you want to scan files in the c:\officefiles folder (and all its subfolders) on a device and save the JSON file with the results to the Finance share on Server01, you can run the following command.

ConsoleCopy

ReadinessReportCreator.exe -blockinternetscan -p c:\officefiles\ -r -output \\server01\finance -silent
  1. After you’ve done all your scans, run the Readiness Report Creator.
  2. On the Create a readiness report page, select Previous readiness results saved together in a local folder or network share, and then specify the location where you saved all the files for the scans.
  3. On the Report settings page, select Excel report, and then specify a location to save the report.
  4. When you open the report in Excel, go to the VBA Results worksheet.
  5. In the Guideline column, look for Blocked VBA file from Internet.

For more detailed information about using the Readiness Toolkit, see Use the Readiness Toolkit to assess application compatibility for Microsoft 365 Apps.

Use policies to manage how Office handles macros

You can use policies to manage how Office handles macros. We recommend that you use the Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet policy. But if that policy isn’t appropriate for your organization, the other option is the VBA Macro Notification Settings policy.

For more information on how to deploy these policies, see Tools available to manage policies.

 Important

You can only use policies if you’re using Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise. Policies aren’t available for Microsoft 365 Apps for business.

Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet

This policy prevents users from inadvertently opening files containing macros from the internet. When a file is downloaded to a device running Windows, or opened from a network share location, Mark of the Web is added to the file identifying it was sourced from the internet.

We recommend enabling this policy as part of the security baseline for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise. You should enable this policy for most users and only make exceptions for certain users as needed.

There’s a separate policy for each of the five applications. The following table shows where each policy can be found in the Group Policy Management Console under User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates:

ApplicationPolicy location
AccessMicrosoft Access 2016\Application Settings\Security\Trust Center
ExcelMicrosoft Excel 2016\Excel Options\Security\Trust Center
PowerPointMicrosoft PowerPoint 2016\PowerPoint Options\Security\Trust Center
VisioMicrosoft Visio 2016\Visio Options\Security\Trust Center
WordMicrosoft Word 2016\Word Options\Security\Trust Center

Which state you choose for the policy determines the level of protection you’re providing. The following table shows the current level of protection you get with each state, before the change in default behavior is implemented.

IconProtection levelPolicy stateDescription
Green circle with white check markProtected [recommended]EnabledUsers will be blocked from running macros in files obtained from the internet.

Part of the Microsoft recommended security baseline.
Red circle with white XNot protectedDisabledWill respect the settings configured under File > Options > Trust Center > Trust Center Settings… > Macro Settings.
Red circle with white XNot protectedNot ConfiguredWill respect the settings configured under File > Options > Trust Center > Trust Center Settings… > Macro Settings.

 Note

  • If you set this policy to Disabled, users will see, by default, a security warning when they open a file with a macro. That warning will let users know that macros have been disabled, but will allow them to run the macros by choosing the Enable content button.
  • This warning is the same warning users have been shown previously, prior to this recent change we’re implementing to block macros.
  • We don’t recommend setting this policy to Disabled permanently. But in some cases, it might be practical to do so temporarily as you test out how the new macro blocking behavior affects your organization and as you develop a solution for allowing safe usage of macros.

After we implement the change to the default behavior, the level of protection changes when the policy is set to Not Configured.

IconProtection levelPolicy stateDescription
Green circle with white check markProtectedNot ConfiguredUsers will be blocked from running macros in files obtained from the internet.

Users will see the Security Risk banner with a Learn More button

VBA Macro Notification Settings

If you don’t use the “Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet” policy, you can use the “VBA Macro Notification Settings” policy to manage how macros are handled by Office.

This policy prevents users from being lured into enabling malicious macros. By default, Office is configured to block files that contain VBA macros and display a Trust Bar with a warning that macros are present and have been disabled. Users can inspect and edit the files if appropriate, but can’t use any disabled functionality until they select Enable Content on the Trust Bar. If the user selects Enable Content, then the file is added as a Trusted Document and macros are allowed to run.

There’s a separate policy for each of the five applications. The following table shows where each policy can be found in the Group Policy Management Console under User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates:

ApplicationPolicy location
AccessMicrosoft Access 2016\Application Settings\Security\Trust Center
Excel [1]Microsoft Excel 2016\Excel Options\Security\Trust Center
PowerPointMicrosoft PowerPoint 2016\PowerPoint Options\Security\Trust Center
VisioMicrosoft Visio 2016\Visio Options\Security\Trust Center
WordMicrosoft Word 2016\Word Options\Security\Trust Center

 Note

  • [1] For Excel, the policy is named Macro Notification Settings.
  • The “VBA Macro Notification Settings” policy is also available for Project and Publisher.

Which state you choose for the policy determines the level of protection you’re providing. The following table shows the level of protection you get with each state.

IconProtection levelPolicy statePolicy value
Green circle with white check markProtected [recommended]EnabledDisable all except digitally signed macros (and select “Require macros to be signed by a trusted publisher”)
Green circle with white check markProtectedEnabledDisable all without notification
Orange circle with white check markPartially protectedEnabledDisable all with notification
Orange circle with white check markPartially protectedDisabled(Same behavior as “Disable all with notification”)
Red circle with white XNot protectedEnabledEnable all macros (not recommended)

 Important

Securing macros is important. For users that don’t need macros, turn off all macros by choosing “Disable all without notification.”

Our security baseline recommendation is that you should do the following:

  • Enable the “VBA Macro Notification Settings” policy.
  • For users that need macros, choose “Disable all except digitally signed macros” and then select “Require macros to be signed by a trusted publisher.” The certificate needs to be installed as a Trusted Publisher on users’ devices.

If you don’t configure the policy, users can configure macro protection settings under File > Options > Trust Center > Trust Center Settings… > Macro Settings.

