Does the WiFi channel matter? A guide to which channel you should choose.

SEPTEMBER 20, 2022 BY MARK B

When having trouble getting a good performance from your wireless router or access point, the first settings that people usually change is the WiFi channel. And it makes sense considering that it may be just a bit ‘too crowded’, so change the number, save and the WiFi speed should come back to life, right?

It is possible to see an increase in throughput, but you should never change the settings blindly, hoping that something may stick. I admit that I am guilty of doing just that some time ago, but the concept behind the WiFi channels doesn’t need to be mystifying. So let’s have a look at what they are, their relationship with the channel bandwidth and which should be the suitable settings for your network.

Table of Contents

What is a WiFi channel?

I am sure that most of you are familiar with the 2.4GHz and the 5GHz radio band, but you need to understand that they’re not some fixed frequency points, instead, they’re more like a spectrum of frequencies. The 2.4GHz has a range of frequencies from 2,402MHz to 2,483MHz and, when you tune to a specific frequency within this spectrum, you essentially are selecting a WiFi channel for your data transmission.

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2.4GHz Channels – 20MHz channel bandwidth.

For example, the channel 1 is associated with the 2,412MHz (the range is between 2,401 to 2,423MHz), the channel two is 2,417MHz (2,406 to 2,428MHz range), channel 7 is 2,442MHz (2,431 to 2,453MHz range) and the channel 14 is 2,484MHz (2,473 to 2,495MHz range). As you can see, there is some overlapping in the frequency range between certain channels, but we’ll talk more about it in a minute. The range of 5GHz radio band spans between 5.035MHz and 5.980MHz.

This means that the channel 36 is associated with the 5,180MHz (the range between 5,170 and 5,190MHz), the channel 40 is 5,200MHz (between 5,190 and 5,210MHz) and channel 44 can be associated with the 5,220MHz frequency (the range between 5,210 and 5,230MHz). Now, let’s talk about overlapping and non-overlapping channels.

Overlapping vs non-overlapping channels

If you had a look at the channel representation that I put together for the 2.4GHz frequency band using the 20MHz WiFi channel bandwidth, you can see that three channels are different from the others. The channels 1, 6 and 11 are non-overlapping and you can see from the graph that if your APs are using these channels, then they’re far less prone to interference.

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5GHz – Channel allocation.

To get an even better idea is to have a look at the graph representing the 5GHz channels and the way they’re grouped to create a larger channel bandwidth. We have talked about the two main types of interference, the co-channel and the adjacent channel interference when we analyzed the best channel bandwidth to use for the 5GHz band. And the idea is that when using the same channel, the devices will be forced to take turns, therefore slowing down the network.

But it’s also possible that the adjacent channels may bleed into each other, adding noise to the data, rendering the WiFi connection unusable. That’s why most people suggest to keep a less wide channel bandwidth and use non-overlapping channels if there are lots of APs in the area (which are not properly adjusted by a system admin).

Changing the channel, but not the channel bandwidth

We already know that changing the channel bandwidth will have a significant impact on the WiFi performance because 20MHz or 40MHz will deliver a far more stable throughput on the 5GHz frequency band (although not that high) in a crowded environment.

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Multiple wireless access points.

But what happens when we change the WiFi channel, while keeping the same channel bandwidth? Again, it depends if you’re switching from overlapping to non-overlapping channels because doing so, you may see a noticeable increase in performance (just keep an eye on the available channels because the wider the channel bandwidth, the less the non-overlapping channels will be available for you to use). Now, in the ideal scenario, where there is no interference, when moving from one channel to the other within the same bandwidth shouldn’t really make that much of a difference in terms of data transfer rate.

Auto or manual WiFi channel selection?

The wireless routers and access points usually have the WiFi channel selection set to auto, which means that you may see that your neighbors change theirs annoyingly often. That’s because every time they restart the router/AP or there’s a power outage, the channel may be changed, so that it’s the least crowded available.

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Abundance of Wireless Access Points.

If you choose yours manually, you will have to keep up with the changes to your neighboring WiFi networks, which is why it’s a good idea to keep the WiFi channel on your AP on auto as well. If we’re talking about an office or some large enterprise network, it’s obviously better to have full control on how the network behaves, so the manual selection is better.

When you should use DFS channels?

DFS stands for Dynamic Frequency Selection and it refers to those frequencies that are usually limited for military use or for radars (such as weather devices or airport equipment), which means that they can differ from country to country. So make sure to check whether you’re allowed to use certain channels (especially if you got the wireless router or AP from abroad), before you get a knock on your door. Also, it’s pretty much obvious that you won’t be able to use these channels if you live near an airport.

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Engenius EWS850AP access point.

That being said, the main benefit to using DFS channels is that you are no longer impacted by interference from your neighbors WiFi. But do be aware that, depending on the router, there is a high chance that in case it detects a near-by radar using the same frequency, then it will switch to another WiFi channel automatically.

Also, there is another problem that I have often encountered. Not that many client devices will actually connect to a WiFi network that uses DFS channels, so you may find out that while your PC and smartphone continue to have access to the Internet, pretty much every other smart or IoT device will drop the connection.

Source :
https://www.mbreviews.com/does-the-wifi-channel-matter/

Do WiFi 6 routers have better range?

OCTOBER 15, 2022 BY MARK B

I do get the question of whether the WiFi 6 routers have better range from time to time and my answer is that some do have a better range than the WiFi 5 router, while some don’t. It’s only normal that an expensive new piece of technology will behave better than an old, battle-scarred router. But, in general, are the WiFi 6 routers able to cover more space than the devices from the older WiFi generation?

Especially since we are promised that the OFDMA will just make everything way better, so just go and buy the new stuff, throw away the old! The idea behind the WiFi 6 standard (IEEE 802.11ax) was not really about speed or increased coverage, it was about handling a denser network, with a lot of very diverse client devices in an environment prone to lots of interference.

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Abundance of Wireless Access Points.

As a consequence, you may see some benefits in regard to coverage and throughput, despite not really being the main aim. It’s clear that those that stand to get the most benefit are SMBs and especially the enterprise market, so why do Asus, Netgear, TP-Link and other home-network-based manufacturers keep on pushing WiFi 6 routers forward? The tempting response is money, which is true, but only partially.

We have started to get more denser networks even in our homes (smart and IoT devices) and living in a city means your neighbors will also add to the creation of denser networks, so WiFi 6 could make sense, right? With the correct client devices, yes and you may also see a better range. So, let’s do a slightly deeper dive into the subject and understand whether WiFi 6 routers have a better range in real-life conditions.

Table of Contents

What determines the range of a router?

The main factors that can determine the range of a router can be considered the transmit power, the antenna gain and the interference in the area where the signal needs to travel. The SoC will also play an important role on the WiFi performance of the router.

1. The Transmit Power

I have covered this topic a bit in a separate article, where I discussed whether the user should adjust the transmit power to their access point or leave the default values. And the conclusion was that the default values are usually wrong and yes, you should adjust them in a manner as to get a more efficient network, even if it may seem that the coverage will suffer. But before that know that there are legal limitations to the transmit power.

The FCC says that the maximum transmitter output power that goes towards the antenna can go up to 1 Watt (30dBm), but the EIRP caps that limit to 36dBm. The EIRP is the sum between the maximum output power that goes towards the antenna and the antenna gain.

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Mikrotik Netmetal AC2 – free to add whichever antennas you like.

This means that the manufacturer is free to try different variations between the power output and the antenna gain as to better reach the client devices, while keeping that limit in mind.
This factor has not changed from the previous WiFi standard, so, the WiFi 6 has the same limit put in place as the WiFi 5 (and the previous wireless standards). The advice is to still lower the transmit gain as much as possible for the 2.4GHz radio and to increase it to the maximum for the 5GHz radio. That’s because the former radiates a lot better through objects, while the latter does not, but it provides far better speeds.

2. The Antenna Gain

This ties in nicely with the previous section since, just like the output power, the antenna gain needs to be adjusted by the manufacturer within the limits dictated by the FCC. And there is an interesting thing that I noticed with the newer WiFi 6 routers, something that was not common with the previous gen routers. The antennas can’t be removed on most routers, only on the most expensive models.

This means that in most cases, you can’t upgrade the antennas, potentially having a better range. Before, you could take an older router, push the transmit power to the maximum (you could also push it past its hardware limits with DDWRT or some other third-party software) and then add some high-gain antennas.

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Old TP-Link router.

This way, the range could have been better, but could you actually go past the allowed limit? The chipset inside the router most likely kept everything within the allowed limit, but you could still get closer to that limit. Would you see any benefit though? That’s another story because years ago, when there were way fewer wireless devices around, pushing everything to the maximum made sense due to the less amount of interference.

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Nowadays, you’re just going to annoy your neighbors, while also making a mess of your WiFi clients connection. Sure, you will connect to a faraway client device, but will it be able to transfer data at a good speed? Doubt it, so it will just hog the entire network. The WiFi 6 standard does help alleviate this problem a bit, but we’ll talk more about it in a minute.

3. The WiFi Interference

This factor comes in different flavors. It can be from other devices that use the same channel, other access points that broadcast the signal through your house over the same channels or it can even be from your microwave. Ideally, you want to keep your WiFi inside your home, so that it doesn’t interfere with the WiFi signal from other routers or dedicated access points. Which is why the 5GHz radio has become the default option for connecting smartphones, laptops, TVs or PCs, while the 2.4GHz is usually left for the IoT devices.

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Interesting antenna patterns to limit interference. Left: Zyxel WAX630S. Right Zyxel WAX650S.

At least this has been true for the WiFi 5 routers because the WiFi6 routers can use OFDMA on the 2.4GHz band and help push the throughput to spectacular levels (where it would actually be if there were little to no interference, it’s not an actual boost in speed). For example, the Asus RT-AX86U can reach up to 310Mbps at 5 feet (40MHz channel bandwidth), but very few routers implement it on both radios due to the cost constraints.

For example, the Ubiquiti U6-LR only uses OFDMA on the 5GHz radio band, further showing the tendency to leave the 2.4GHz for the IoT devices. Now let’s talk about the walls. There are two main behaviors that you need to keep in mind. First, there’s the obstacle aspect which is obvious since you can see that when you move your client device in another room than your router, the signal drops a bit. Moving it farther will add more attenuation and the speed will drop even more.

For example, I have an office that’s split into two by a very thick wall so, on paper, one router positioned in the middle should suffice for both sides, right? Not quite because this wall is very thick and made of concrete, so it works as a phenomenal signal blocker.

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Asus AiMesh.

That’s why I needed two routers in the middle of the office to cover both sides effectively. The other aspect is signal reflection. What this means is that if you broadcast the signal in the open, it will reach let’s say up to 70 feet, but, if you broadcast it in a long hallway, you can get a great signal at the end of the hallway (could be double the distance than in the open field). But this also means that you may see some very weird, inconsistent coverage with your client devices.

What about the client devices?

This is a very important factor that is often overlooked when people talk about WiFi range and it’s incredibly important to understand the role of the network adapter especially in regard to the WiFi 6 client devices. First of all, understand that not all client devices are the same, some have a great receiver which can see the WiFi signal from very far away, others are very shy and want to be closer to the router. Then, there’s the specific features compatibility.

MU-MIMO, Beamforming and now the OFDMA have become a standard with newer routers, but, if the wireless client devices don’t support these features, it doesn’t really matter if they’re implemented or not. And this is one of the reasons why you may have noticed (even in my router tests) that a WiFi 5 client will most likely yield similar results when connected to a WiFi 5 router as well as when it’s connected to a WiFi 6 router.
So, if you want to see improvements when using WiFi 6 routers, make sure that you have compatible adapters installed in your main client devices. Otherwise, there is no actual point to upgrading.

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WiFi 6 adapter.

How can OFDMA improve range?

Yes, yes, I know OFDMA was not designed to improve the speed, nor the range of the network, but even so, the consequences of its optimizations are exactly these. A better throughput and a perceived far better range. The Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access breaks the channel frequency into smaller subcarriers, and it assigns them to individual clients.

So, while before, one client would start transmitting and every other client device had to wait until it was done, now, it’s possible to get multiple simultaneous data transmissions, greatly improving the efficiency of the network and significantly lowering the latency (which is excellent news for online gaming). I have talked about how a far-away client device can hog the network when I analyzed the best settings for the transmit power – that was because it would connect to the AP or router and transmit at a very low data speed rate.

Using OFDMA, in this type of scenario, it can improve the network behavior and, even if the range itself isn’t changed, due to the way the networks are so much denser nowadays, you’ll get a more efficient network behavior for both close and far away client devices. So yes, better range and more speed.

BSS Coloring to tame the interference

I already mentioned that the interference from other APs or wireless routers will have a major impact on the perceived range of your network.

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Image Source

And one of the reasons is the co-channel interference which occurs when multiple access points use the same channel and are therefore constrained to share it between them. As a consequence, you get a slower network because if there are lots of connected clients, they’ll easily fill up the available space. The BSS coloring assigns a color code to each client device which is then assigned to its closest access point.

This way, the signal broadcast is reduced from the client side as to not interfere with the other APs or client devices in the proximity. Obviously, the power output is still high enough to ensure a proper communication with the AP. And I know you haven’t seen this feature advertised as much on the boxes of APs or routers, which is due to cost constraints. I have seen it on the EnGenius EWS850AP, a WiFi 6 outdoors access point which is a device suitable for some very specific applications, but not on many other WiFi 6 networking devices.

Besides cost, the reason why it’s not that common especially on consumer-type WiFi 6 routers is that it’s not yet that useful. I say that because unless all the clients in the area are equipped with WiFi 6 adapters, the WiFi 5 (and lower) client devices will still broadcast their signal as far away as they can, interfering with the other WiFi devices.

Do WiFi 6 routers actually have a better range?

In an ideal, lab environment, most likely not, since as I said, the idea is to handle denser networks and not to push the WiFi range farther.

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Asus RT-AC86U vs RT-AX86U.

But in real-life conditions, you should see a far better perceived range if the right conditions are met. And almost everything revolves around using WiFi 6 client devices that can actually take advantage of these awesome features. It’s also wise to adjust the settings of your router or AP accordingly since the default values are very rarely good. Ideally, so should your neighbors since only this way, you will see a proper improvement in both range and network performance. Otherwise, there is barely any reason to upgrade from the WiFi 5 equipment.

At the same time, it’s worth checking out the WiFi 6E which adds a new frequency band, the 6GHz, which can actually increase the throughput in a spectacular manner since the radio is subjected to far less interference (the range doesn’t seem changed though). I have recently tested the EnGenius ECW336 which uses this new standard and yes, it’s a bit pricy, but Zyxel has released a new WiFi 6E AP that is a bit cheaper, and I will be testing it soon.

Source :
https://www.mbreviews.com/do-wifi-6-routers-have-better-range/

How many Watts does a PoE switch use – Are the newer network switches more power efficient?

OCTOBER 31, 2022 BY MARK B

In light of the current global price hikes for energy, you’re very much justified in worrying about how many Watts your PoE switch actually uses. And, unless you have solar panels to enable your ‘lavish’ lifestyle, you’re going to have a bad time running too many networking devices at the same time, especially if they’re old and inefficient. But there’s the dilemma of features. For example, if we were to put two TVs together, an older one and a newer, it would be obvious that the latter would consume less power.

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EnGenius ECS2512FP Switch with lots of Ethernet cables.

But, after adding all the new features and technologies which do require more power to be drawn, plus the higher price tag and it becomes clear that it’s less of an investment than we initially thought. Still, the manufacturers are clearly pushing the users towards the use of PoE instead of the power adapter – the newer Ubiquiti access points only have a PoE Ethernet port.

And it makes sense considering that they’re easier to install, without worrying about being close to a power source, no more used outlets and the possibility to have centralized control via a PoE switch. But, for some people, all these advantages may fall short if the power consumption of such a setup exceeds the acceptable threshold, so, for those of you conflicted about whether you should give PoE Ethernet switches a try, let’s see how much Watts they actually consume.

Table of Contents

Old vs new PoE switches – Does age matter?