The following table shows the choices users can make under Macro Settings and the level of protection each setting provides.

IconProtection levelSetting chosen
Green circle with white check markProtectedDisable all macros except digitally signed macros
Green circle with white check markProtectedDisable all macros without notification
Orange circle with white check markPartially protectedDisable all macros with notification (default)
Red circle with white XNot protectedEnable all macros (not recommended; potentially dangerous code can run)

 Note

In the policy setting values and the product UI for Excel, the word “all” is replaced by “VBA.” For example, “Disable VBA macros without notification.”

Tools available to manage policies

There are several tools available to you to configure and deploy policy settings to users in your organization.

Cloud Policy

You can use Cloud Policy to configure and deploy policy settings to devices in your organization, even if the device isn’t domain joined. Cloud Policy is a web-based tool and is found in the Microsoft 365 Apps admin center.

In Cloud Policy, you create a policy configuration, assign it to a group, and then select policies to be included in the policy configuration. To select a policy to include, you can search by the name of the policy. Cloud Policy also shows which policies are part of the Microsoft recommended security baseline. The policies available in Cloud Policy are the same User Configuration policies that are available in the Group Policy Management Console.

For more information, see Overview of Cloud Policy service for Microsoft 365.

Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center

In the Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center, you can use either the Settings catalog (preview) or Administrative Templates to configure and deploy policy settings to your users for devices running Windows 10 or later.

To get started, go to Devices > Configuration profiles > Create profile. For Platform, choose Windows 10 and later and then choose the profile type.

For more information, see the following articles:

Group Policy Management Console

If you have Windows Server and Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) deployed in your organization, you can configure policies by using Group Policy. To use Group Policy, download the most current Administrative Template files (ADMX/ADML) for Office, which include the policy settings for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise. After you copy the Administrative Template files to AD DS, you can use the Group Policy Management Console to create Group Policy Objects (GPOs) that include policy settings for your users, and for domain joined devices.

Wordfence 7.7.0 Is Out! Here Are The Changes

Wordfence 7.7.0 has just been released and as usual, it includes several awesome enhancements and updates for our security conscious WordPress publishers and e-commerce websites. This post goes into a little more detail on each change we’ve included. We don’t usually post additional detail like this, and we thought we’d give it a try, and make it a routine if the community approves.

This is based on the official Wordfence 7.7.0 changelog, which is included below. The format I’ve used here is the changelog entry as a heading and some detail on what the entry means and some background where applicable.

Improvement: Added configurable scan resume functionality to prevent scan failures on sites with intermittent connectivity issues

We’ve added “scan resume” functionality which is configurable and will prevent security scan failures on sites that might have intermittent connectivity issues. As you know Wordfence runs on over 4 million websites on over 12,000 unique networks, and to say that we run in a range of environments and configurations is an understatement. Our quality assurance team has an oversized influence on the product, and this is one more way they have made Wordfence even more robust in version 7.7.0.

Improvement: Added new scan result for vulnerabilities found in plugins that do not have patched versions available via WordPress.org

This adds a scan result for plugins that have a vulnerability and are still present in the official WordPress plugin repository, and where there is no fix available. The usual course of action is that the plugin team will disable a plugin in the repository that has a known vulnerability, where the vulnerability has not been fixed yet. In some cases, this doesn’t happen, and this scan result is designed to deal with this unusual case. This change will also allow plugins that are not provided through wordpress.org to be flagged as vulnerable if there is no update available.

Improvement: Implemented stand-alone MMDB reader for IP address lookups to prevent plugin conflicts and support additional PHP versions

We use the Maxmind database internally for location lookups. Our code was using the Maxmind PHP library to perform these lookups. Maxmind stopped supporting older PHP versions a while ago, but many of our customers are still on those old versions. We have also found that other WordPress plugins may use a different version of the Maxmind library, which can lead to conflicts. So we’ve rolled our own stand-alone MMDB reader to resolve both of these issues. We now support older PHP versions than the official Maxmind library, and you won’t see any conflicts if another plugin is using the Maxmind library.

Improvement: Added option to disable looking up IP address locations via the Wordfence API

By default Wordfence contacts our servers to perform an IP address location lookup. This is just the way the plugin was originally engineered (by me actually) to try to move as much processing to our own servers and reduce resource usage on our customer websites. Some of our customers prefer that lookup to happen locally, so we’ve provided that option. The default is still to do the lookup on our servers, but you have the option to enable local lookups. The one downside of enabling this feature is that you’ll only get country-level lookups.

Improvement: Prevented successful logins from resetting brute force counters

Another design decision I made early on is that a successful login on a WordPress website would reset our brute-force login counters to zero. This made sense because if a real user makes multiple login failures and then succeeds, clearly they’re the real user and we should reset our counters so that their next failure doesn’t lock them out. Well, an unintended side effect of this is that a threat actor can register an account on WordPress websites with open registration, and sign in, and that would reset brute force counters to zero, so they can keep trying to guess that admin account’s password. We’ve fixed this by removing the reset that occurs on successful login.

Improvement: Clarified IPv6 diagnostic

We found that a message on our diagnostics page caused users to think they need to fix something related to IPv6. So we clarified the message to prevent our customers from going on wild goose chases trying to fix something that doesn’t need fixing.

Improvement: Included maximum number of days in live traffic option text

This is also a clarification. The maximum amount of data in live traffic that we store is 30 days. This wasn’t clear and some users would enter a larger number of days, expecting to see more than 30 days of data. We’ve fixed this user interface issue to make it clear.

Fix: Made timezones consistent on firewall page

When the page showing firewall activity loaded more results, they’d be in UTC time instead of your correct timezone. Oops! We fixed that little issue.

Fix: Added “Use only IPv4 to start scans” option to search

We have the ability to search your Wordfence options page which is super useful. This option was not included in the search, so we fixed that.

Fix: Prevented deprecation notices on PHP 8.1 when emailing the activity log

PHP 8.1 provides notices that a function has been deprecated if a developer (like us) is using an older function call. We were in this case, and PHP 8.1 was rightfully complaining about it. So we switched to a more modern version of the same code.

Fix: Prevented warning on PHP 8 related to process owner diagnostic

On our diagnostics page, if a hosting provider has restricted an account from seeing its own username, our customers would see a warning that you can’t access an array offset on a boolean. We fixed that.

Fix: Prevented PHP Code Sniffer false positive related to T_BAD_CHARACTER

We use PHP code sniffer to look for things that are incompatible between versions. We were getting a false positive when using this internal tool, so we fixed that. This change is really for the benefit of our engineering team.

Fix: Removed unsupported beta feed option

A long time ago when there was fire in the sky and the seas were boiling, we launched the first version of the Wordfence firewall. Because we wanted to test out new rules, and some of our users were brave enough to try the new stuff, we included this option. We would release beta firewall rules and malware signatures, and our brave testing community would try them out first by enabling this option. We do all our testing internally now and the firewall code and rule syntax has become extremely robust, so we don’t do these kinds of releases anymore. So we removed this configuration option.

Below I’ve included the short version of the changelog that you’ll see on WordPress.org. You’re most welcome to post your comments and questions below. Keep in mind that support questions are best posted via our official support channels, but if you’d like to chat about this post, comment below and a member of the team or I will reply if needed.

Regards,

Mark Maunder – Wordfence Founder & CEO

Wordfence 7.7.0 – OCTOBER 3, 2022

  • Improvement: Added configurable scan resume functionality to prevent scan failures on sites with intermittent connectivity issues
  • Improvement: Added new scan result for vulnerabilities found in plugins that do not have patched versions available via WordPress.org
  • Improvement: Implemented stand-alone MMDB reader for IP address lookups to prevent plugin conflicts and support additional PHP versions
  • Improvement: Added option to disable looking up IP address locations via the Wordfence API
  • Improvement: Prevented successful logins from resetting brute force counters
  • Improvement: Clarified IPv6 diagnostic
  • Improvement: Included maximum number of days in live traffic option text
  • Fix: Made timezones consistent on firewall page
  • Fix: Added “Use only IPv4 to start scans” option to search
  • Fix: Prevented deprecation notices on PHP 8.1 when emailing the activity log
  • Fix: Prevented warning on PHP 8 related to process owner diagnostic
  • Fix: Prevented PHP Code Sniffer false positive related to T_BAD_CHARACTER
  • Fix: Removed unsupported beta feed option

    Source :
    https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/10/wordfence-7-7-0-is-out-here-are-the-changes/

Migrate WordPress from PHP 5 to PHP 7

If your website’s PHP version Because PHP is not the same as the PHP version in your backup, it may cause issues with the proper operation of your website and with some applications. This is more common when migrating from PHP 5 to PHP 7.

We recommend that users regularly backup their WordPress sites or network of sites. You can also use the All-in-One WP Migration plugin extensions to set up automatic backups. Make sure your plugin version is always up to date.
In most cases, the PHP update will have no effect on WordPress or popular plugins or themes. However, it is possible that some plugins, themes, or other functionalities will cease to function.

Set the WP_DEBUG constant to true in your wp-config.php file to see all errors, warnings, and notes generated by the website during execution. This will assist you in locating any problems.

If your install is stuck at “restoring X% files,” “restoring database,” or “activating mu-plugins”

1. Leave the plugin running for another 15 minutes while it is on “Restoring database.”
2. After 15 minutes, open another tab and attempt to login to wp-admin using the exported site’s WP Admin username and password.
3. Save the permalinks structure twice by going to settings -> permalinks.
Your website should now be successfully migrated.

If it isn’t and you receive a 500 error, please edit your wp-config.php file and set WP_DEBUG to true, then refresh the page to see an error. This may assist you in determining the problem, or you can share the error with the Servmask support team for assistance.

Could it be my server settings?

Memory limit needs to be at 256M, max_execution_time to 500, and mysql.connect_timeout to 400. You can find these settings by uploading this file. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/ize8t2k4nww5iq7/phpinfo.php?dl=0) in wp-content of your imported site and then open http://YOURDOMAINNAME.COM/wp-content/phpinfo.php. (tip – use Ctr F search the data that you get)

Source :
https://help.servmask.com/knowledgebase/migrate-wordpress-from-php-5-to-php-7/

Edge Chromium/ Chrome URL Whitelist and Blacklist

In case you do not wish to utilize the “Secure Browser”, instead, you want to use the “Edge Chromium” browser, then the “Secure Browser” URL management will not apply to Chrome or Edge browsers setup as Local Applications. 

In this case, please follow the following steps:

  • In the profile go to Computer Settings | Additional Registry Values
  • Add the link you want to “Allow” or “Deny”

To “Block” all URL’s within “Edge Chromium” use the following registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\URLBlocklist

Value Name: 1

Value Type: REG_SZ

Value Data: *

To “Allow” URL use the following registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\URLAllowlist

Value Name: 1

Value Type: REG_SZ

Value Data: teams.microsoft.com (used as an example)

Multiple links can be allowed by adding another registry key:

Click to Zoom

To “Block” all URL’s within “Chrome” use the following registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\URLBlocklist

Value Name: 1

Value Type: REG_SZ

Value Data: *

To “Block” file access within “Chrome” use the following registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\URLBlocklist

Value Name: `

Value Type: REG_SZ

Value Data: file://*

To “Block” facebook.com within “Chrome” use the following registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\URLBlocklist

Value Name: `

Value Type: REG_SZ

Value Data: facebook.com

To “Allow” URL use the following registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\URLAllowlist

Value Name: 1

Value Type: REG_SZ

Value Data: https://thinscale.com (used as an example)

Source :
https://kb.thinscale.com/thinkiosk-knowledge-base/edge-url-management

What are webhooks?