The PoE standard started being implemented into network switches about two decades ago and it became a bit more common for SMBs about 10 years ago. The first PoE switch that I tested was from Open Mesh (the S8) and it supported the IEEE 802.3at/af.

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Open Mesh S8 Ethernet Switch.

This meant that the power output per port was 30 Watts, so it can’t really be considered an old switch (unless you take into account that Open Mesh doesn’t exist anymore). But I wanted to mention this switch because while the total power budget was 150 Watts, it did need to rely on a fan to keep the case cool. Very recently I tested the EnGenius ECS2512FP which offers almost double the PoE budget, 2.5GbE ports and it relies on passive cooling.

So, even if it may not seem so at first, even in the last five years, there have been significant advancements in regard to power efficiency. Indeed, a very old Ethernet switch that supports only the PoE 802.11af standard (15.4W limit per port) most likely needed to be cooled by fans and was not really built with the power efficiency aspect in mind. Before I get an angry mob to scream that the EEE from the IEEE stands for Energy-Efficient Ethernet, so adhering to the 802.3af standard should already ensure that the switch doesn’t consume that much power, I had another standard in mind.

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Multiple wireless access points.

It’s the Green Ethernet from the 802.3az standard that made the difference with network switches that had lots of Ethernet ports. And this is an important technology because it makes sure that if a host has not been active for a long time, then the port to which is connected enters a sort of stand-by mode, where the power consumption is significantly reduced.

The port will become active again once there is activity from the client side, so the switch does ping the device from time to time (what I want to say is that the power is not completely turned off). So, if the network switch is older, it may not have this technology which means that you may lose a few dollars a month for this reason alone.

How many Watts does a PoE switch use by itself?

It depends on the PoE switch that you’re using. A 48-port switch that has three fans which run at full speed all the time is going to consume far more power than the 8-port unmanaged switch. You don’t have to believe me, let’s just check the numbers. I was lucky enough to still have the FS S3400-48T4SP around (it supports the 802.3af/at and has a maximum PoE budget of 370W), so I connected it to a power source and checked how many Watts it eats up when no device is connected to any of the 48 PoE ports.

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FS S3400-48T4SP – 1st: no devices connected. 2nd: TP-Link EAP660 HD connected. 3rd: Both the EAP660 HD and the EAP670 connected.

It was 24.5 Watts which is surprisingly efficient considering the size of the switch and the four fans that run all the time. The manufacturer says that the maximum power consumption can be 400W, so the approx. 25W without any PoE device falls within the advertised amount. Next, I checked the power consumption of the Zyxel XS1930-12HP.

This switch is very particular because it has eight 10Gbps Ethernet ports and it supports the PoE++ standard (IEEE 802.3bt) which means that each port can offer up to 60W of PoE budget per device. At the same time, the maximum PoE budget is 375 Watts and, while no device was connected to any port, the Ethernet switch drew an average of 29 Watts (the switch does have two fans).

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Zyxel XS1930-12HP – 1st: no devices connected. 2nd: TP-Link EAP660 HD connected. 3rd: Both the EAP660 HD and the EAP670 connected.

Yes, it’s more than the 48-port from FS, so it’s not always the case that having more ports means that there is a higher power consumption – obviously, more PoE devices will raise the overall power consumption.

Unmanaged vs Managed switches

Lastly, I checked out the power consumption of an unmanaged switch, the TRENDnet TPE-LG80 which has eight PoE ports, with a maximum budget of 65W. The PoE standards that are supported are the IEEE 802.3af and the IEEE 802.3at, so it can go up to 30W per port. That being said, the actual power consumption when there was no device connected was 3 Watts.

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TRENDnet TPE-LG80 – 1st: no devices connected. 2nd: TP-Link EAP660 HD connected. 3rd: Both the EAP660 HD and the EAP670 connected.

Quite the difference when compared to the other two switches, but it was to be expected for a small unmanaged Gigabit PoE switch.

Access Points: PoE vs Power adapter

I am not going to bore you with details. You know what an access point is, and you also know that some have a power adapter, while some don’t. So, I took the TP-Link EAP660 HD and the EAP670 (because I had them left on the desk after testing them) and I checked if the power consumption differs between PoE and using the provided adapter. Also, I connected the APs to the three switches mentioned above to see if there’s a difference in PoE use between brands and between managed and unmanaged switches.

The TP-Link EAP660-HD draws an average of 6.9 Watts when connected to the socket via the power adapter. The EAP670 needs a bit less, since the average was 6.4 Watts. When connected to the 48-port FS S3400-48T4SP, the EAP660 HD needed 7.7W from the PoE budget, while the EAP670 added 7.6W, so, overall, the power consumption is more elevated. Moving on to the PoE++ Zyxel XS1930-12HP switch, I saw that adding the TP-Link EAP660HD, it required 10.5W and, connecting the EAP670 meant that an additional 6.8W which is quite the difference.

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Comparison Access Points: PoE vs Power adapter.

Obviously, neither access points were connected to any client device, so there should be no extra overhead. In any case, we see that the PoE consumption is once again slightly more elevated than using the power adapters. Lastly, after connecting the EAP660 HD to the unmanaged TRENDnet TPE-LG80, the power consumption rose by 10 Watts, which is in line with the previous network switch. Adding the EAP670, it showed that an extra 6.8W were drawn, which is again, the same value as on the previous switch.

As a conclusion, we can see objectively that using the power adapter means less power consumption and that’s without taking into account the power needed to keep the switch itself alive.

Does the standard matter?

I won’t really extrapolate on all the available PoE switches on the market, but in my experience, it does seem that the PoE++ switches (those that support the 802.3at standard) do consume more power than the 802.3af/at switches, so yes, the standards do matter. Is it a significant difference?

switch-watts-power-consumption-devices
The switches and the access points that I just tested.

Well, it can add up if you have lots of switches for lots of access points but bear in mind that most APs will work just fine with the 30W limitation in place, so, unless you need something very particular, I’m not sure that the PoE++ is mandatory. For now, since it’s going to become more widespread and efficient in time.

Passive cooled PoE switches vs Fans

This one is pretty obvious. Yes, fans do need more power than a passive cooling system, so, at least in the first minutes or hours, the advantage goes to the passive cooling. But things do change when the power supply and the components start to build heat which makes the entire system less efficient than the fan-cooling systems.

Source :
https://www.mbreviews.com/how-many-watts-does-a-poe-switch-use/

What are Spatial Streams? And does the number of spatial streams actually matter?

AUGUST 6, 2022 BY MARK B

The spatial streams are connections made between the router and the client device where data is being sent. To get an even better grasp of what I am talking about, we need to go way back, down to the WiFi 3 (IEEE 802.11g standard) and lower which used what is called SISO systems (Single Input Single Output). The idea was to use a single transmitter antenna and the signal would get received by the access point on a single antenna.

And it’s true that the early days of WiFi routers were promising, but also quite rough because without clear line of sight, the AP could experience reflections of the signal in the room (multi-path fading), the risk to experience the cliff effect if there are too many interference and more. Obviously, these problems were mostly fixed with the emergence of the MIMO, which uses multiple transmission antennas to send the signal towards multiple reception antennas.

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SISO (Single Input Single Output)

In other words, the slightly more modern approach is to use multiple spatial streams to send and receive the data. Then there’s the MU-MIMO which takes things to another level. And I know you came here to understand what the numbers on the router box actually mean, if MU-MIMO actually matters and if support for 4×4, 8×8 or 16×16 (and more) are something that your wireless router (or separate access point) needs to have. You will see that most of is just over-the-top advertising with little to no real-life improvements to the WiFi performance, so let’s see why that is. Before that, let’s get a better understanding of the spatial streams and MIMO.

Table of Contents

Spatial Stream and MIMO

We already established what the SISO is, but there are some other configurations that the manufacturers have explored before using the MIMO approach. For example, the SIMO (Single Input Multiple Output) uses more than one receiver antennas on the same radio to capture the signal, so it has more than one chances to be properly processed. And there’s also the MISO approach where the signal is broadcasted across more than one stream with a single antenna receiving it.

The MIMO is the better form, where the same signal is transmitted across multiple streams and it is also received by multiple antennas. But, it’s not that it chooses which signal is the better one, no, all get processed and the end result is what the receiver interprets to be the original signal based on what it received at different intervals, with various amounts of data loss and so on. What we previously discussed is called spatial diversity where the same signal gets transmitted across multiple spatial streams towards multiple antennas, therefore keeping the risk of degradation to the minimum, but there are other approaches as well.

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MIMO – Spatial Diversity and Spatial Multiplexing.

One of them is called spatial multiplexing where the idea is to increase the data transfer rate since more than one independent stream of data is transmitted via multiple streams. The risk comes from interference which is why the data streams aren’t transmitted at the same time, but are phased out at different points in time. Another method that helps move data without risking collision or interference is by dividing the bandwidth into multiple frequency bands, each used to stream an independent and separate signal.

It’s also know as FDM, but I am sure you may have also heard about the OFDM which moved data a bit different. To make the bandwidth use even more efficient, the carriers are orthogonal. This means that instead of being far apart, as they were with the FDM, with the OFDM, they are more densely packed and the distance between carriers is minimal since there is little adjacent channel interference.

Spatial Streams and MU-MIMO

MU-MIMO (Multiple User Multiple Input Multiple Output) is supposed to be some sort of holy grail for handling multiple demanding client devices. That’s because while SU-MIMO (or MIMO) can handle one client device at a time, the MU-MIMO should serve more than one devices at the same time.

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MU-MIMO – Linksys EA8500.

If you don’t yet know, the way the client devices are handled ‘in the traditional sense’ (SU-MIMO), is first arrived, first served. So, if the device is connected at a high data transfer rate, it receives or sends the data quickly and lets another device to be served. With the modern hardware, you won’t even notice that your WiFi devices actually take turns. That it, unless you start streaming large packets of data at the same time on multiple devices which is where you’re going to start seeing the buffering icon.

Furthermore, be aware that devices that are far away and are connected at a lower data transfer rate are going to slow down the network because it will take longer to finish up the task (which is why it’s better to avoid legacy devices and to not increase the transmit power on your access point).

MU-MIMO doesn’t really change the way it handles a single client, but it can do the same for more than one devices at the same time. Imagine that your router starts behaving as if it were two, four or more routers at the same time. This way, the client devices don’t have to wait one after the other. The problem is that MU-MIMO doesn’t seem to rise to the expectations. Yet.

Is MU-MIMO under performing?

On paper, it shouldn’t. And the router boxes do have the theoretical maximum data transfer rates printed in bold letters and numbers. So, the first culprit is the advertisement. You know that Asus, TP-Link, Linksys or Netgear router that seemingly should reach 6,000Mbps (AX6000) or more since we also have AX1100 routers now? Well, you’re not going to see those number in real life.

netgear-nighthawk-rax43-front
Netgear RAX43.

Actually if you’re checking the single stream performance, it most likely won’t even get close to 1Gbps. So, what’s the deal? Well, the manufacturers add up the maximum possible rate for each radio, which, in turn is based on the maximum amount of data streams that can be handled at the same time. This means that using MU-MIMO, you’re going to actually see a better performance? Well, not as much as you’d have hoped and in some cases, you may actually see a worse performance.

At least two sources (1)(2) have confirmed that not only did they not see a better performance when using MU-MIMO devices, but in some cases it was actually a bit worse. That’s not because the technology is bad, it’s because the WiFi adapters just aren’t that great. Most PC adapters, laptops and smartphones are still stuck with a 2×2 MU-MIMO WiFi adapter. And both Qualcomm and Broadcom chipsets seem to drop to 1×1 even if the client devices were 2×2, while the router was 4×4. These tests were done with WiFi 5 hardware, where MU-MIMO was limited to downstream only. So has anything changed with WiFi 6?

Besides adding support for MU-MIMO upstream as well, it does seem that MU-MIMO does offer some improvements with WiFi 6 client devices and access points, but only detrimental. So, it seems that MU-MIMO can be useful in only very specific scenarios, in a very crowded network, where the client devices don’t move around.

wifi-6-range
WiFi 6 adapter on a Desktop PC.

But, in most cases, it’s still a borderline gimmick that manufacturers like to put on their box to sell the router. That’s because the client devices are still way behind the WiFi technological advances and the consumer routers are underpowered. Still, if you have multiple 4×4 MU-MIMO PCs and a powerful WiFi 6 access points, you may see a benefit if your network is pushed to the limit.

Beamforming

You may have seen the term Beamforming being advertised alongside MU-MIMO on the wireless router / AP boxes and it refers to a very interesting technique where the signal is transmitted towards the connected clients and not broadcasted everywhere. The way the wireless routers (or access points) do this is by identifying the compatible receiver and then increasing the power output (including the transfer data rates) only towards that client device. The particularity of using Beamforming is that it’s effective only for medium-range transmissions.

If the client device is close enough to the router, then it’s already at a high transfer rate and it doesn’t need to use Beamforming. The same is true if the client device is too far because the gain from Beamforming will not be enough to increase the data transfer rate. But what’s even more interesting is that despite being advertised as a technology that’s going to change the way your devices connect to the network, it’s actually very rarely used with commercial devices. That’s because of the aforementioned antenna gain.

tp-link-archer-ax50-beamforming
Source: TP-Link official website.

Beamforming works best with Point to Point access points because the idea is to focus the signal over very large distances with clear line of sight, without worrying about going above some set limit. Indoors, there is a limit set by EIRP and your access point or wireless router will make sure it won’t go above it. So, even if the Beamforming is able to push way past that limit (for example, three or four beamforming antennas can easily go past the 6dbi maximum gain), the transmit power will be severely cut.

But there is more because it seems that the WiFi 5 and WiFi 6 routers (and access points) will prioritize spatial multiplexing over beamforming, especially on the 4×4 and lower devices. Obviously, the one at a time approach still applies here as well, and the AP will switch dynamically between the supported modes when handling a client device. Even so, having the support for more multiple spatial streams, the better for the signal, right? Yes, the more spatial streams that are available, the more ways to properly transmit the data you will have, ensuring that it arrives at the destination quickly and as intact as possible.

Bibliography:
(1) ScienceDirect.com
(2) SmallNetBuilder.com

Source :
https://www.mbreviews.com/what-are-spatial-streams/

Black Basta-Affiliated Water Curupira’s Pikabot Spam Campaign

By: Shinji Robert Arasawa, Joshua Aquino, Charles Steven Derion, Juhn Emmanuel Atanque, Francisrey Joshua Castillo, John Carlo Marquez, Henry Salcedo, John Rainier Navato, Arianne Dela Cruz, Raymart Yambot, Ian Kenefick
January 09, 2024
Read time: 8 min (2105 words)

A threat actor we track under the Intrusion set Water Curupira (known to employ the Black Basta ransomware) has been actively using Pikabot. a loader malware with similarities to Qakbot, in spam campaigns throughout 2023.

Pikabot is a type of loader malware that was actively used in spam campaigns by a threat actor we track under the Intrusion set Water Curupira in the first quarter of 2023, followed by a break at the end of June that lasted until the start of September 2023. Other researchers have previously noted its strong similarities to Qakbot, the latter of which was taken down by law enforcement in August 2023. An increase in the number of phishing campaigns related to Pikabot was recorded in the last quarter of 2023, coinciding with the takedown of Qakbot — hinting at the possibility that Pikabot might be a replacement for the latter (with DarkGate being another temporary replacement in the wake of the takedown).

Pikabot’s operators ran phishing campaigns, targeting victims via its two components — a loader and a core module — which enabled unauthorized remote access and allowed the execution of arbitrary commands through an established connection with their command-and-control (C&C) server. Pikabot is a sophisticated piece of multi-stage malware with a loader and core module within the same file, as well as a decrypted shellcode that decrypts another DLL file from its resources (the actual payload).

In general, Water Curupira conducts campaigns for the purpose of dropping backdoors such as Cobalt Strike, leading to Black Basta ransomware attacks (coincidentally, Black Basta also returned to operations in September 2023). The threat actor conducted several DarkGate spam campaigns and a small number of IcedID campaigns in the early weeks of the third quarter of 2023, but has since pivoted exclusively to Pikabot.