A simple guide to connecting web apps with webhooks

By Matthew Guay · September 20, 2022

what-are-webhooks primary img

You might have seen webhooks mentioned in your apps’ settings and wondered if they’re something you should use. The answer, in a nutshell, is probably yes.

Webhooks are one way that apps can send automated messages or information to other apps. It’s how PayPal tells your accounting app when your clients pay you, how Twilio routes phone calls to your number, and how WooCommerce can notify you about new orders in Slack.

They’re a simple way your online accounts can “speak” to each other and get notified automatically when something new happens. In many cases, you’ll need to know how to use webhooks if you want to automatically push data from one app to another.

Let’s break it down, learn how to speak webhook, and get your favorite apps to talk to each other.

Here’s what we’ll cover:

What are webhooks?

Example SMS message with a sender, receiver, and message

There are two ways your apps can communicate with each other to share information: polling and webhooks. As one of our customer champion’s friends has explained it: polling is like knocking on your friend’s door and asking if they have any sugar (aka information), but you have to go and ask for it every time you want it. Webhooks are like someone tossing a bag of sugar at your house whenever they buy some. You don’t have to ask—they just automatically punt it over every time it’s available.

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Webhooks are automated messages sent from apps when something happens. They have a message—or payload—and are sent to a unique URL—essentially the app’s phone number or address. Webhooks are almost always faster than polling, and require less work on your end.

They’re much like SMS notifications. Say your bank sends you an SMS when you make a new purchase. You already told the bank your phone number, so they knew where to send the message. They type out “You just spent $10 at NewStore” and send it to your phone number +1-234-567-8900. Something happened at your bank, and you got a message about it. All is well.

Webhooks work the same way.

Example webhook data

Take another look at our example message about a new order. Bob opened your store’s website, added $10 of paper to his shopping cart, and checked out. Boom, something happened, and the app needs to tell you. Time for the webhook.

Wait: who’s the app gonna call? Just like you need to tell the bank your phone number before they can text you, for webhooks, you need to tell the originating app—your eCommerce store, in this case—the webhook URL of the receiving app, the app where you want the data to be sent.

Say you want to make an invoice for this new order. The app that creates this invoice is on the receiving end—it’s the app that needs the order data.

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You’d first open your invoice app, make an invoice template, and copy its webhook URL—something like yourapp.com/data/12345. Then open your eCommerce store app, and add that URL to its webhook settings. That URL is your invoice app’s phone number, essentially. If another app pings that URL (or if you enter the URL in your browser’s address bar), the app will notice that someone is trying to send it data.

Ok. Back to the order. Your eCommerce store got the order and knows it needs to send the details to yourapp.com/data/12345. It then writes the order in a serialization format. The simplest of those formats is called “form-encoded”, and means your customer’s order would look something like this:

Customer=bob&value=10.00&item=paper

Now your eCommerce store needs to send the message. The simplest way to send data to a webhooks URL is with an HTTP GET request. Literally, that means to add the data to the URL and ping the URL (or enter it in your browser’s address bar). The same way you can open Zapier’s about page by typing /about after zapier.com, your apps can send messages to each other by tagging extra text with a question mark on the end of a website address. Here’s the full GET request for our order:

https://yourapp.com/data/12345?Customer=bob&value=10.00&item=paper

Deep inside your invoice app, something dings and says “You’ve got mail!” and the app gets to work, making a new invoice for Bob’s $10 paper order. That’s webhooks in action.

Remember when you had to check your email to see if you had new messages—and how freeing push email (“You’ve got mail!”) was? That’s what webhooks are for your apps. They don’t have to check for new info anymore. Instead, when something happens, they can push the data to each other and not waste their time checking and waiting.

→ Ready to start using webhooks? Jump ahead to skip the geeky details—or keep reading to learn more about the terms you’ll often see used with webhooks.

That’s the simple version. Technically, webhooks are “user-defined callbacks made with HTTP” according to Jeff Lindsay, one of the first people to conceptualize webhooks. Webhooks are data and executable commands sent from one app to another over HTTP instead of through the command line in your computer, formatted in XML, JSON, or form-encoded serialization. They’re called webhooks since they’re software hooks—or functions that run when something happens—that work over the web. And they’re typically secured through obscurity—each user of an application gets a unique, random URL to send webhook data to—though they can optionally be secured with a key or signature.

Webhooks typically are used to connect two different applications. When an event happens on the trigger application, it serializes data about that event and sends it to a webhook URL from the action application—the one you want to do something based on the data from the first application. The action application can then send a callback message, often with an HTTP status code like 302 to let the trigger application know if the data was received successfully or 404 if not.

Webhooks are similar to APIs—but simpler. An API is a full language for an app with functions or calls to add, edit, and retrieve data. The difference is, with an API, you have to do the work yourself. If you build an application that connects to another with an API, your application will need to have ways to ask the other app for new data when it needs it. Webhooks, on the other hand, are for one specific part of an app, and they’re automated. You might have a webhook just for new contacts—and whenever a new contact is added, the application will push the data to the other application’s webhooks URL automatically. It’s a simple, one-to-one connection that runs automatically.

How to use webhooks

Video Thumbnail

You know the lingo, understand how apps can message each other with webhooks, and can even figure out what the serialized data means. You speak webhook.

It’s time to use it. The best way to make sure you understand how webhooks work is to test it out, try making your own webhooks, and see if they work. Or, you can jump ahead and just drop your webhook URL into an app to share data—after all, you don’t have to know how to make webhooks to use them.

Here are the resources you need:

Test webhooks with RequestBin and Postman

The quickest way to learn is to experiment—and it’s best to experiment with something you can’t break. With webhooks, there are two great tools for that: RequestBin (owned by Pipedream) and Postman.