Pikabot, which gains initial access to its victim’s machine through spam emails containing an archive or a PDF attachment, exhibits the same behavior and campaign identifiers as Qakbot

Figure 1. Our observations from the infection chain based on Trend’s investigation
Figure 1. Our observations from the infection chain based on Trend’s investigation

Initial access via email

The malicious actors who send these emails employ thread-hijacking, a technique where malicious actors use existing email threads (possibly stolen from previous victims) and create emails that look like they were meant to be part of the thread to trick recipients into believing that they are legitimate. Using this technique increases the chances that potential victims would select malicious links or attachments. Malicious actors send these emails using addresses (created either through new domains or free email services) with names that can be found in original email threads hijacked by the malicious actor. The email contains most of the content of the original thread, including the email subject, but adds a short message on top directing the recipient to open the email attachment.

This attachment is either a password-protected archive ZIP file containing an IMG file or a PDF file. The malicious actor includes the password in the email message. Note that the name of the file attachment and its password vary for each email.

Figure 2. Sample email with a malicious ZIP attachment
Figure 2. Sample email with a malicious ZIP attachment
Figure 3. Sample email with a malicious PDF attachment
Figure 3. Sample email with a malicious PDF attachment

The emails containing PDF files have a shorter message telling the recipient to check or view the email attachment.

The first stage of the attack

The attached archive contains a heavily obfuscated JavaScript (JS) with a file size amounting to more than 100 KB. Once executed by the victim, the script will attempt to execute a series of commands using conditional execution.

Figure 4. Files extracted to the attached archive (.zip or .img)
Figure 4. Files extracted to the attached archive (.zip or .img)
Figure 5. Deobfuscated JS command
Figure 5. Deobfuscated JS command

The script attempts command execution using cmd.exe. If this initial attempt is unsuccessful, the script proceeds with the following steps: It echoes a designated string to the console and tries to ping a specified target using the same string. In case the ping operation fails, the script employs Curl.exe to download the Pikabot payload from an external server, saving the file in the system’s temporary directory.

Subsequently, the script will retry the ping operation. If the retry is also unsuccessful, it uses rundll32.exe to execute the downloaded Pikabot payload (now identified as a .dll file) with “Crash” as the export parameter. The sequence of commands concludes by exiting the script with the specified exit code, ciCf51U2FbrvK.

We were able to observe another attack chain where the malicious actors implemented a more straightforward attempt to deliver the payload. As before, similar phishing techniques were performed to trick victims into downloading and executing malicious attachments. In this case, password-protected archive attachments were deployed, with the password contained in the body of the email.

However, instead of a malicious script, an IMG file was extracted from the attachment. This file contained two additional files — an LNK file posing as a Word document and a DLL file, which turned out to be the Pikabot payload extracted straight from the email attachment:

Figure 6. The content of the IMG file
Figure 6. The content of the IMG file

Contrary to the JS file observed earlier, this chain maintained its straightforward approach even during the execution of the payload.

Once the victim is lured into executing the LNK file, rundll32.exe will be used to run the Pikabot DLL payload using an export parameter, “Limit”.

The content of the PDF file is disguised to look like a file hosted on Microsoft OneDrive to convince the recipient that the attachment is legitimate. Its primary purpose is to trick victims into accessing the PDF file content, which is a link to download malware.

Figure 7. Malicious PDF file disguised to look like a OneDrive attachment; note the misspelling of the word “Download”
Figure 7. Malicious PDF file disguised to look like a OneDrive attachment; note the misspelling of the word “Download”
Figure 7. Malicious PDF file disguised to look like a OneDrive attachment; note the misspelling of the word “Download”

When the user selects the download button, it will attempt to access a malicious URL, then proceed to download a malicious JS file (possibly similar to the previously mentioned JS file).

The delivery of the Pikabot payload via PDF attachment is a more recent development, emerging only in the fourth quarter of 2023.

We discovered an additional variant of the malicious downloader that employed obfuscation methods involving array usage and manipulation:

Figure 8. Elements of array “_0x40ee” containing download URLs and JS methods used for further execution
Figure 8. Elements of array “_0x40ee” containing download URLs and JS methods used for further execution

Nested functions employed array manipulation methods using “push” and “shift,” introducing complexity to the code’s structure and concealing its flow to hinder analysis. The presence of multiple download URLs, the dynamic creation of random directories using the mkdir command, and the use of Curl.exe, as observed in the preceding script, are encapsulated within yet another array. 

The JavaScript will run multiple commands in an attempt to retrieve the malicious payload from different external websites using Curl.exe, subsequently storing it in a random directory created using mkdir.

Figure 9. Payload retrieval commands using curl.exe
Figure 9. Payload retrieval commands using curl.exe

The rundll32.exe file will continue to serve as the execution mechanism for the payload, incorporating its export parameter.

Figure 10. Payload execution using rundll32.exe
Figure 10. Payload execution using rundll32.exe

The Pikabot payload

We analyzed the DLL file extracted from the archive shown in Figure 6 and found it to be a sample of a 32-bit DLL file with 1515 exports. Calling its export function “Limit”, the file will decrypt and execute a shellcode that identifies if the process is being debugged by calling the Windows API NtQueryInformationProcess twice with the flag 0x7 (ProcessDebugPort) on the first call and 0x1F ProcessDebugFlags on the second call. This shellcode also decrypts another DLL file that it loads into memory and then eventually executes.

Figure 11. The shellcode calling the entry point of the decrypted DLL file
Figure 11. The shellcode calling the entry point of the decrypted DLL file

The decrypted DLL file will execute another anti-analysis routine by loading incorrect libraries and other junk to detect sandboxes. This routine seems to be copied from a certain GitHub article.

Security/Virtual Machine/Sandbox DLL filesReal DLL filesFake DLL files
cmdvrt.32.dllkernel32.dllNetProjW.dll
cmdvrt.64.dllnetworkexplorer.dllGhofr.dll
cuckoomon.dllNlsData0000.dllfg122.dll
pstorec.dll  
avghookx.dll  
avghooka.dll  
snxhk.dll  
api_log.dll  
dir_watch.dll  
wpespy.dll  

Table 1. The DLL files loaded to detect sandboxes

After performing the anti-analysis routine, the malware loads a set of PNG images from its resources section which contains an encrypted chunk of the core module and then decrypts them. Once the core payload has been decrypted, the Pikabot injector creates a suspended process (%System%\SearchProtocolHost) and injects the core module into it. The injector uses indirect system calls to hide its injection.

Figure 12. Loading the PNG images to build the core module
Figure 12. Loading the PNG images to build the core module

Resolving the necessary APIs is among the malware’s initial actions. Using a hash of each API (0xF4ACDD80x03A5AF65E, and 0xB1D50DE4), Pikabot uses two functions to obtain the addresses of the three necessary APIs, GetProcAddressLoadLibraryA, and HeapFree. This process is done by looking through kernel32.dll exports. The rest of the used APIs are resolved using GetProcAddress with decrypted strings. Other pertinent strings are also decrypted during runtime before they are used.

Figure 13. Harvesting the GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary API
Figure 13. Harvesting the GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary API
Figure 13. Harvesting the GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary API

The Pikabot core module checks the system’s languages and stops its execution if the language is any of the following:

  • Russian (Russia)
  • Ukrainian (Ukraine)
  •   

It will then ensure that only one instance of itself is running by creating a hard-coded mutex, {A77FC435-31B6-4687-902D-24153579C738}.

The next stage of the core module involves obtaining details about the victim’s system and forwarding them to a C&C server. The collected data uses a JSON format, with every data item  using the wsprintfW function to fill its position. The stolen data will look like the image in Figure 13 but with the collected information before encryption:

Figure 14. Stolen information in JSON format before encryption
Figure 14. Stolen information in JSON format before encryption

Pikabot seems to have a binary version and a campaign ID. The keys 0fwlm4g and v2HLF5WIO are present in the JSON data, with the latter seemingly being a campaign ID.

The malware creates a named pipe and uses it to temporarily store the additional information gathered by creating the following processes: 

  • whoami.exe /all
  • ipconfig.exe /all
  • netstat.exe -aon

Each piece of information returned will be encrypted before the execution of the process.

A list of running processes on the system will also be gathered and encrypted by calling CreateToolHelp32Snapshot and listing processes through Process32First and Process32Next.

Once all the information is gathered, it will be sent to one of the following IP addresses appended with the specific URL, cervicobrachial/oIP7xH86DZ6hb?vermixUnintermixed=beatersVerdigrisy&backoff=9zFPSr: 

  • 70[.]34[.]209[.]101:13720
  • 137[.]220[.]55[.]190:2223
  • 139[.]180[.]216[.]25:2967
  • 154[.]61[.]75[.]156:2078
  • 154[.]92[.]19[.]139:2222
  • 158[.]247[.]253[.]155:2225
  • 172[.]233[.]156[.]100:13721

However, as of writing, these sites are inaccessible.

C&C servers and impact

As previously mentioned, Water Curupira conducts campaigns to drop backdoors such as Cobalt Strike, which leads to Black Basta ransomware attacks.It is this potential association with a sophisticated type of ransomware such as Black Basta that makes Pikabot campaigns particularly dangerous.

The threat actor also conducted several DarkGate spam campaigns and a small number of IcedID campaigns during the early weeks of the third quarter of 2023, but has since pivoted exclusively to Pikabot.

Lastly, we have observed distinct clusters of Cobalt Strike beacons with over 70 C&C domains leading to Black Basta, and which have been dropped via campaigns conducted by this threat actor.

Security recommendations

To avoid falling victim to various online threats such as phishing, malware, and scams, users should stay vigilant when it comes to emails they receive. The following are some best practices in user email security:

  • Always hover over embedded links with the pointer to learn where the link leads.
  • Check the sender’s identity. Unfamiliar email addresses, mismatched email and sender names, and spoofed company emails are signs that the sender has malicious intent.
  • If the email claims to come from a legitimate company, verify both the sender and the email content before downloading attachments or selecting embedded links.
  • Keep operating systems and all pieces of software updated with the latest patches.
  • Regularly back up important data to an external and secure location. This ensures that even if you fall victim to a phishing attack, you can restore your information.

A multilayered approach can help organizations guard possible entry points into their system (endpoint, email, web, and network). Security solutions can detect malicious components and suspicious behavior, which can help protect enterprises.  

  • Trend Vision One™ provides multilayered protection and behavior detection, which helps block questionable behavior and tools before ransomware can do any damage. 
  • Trend Cloud One™ – Workload Security protects systems against both known and unknown threats that exploit vulnerabilities. This protection is made possible through techniques such as virtual patching and machine learning.  
  • Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Email Inspector employs custom sandboxing and advanced analysis techniques to effectively block malicious emails, including phishing emails that can serve as entry points for ransomware.  
  • Trend Micro Apex One™ offers next-level automated threat detection and response against advanced concerns such as fileless threats and ransomware, ensuring the protection of endpoints.
     

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The indicators of compromise for this blog entry can be found here.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/24/a/a-look-into-pikabot-spam-wave-campaign.html

Ubiquiti UniFi Network Application 8.0.7

Overview

UniFi Network Application 8.0.7 adds support for Radio Manager, WireGuard VPN Client, and Site Overview, and improves the Port Manager section by adding an overview of all ports and the VLAN Viewer.

Radio Manager

The new Radios page provides an overview of the Access Point radios and their configuration, statistics, and performance.

  • Filter Devices – Show all APs or only specific devices.
  • Filter Bands – Use the filters to display only certain bands or MIMO, e.g. 5 GHz or 3×3.
  • Bulk Edit – Change the radio configuration on multiple APs at the same time.

Improved Port Manager

The new Ports page provides an overview of all ports across your devices.

  • Filter Ports – Use the filters to display only certain ports, e.g. only PoE or SFP ports.
  • Filter Devices – Show all ports or only ports on a specific device.
  • Insights – View and compare statistics between ports on the same device.

The VLAN port management has been redesigned to improve UX when managing VLANs.

  • Native VLAN / Network – Used for untagged traffic, i.e. not tagged with a VLAN ID. Previously this option was called ‘Primary Network’.
  • Tagged VLAN Management – Used for traffic tagged with a VLAN ID. Previously this option was called ‘Traffic Restriction’.
  • Allow All – Configured VLANs are automatically tagged (allowed) on the port.
  • Block All – All tagged VLANs are blocked (not allowed) on the port.
  • Custom – Specify which VLANs are tagged (allowed) on the port. Any VLAN that is not specified is blocked.

When adding a new VLAN, it is automatically tagged (allowed) on the port when using ‘Allow All’. If ‘Custom’ is used, the new VLAN needs to be manually added to the port.

VLAN Viewer

Provides an easy way to see Native and Tagged VLANs across your devices.

  • Native VLAN Assignment – This shows which VLAN ID is set as native.
  • VLAN Tagging – Shows which VLANs are tagged, blocked, or native.
  • Search for VLANs using the VLAN name, ID, or subnet.

WireGuard VPN Client

Allows you to connect your UniFi Gateway to a VPN service provider and send internet traffic from devices over the VPN. Uploading a file and manual configuration are both supported.

Site Overview

Provides an overview of all sites used on UniFi Network Applications managing multiple sites.

  • UniFi Devices – See how many devices are connected to each site.
  • Client Devices – See how many WiFi/wired clients and guests are connected to each site.
  • Insight – See which sites have offline devices and critical notifications.

Client Connections

The System Log now provides much more details on client connections such as the connection time and data usage.

Improvements

  • Improved Port Manager.
  • Added all ports overview.
  • Added VLAN Viewer.
  • Improved VLAN port management UX.
  • Added Site Overview.
  • Added ability to select which networks Suspicious Activity is enabled on.
  • Added sorting feature for IP Groups.
  • Added ability to allow opening predefined firewall rules.
  • Improved validation for Prefix ID in Virtual Network settings.
  • Improved empty MAC whitelist validation in Port Manager.
  • Improved validation for DHCP options.
  • Improved DHCP Server TFTP Server field validation.
  • Improved Traffic Rule IP Address validation.
  • Improved Firewall Rules UX.
  • Improved Security Settings UX.
  • Improved Global Network Settings UX.
  • Enabled auto upgrade for UXG-Pro after the adoption is completed.
  • Remove LTE Failover WAN from IPTV Options.
  • Show the local language in the Language dropdown.
  • Prevent provisioning more Layer 3 static routes than UniFi switches can support.
  • Routes that are over the limit at the time of upgrade will be marked as Paused.
  • This does not mean that total static route support on Layer 3 UniFi switches is decreased, instead, UX is improved to prevent configuration of routes that are not functional.

VPN

  • Added WireGuard VPN Client.
  • Added messaging to create traffic routes after creating VPN Clients. This applies to the VPN Client feature, not adding clients to VPN Servers.
  • Added validation in VPN Server settings when the port overlaps with a Port Forwarding rule.
  • Added IP/Hostname override option for OpenVPN and WireGuard VPN Servers.
  • This adds a custom hostname or IP address to the configuration file used by clients.
  • This option is useful if the UniFi Gateway is behind NAT or is using a dynamically assigned IP address.
  • Added validation for Local IP in IPsec Site-to-Site VPN settings.
  • Automatically remove Site-to-Site Auto IPsec configuration if the adopted gateway doesn’t support it.
  • Improved Site-to-Site VPN validations.
  • Improved configuration file generation time for OpenVPN Servers.
  • Increased OpenVPN and WireGuard VPN Client limit from 5 to 8. This applies to the VPN Client feature, not VPN users connecting to VPN Servers.
  • Remove the PPTP Server if the adopted gateway doesn’t support it.

Clients and Devices

  • Added PoE power cycle option to the device side panel.
  • Added confirmation message when configuring Network Overrides.
  • Improved UniFi Devices page performance on larger setups.
  • Improved System Logs for client connections.
  • Locked the first column for Devices/Clients pages when scrolling horizontally.
  • Client hostnames (if present) are now shown in the side panel overview.
  • Moved filters to the left side in the Device and Client pages.

WiFi

  • Added Radio Manager.
  • Added ability to enable Professional installer toggle for Consoles.
  • Improved adding clients to MAC Address Filters.
  • Improved actionable feedback when Outdoor Mode is enabled.
  • Removed Global AP Settings, you can now use Radio Manager for bulk editing.
  • Collapse RF Scan tab by default in the AP device panel.
  • Changed WiFi Experience to TX retries for APs in their device panel.
  • Enhanced voucher printing options.

Bugfixes

  • Fixed an issue where some UniFi devices were incorrectly shown on the Client Devices page or not shown at all.
  • As a result of this fix, unmanaged non-network UniFi devices (e.g. UniFi Protect camera) may appear again as offline devices.
  • These offline devices will be removed automatically based on the Data Retention settings.
  • Automatic removal is an automated, periodic process that will run for several minutes after updating. Manual removal is also possible.
  • Fixed an issue where blocked clients couldn’t connect if they were removed until the next AP provision.
  • Fixed incorrect channel width for BeaconHD/U6-Extender.
  • Fixed an issue where Virtual Network usable hosts were incorrectly calculated.
  • Fixed missing ISP names in internet-related notifications.
  • Fixed rare gateway adoption issues via Layer 3.
  • Fixed an issue where WiFiman speed test results were not shown.
  • Fixed issue where WAN configuration is not populated when moving a gateway device to a new site.
  • Fixed an issue where CGNAT IP addresses were incorrectly marked as public IPs for Site Magic.
  • Fixed invalid connected client count for In-Wall APs.
  • Fixed unmanaged Network devices not shown on Client and Device pages in rare cases.
  • Fixed an issue where the Console would appear offline in rare cases.
  • Fixed sorting when there are multiple pages.
  • Fixed an issue where Voice VLAN settings are not effective when all VLANs are auto-allowed on switch ports.
  • Fixed an issue where Lock to AP is not disabled when removing an AP.
  • Fixed an issue where RADIUS profiles couldn’t be disabled when using a WireGuard VPN Server.
  • Fixed rare gateway configuration error.

Additional information

  • Create a backup before upgrading your UniFi Network Application in the event any issues are encountered.
  • See the UniFi Network Server Help Center article for more information on self-hosting a server.
  • UniFi Network Application 7.5 and newer requires MongoDB 3.6 (up to 4.4) and Java 17.

UniFi Network Native Application for UniFi OS

A specific application version that is only compatible with the UDM and UDR (running UniFi OS 3.1.6 or newer).

  • The UniFi OS update uses the application version that is required for your console.
  • The manual update process via SSH requires you to use the compatible package. Incompatible packages will be rejected on installation.
  • Older UniFi OS versions (before UniFi OS 3.1.6) on the UDM and UDR still use regular UniFi Network Application for UniFi OS.

 Checksumsb6a4fc86282e114c3a683ee9b43b4fde *UniFi-installer.exe 93413c6edc8d2bc44034b5086fa06fd7 *UniFi-Network-Server.dmg 6f10183dc78bf6d36290309cee8b6714 *UniFi.unix.zip f8e3a81f533d5bedb110afc61695846f *unifi_sysvinit_all.deb f6303e22d7c66102558db1dfeba678a7 *unifi-uos_sysvinit.deb b86b7b88ab650bf1de1a337f2f65d712 *unifi-native_sysvinit.deb 601df32736f41e40a80a3e472450a3e1 *unifi_sh_api ———————————————————————————————————————— SHA256(UniFi-installer.exe)= 193e309725a24a9dc79ac8115ad6ec561e466d0f871bc10c1d48a1c1631e2cfd SHA256(UniFi-Network-Server.dmg)= eb6160c6763f884fbb73df03ecdbc67381ad3cd06f037b227c399a7b33a29c0f SHA256(UniFi.unix.zip)= b409eb13d666d3afbf6f299650f0ee929a45da0ce4206ffe804a72d097f19f36 SHA256(unifi_sysvinit_all.deb)= 4221d7a0f8ce66c58a4f71b70ba6f32e16310429d3fe8165bf0f47bbdb6401a6 SHA256(unifi-uos_sysvinit.deb)= fafdfa57fc5b324e8fc0959b4127e3aafa10f1e4cfdf34c91af6a366033c1937 SHA256(unifi-native_sysvinit.deb)= 3bfd0e985d099fe9bc99578b82548269cf5d65f77e354c714b6b49194e5cd368 SHA256(unifi_sh_api)= 1791685039ea795970bcc7a61eec854058e3e6fc13c52770e31e20f3beb622eb

Download links

UniFi Network Application for Windows

UniFi Network Application for macOS

UniFi Network Application for Debian/Ubuntu

UniFi Network Application for UniFi OS

UniFi Network Native Application for UniFi OS

UniFi Network Application for unsupported Unix/Linux distros *** DIY / Completely unsupported ***

unifi_sh_api (shell library)

Source :
https://community.ui.com/releases/UniFi-Network-Application-8-0-7/7818b9df-4845-4c82-ba3c-1218e61010d4

The Ultimate Guide to Password Best Practices: Guarding Your Digital Identity

Dirk Schrader
Published: November 14, 2023
Updated: November 24, 2023

In the wake of escalating cyber-attacks and data breaches, the ubiquitous advice of “don’t share your password” is no longer enough. Passwords remain the primary keys to our most important digital assets, so following password security best practices is more critical than ever. Whether you’re securing email, networks, or individual user accounts, following password best practices can help protect your sensitive information from cyber threats.

Read this guide to explore password best practices that should be implemented in every organization — and learn how to protect vulnerable information while adhering to better security strategies.

The Secrets of Strong Passwords

A strong password is your first line of defense when it comes to protecting your accounts and networks. Implement these standard password creation best practices when thinking about a new password:

  • Complexity: Ensure your passwords contain a mix of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters. It should be noted that composition rules, such as lowercase, symbols, etc. are no longer recommended by NIST — so use at your own discretion.
  • Length: Longer passwords are generally stronger — and usually, length trumps complexity. Aim for at least 6-8 characters.
  • Unpredictability: Avoid using common phrases or patterns. Avoid using easily guessable information like birthdays or names. Instead, create unique strings that are difficult for hackers to guess.

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Combining these factors makes passwords harder to guess. For instance, if a password is 8 characters long and includes uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers and special characters, the total possible combinations would be (26 + 26 + 10 + 30)^8. This astronomical number of possibilities makes it exceedingly difficult for an attacker to guess the password.

Of course, given NIST’s updated guidance on passwords, the best approach to effective password security is using a password manager — this solution will not only help create and store your passwords, but it will automatically reject common, easy-to-guess passwords (those included in password dumps). Password managers greatly increase security against the following attack types.

Password-Guessing Attacks

Understanding the techniques that adversaries use to guess user passwords is essential for password security. Here are some of the key attacks to know about:

Brute-Force Attack

In a brute-force attack, an attacker systematically tries every possible combination of characters until the correct password is found. This method is time-consuming but can be effective if the password is weak.

Strong passwords help thwart brute force attacks because they increase the number of possible combinations an attacker must try, making it unlikely they can guess the password within a reasonable timeframe.

Dictionary Attack

A dictionary attack is a type of brute-force attack in which an adversary uses a list of common words, phrases and commonly used passwords to try to gain access.

Unique passwords are essential to thwarting dictionary attacks because attackers rely on common words and phrases. Using a password that isn’t a dictionary word or a known pattern significantly reduces the likelihood of being guessed. For example, the string “Xc78dW34aa12!” is not in the dictionary or on the list of commonly used passwords, making it much more secure than something generic like “password.”

Dictionary Attack with Character Variations

In some dictionary attacks, adversaries also use standard words but also try common character substitutions, such as replacing ‘a’ with ‘@’ or ‘e’ with ‘3’. For example, in addition to trying to log on using the word “password”, they might also try the variant “p@ssw0rd”.

Choosing complex and unpredictable passwords is necessary to thwart these attacks. By using unique combinations and avoiding easily guessable patterns, you make it challenging for attackers to guess your password.

How Password Managers Enhance Security

Password managers are indispensable for securely storing and organizing your passwords. These tools offer several key benefits:

  • Security: Password managers store passwords and enter them for you, eliminating the need for users to remember them all. All users need to remember is the master password for their password manager tool. Therefore, users can use long, complex passwords as recommended by best practices without worrying about forgetting their passwords or resorting to insecure practices like writing passwords down or reusing the same password for multiple sites or applications.
  • Password generation: Password managers can generate a strong and unique password for user accounts, eliminating the need for individuals to come up with them.
  • Encryption: Password managers encrypt password vaults, ensuring the safety of data — even if it is compromised.
  • Convenience: Password managers enable users to easily access passwords across multiple devices.

When selecting a password manager, it’s important to consider your organization’s specific needs, such as support for the platforms you use, price, ease of use and vendor breach history. Conduct research and read reviews to identify the one that best aligns with your organization’s requirements. Some noteworthy options include Netwrix Password Secure, LastPass, Dashlane, 1Password and Bitwarden.

How Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Adds an Extra Layer of Security

Multifactor authentication strengthens security by requiring two or more forms of verification before granting access. Specifically, you need to provide at least two of the following authentication factors:

  • Something you know: The classic example is your password.
  • Something you have: Usually this is a physical device like a smartphone or security token.
  • Something you are: This is biometric data like a fingerprint or facial recognition.

MFA renders a stolen password worthless, so implement it wherever possible.

Password Expiration Management

Password expiration policies play a crucial role in maintaining strong password security. Using a password manager that creates strong passwords also has an influence on password expiration. If you do not use a password manager yet, implement a strategy to check all passwords within your organization; with a rise in data breaches, password lists (like the known rockyou.txt and its variations) used in brute-force attacks are constantly growing. The website haveibeenpawned.com offers a service to check whether a certain password has been exposed. Here’s what users should know about password security best practices related to password expiration:

  • Follow policy guidelines: Adhere to your organization’s password expiration policy. This includes changing your password when prompted and selecting a new, strong password that meets the policy’s requirements.
  • Set reminders: If your organization doesn’t enforce password expiration via notifications, set your own reminders to change your password when it’s due. Regularly check your email or system notifications for prompts.
  • Avoid obvious patterns: When changing your password, refrain from using variations of the previous one or predictable patterns like “Password1,” “Password2” and so on.
  • Report suspicious activity: If you notice any suspicious account activity or unauthorized password change requests, report them immediately to your organization’s IT support service or helpdesk.
  • Be cautious with password reset emails: Best practice for good password security means being aware of scams. If you receive an unexpected email prompting you to reset your password, verify its authenticity. Phishing emails often impersonate legitimate organizations to steal your login credentials.

Password Security and Compliance

Compliance standards require password security and password management best practices as a means to safeguard data, maintain privacy and prevent unauthorized access. Here are a few of the laws that require password security:

  • HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act): HIPAA mandates that healthcare organizations implement safeguards to protect electronic protected health information (ePHI), which includes secure password practices.
  • PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard): PCI DSS requires organizations that handle payment card data on their website to implement strong access controls, including password security, to protect cardholder data.
  • GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation): GDPR requires organizations that store or process the data of EU residents to implement appropriate security measures to protect personal data. Password security is a fundamental aspect of data protection under GDPR.
  • FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act): FERPA governs the privacy of student education records. It includes requirements for securing access to these records, which involves password security.

Organizations subject to these compliance standards need to implement robust password policies and password security best practices. Failure to do so can result in steep fines and other penalties.

There are also voluntary frameworks that help organizations establish strong password policies. Two of the most well known are the following:

  • NIST Cybersecurity Framework: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides guidelines and recommendations, including password best practices, to enhance cybersecurity.
  • ISO 27001: ISO 27001 is an international standard for information security management systems (ISMSs). It includes requirements related to password management as part of its broader security framework.

Password Best Practices in Action

Now, let’s put these password security best practices into action with an example:

Suppose your name is John Doe and your birthday is December 10, 1985. Instead of using “JohnDoe121085” as your password (which is easily guessable), follow these good password practices:

  • Create a long, unique (and unguessable) password, such as: “M3an85DJ121!”
  • Store it in a trusted password manager.
  • Enable multi-factor authentication whenever available.

10 Password Best Practices

If you are looking to strengthen your security, follow these password best practices:

  • Remove hints or knowledge-based authentication: NIST recommends not using knowledge-based authentication (KBA), such as questions like “What town were you born in?” but instead, using something more secure, like two-factor authentication.
  • Encrypt passwords: Protect passwords with encryption both when they are stored and when they are transmitted over networks. This makes them useless to any hacker who manages to steal them.
  • Avoid clear text and reversible forms: Users and applications should never store passwords in clear text or any form that could easily be transformed into clear text. Ensure your password management routine does not use clear text (like in an XLS file).
  • Choose unique passwords for different accounts: Don’t use the same, or even variations, of the same passwords for different accounts. Try to come up with unique passwords for different accounts.
  • Use a password management: This can help select new passwords that meet security requirements, send reminders of upcoming password expiration, and help update passwords through a user-friendly interface.
  • Enforce strong password policies: Implement and enforce strong password policies that include minimum length and complexity requirements, along with a password history rule to prevent the reuse of previous passwords.
  • Update passwords when needed: You should be checking and – if the results indicate so – updating your passwords to minimize the risk of unauthorized access, especially after data breaches.
  • Monitor for suspicious activity: Continuously monitor your accounts for suspicious activity, including multiple failed login attempts, and implement account lockouts and alerts to mitigate threats.
  • Educate users: Conduct or partake in regular security awareness training to learn about password best practices, phishing threats, and the importance of maintaining strong, unique passwords for each account.
  • Implement password expiration policies: Enforce password expiration policies that require password changes at defined circumstances to enhance security.

How Netwrix Can Help

Adhering to password best practices is vital to safeguarding sensitive information and preventing unauthorized access.

Netwrix Password Secure provides advanced capabilities for monitoring password policies, detecting and responding to suspicious activity and ensuring compliance with industry regulations. With features such as real-time alerts, comprehensive reporting and a user-friendly interface, it empowers organizations to proactively identify and address password-related risks, enforce strong password policies, and maintain strong security across their IT environment.

Conclusion

In a world where cyber threats are constantly evolving, adhering to password management best practices is essential to safeguard your digital presence. First and foremost, create a strong and unique password for each system or application — remember that using a password manager makes it much easier to adhere to this critical best practice. In addition, implement multifactor authentication whenever possible to thwart any attacker who manages to steal your password. By following the guidelines, you can enjoy a safer online experience and protect your valuable digital assets.

Dirk Schrader

Dirk Schrader is a Resident CISO (EMEA) and VP of Security Research at Netwrix. A 25-year veteran in IT security with certifications as CISSP (ISC²) and CISM (ISACA), he works to advance cyber resilience as a modern approach to tackling cyber threats. Dirk has worked on cybersecurity projects around the globe, starting in technical and support roles at the beginning of his career and then moving into sales, marketing and product management positions at both large multinational corporations and small startups. He has published numerous articles about the need to address change and vulnerability management to achieve cyber resilience.

Source :
https://blog.netwrix.com/2023/11/15/password-best-practices/

How to Set Up a VLAN

Diego Asturias UPDATED: July 11, 2023


If you want to improve your network security and performance, learning how to set up a VLAN properly is all you need. Virtual LANs are powerful networking tools that allow you to segment your network into logical groups and isolate traffic between them.

In this post, we will go through the steps required to set up a VLAN in your network. We will configure two switches along with their interfaces and VLANs, respectively.

So, let’s dive in and learn how to set up VLANs and take your network to the next level.

Table of Contents

  • What is a VLAN?
  • Preparing for VLAN configuration
    • Our Lab
    • Network Diagram
  • How to set up a VLAN on a Switch?
    • Let’s connect to the Switch
    • Configure VLANs
    • Assign switch ports to VLANs
    • Configure trunk ports
  • Extra Configuration to Consider

What is a VLAN?