How data appears in Requestbin

How data appears in Requestbin

RequestBin lets you create a webhooks URL and send data to it to see how it’s recognized. Go to RequestBin, click Create a RequestBin, then copy the URL it gives you.You’ll need to have a Pipedream account (created with Google or GitHub) before you can view and use a URL.

Now, serialize some data in form encoded style—or copy our example form copy above. Open a new tab, paste your RequestBin URL in the URL bar, add a ? to the end, then paste your serialized data. You’ll end up with something like this:

https://requestbin.com/19uynve1?customer=bob&value=10.00&item=paper

Press enter in your browser’s address bar, and you’ll get a simple message back: success:true. Refresh your RequestBin tab, and you’ll see the data listed at the bottom as in the screenshot above.

Click REST under INTEGRATIONS to see the data.

Click REST under INTEGRATIONS to see the data.

You can then try sending POST requests in Terminal or from your own app’s code, if you’d like, using RequestBin’s sample code. That’s a bit more complex—but gives you a way to play with JSON or XML encoding, too.

The setup in Postman

The setup in Postman

Or, use another app for that. The app Postman lets you make custom HTTP requests for an easy way to send customized data to a webhooks URL. Enter the URL, then choose the HTTP request method you want to use (GET, POST, PUT, etc), and add the body data. That’ll let you send far more detailed requests to your webhook URL without having to use more code.

Add webhooks to your apps

Testing webhooks and serializing data by hand is tricky—as is copying and pasting data from your apps. Let’s skip both, and just get our apps talking to each other.

We’re using WordPress-powered form tool Gravity Forms and document template-builder app WebMerge as the examples here—but the same general idea works in most other apps that support webhooks. Here’s essentially what you need to do:

Gravity Forms Webhook data

Open your form’s Webhook settings in Gravity Forms

First, enable webhooks in your app if they’re not already and open the webhooks settings (in Gravity Forms, for instance, you need to install an add-on; in Active Campaign or WooCommerce, you’ll find webhooks under the app’s default settings). Your app might have one set of webhook settings for the entire app—or, often, it’ll have a specific webhook for each form, document, or other items the app maintains.

We want the data to come from Gravity Forms, so we’ll open the Webhooks settings under the form we want to use. That gives us a URL field (this lets us tell Gravity Forms where we want to send the data) and options to specify the webhook HTTP request method (how to send the data).

WebMerge webhook

Each WebMerge document template has a unique webhook URL.

Now let’s get that URL from the app that will receive the data—WebMerge, in this case. In WebMerge, each document has its own “merge URL”—and it wants the data in form encoded serialization, as you can tell from the ampersands in the example data. Copy the merge URL—or whatever URL your app offers, as it may have a different name.

Tip: You’ll often find webhook URLs and related settings under the “integration”, “webhook”, or “workflow” settings, depending on your app.

Add webhooks URL to Gravity Forms

Add the webhooks URL to your trigger app so it can share data when something happens

Finally, go back to your trigger app—Gravity Forms in our case—and paste the webhook URL in Gravity Forms’ URL field. You may also be able to set the correct request method and the specific field values to ensure only the data you want is sent, and is shared with the same variable names as the receiving app uses. Save the settings, and you’re good to go.

The next time someone fills out our form that Bob ordered 10.00 of paper, Gravity Forms will send the data to WebMerge’s URL as https://www.webmerge.me/merge/149933/gxszxg?Name=Bob&Item=Paper&Value=10.00 and WebMerge will turn that into a complete invoice.

PayPal IPN

PayPal IPN is very similar to webhooks—and you can add a webhook URL to PayPal to get payment notifications

Once you start using webhooks, you’ll notice them (or similar links) everywhere, in places you never thought they’d show up. PayPal, for instance, uses Instant Payment Notifications or IPNs to send notifications whenever you receive a payment. Have an app that you’d like to do something whenever you get a PayPal payment? Add its webhooks URL to PayPal’s IPN settings and that app will get a message the next time you get money.

Or take Twimlets, Twilio‘s simple apps to forward calls, record voicemail messages, start a conference call, and more. To, say, forward a call, you’ll add a familiar, webhook-style Twimlet address like http://twimlets.com/forward?PhoneNumber=415-555-1212 to your Twilio phone number settings. Want to build your own phone-powered app, or notify another app when a new call comes in? Put your webhook URL in Twilio’s settings instead.

They might go by different names, but once you notice places where apps offer to send notifications to a unique link, you’ll often have found somewhere else webhooks can work. Now that you know how to use webhooks, you can use them to make software do whatever you want.

Use webhooks in any app with Zapier

Many apps on Zapier use webhooks behind the scenes already. You may not realize it, since Zapier apps generally handle all the actual setup for you. If you come across an app that offers webhooks as an option, you can use a webhooks step in a Zap to set that up yourself using what you’ve learned about webhooks. Note: Webhooks by Zapier is a built-in tool only available to Zapier users on a paid plan or during their trial period.

Copy Webhooks URL from Zapier

Say you have an app that can send data to a webhooks URL. To connect it to other apps, you’ll make a new Zap—what we call Zapier’s automated app workflows—and choose Webhooks by Zapier as the trigger app. Select Catch Hook, which can receive a GET, POST, or PUT request from another app. Zapier will give you a unique webhooks URL—copy that, then add it to your app’s webhooks URL field in its settings.

GET requests ask the server for data. POST requests send data to a computer. PUSH requests ask the server for specific data, typically to update it.

Test webhooks in Zapier

Zapier will parse each serialized item from your webhook data

Then have your app test the URL, or perhaps just add a new item (a new form entry, contact, or whatever thing your app makes) to have your app send the data to the webhook. Test the webhook step in Zapier, and you’ll see data from the webhook listed in Zapier.