Before we go deep into learning how to set up a VLAN and provide examples, let’s understand the foundations of VLANs (or Virtual Local Area Networks).

In a nutshell, VLANs are logical groupings of devices that rely on Layer 2 addresses (MAC) for communication. VLANs are implemented to segment a physical network (or large Layer two broadcast domains) into multiple smaller logical networks (isolated broadcast domains).

Each VLAN behaves as a separate network with its own broadcast domain. VLANs help prevent broadcast storms (extreme amounts of broadcast traffic). They also help control traffic and overall improve network security and performance.

Preparing for VLAN configuration

Although VLANs are usually left for Layer 2 switches, in reality, any device (including routers and L3 switches) with switching capabilities and support of VLAN configuration should be an excellent fit for VLANs. In addition, VLANs are supported by different vendors, and since each vendor has a different OS and code, the way the VLANs are configured may slightly change.

Furthermore, you can also use specific software such as network diagramming and simulation to help you create network diagrams and test your configuration.

Our Lab

We will configure a popular Cisco (IOS-based) switch for demonstration purposes. We will use Boson NetSim (a network simulator for Cisco networking hardware and software) to run Cisco IOS simulated commands. This simulation is like you were configuring an actual Cisco switch or router.

Network Diagram

To further illustrate how to set up a VLAN, we will work on the following network diagram. We will configure two VLANs in two different switches. We will then configure each port on the switches connected to a PC. We will then proceed to configure the trunk port, which is vital for VLAN traffic.

Network Diagram

Network diagram details

  • S2 and S3 (Switch 2 and Switch 3) – Two Cisco L2 Switches connecting PCs at different VLANs (VLAN 10 and VLAN 20) via Fast Ethernet interfaces.
  • VLANs 10 and VLAN20. These VLANs configured in L2 switches (S2 and S3) create a logical grouping of PCs within the network. In addition, each VLAN gets a name, VLAN 10 (Engineering) and VLAN 20 (Sales).
  • PCs. PC1, PC2, PC3, and PC4 are each connected to a specific L2 switch.

How to set up a VLAN on a Switch?

So now that you know the VLAN configuration we will be using, including the number of switches, VLAN ID, VLAN name, and the devices or ports that will be part of the configuration, let’s start setting up the VLANs.

Note: VLAN configuration is just a piece of the puzzle. Switches also need proper interface configuration, authentication, access, etc. To learn how to correctly connect and configure everything else, follow the step-by-step guide on how to configure a Cisco Switch. 

a. Let’s connect to the switch

Inspect your hardware and find the console port. This port is usually located on the back of your Cisco switch. You can connect to the switch’s “console port” using a console cable (or rollover). Connect one end of the console cable to the switch’s console port and the other to your computer’s serial port.

Note: Obviously, not all modern computers have serial ports. Some modern switches come with a Mini USB port or AUX port to help with this. But if your hardware doesn’t have these ports, you can also connect to the switch port using special cables like an RJ-45 rollover cable, a Serial DB9-to-RJ-45 console cable, or a serial-to-USB adapter. 

  • Depending on your switch’s model, you can configure it via Command Line Interface (CLI) or Graphical User Interface (GUI). We will connect to the most popular user interface: The IOS-based CLI. 
  • To connect to your switch’s IOS-based CLI, you must use a terminal emulator on your computer, such as PuTTY or SecureCRT.
  • You’ll need to configure the terminal emulator to use the correct serial port and set the baud rate to 9600. Learn how to properly set these parameters in the Cisco switching configuration guide.
  • In the terminal emulator, press Enter to activate the console session. The Cisco switch should display a prompt asking for a username and password.
  • Enter your username and password to log in to the switch.
connect to the switch

b. Configure VLANs

According to our previously shown network diagram, we will need two VLANs; VLAN 10 and VLAN 20.

  • To configure Layer 2 switches, you need to enter the privileged EXEC mode by typing “enable” and entering the password (if necessary).
  • Enter the configuration mode by typing “configure terminal.”
  • Create the VLAN with “vlan <vlan ID>” (e.g., “vlan 10”).
  • Name the VLAN by typing “name <vlan name>” (e.g., “name Sales”).
  • Repeat these two steps for each VLAN you want to create.

Configuration on Switch 2 (S2)

S2# configure terminal

S2(config)# vlan 10

S2(config-vlan)# name Engineering

S2(config-vlan)# end

S2# configure terminal

S2(config)# vlan 20

S2(config-vlan)# name Sales

S2(config-vlan)# end

Use the “show vlan” command to see the configured VLANs. From the output below, you’ll notice that the two new VLANs 10 (Engineering) and 20 (Sales) are indeed configured and active but not yet assigned to any port.

Configure VLANs

Configuration on Switch 3 (S3)

S3# configure terminal

S3(config)# vlan 10

S3(config-vlan)# name Engineering

S3(config-vlan)# end

S3# configure terminal

S3(config)# vlan 20

S3(config-vlan)# name Sales

S3(config-vlan)# end

Configuration on Switch 3 (S3)

Note: From the output above, you might have noticed VLAN 1 (default), which is currently active and is assigned to all the ports in the switch. This VLAN, also known as native VLAN, is the default VLAN on most Cisco switches. It is used for untagged traffic on a trunk port. This means that all traffic that is not explicitly tagged with VLAN information will be sent to this default VLAN. 

Now, let’s remove those VLAN 1 tags from interfaces Fa0/2 and Fa0/3. Or in simple words let’s assign the ports to our newly created VLANs.

c. Assign switch ports to VLANs

In the previous section, we created our VLANs; now, we must assign the appropriate switch ports to the correct VLANs. The proper steps to assign switch ports to VLANs are as follows:

  • Enter configuration mode. Remember to run these commands under the configuration mode (configure terminal).
  • Assign ports to the VLANs by typing “interface <interface ID>” (e.g., “interface GigabitEthernet0/1”).
  • Configure the port as an access port by typing “switchport mode access”
  • Assign the port to a VLAN by typing “switchport access vlan <vlan ID>” (e.g., “switchport access vlan 10”).
  • Repeat these steps for each port you want to assign to a VLAN.

Let’s refer to a section of our network diagram

network diagram

Configuration on Switch 2 (S2)

S2(config)# interface fastethernet 0/2

S2(config-if)# switchport mode access

S2(config-if)# switchport access vlan 10

S2(config)# interface fastethernet 0/3

S2(config-if)# switchport mode access

S2(config-if)# switchport access vlan 20

Configuration on Switch 2 (S2)

Use the “show running-configuration” to see the new configuration taking effect on the interfaces.

Configuration on Switch 3 (S3)

S3(config)# interface fastethernet 0/2

S3(config-if)# switchport mode access

S3(config-if)# switchport access vlan 10

S3(config)# interface fastethernet 0/3

S3(config-if)# switchport mode access

S3(config-if)# switchport access vlan 20

Configuration on Switch 3 (S3)

A “show running-configuration” can show you our configuration results.

show running-configuration

d. Configure trunk ports

Trunk ports are a type of switch port mode (just like access) that perform essential tasks like carrying traffic for multiple VLANs between switches, tagging VLAN traffic, supporting VLAN management, increasing bandwidth efficiency, and allowing inter-VLAN routing.

If we didn’t configure trunk ports between our switches, the PCs couldn’t talk to each other on different switches, even if they were on the same VLAN.

Here’s a step by step to configuring trunk ports

  • Configure a trunk port to carry traffic between VLANs by typing “interface <interface ID>” (e.g., “interface FastEthernet0/12”).
  • Set the trunk encapsulation method (dot1q). The IEEE 802.1Q (dot1q) trunk encapsulation method is the standard tagging Ethernet frames with VLAN information.
  • Configure the port as a trunk port by typing “switchport mode trunk”.
  • Repeat the steps for each trunk port you want to configure.

Note (on redundant trunk links): To keep our article simple, we will configure one trunk link. However, keep in mind that any good network design (including trunk links) would need redundancy. One trunk link between switches is not an optimal redundant solution for networks on production. To add redundancy, we recommend using EtherChannel to bundle physical links together and configure the logical link as a trunk port. You can also use Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) by using the “spanning-tree portfast trunk” command.

Let’s refer to our network diagram

network diagram

Configuration on Switch 2 (S2)

S2(config)# interface fastethernet 0/12

S2(config-if)# switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q

S2(config-if)# switchport mode trunk

S2(config-if)# exit

Configuration on Switch 2 (S2)

Configuration on Switch 3 (S3)

S3(config)# interface fastethernet 0/24

S3(config-if)# switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q

S3(config-if)# switchport mode trunk

S3(config-if)# exit

Configuration on Switch 3 (S3)

Note: You can use different types of trunk encapsulation such as dot1q and ISL, just make sure both ends match the type of encapsulation.

Extra Configuration to Consider

Once you finish with VLAN and trunk configuration, remember to test VLAN connectivity between PCs, you can do this by configuring the proper IP addressing and doing a simple ping. Below are other key configurations related to your new VLANs that you might want to consider.

a. Ensure all your interfaces are up and running

To ensure that your interfaces are not administratively down, issue a “no shutdown” (or ‘no shut’) command on all those newly configured interfaces. Additionally, you can also use the “show interfaces” to see the status of all the interfaces.

no shutdown command

b. (Optional) enable inter-VLAN

VLANs, as discussed earlier, separate broadcast domains (Layer 2) — they do not know how to route IP traffic because Layer 2 devices like switches can’t accept IP address configuration on their interfaces. To allow inter-VLAN communication (PCs on one VLAN communicate with PCs on another VLAN), you would need to use a Layer 3 device (a router or L3 switch) to route traffic.

There are three ways to implement inter-VLAN routing: an L3 router with multiple Ethernet interfaces, an L3 router with one router interface using subinterfaces (known as Router-On-a-Stick), and an L3 switch with SVI.

We will show a step-by-step on how to configure Router-On-a-Stick for inter-VLAN communications. 

  • Connect the router to one switch via a trunk port.
  • Configure subinterfaces on the router for each VLAN (10 and 20 in our example). To configure subinterfaces, use the “interface” command followed by the VLAN number with a period and a subinterface number (e.g., “interface FastEthernet0/0.10” for VLAN 10). For example, to configure subinterfaces for VLANs 10 and 20, you would use the following commands:

> router(config)# interface FastEthernet 0/0

> router(config-if)# no shutdown

> router(config-if)# interface FastEthernet 0/0.10

> router(config-subif)# encapsulation dot1Q 10

> router(config-subif)# ip address 192.168.10.1 255.255.255.0

> router(config-subif)# interface FastEthernet 0/0.20

> router(config-subif)# encapsulation dot1Q 20

> router(config-subif)# ip address 192.168.20.1 255.255.255.0

  • Configure a default route on the router using the “ip route” command. This is a default route to the Internet through a gateway at IP address 192.168.1.1. For example:

> router(config)# ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.1.1

c. Configure DHCP Server

To automatically assign IP addresses to devices inside the VLANs, you will need to configure a DHCP server. Follow these steps:

  1. The DHCP server should also be connected to the VLAN.
  2. Configure the DHCP server to provide IP addresses to devices in the VLAN.
  3. Configure the router to forward DHCP requests to the DHCP server by typing “ip helper-address <ip address>” (e.g., “ip helper-address 192.168.10.2”).

Final Words

By following the steps outlined in this post, you can easily set up a VLAN on your switch and effectively segment your network. Keep in mind to thoroughly test your VLAN configuration and consider additional configuration options to optimize your network for your specific needs.

With proper setup and configuration, VLANs can greatly enhance your network’s capabilities and 10x increase its performance and security.

Source :
https://www.pcwdld.com/how-to-set-up-a-vlan/

NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations

Release Date October 05, 2023
Alert CodeAA23-278A

A plea for network defenders and software manufacturers to fix common problems.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Security Agency (NSA) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) to highlight the most common cybersecurity misconfigurations in large organizations, and detail the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) actors use to exploit these misconfigurations.

Through NSA and CISA Red and Blue team assessments, as well as through the activities of NSA and CISA Hunt and Incident Response teams, the agencies identified the following 10 most common network misconfigurations:

  1. Default configurations of software and applications
  2. Improper separation of user/administrator privilege
  3. Insufficient internal network monitoring
  4. Lack of network segmentation
  5. Poor patch management
  6. Bypass of system access controls
  7. Weak or misconfigured multifactor authentication (MFA) methods
  8. Insufficient access control lists (ACLs) on network shares and services
  9. Poor credential hygiene
  10. Unrestricted code execution

These misconfigurations illustrate (1) a trend of systemic weaknesses in many large organizations, including those with mature cyber postures, and (2) the importance of software manufacturers embracing secure-by-design principles to reduce the burden on network defenders:

  • Properly trained, staffed, and funded network security teams can implement the known mitigations for these weaknesses.
  • Software manufacturers must reduce the prevalence of these misconfigurations—thus strengthening the security posture for customers—by incorporating secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices.[1]

NSA and CISA encourage network defenders to implement the recommendations found within the Mitigations section of this advisory—including the following—to reduce the risk of malicious actors exploiting the identified misconfigurations.

  • Remove default credentials and harden configurations.
  • Disable unused services and implement access controls.
  • Update regularly and automate patching, prioritizing patching of known exploited vulnerabilities.[2]
  • Reduce, restrict, audit, and monitor administrative accounts and privileges.

NSA and CISA urge software manufacturers to take ownership of improving security outcomes of their customers by embracing secure-by-design and-default tactics, including:

  • Embedding security controls into product architecture from the start of development and throughout the entire software development lifecycle (SDLC).
  • Eliminating default passwords.
  • Providing high-quality audit logs to customers at no extra charge.
  • Mandating MFA, ideally phishing-resistant, for privileged users and making MFA a default rather than opt-in feature.[3]

Download the PDF version of this report: PDF, 660 KB

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 13, and the MITRE D3FEND™ cybersecurity countermeasures framework.[4],[5] See the Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques section for tables summarizing the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques, and the Mitigations section for MITRE D3FEND countermeasures.

For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.[6],[7]

Overview

Over the years, the following NSA and CISA teams have assessed the security posture of many network enclaves across the Department of Defense (DoD); Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB); state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments; and the private sector:

  • Depending on the needs of the assessment, NSA Defensive Network Operations (DNO) teams feature capabilities from Red Team (adversary emulation), Blue Team (strategic vulnerability assessment), Hunt (targeted hunt), and/or Tailored Mitigations (defensive countermeasure development).
  • CISA Vulnerability Management (VM) teams have assessed the security posture of over 1,000 network enclaves. CISA VM teams include Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) and CISA Red Team Assessments (RTA).[8] The RVA team conducts remote and onsite assessment services, including penetration testing and configuration review. RTA emulates cyber threat actors in coordination with an organization to assess the organization’s cyber detection and response capabilities.
  • CISA Hunt and Incident Response teams conduct proactive and reactive engagements, respectively, on organization networks to identify and detect cyber threats to U.S. infrastructure.

During these assessments, NSA and CISA identified the 10 most common network misconfigurations, which are detailed below. These misconfigurations (non-prioritized) are systemic weaknesses across many networks.

Many of the assessments were of Microsoft® Windows® and Active Directory® environments. This advisory provides details about, and mitigations for, specific issues found during these assessments, and so mostly focuses on these products. However, it should be noted that many other environments contain similar misconfigurations. Network owners and operators should examine their networks for similar misconfigurations even when running other software not specifically mentioned below.

1. Default Configurations of Software and Applications

Default configurations of systems, services, and applications can permit unauthorized access or other malicious activity. Common default configurations include:

  • Default credentials
  • Default service permissions and configurations settings
Default Credentials

Many software manufacturers release commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) network devices —which provide user access via applications or web portals—containing predefined default credentials for their built-in administrative accounts.[9] Malicious actors and assessment teams regularly abuse default credentials by:

  • Finding credentials with a simple web search [T1589.001] and using them [T1078.001] to gain authenticated access to a device.
  • Resetting built-in administrative accounts [T1098] via predictable forgotten passwords questions.
  • Leveraging default virtual private network (VPN) credentials for internal network access [T1133].
  • Leveraging publicly available setup information to identify built-in administrative credentials for web applications and gaining access to the application and its underlying database.
  • Leveraging default credentials on software deployment tools [T1072] for code execution and lateral movement.