Use webhooks in action app in Zapier

You can add each data item from your webhook to another app in Zapier

Now you can use that data in another app. Select the action app—the app you want to send data to. You’ll see form fields to add data to that app. Click in the field where you want to add webhooks data and select it from the dropdown. Test your Zap and it’s now ready to use. Now the next time your trigger app sends data to the webhook, Zapier will automatically add it to the action app you selected.

Zapier webhook action

Zapier can send any data you want to a webhooks URL

The reverse works as well. Want to send data from one app to another via webhooks? Zapier can turn the data from the trigger app into a serialized list and send it to any webhooks URL you want.

First, select the trigger app you want to send data from, and set it up in Zapier as normal. Then select Webhooks as the action app, and choose how you want to send the data (POST is typically the best option for most webhook integrations).

Finally, paste the webhooks URL from the app you want to receive the data into the URL field in Zapier’s webhook settings. You can choose how to serialize the data (form or JSON are typically best). Zapier will then automatically send all of the data from your trigger app to the webhook—or you can set the specific data variables from the Data fields below.

Zapier send data to webhook URL

You can specify how Zapier serializes your data and choose the specific data it sends to your webhook

You’re now ready to use your Zap. Now whenever something new happens in your trigger app, Zapier will copy the data and send it to your other app’s webhooks URL.

Webhooks are one of the best ways to connect apps that wouldn’t otherwise work with Zapier. Have a Mac or iPhone app that doesn’t connect with Zapier? Using Alfred or Siri Shortcuts—plus a Zapier Webhooks URL—you can connect them to your Zapier workflows. Here’s how:

Or, automate any other app that uses webhooks with Zapier’s webhook integrations or use one of these popular Zap templates to get started quickly:

Add info to a Google Sheet from new Webhook POST requests

Try it

  • Google Sheets logo
  • Webhooks by Zapier logo

Google Sheets, Webhooks by Zapier

Google Sheets + Webhooks by ZapierMore details

Send webhooks with new items in RSS feeds

Try it

  • RSS by Zapier logo
  • Webhooks by Zapier logo

RSS by Zapier, Webhooks by Zapier

RSS by Zapier + Webhooks by ZapierMore details

POST new Facebook Lead Ads to a webhook

Try it

  • Facebook Lead Ads logo
  • Webhooks by Zapier logo

Facebook Lead Ads, Webhooks by Zapier

Facebook Lead Ads + Webhooks by ZapierMore details

Send emails with new caught webhooks

Try it

  • Email by Zapier logo
  • Webhooks by Zapier logo

Email by Zapier, Webhooks by Zapier

Email by Zapier + Webhooks by ZapierMore details

POST new user tweets to a webhook

Try it

  • Twitter logo
  • Webhooks by Zapier logo

Twitter, Webhooks by Zapier

Twitter + Webhooks by ZapierMore details

Time to start using webhooks

Ok, you’ve got this. Armed with your newfound knowledge about webhooks and their confusing terminology, you’re ready to start using them in your work. Poke around your favorite web apps’ advanced settings and see if any of them support webhooks. Think through how you could use them—then give it a shot.

And bookmark this article. Next time you read something about a GET request needing to make an HTTP callback, or see a URL with ?name=bob&value=10 and such at the end, you’ll know what it actually means.

Further Reading: Want to learn more about webhooks? Read up on our Webhooks documentation page for all the details.

Source :
https://zapier.com/blog/what-are-webhooks/

Customer Guidance for Reported Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server

September 30, 2022 updates:

  • Added link to Microsoft Security blog in Summary.
  • Microsoft created a script for the URL Rewrite mitigation steps and modified step 6 in the Mitigations section.
  • Microsoft released the Exchange Server Emergency Mitigation Service (EMS) mitigation for this issue. More information is in the Mitigations section. 
  • Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) guidance, and auditing AV exclusions to optimize detection, and blocking of the Exchange vulnerability exploitation in the Detections section.
  • Microsoft Sentinel hunting queries in the Detections section.

Summary

Microsoft is investigating two reported zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, Exchange Server 2016, and Exchange Server 2019. The first one, identified as CVE-2022-41040, is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, and the second one, identified as CVE-2022-41082, allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) when PowerShell is accessible to the attacker.  

Currently, Microsoft is aware of limited targeted attacks using these two vulnerabilities.  In these attacks, CVE-2022-41040 can enable an authenticated attacker to remotely trigger CVE-2022-41082. It should be noted that authenticated access to the vulnerable Exchange Server is necessary to successfully exploit either vulnerability.

We are working on an accelerated timeline to release a fix. Until then, we’re providing mitigations and the detections guidance below to help customers protect themselves from these attacks. 

Microsoft Exchange Online has detections and mitigations to protect customers. As always, Microsoft is monitoring these detections for malicious activity and we’ll respond accordingly if necessary to protect customers.

Microsoft Security Threat Intelligence teams have provided further analysis of observed activity along with mitigation and detection guidance in a new Microsoft Security blog.

We will also continue to provide updates here to help keep customers informed. 

Mitigations

Exchange Online customers do not need to take any action.

The current Exchange Server mitigation is to add a blocking rule in “IIS Manager -> Default Web Site -> URL Rewrite -> Actions” to block the known attack patterns. Exchange Server customers should review and choose only one of the following three mitigation options.

Option 1: For customers who have the Exchange Server Emergency Mitigation Service (EMS) enabled, Microsoft released the URL Rewrite mitigation for Exchange Server 2016 and Exchange Server 2019. The mitigation will be enabled automatically. Please see this blog post for more information on this service and how to check active mitigations.

Option 2: Microsoft created the following script for the URL Rewrite mitigation steps. https://aka.ms/EOMTv2 

Option 3: Customers can follow the below instructions, which are currently being discussed publicly and are successful in breaking current attack chains. 1. Open IIS Manager. 
2. Select Default Web Site.
3. In the Feature View, click URL Rewrite.