In addition to devices that provide network access, printers, scanners, security cameras, conference room audiovisual (AV) equipment, voice over internet protocol (VoIP) phones, and internet of things (IoT) devices commonly contain default credentials that can be used for easy unauthorized access to these devices as well. Further compounding this problem, printers and scanners may have privileged domain accounts loaded so that users can easily scan documents and upload them to a shared drive or email them. Malicious actors who gain access to a printer or scanner using default credentials can use the loaded privileged domain accounts to move laterally from the device and compromise the domain [T1078.002].

Default Service Permissions and Configuration Settings

Certain services may have overly permissive access controls or vulnerable configurations by default. Additionally, even if the providers do not enable these services by default, malicious actors can easily abuse these services if users or administrators enable them.

Assessment teams regularly find the following:

  • Insecure Active Directory Certificate Services
  • Insecure legacy protocols/services
  • Insecure Server Message Block (SMB) service
Insecure Active Directory Certificate Services

Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is a feature used to manage Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates, keys, and encryption inside of Active Directory (AD) environments. ADCS templates are used to build certificates for different types of servers and other entities on an organization’s network.

Malicious actors can exploit ADCS and/or ADCS template misconfigurations to manipulate the certificate infrastructure into issuing fraudulent certificates and/or escalate user privileges to domain administrator privileges. These certificates and domain escalation paths may grant actors unauthorized, persistent access to systems and critical data, the ability to impersonate legitimate entities, and the ability to bypass security measures.

Assessment teams have observed organizations with the following misconfigurations:

  • ADCS servers running with web-enrollment enabled. If web-enrollment is enabled, unauthenticated actors can coerce a server to authenticate to an actor-controlled computer, which can relay the authentication to the ADCS web-enrollment service and obtain a certificate [T1649] for the server’s account. These fraudulent, trusted certificates enable actors to use adversary-in-the-middle techniques [T1557] to masquerade as trusted entities on the network. The actors can also use the certificate for AD authentication to obtain a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) [T1558.001], which they can use to compromise the server and usually the entire domain.
  • ADCS templates where low-privileged users have enrollment rights, and the enrollee supplies a subject alternative name. Misconfiguring various elements of ADCS templates can result in domain escalation by unauthorized users (e.g., granting low-privileged users certificate enrollment rights, allowing requesters to specify a subjectAltName in the certificate signing request [CSR], not requiring authorized signatures for CSRs, granting FullControl or WriteDacl permissions to users). Malicious actors can use a low-privileged user account to request a certificate with a particular Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and gain a certificate where the SAN matches the User Principal Name (UPN) of a privileged account.

Note: For more information on known escalation paths, including PetitPotam NTLM relay techniques, see: Domain Escalation: PetitPotam NTLM Relay to ADCS Endpoints and Certified Pre-Owned, Active Directory Certificate Services.[10],[11],[12]

Insecure legacy protocols/services

Many vulnerable network services are enabled by default, and assessment teams have observed them enabled in production environments. Specifically, assessment teams have observed Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS), which are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. If these services are enabled in a network, actors can use spoofing, poisoning, and relay techniques [T1557.001] to obtain domain hashes, system access, and potential administrative system sessions. Malicious actors frequently exploit these protocols to compromise entire Windows’ environments.

Malicious actors can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a target network by responding to passing traffic, effectively poisoning the service so that target computers will communicate with an actor-controlled system instead of the intended one. If the requested system requires identification/authentication, the target computer will send the user’s username and hash to the actor-controlled system. The actors then collect the hash and crack it offline to obtain the plain text password [T1110.002].

Insecure Server Message Block (SMB) service

The Server Message Block service is a Windows component primarily for file sharing. Its default configuration, including in the latest version of Windows, does not require signing network messages to ensure authenticity and integrity. If SMB servers do not enforce SMB signing, malicious actors can use machine-in-the-middle techniques, such as NTLM relay. Further, malicious actors can combine a lack of SMB signing with the name resolution poisoning issue (see above) to gain access to remote systems [T1021.002] without needing to capture and crack any hashes.

2. Improper Separation of User/Administrator Privilege

Administrators often assign multiple roles to one account. These accounts have access to a wide range of devices and services, allowing malicious actors to move through a network quickly with one compromised account without triggering lateral movement and/or privilege escalation detection measures.

Assessment teams have observed the following common account separation misconfigurations:

  • Excessive account privileges
  • Elevated service account permissions
  • Non-essential use of elevated accounts
Excessive Account Privileges

Account privileges are intended to control user access to host or application resources to limit access to sensitive information or enforce a least-privilege security model. When account privileges are overly permissive, users can see and/or do things they should not be able to, which becomes a security issue as it increases risk exposure and attack surface.

Expanding organizations can undergo numerous changes in account management, personnel, and access requirements. These changes commonly lead to privilege creep—the granting of excessive access and unnecessary account privileges. Through the analysis of topical and nested AD groups, a malicious actor can find a user account [T1078] that has been granted account privileges that exceed their need-to-know or least-privilege function. Extraneous access can lead to easy avenues for unauthorized access to data and resources and escalation of privileges in the targeted domain.

Elevated Service Account Permissions

Applications often operate using user accounts to access resources. These user accounts, which are known as service accounts, often require elevated privileges. When a malicious actor compromises an application or service using a service account, they will have the same privileges and access as the service account.

Malicious actors can exploit elevated service permissions within a domain to gain unauthorized access and control over critical systems. Service accounts are enticing targets for malicious actors because such accounts are often granted elevated permissions within the domain due to the nature of the service, and because access to use the service can be requested by any valid domain user. Due to these factors, kerberoasting—a form of credential access achieved by cracking service account credentials—is a common technique used to gain control over service account targets [T1558.003].

Non-Essential Use of Elevated Accounts

IT personnel use domain administrator and other administrator accounts for system and network management due to their inherent elevated privileges. When an administrator account is logged into a compromised host, a malicious actor can steal and use the account’s credentials and an AD-generated authentication token [T1528] to move, using the elevated permissions, throughout the domain [T1550.001]. Using an elevated account for normal day-to-day, non-administrative tasks increases the account’s exposure and, therefore, its risk of compromise and its risk to the network.

Malicious actors prioritize obtaining valid domain credentials upon gaining access to a network. Authentication using valid domain credentials allows the execution of secondary enumeration techniques to gain visibility into the target domain and AD structure, including discovery of elevated accounts and where the elevated accounts are used [T1087].

Targeting elevated accounts (such as domain administrator or system administrators) performing day-to-day activities provides the most direct path to achieve domain escalation. Systems or applications accessed by the targeted elevated accounts significantly increase the attack surface available to adversaries, providing additional paths and escalation options.

After obtaining initial access via an account with administrative permissions, an assessment team compromised a domain in under a business day. The team first gained initial access to the system through phishing [T1566], by which they enticed the end user to download [T1204] and execute malicious payloads. The targeted end-user account had administrative permissions, enabling the team to quickly compromise the entire domain.

3. Insufficient Internal Network Monitoring

Some organizations do not optimally configure host and network sensors for traffic collection and end-host logging. These insufficient configurations could lead to undetected adversarial compromise. Additionally, improper sensor configurations limit the traffic collection capability needed for enhanced baseline development and detract from timely detection of anomalous activity.

Assessment teams have exploited insufficient monitoring to gain access to assessed networks. For example:

  • An assessment team observed an organization with host-based monitoring, but no network monitoring. Host-based monitoring informs defensive teams about adverse activities on singular hosts and network monitoring informs about adverse activities traversing hosts [TA0008]. In this example, the organization could identify infected hosts but could not identify where the infection was coming from, and thus could not stop future lateral movement and infections.
  • An assessment team gained persistent deep access to a large organization with a mature cyber posture. The organization did not detect the assessment team’s lateral movement, persistence, and command and control (C2) activity, including when the team attempted noisy activities to trigger a security response. For more information on this activity, see CSA CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks.[13]

4. Lack of Network Segmentation

Network segmentation separates portions of the network with security boundaries. Lack of network segmentation leaves no security boundaries between the user, production, and critical system networks. Insufficient network segmentation allows an actor who has compromised a resource on the network to move laterally across a variety of systems uncontested. Lack of network segregation additionally leaves organizations significantly more vulnerable to potential ransomware attacks and post-exploitation techniques.

Lack of segmentation between IT and operational technology (OT) environments places OT environments at risk. For example, assessment teams have often gained access to OT networks—despite prior assurance that the networks were fully air gapped, with no possible connection to the IT network—by finding special purpose, forgotten, or even accidental network connections [T1199].

5. Poor Patch Management

Vendors release patches and updates to address security vulnerabilities. Poor patch management and network hygiene practices often enable adversaries to discover open attack vectors and exploit critical vulnerabilities. Poor patch management includes:

  • Lack of regular patching
  • Use of unsupported operating systems (OSs) and outdated firmware
Lack of Regular Patching

Failure to apply the latest patches can leave a system open to compromise from publicly available exploits. Due to their ease of discovery—via vulnerability scanning [T1595.002] and open source research [T1592]—and exploitation, these systems are immediate targets for adversaries. Allowing critical vulnerabilities to remain on production systems without applying their corresponding patches significantly increases the attack surface. Organizations should prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in their environments.[2]

Assessment teams have observed threat actors exploiting many CVEs in public-facing applications [T1190], including:

  • CVE-2019-18935 in an unpatched instance of Telerik® UI for ASP.NET running on a Microsoft IIS server.[14]
  • CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) in an unpatched VMware® Horizon server.[15]
  • CVE-2022-24682, CVE-2022-27924, and CVE-2022-27925 chained with CVE-2022-37042, or CVE-2022-30333 in an unpatched Zimbra® Collaboration Suite.[16]
Use of Unsupported OSs and Outdated Firmware

Using software or hardware that is no longer supported by the vendor poses a significant security risk because new and existing vulnerabilities are no longer patched. Malicious actors can exploit vulnerabilities in these systems to gain unauthorized access, compromise sensitive data, and disrupt operations [T1210].

Assessment teams frequently observe organizations using unsupported Windows operating systems without updates MS17-010 and MS08-67. These updates, released years ago, address critical remote code execution vulnerabilities.[17],[18]

6. Bypass of System Access Controls

A malicious actor can bypass system access controls by compromising alternate authentication methods in an environment. If a malicious actor can collect hashes in a network, they can use the hashes to authenticate using non-standard means, such as pass-the-hash (PtH) [T1550.002]. By mimicking accounts without the clear-text password, an actor can expand and fortify their access without detection. Kerberoasting is also one of the most time-efficient ways to elevate privileges and move laterally throughout an organization’s network.

7. Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods

Misconfigured Smart Cards or Tokens

Some networks (generally government or DoD networks) require accounts to use smart cards or tokens. Multifactor requirements can be misconfigured so the password hashes for accounts never change. Even though the password itself is no longer used—because the smart card or token is required instead—there is still a password hash for the account that can be used as an alternative credential for authentication. If the password hash never changes, once a malicious actor has an account’s password hash [T1111], the actor can use it indefinitely, via the PtH technique for as long as that account exists.

Lack of Phishing-Resistant MFA

Some forms of MFA are vulnerable to phishing, “push bombing” [T1621], exploitation of Signaling System 7 (SS7) protocol vulnerabilities, and/or “SIM swap” techniques. These attempts, if successful, may allow a threat actor to gain access to MFA authentication credentials or bypass MFA and access the MFA-protected systems. (See CISA’s Fact Sheet Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA for more information.)[3]

For example, assessment teams have used voice phishing to convince users to provide missing MFA information [T1598]. In one instance, an assessment team knew a user’s main credentials, but their login attempts were blocked by MFA requirements. The team then masqueraded as IT staff and convinced the user to provide the MFA code over the phone, allowing the team to complete their login attempt and gain access to the user’s email and other organizational resources.

8. Insufficient ACLs on Network Shares and Services

Data shares and repositories are primary targets for malicious actors. Network administrators may improperly configure ACLs to allow for unauthorized users to access sensitive or administrative data on shared drives.

Actors can use commands, open source tools, or custom malware to look for shared folders and drives [T1135].

  • In one compromise, a team observed actors use the net share command—which displays information about shared resources on the local computer—and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on compromised computers. In the same compromise, the actors used a custom tool, CovalentStealer, which is designed to identify file shares on a system, categorize the files [T1083], and upload the files to a remote server [TA0010].[19],[20]
  • Ransomware actors have used the SoftPerfect® Network Scanner, netscan.exe—which can ping computers [T1018], scan ports [T1046], and discover shared folders—and SharpShares to enumerate accessible network shares in a domain.[21],[22]

Malicious actors can then collect and exfiltrate the data from the shared drives and folders. They can then use the data for a variety of purposes, such as extortion of the organization or as intelligence when formulating intrusion plans for further network compromise. Assessment teams routinely find sensitive information on network shares [T1039] that could facilitate follow-on activity or provide opportunities for extortion. Teams regularly find drives containing cleartext credentials [T1552] for service accounts, web applications, and even domain administrators.

Even when further access is not directly obtained from credentials in file shares, there can be a treasure trove of information for improving situational awareness of the target network, including the network’s topology, service tickets, or vulnerability scan data. In addition, teams regularly identify sensitive data and PII on shared drives (e.g., scanned documents, social security numbers, and tax returns) that could be used for extortion or social engineering of the organization or individuals.

9. Poor Credential Hygiene

Poor credential hygiene facilitates threat actors in obtaining credentials for initial access, persistence, lateral movement, and other follow-on activity, especially if phishing-resistant MFA is not enabled. Poor credential hygiene includes:

  • Easily crackable passwords
  • Cleartext password disclosure
Easily Crackable Passwords

Easily crackable passwords are passwords that a malicious actor can guess within a short time using relatively inexpensive computing resources. The presence of easily crackable passwords on a network generally stems from a lack of password length (i.e., shorter than 15 characters) and randomness (i.e., is not unique or can be guessed). This is often due to lax requirements for passwords in organizational policies and user training. A policy that only requires short and simple passwords leaves user passwords susceptible to password cracking. Organizations should provide or allow employee use of password managers to enable the generation and easy use of secure, random passwords for each account.

Often, when a credential is obtained, it is a hash (one-way encryption) of the password and not the password itself. Although some hashes can be used directly with PtH techniques, many hashes need to be cracked to obtain usable credentials. The cracking process takes the captured hash of the user’s plaintext password and leverages dictionary wordlists and rulesets, often using a database of billions of previously compromised passwords, in an attempt to find the matching plaintext password [T1110.002].

One of the primary ways to crack passwords is with the open source tool, Hashcat, combined with password lists obtained from publicly released password breaches. Once a malicious actor has access to a plaintext password, they are usually limited only by the account’s permissions. In some cases, the actor may be restricted or detected by advanced defense-in-depth and zero trust implementations as well, but this has been a rare finding in assessments thus far.

Assessment teams have cracked password hashes for NTLM users, Kerberos service account tickets, NetNTLMv2, and PFX stores [T1555], enabling the team to elevate privileges and move laterally within networks. In 12 hours, one team cracked over 80% of all users’ passwords in an Active Directory, resulting in hundreds of valid credentials.

Cleartext Password Disclosure

Storing passwords in cleartext is a serious security risk. A malicious actor with access to files containing cleartext passwords [T1552.001] could use these credentials to log into the affected applications or systems under the guise of a legitimate user. Accountability is lost in this situation as any system logs would record valid user accounts accessing applications or systems.

Malicious actors search for text files, spreadsheets, documents, and configuration files in hopes of obtaining cleartext passwords. Assessment teams frequently discover cleartext passwords, allowing them to quickly escalate the emulated intrusion from the compromise of a regular domain user account to that of a privileged account, such as a Domain or Enterprise Administrator. A common tool used for locating cleartext passwords is the open source tool, Snaffler.[23]

10. Unrestricted Code Execution

If unverified programs are allowed to execute on hosts, a threat actor can run arbitrary, malicious payloads within a network.