4. In the Actions pane on the right-hand side, click Add Rule(s)…  

5. Select Request Blocking and click OK. 

6. Add the string “.*autodiscover\.json.*\@.*Powershell.*” (excluding quotes).
7. Select Regular Expression under Using.
8. Select Abort Request under How to block and then click OK.

9. Expand the rule and select the rule with the pattern .*autodiscover\.json.*\@.*Powershell.* and click Edit under Conditions. 

10. Change the Condition input from {URL} to {REQUEST_URI}

NOTE: If you need to change any rule it is best to delete and recreate it.

Impact: There is no known effect on Exchange functionality if URL Rewrite is installed as recommended. 

Detections

Microsoft Sentinel 

Based on what we’re seeing in the wild, looking for the techniques listed below will help defenders. Our post on Web Shell Threat Hunting with Microsoft Sentinel also provides guidance on looking for web shells in general.  

The Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell detection, which was created in response to ProxyShell, can be used for queries as there are similarities in function with this threat. Also, the new Exchange Server Suspicious File Downloads and Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call queries specifically look for suspicious downloads or activity in IIS logs. In addition to those, we have a few more that might be helpful when looking for post-exploitation activity:

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint 
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects post-exploitation activity. The following alerts can be related to this threat:  

  • Possible web shell installation 
  • Possible IIS web shell
  • Suspicious Exchange Process Execution 
  • Possible exploitation of Exchange Server vulnerabilities 
  • Suspicious processes indicative of a web shell 
  • Possible IIS compromise 

Customers with Microsoft Defender Antivirus enabled can also detect the web shell malware used in exploitation of this vulnerability in-the-wild as of this writing with the following alerts:

  • ‘Chopper’ malware was detected on an IIS Web server 
  • ‘Chopper’ high-severity malware was detected 

Microsoft Defender Antivirus 
Microsoft Exchange AMSI integration and Antivirus Exclusions

Exchange supports the integration with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) since the June 2021 Quarterly Updates for Exchange. It is highly recommended to ensure these updates are installed and AMSI is working using the guidance provided by the Exchange Team, as this integration provides the best ability for Defender Antivirus to detect and block exploitation of vulnerabilities on Exchange.

Many organizations exclude Exchange directories from antivirus scans for performance reasons. It’s highly recommended to audit AV exclusions on the Exchange systems and assess if they can be removed without impacting performance and still ensure the highest level of protection. Exclusions can be managed via Group Policy, PowerShell, or systems management tools like System Center Configuration Manager.

To audit AV exclusions on an Exchange Server running Defender Antivirus, launch the Get-MpPreference command from an elevated PowerShell prompt.

If exclusions cannot be removed for Exchange processes and folders, running Quick Scan in Defender Antivirus scans Exchange directories and files regardless of exclusions.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus (EPP) provides detections and protections for components and behaviors related to this threat under the following signatures: 

Why Continuous Security Testing is a Must for Organizations Today

The global cybersecurity market is flourishing. Experts at Gartner predict that the end-user spending for the information security and risk management market will grow from $172.5 billion in 2022 to $267.3 billion in 2026.

One big area of spending includes the art of putting cybersecurity defenses under pressure, commonly known as security testing. MarketsandMarkets forecasts the global penetration testing (pentesting) market size is expected to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 13.7% from 2022 to 2027. However, the costs and limitations involved in carrying out a penetration test are already hindering the market growth, and consequently, many cybersecurity professionals are making moves to find an alternative solution.

Pentests aren’t solving cybersecurity pain points

Pentesting can serve specific and important purposes for businesses. For example, prospective customers may ask for the results of one as proof of compliance. However, for certain challenges, this type of security testing methodology isn’t always the best fit.

1 — Continuously changing environments

Securing constantly changing environments within rapidly evolving threat landscapes is particularly difficult. This challenge becomes even more complicated when aligning and managing the business risk of new projects or releases. Since penetration tests focus on one moment in time, the result won’t necessarily be the same the next time you make an update.

2 — Rapid growth

It would be unusual for fast-growing businesses not to experience growing pains. For CISOs, maintaining visibility of their organization’s expanding attack surface can be particularly painful.

According to HelpNetSecurity, 45% of respondents conduct pentests only once or twice per year and 27% do it once per quarter, which is woefully insufficient given how quickly infrastructure and applications change.

3 — Cybersecurity skills shortages

As well as limitations in budgets and resources, finding the available skillsets for internal cybersecurity teams is an ongoing battle. As a result, organizations don’t have the dexterity to spot and promptly remediate specific security vulnerabilities.

While pentests can offer an outsider perspective, often it is just one person performing the test. For some organizations, there is also an issue on trust when relying on the work of just one or two people. Sándor Incze, CISO at CM.com, gives his perspective:

“Not all pentesters are equal. It’s very hard to determine if the pentester you’re hiring is good.”

4 — Cyber threats are evolving

The constant struggle to stay up to date with the latest cyberattack techniques and trends puts media organizations at risk. Hiring specialist skills for every new cyber threat type would be unrealistic and unsustainable.

HelpNetSecurity reported that it takes 71 percent of pentesters one week to one month to conduct a pentest. Then, more than 26 percent of organizations must wait between one to two weeks to get the test results, and 13 percent wait even longer than that. Given the fast pace of threat evolution, this waiting period can leave companies unaware of potential security issues and open to exploitation.

5 — Poor-fitting security testing solutions for agile environments

Continuous development lifecycles don’t align with penetration testing cycles (often performed annually.) Therefore, vulnerabilities mistakenly created during long security testing gaps can remain undiscovered for some time.