Malicious actors often execute code after gaining initial access to a system. For example, after a user falls for a phishing scam, the actor usually convinces the victim to run code on their workstation to gain remote access to the internal network. This code is usually an unverified program that has no legitimate purpose or business reason for running on the network.

Assessment teams and malicious actors frequently leverage unrestricted code execution in the form of executables, dynamic link libraries (DLLs), HTML applications, and macros (scripts used in office automation documents) [T1059.005] to establish initial access, persistence, and lateral movement. In addition, actors often use scripting languages [T1059] to obscure their actions [T1027.010] and bypass allowlisting—where organizations restrict applications and other forms of code by default and only allow those that are known and trusted. Further, actors may load vulnerable drivers and then exploit the drivers’ known vulnerabilities to execute code in the kernel with the highest level of system privileges to completely compromise the device [T1068].

MITIGATIONS

Network Defenders

NSA and CISA recommend network defenders implement the recommendations that follow to mitigate the issues identified in this advisory. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as well as with the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Mitigations and MITRE D3FEND frameworks.

The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.[24]

Mitigate Default Configurations of Software and Applications
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Default configurations of software and applicationsModify the default configuration of applications and appliances before deployment in a production environment [M1013],[D3-ACH]. Refer to hardening guidelines provided by the vendor and related cybersecurity guidance (e.g., DISA’s Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and configuration guides).[25],[26],[27]
Default configurations of software and applications: Default CredentialsChange or disable vendor-supplied default usernames and passwords of services, software, and equipment when installing or commissioning [CPG 2.A]. When resetting passwords, enforce the use of “strong” passwords (i.e., passwords that are more than 15 characters and random [CPG 2.B]) and follow hardening guidelines provided by the vendor, STIGsNSA, and/or NIST [M1027],[D3-SPP].[25],[26],[28],[29]
Default service permissions and configuration settings: Insecure Active Directory Certificate ServicesEnsure the secure configuration of ADCS implementations. Regularly update and patch the controlling infrastructure (e.g., for CVE-2021-36942), employ monitoring and auditing mechanisms, and implement strong access controls to protect the infrastructure.If not needed, disable web-enrollment in ADCS servers. See Microsoft: Uninstall-AdcsWebEnrollment (ADCSDeployment) for guidance.[30]If web enrollment is needed on ADCS servers:Enable Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) for Client Authority Web Enrollment. This is done by choosing the “Required” option. For guidance, see Microsoft: KB5021989: Extended Protection for Authentication.[31]Enable “Require SSL” on the ADCS server.Disable NTLM on all ADCS servers. For guidance, see Microsoft: Network security Restrict NTLM in this domain – Windows Security | Microsoft Learn and Network security Restrict NTLM Incoming NTLM traffic – Windows Security.[32],[33]Disable SAN for UPN Mapping. For guidance see, Microsoft: How to disable the SAN for UPN mapping – Windows Server. Instead, smart card authentication can use the altSecurityIdentities attribute for explicit mapping of certificates to accounts more securely.[34]Review all permissions on the ADCS templates on applicable servers. Restrict enrollment rights to only those users or groups that require it. Disable the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag from templates to prevent users from supplying and editing sensitive security settings within these templates. Enforce manager approval for requested certificates. Remove FullControlWriteDacl, and Write property permissions from low-privileged groups, such as domain users, to certificate template objects.
Default service permissions and configuration settings: Insecure legacy protocols/servicesDetermine if LLMNR and NetBIOS are required for essential business operations.If not required, disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy.
Default service permissions and configuration settings: Insecure SMB serviceRequire SMB signing for both SMB client and server on all systems.[25] This should prevent certain adversary-in-the-middle and pass-the-hash techniques. For more information on SMB signing, see Microsoft: Overview of Server Message Block Signing. [35] Note: Beginning in Microsoft Windows 11 Insider Preview Build 25381, Windows requires SMB signing for all communications.[36]
Mitigate Improper Separation of User/Administrator Privilege
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Improper separation of user/administrator privilege:Excessive account privileges,Elevated service account permissions, andNon-essential use of elevated accountsImplement authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) systems [M1018] to limit actions users can perform, and review logs of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. Apply least privilege principles to user accounts and groups allowing only the performance of authorized actions.Audit user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary on a routine basis [CPG 2.D]. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts.Restrict use of privileged accounts to perform general tasks, such as accessing emails and browsing the Internet [CPG 2.E],[D3-UAP]. See NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet (CSI) Defend Privileges and Accounts for more information.[37]Limit the number of users within the organization with an identity and access management (IAM) role that has administrator privileges. Strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles, and policies.Implement time-based access for privileged accounts. For example, the just-in-time access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model) by setting network-wide policy to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level. As needed, individual users can submit requests through an automated process that enables access to a system for a set timeframe. In cloud environments, just-in-time elevation is also appropriate and may be implemented using per-session federated claims or privileged access management tools.Restrict domain users from being in the local administrator group on multiple systems.Run daemonized applications (services) with non-administrator accounts when possible.Only configure service accounts with the permissions necessary for the services they control to operate.Disable unused services and implement ACLs to protect services.
Mitigate Insufficient Internal Network Monitoring
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Insufficient internal network monitoringEstablish a baseline of applications and services, and routinely audit their access and use, especially for administrative activity [D3-ANAA]. For instance, administrators should routinely audit the access lists and permissions for of all web applications and services [CPG 2.O],[M1047]. Look for suspicious accounts, investigate them, and remove accounts and credentials, as appropriate, such as accounts of former staff.[39]Establish a baseline that represents an organization’s normal traffic activity, network performance, host application activity, and user behavior; investigate any deviations from that baseline [D3-NTCD],[D3-CSPP],[D3-UBA].[40]Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them [M1047].Implement a security information and event management (SIEM) system to provide log aggregation, correlation, querying, visualization, and alerting from network endpoints, logging systems, endpoint and detection response (EDR) systems and intrusion detection systems (IDS) [CPG 2.T],[D3-NTA].
Mitigate Lack of Network Segmentation
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Lack of network segmentationImplement next-generation firewalls to perform deep packet filtering, stateful inspection, and application-level packet inspection [D3-NTF]. Deny or drop improperly formatted traffic that is incongruent with application-specific traffic permitted on the network. This practice limits an actor’s ability to abuse allowed application protocols. The practice of allowlisting network applications does not rely on generic ports as filtering criteria, enhancing filtering fidelity. For more information on application-aware defenses, see NSA CSI Segment Networks and Deploy Application-Aware Defenses.[41]Engineer network segments to isolate critical systems, functions, and resources [CPG 2.F],[D3-NI]. Establish physical and logical segmentation controls, such as virtual local area network (VLAN) configurations and properly configured access control lists (ACLs) on infrastructure devices [M1030]. These devices should be baselined and audited to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Leverage properly configured Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) to reduce service exposure to the Internet.[42],[43],[44]Implement separate Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) instances to isolate essential cloud systems. Where possible, implement Virtual Machines (VM) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) to enable micro-segmentation of networks in virtualized environments and cloud data centers. Employ secure VM firewall configurations in tandem with macro segmentation.
Mitigate Poor Patch Management
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Poor patch management: Lack of regular patchingEnsure organizations implement and maintain an efficient patch management process that enforces the use of up-to-date, stable versions of OSs, browsers, and software [M1051],[D3-SU].[45]Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications, internal enterprise endpoints, and servers. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.[2]Automate the update process as much as possible and use vendor-provided updates. Consider using automated patch management tools and software update tools.Where patching is not possible due to limitations, segment networks to limit exposure of the vulnerable system or host.
Poor patch management: Use of unsupported OSs and outdated firmwareEvaluate the use of unsupported hardware and software and discontinue use as soon as possible. If discontinuing is not possible, implement additional network protections to mitigate the risk.[45]Patch the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) and other firmware to prevent exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
Mitigate Bypass of System Access Controls
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Bypass of system access controlsLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent credential compromise and reduce a malicious actor’s ability to move laterally between systems [M1026],[D3-CH]. Implement a method for monitoring non-standard logon events through host log monitoring [CPG 2.G].Implement an effective and routine patch management process. Mitigate PtH techniques by applying patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and newer versions to limit default access of accounts in the local administrator group [M1051],[D3-SU].[46]Enable the PtH mitigations to apply User Account Control (UAC) restrictions to local accounts upon network logon [M1052],[D3-UAP].Deny domain users the ability to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems [M1018],[D3-UAP].Limit workstation-to-workstation communications. All workstation communications should occur through a server to prevent lateral movement [M1018],[D3-UAP].Use privileged accounts only on systems requiring those privileges [M1018],[D3-UAP]. Consider using dedicated Privileged Access Workstations for privileged accounts to better isolate and protect them.[37]
Mitigate Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Weak or misconfigured MFA methods: Misconfigured smart cards or tokens In Windows environments:Disable the use of New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) and other legacy authentication protocols that are susceptible to PtH due to their use of password hashes [M1032],[D3-MFA]. For guidance, see Microsoft: Network security Restrict NTLM in this domain – Windows Security | Microsoft Learn and Network security Restrict NTLM Incoming NTLM traffic – Windows Security.[32],[33]Use built-in functionality via Windows Hello for Business or Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to regularly re-randomize password hashes associated with smartcard-required accounts. Ensure that the hashes are changed at least as often as organizational policy requires passwords to be changed [M1027],[D3-CRO]. Prioritize upgrading any environments that cannot utilize this built-in functionality.As a longer-term effort, implement cloud-primary authentication solution using modern open standards. See CISA’s Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Hybrid Identity Solutions Architecture for more information.[47] Note: this document is part of CISA’s Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project, which provides guidance for FCEB agencies to secure their cloud business application environments and to protect federal information that is created, accessed, shared, and stored in those environments. Although tailored to FCEB agencies, the project’s guidance is applicable to all organizations.[48]
Weak or misconfigured MFA methods: Lack of phishing-resistant MFAEnforce phishing-resistant MFA universally for access to sensitive data and on as many other resources and services as possible [CPG 2.H].[3],[49]
Mitigate Insufficient ACLs on Network Shares and Services
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Insufficient ACLs on network shares and servicesImplement secure configurations for all storage devices and network shares that grant access to authorized users only.Apply the principal of least privilege to important information resources to reduce risk of unauthorized data access and manipulation.Apply restrictive permissions to files and directories, and prevent adversaries from modifying ACLs [M1022],[D3-LFP].Set restrictive permissions on files and folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access [M1022],[D3-LFP].Enable the Windows Group Policy security setting, “Do Not Allow Anonymous Enumeration of Security Account Manager (SAM) Accounts and Shares,” to limit users who can enumerate network shares.
Mitigate Poor Credential Hygiene
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Poor credential hygiene: easily crackable passwords Follow National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) guidelines when creating password policies to enforce use of “strong” passwords that cannot be cracked [M1027],[D3-SPP].[29] Consider using password managers to generate and store passwords.Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure that passwords are “strong” and unique [CPG 2.B],[M1027],[D3-SPP].Use “strong” passphrases for private keys to make cracking resource intensive. Do not store credentials within the registry in Windows systems. Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files.Ensure adequate password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity requirements for Windows service accounts and implement passwords with periodic expiration on these accounts [CPG 2.B],[M1027],[D3-SPP]. Use Managed Service Accounts, when possible, to manage service account passwords automatically.
Poor credential hygiene: cleartext password disclosure Implement a review process for files and systems to look for cleartext account credentials. When credentials are found, remove, change, or encrypt them [D3-FE]. Conduct periodic scans of server machines using automated tools to determine whether sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information, protected health information) or credentials are stored. Weigh the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is of significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may prevent storage of credentials in improper locations.Store hashed passwords using Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP)-15 and Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA) approved algorithms.[50],[51]Consider using group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs) or third-party software to implement secure password-storage applications.
Mitigate Unrestricted Code Execution
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Unrestricted code executionEnable system settings that prevent the ability to run applications downloaded from untrusted sources.[52]Use application control tools that restrict program execution by default, also known as allowlisting [D3-EAL]. Ensure that the tools examine digital signatures and other key attributes, rather than just relying on filenames, especially since malware often attempts to masquerade as common Operating System (OS) utilities [M1038]. Explicitly allow certain .exe files to run, while blocking all others by default.Block or prevent the execution of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may exploit to execute code in kernel mode. Validate driver block rules in audit mode to ensure stability prior to production deployment [D3-OSM].Constrain scripting languages to prevent malicious activities, audit script logs, and restrict scripting languages that are not used in the environment [D3-SEA]. See joint Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace.[53]Use read-only containers and minimal images, when possible, to prevent the running of commands.Regularly analyze border and host-level protections, including spam-filtering capabilities, to ensure their continued effectiveness in blocking the delivery and execution of malware [D3-MA]. Assess whether HTML Application (HTA) files are used for business purposes in your environment; if HTAs are not used, remap the default program for opening them from mshta.exe to notepad.exe.

Software Manufacturers

NSA and CISA recommend software manufacturers implement the recommendations in Table 11 to reduce the prevalence of misconfigurations identified in this advisory. These mitigations align with tactics provided in joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Security-by-Design and -Default. NSA and CISA strongly encourage software manufacturers apply these recommendations to ensure their products are secure “out of the box” and do not require customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, performing monitoring, and conducting routine updates to keep their systems secure.[1]

MisconfigurationRecommendations for Software Manufacturers
Default configurations of software and applicationsEmbed security controls into product architecture from the start of development and throughout the entire SDLC by following best practices in NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), SP 800-218.[54]Provide software with security features enabled “out of the box” and accompanied with “loosening” guides instead of hardening guides. “Loosening” guides should explain the business risk of decisions in plain, understandable language.
Default configurations of software and applications: Default credentialsEliminate default passwords: Do not provide software with default passwords that are universally shared. To eliminate default passwords, require administrators to set a “strong” password [CPG 2.B] during installation and configuration.
Default configurations of software and applications: Default service permissions and configuration settingsConsider the user experience consequences of security settings: Each new setting increases the cognitive burden on end users and should be assessed in conjunction with the business benefit it derives. Ideally, a setting should not exist; instead, the most secure setting should be integrated into the product by default. When configuration is necessary, the default option should be broadly secure against common threats.
Improper separation of user/administrator privilege:Excessive account privileges,Elevated service account permissions, andNon-essential use of elevated accountsDesign products so that the compromise of a single security control does not result in compromise of the entire system. For example, ensuring that user privileges are narrowly provisioned by default and ACLs are employed can reduce the impact of a compromised account. Also, software sandboxing techniques can quarantine a vulnerability to limit compromise of an entire application.Automatically generate reports for:Administrators of inactive accounts. Prompt administrators to set a maximum inactive time and automatically suspend accounts that exceed that threshold.Administrators of accounts with administrator privileges and suggest ways to reduce privilege sprawl.Automatically alert administrators of infrequently used services and provide recommendations for disabling them or implementing ACLs.
Insufficient internal network monitoring Provide high-quality audit logs to customers at no extra charge. Audit logs are crucial for detecting and escalating potential security incidents. They are also crucial during an investigation of a suspected or confirmed security incident. Consider best practices such as providing easy integration with a security information and event management (SIEM) system with application programming interface (API) access that uses coordinated universal time (UTC), standard time zone formatting, and robust documentation techniques.
Lack of network segmentationEnsure products are compatible with and tested in segmented network environments.
Poor patch management: Lack of regular patchingTake steps to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities by embedding security controls into product architecture from the start of development and throughout the SDLC by following best practices in NIST’s SSDFSP 800-218.[54] Pay special attention to:Following secure coding practices [SSDF PW 5.1]. Use memory-safe programming languages where possible, parametrized queries, and web template languages.Conducting code reviews [SSDF PW 7.2, RV 1.2] against peer coding standards, checking for backdoors, malicious content, and logic flaws.Testing code to identify vulnerabilities and verify compliance with security requirements [SSDF PW 8.2].Ensure that published CVEs include root cause or common weakness enumeration (CWE) to enable industry-wide analysis of software security design flaws.
Poor patch management: Use of unsupported operating OSs and outdated firmwareCommunicate the business risk of using unsupported OSs and firmware in plain, understandable language.
Bypass of system access controlsProvide sufficient detail in audit records to detect bypass of system controls and queries to monitor audit logs for traces of such suspicious activity (e.g., for when an essential step of an authentication or authorization flow is missing).
Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods: Misconfigured Smart Cards or Tokens Fully support MFA for all users, making MFA the default rather than an opt-in feature. Utilize threat modeling for authentication assertions and alternate credentials to examine how they could be abused to bypass MFA requirements.
Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods: Lack of phishing-resistant MFAMandate MFA, ideally phishing-resistant, for privileged users and make MFA a default rather than an opt-in feature.[3]
Insufficient ACL on network shares and servicesEnforce use of ACLs with default ACLs only allowing the minimum access needed, along with easy-to-use tools to regularly audit and adjust ACLs to the minimum access needed.
Poor credential hygiene: easily crackable passwords Allow administrators to configure a password policy consistent with NIST’s guidelines—do not require counterproductive restrictions such as enforcing character types or the periodic rotation of passwords.[29]Allow users to use password managers to effortlessly generate and use secure, random passwords within products.
Poor credential hygiene: cleartext password disclosureSalt and hash passwords using a secure hashing algorithm with high computational cost to make brute force cracking more difficult.
Unrestricted code executionSupport execution controls within operating systems and applications “out of the box” by default at no extra charge for all customers, to limit malicious actors’ ability to abuse functionality or launch unusual applications without administrator or informed user approval.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, NSA and CISA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. NSA and CISA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 12–Table 21).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA and NSA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

LEARN FROM HISTORY

The misconfigurations described above are all too common in assessments and the techniques listed are standard ones leveraged by multiple malicious actors, resulting in numerous real network compromises. Learn from the weaknesses of others and implement the mitigations above properly to protect the network, its sensitive information, and critical missions.