Bringing security testing into the 21st-century Impact

Cybersecurity Testing

A proven solution to these challenges is to utilize ethical hacker communities in addition to a standard penetration test. Businesses can rely on the power of these crowds to assist them in their security testing on a continuous basis. A bug bounty program is one of the most common ways to work with ethical hacker communities.

What is a bug bounty program?

Bug bounty programs allow businesses to proactively work with independent security researchers to report bugs through incentivization. Often companies will launch and manage their program through a bug bounty platform, such as Intigriti.

Organizations with high-security maturity may leave their bug bounty program open for all ethical hackers in the platform’s community to contribute to (known as a public program.) However, most businesses begin by working with a smaller pool of security talent through a private program.

How bug bounty programs support continuous security testing structures

While you’ll receive a certificate to say you’re secure at the end of a penetration test, it won’t necessarily mean that’s still the case the next time you make an update. This is where bug bounty programs work well as a follow-up to pentests and enable a continuous security testing program.

The impact of bug bounty program on cybersecurity

By launching a bug bounty program, organizations experience:

  1. More robust protection: Company data, brand, and reputation have additional protection through continuous security testing.
  2. Enabled business goals: Enhanced security posture, leading to a more secure platform for innovation and growth.
  3. Improved productivity: Increased workflow with fewer disruptions to the availability of services. More strategic IT projects that executives have prioritized, with fewer security “fires” to put out.
  4. Increased skills availability: Internal security team’s time is freed by using a community for security testing and triage.
  5. Clearer budget justification: Ability to provide more significant insights into the organization’s security posture to justify and motivate for an adequate security budget.
  6. Improved relationships: Project delays significantly decrease without the reliance on traditional pentests.

Want to know more about setting up and launching a bug bounty program?

Intigriti is the leading European-based platform for bug bounty and ethical hacking. The platform enables organizations to reduce the risk of a cyberattack by allowing Intigriti’s network of security researchers to test their digital assets for vulnerabilities continuously.

If you’re intrigued by what you’ve read and want to know about bug bounty programs, simply schedule a meeting today with one of our experts.

www.intigriti.com

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/why-continuous-security-testing-is-must.html

Record DDoS Attack with 25.3 Billion Requests Abused HTTP/2 Multiplexing

Cybersecurity company Imperva has disclosed that it mitigated a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack with a total of over 25.3 billion requests on June 27, 2022.

The “strong attack,” which targeted an unnamed Chinese telecommunications company, is said to have lasted for four hours and peaked at 3.9 million requests per second (RPS).

“Attackers used HTTP/2 multiplexing, or combining multiple packets into one, to send multiple requests at once over individual connections,” Imperva said in a report published on September 19.

The attack was launched from a botnet that comprised nearly 170,000 different IP addresses spanning routers, security cameras, and compromised servers located in more than 180 countries, primarily the U.S., Indonesia, and Brazil.

CyberSecurity

The disclosure also comes as web infrastructure provider Akamai said it fielded a new DDoS assault aimed at a customer based in Eastern Europe on September 12, with attack traffic spiking at 704.8 million packets per second (pps).

The same victim was previously targeted on July 21, 2022, in a similar fashion in which the attack volume ramped up to 853.7 gigabits per second (Gbps) and 659.6 million pps over a period of 14 hours.

Akamai’s Craig Sparling said the company has been “bombarded relentlessly with sophisticated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks,” indicating that the offensives could be politically motivated in the face of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Both the disruptive attempts were UDP flood attacks where the attacker targets and overwhelms arbitrary ports on the target host with User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets.

CyberSecurity

UDP, being both connectionless and session-less, makes it an ideal networking protocol for handling VoIP traffic. But these same traits can also render it more susceptible to exploitation.

“Without an initial handshake to ensure a legitimate connection, UDP channels can be used to send a large volume of traffic to any host,” NETSCOUT says.

“There are no internal protections that can limit the rate of a UDP flood. As a result, UDP flood DoS attacks are exceptionally dangerous because they can be executed with a limited amount of resources.”

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/record-ddos-attack-with-253-billion.html

Hackers Exploited Zero-Day RCE Vulnerability in Sophos Firewall — Patch Released

Security software company Sophos has released a patch update for its firewall product after it was discovered that attackers were exploiting a new critical zero-day vulnerability to attack its customers’ network.

The issue, tracked as CVE-2022-3236 (CVSS score: 9.8), impacts Sophos Firewall v19.0 MR1 (19.0.1) and older and concerns a code injection vulnerability in the User Portal and Webadmin components that could result in remote code execution.

The company said it “has observed this vulnerability being used to target a small set of specific organizations, primarily in the South Asia region,” adding it directly notified these entities.

CyberSecurity

As a workaround, Sophos is recommending that users take steps to ensure that the User Portal and Webadmin are not exposed to WAN. Alternatively, users can update to the latest supported version –

  • v19.5 GA
  • v19.0 MR2 (19.0.2)
  • v19.0 GA, MR1, and MR1-1
  • v18.5 MR5 (18.5.5)
  • v18.5 GA, MR1, MR1-1, MR2, MR3, and MR4
  • v18.0 MR3, MR4, MR5, and MR6
  • v17.5 MR12, MR13, MR14, MR15, MR16, and MR17
  • v17.0 MR10

Users running older versions of Sophos Firewall are required to upgrade to receive the latest protections and the relevant fixes.

The development marks the second time a Sophos Firewall vulnerability has come under active attacks within a year. Earlier this March, another flaw (CVE-2022-1040) was used to target organizations in the South Asia region.

CyberSecurity

Then in June 2022, cybersecurity firm Volexity shared more details of the attack campaign, pinning the intrusions on a Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) known as DriftingCloud.

Sophos firewall appliances have also previously come under attack to deploy what’s called the Asnarök trojan in an attempt to siphon sensitive information.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/hackers-actively-exploiting-new-sophos.html

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