WORKS CITED

[1]   Joint Guide: Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Security-by-Design and -Default (2023), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/principles_approaches_for_security-by-design-default_508c.pdf
[2]   CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
[3]   CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf
[4]   MITRE, ATT&CK for Enterprise, https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v13/matrices/enterprise/
[5]   MITRE, D3FEND, https://d3fend.mitre.org/
[6]   CISA, Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/best-practices-mitre-attckr-mapping
[7]   CISA, Decider Tool, https://github.com/cisagov/Decider/
[8]   CISA, Cyber Assessment Fact Sheet, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/VM_Assessments_Fact_Sheet_RVA_508C.pdf
[9]   Joint CSA: Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access, https://media.defense.gov/2022/May/17/2002998718/-1/-1/0/CSA_WEAK_SECURITY_CONTROLS_PRACTICES_EXPLOITED_FOR_INITIAL_ACCESS.PDF
[10]  Microsoft KB5005413: Mitigating NTLM Relay Attacks on Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429
[11]  Raj Chandel, Domain Escalation: PetitPotam NTLM Relay to ADCS Endpoints, https://www.hackingarticles.in/domain-escalation-petitpotam-ntlm-relay-to-adcs-endpoints/
[12]  SpecterOps – Will Schroeder, Certified Pre-Owned, https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2
[13]  CISA, CSA: CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a
[14]  Joint CSA: Threat Actors Exploit Progress Telerik Vulnerabilities in Multiple U.S. Government IIS Servers, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-074a
[15]  Joint CSA: Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network, Deploy Crypto Miner, Credential Harvester, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-320a
[16]  Joint CSA: Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-228a
[17]  Microsoft, How to verify that MS17-010 is installed, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-verify-that-ms17-010-is-installed-f55d3f13-7a9c-688c-260b-477d0ec9f2c8
[18]  Microsoft, Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-067 – Critical Vulnerability in Server Service Could Allow Remote Code Execution (958644), https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2008/ms08-067
[19]  Joint CSA: Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-277a
[20]  CISA, Malware Analysis Report: 10365227.r1.v1, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/mar-10365227.r1.v1.clear_.pdf
[21]  Joint CSA: #StopRansomware: BianLian Ransomware Group, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-136a
[22]  CISA Analysis Report: FiveHands Ransomware, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/analysis-reports/ar21-126a
[23]  Snaffler, https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler
[24]  CISA, Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals
[25]  Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/
[26]  NSA, Network Infrastructure Security Guide, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/15/2003018261/-1/-1/0/CTR_NSA_NETWORK_INFRASTRUCTURE_SECURITY_GUIDE_20220615.PDF
[27]  NSA, Actively Manage Systems and Configurations, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180326/-1/-1/0/Actively%20Manage%20Systems%20and%20Configurations.docx%20-%20Copy.pdf
[28]  NSA, Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance, https://www.nsa.gov/cybersecurity-guidance
[29]  National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST), NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management, https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/upd2/final
[30]  Microsoft, Uninstall-AdcsWebEnrollment, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/adcsdeployment/uninstall-adcswebenrollment
[31]  Microsoft, KB5021989: Extended Protection for Authentication, https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/topic/kb5021989-extended-protection-for-authentication-1b6ea84d-377b-4677-a0b8-af74efbb243f
[32]  Microsoft, Network security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-ntlm-authentication-in-this-domain
[33]  Microsoft, Network security: Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM traffic, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-incoming-ntlm-traffic
[34]  Microsoft, How to disable the Subject Alternative Name for UPN mapping, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/disable-subject-alternative-name-upn-mapping
[35]  Microsoft, Overview of Server Message Block signing, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/overview-server-message-block-signing
[36]  Microsoft, SMB signing required by default in Windows Insider, https://aka.ms/SmbSigningRequired
[37]  NSA, Defend Privileges and Accounts, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180330/-1/-1/0/Defend%20Privileges%20and%20Accounts%20-%20Copy.pdf
[38]  NSA, Advancing Zero Trust Maturity Throughout the User Pillar, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/14/2003178390/-1/-1/0/CSI_Zero_Trust_User_Pillar_v1.1.PDF
[39]  NSA, Continuously Hunt for Network Intrusions, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180360/-1/-1/0/Continuously%20Hunt%20for%20Network%20Intrusions%20-%20Copy.pdf
[40]  Joint CSI: Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
[41]  NSA, Segment Networks and Deploy Application-aware Defenses, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180325/-1/-1/0/Segment%20Networks%20and%20Deploy%20Application%20Aware%20Defenses%20-%20Copy.pdf
[42]  Joint CSA: NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across all Operational Technologies and Control Systems, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/23/2002462846/-1/-1/0/OT_ADVISORY-DUAL-OFFICIAL-20200722.PDF
[43]  NSA, Stop Malicious Cyber Activity Against Connected Operational Technology, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/29/2002630479/-1/-1/0/CSA_STOP-MCA-AGAINST-OT_UOO13672321.PDF
[44]  NSA, Performing Out-of-Band Network Management, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/17/2002499616/-1/-1/0/PERFORMING_OUT_OF_BAND_NETWORK_MANAGEMENT20200911.PDF
[45]  NSA, Update and Upgrade Software Immediately, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180319/-1/-1/0/Update%20and%20Upgrade%20Software%20Immediately.docx%20-%20Copy.pdf
[46]  Microsoft, Microsoft Security Advisory 2871997: Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityAdvisories/2016/2871997
[47]  CISA, Secure Cloud Business Applications Hybrid Identity Solutions Architecture, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/csso-scuba-guidance_document-hybrid_identity_solutions_architecture-2023.03.22-final.pdf
[48]  CISA, Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project, https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/secure-cloud-business-applications-scuba-project
[49]  NSA, Transition to Multi-factor Authentication, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180346/-1/-1/0/Transition%20to%20Multi-factor%20Authentication%20-%20Copy.pdf
[50]  Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), CNSS Policy 15, https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Policies.cfm
[51]  NSA, NSA Releases Future Quantum-Resistant (QR) Algorithm Requirements for National Security Systems, https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/News-Highlights/Article/Article/3148990/nsa-releases-future-quantum-resistant-qr-algorithm-requirements-for-national-se/
[52]  NSA, Enforce Signed Software Execution Policies, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180334/-1/-1/0/Enforce%20Signed%20Software%20Execution%20Policies%20-%20Copy.pdf
[53]  Joint CSI: Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003021689/-1/-1/0/CSI_KEEPING_POWERSHELL_SECURITY_MEASURES_TO_USE_AND_EMBRACE_20220622.PDF
[54]  NIST, NIST SP 800-218: Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1: Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final

Disclaimer of Endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Trademarks

Active Directory, Microsoft, and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
MITRE ATT&CK is registered trademark and MITRE D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
SoftPerfect is a registered trademark of SoftPerfect Proprietary Limited Company.
Telerik is a registered trademark of Progress Software Corporation.
VMware is a registered trademark of VMWare, Inc.
Zimbra is a registered trademark of Synacor, Inc.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring cybersecurity organizations’ missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov
General Cybersecurity Inquiries: Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov 
Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov
Media Inquiries / Press Desk: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov 

To report suspicious activity contact CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 12–Table 21 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

Technique TitleIDUse
Active Scanning: Vulnerability ScanningT1595.002Malicious actors scan victims for vulnerabilities that be exploited for initial access.
Gather Victim Host InformationT1592Malicious actors gather information on victim client configurations and/or vulnerabilities through vulnerabilities scans and searching the web.
Gather Victim Identity Information: CredentialsT1589.001Malicious actors find default credentials through searching the web.
Phishing for InformationT1598Malicious actors masquerade as IT staff and convince a target user to provide their MFA code over the phone to gain access to email and other organizational resources.
Technique TitleIDUse
External Remote ServicesT1133Malicious actors use default credentials for VPN access to internal networks.
Valid Accounts: Default AccountsT1078.001Malicious actors gain authenticated access to devices by finding default credentials through searching the web.Malicious actors use default credentials for VPN access to internal networks, and default administrative credentials to gain access to web applications and databases.
Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1190Malicious actors exploit CVEs in Telerik UI, VM Horizon, Zimbra Collaboration Suite, and other applications for initial access to victim organizations.
PhishingT1566Malicious actors gain initial access to systems by phishing to entice end users to download and execute malicious payloads.
Trust RelationshipT1199Malicious actors gain access to OT networks despite prior assurance that the networks were fully air gapped, with no possible connection to the IT network, by finding special purpose, forgotten, or even accidental network connections.
Technique TitleIDUse
Software Deployment ToolsT1072Malicious actors use default or captured credentials on software deployment tools to execute code and move laterally.
User ExecutionT1204Malicious actors gain initial access to systems by phishing to entice end users to download and execute malicious payloads or to run code on their workstations.
Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059Malicious actors use scripting languages to obscure their actions and bypass allowlisting.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual BasicT1059.005Malicious actors use macros for initial access, persistence, and lateral movement.
Technique TitleIDUse
Account ManipulationT1098Malicious actors reset built-in administrative accounts via predictable, forgotten password questions.
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Malicious actors analyze topical and nested Active Directory groups to find privileged accounts to target.
Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsT1078.002Malicious actors obtain loaded domain credentials from printers and scanners and use them to move laterally from the network device.
Exploitation for Privilege EscalationT1068Malicious actors load vulnerable drivers and then exploit their known vulnerabilities to execute code in the kernel with the highest level of system privileges to completely compromise the device.
Technique TitleIDUse
Obfuscated Files or Information: Command ObfuscationT1027.010Malicious actors often use scripting languages to obscure their actions.
Technique TitleIDUse
Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557Malicious actors force a device to communicate through actor-controlled systems, so they can collect information or perform additional actions.
Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB RelayT1557.001Malicious actors execute spoofing, poisoning, and relay techniques if Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR), NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS), and Server Message Block (SMB) services are enabled in a network.
Brute Force: Password CrackingT1110.002Malicious actors capture user hashes and leverage dictionary wordlists and rulesets to extract cleartext passwords.
Credentials from Password StoresT1555Malicious actors gain access to and crack credentials from PFX stores, enabling elevation of privileges and lateral movement within networks.
Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111Malicious actors can obtain password hashes for accounts enabled for MFA with smart codes or tokens and use the hash via PtH techniques.
Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationT1621Malicious actors use “push bombing” against non-phishing resistant MFA to induce “MFA fatigue” in victims, gaining access to MFA authentication credentials or bypassing MFA, and accessing the MFA-protected system.
Steal Application Access TokenT1528Malicious actors can steal administrator account credentials and the authentication token generated by Active Directory when the account is logged into a compromised host.
Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesT1649Unauthenticated malicious actors coerce an ADCS server to authenticate to an actor-controlled server, and then relay that authentication to the web certificate enrollment application to obtain a trusted illegitimate certificate.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden TicketT1558.001Malicious actors who have obtained authentication certificates can use the certificate for Active Directory authentication to obtain a Kerberos TGT.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: KerberoastingT1558.003Malicious actors obtain and abuse valid Kerberos TGTs to elevate privileges and laterally move throughout an organization’s network.
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in FilesT1552.001Malicious actors find cleartext credentials that organizations or individual users store in spreadsheets, configuration files, and other documents.
Technique TitleIDUse
Account DiscoveryT1087Malicious actors with valid domain credentials enumerate the AD to discover elevated accounts and where they are used.
File and Directory DiscoveryT1083Malicious actors use commands, such as net share, open source tools, such as SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or custom malware, such as CovalentStealer to discover and categorize files.Malicious actors search for text files, spreadsheets, documents, and configuration files in hopes of obtaining desired information, such as cleartext passwords.
Network Share DiscoveryT1135Malicious actors use commands, such as net share, open source tools, such as SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or custom malware, such as CovalentStealer, to look for shared folders and drives.
Technique TitleIDUse
Exploitation of Remote ServicesT1210Malicious actors can exploit OS and firmware vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized network access, compromise sensitive data, and disrupt operations.
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.002If SMB signing is not enforced, malicious actors can use name resolution poisoning to access remote systems.
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access TokenT1550.001Malicious actors with stolen administrator account credentials and AD authentication tokens can use them to operate with elevated permissions throughout the domain.
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the HashT1550.002Malicious actors collect hashes in a network and authenticate as a user without having access to the user’s cleartext password.
Technique TitleIDUse
Data from Network Shared DriveT1039Malicious actors find sensitive information on network shares that could facilitate follow-on activity or provide opportunities for extortion.

Source :
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-278a

Top 5 Security Misconfigurations Causing Data Breaches in 2023

Edward Kost
updated May 15, 2023

Security misconfigurations are a common and significant cybersecurity issue that can leave businesses vulnerable to data breaches. According to the latest data breach investigation report by IBM and the Ponemon Institute, the average cost of a breach has peaked at US$4.35 million. Many data breaches are caused by avoidable errors like security misconfiguration. By following the tips in this article, you could identify and address a security error that could save you millions of dollars in damages.

Learn how UpGuard can help you detect data breach risks >

What is a Security Misconfiguration?

A security misconfiguration occurs when a system, application, or network device’s settings are not correctly configured, leaving it exposed to potential cyber threats. This could be due to default configurations left unchanged, unnecessary features enabled, or permissions set too broadly. Hackers often exploit these misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, launch malware attacks, or carry out phishing attacks, among other malicious activities.

What Causes Security Misconfigurations?

Security misconfigurations can result from various factors, including human error, lack of awareness, and insufficient security measures. For instance, employees might configure systems without a thorough understanding of security best practices, security teams might overlook crucial security updates due to the growing complexity of cloud services and infrastructures.

Additionally, the rapid shift to remote work during the pandemic has increased the attack surface for cybercriminals, making it more challenging for security teams to manage and monitor potential vulnerabilities.

List of Common Types of Security Configurations Facilitating Data Breaches

Some common types of security misconfigurations include:

1. Default Settings

With the rise of cloud solutions such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure, companies increasingly rely on these platforms to store and manage their data. However, using cloud services also introduces new security risks, such as the potential for misconfigured settings or unauthorized access.

A prominent example of insecure default software settings that could have facilitated a significant breach is the Microsoft Power Apps data leak incident of 2021. By default, Power Apps portal data feeds were set to be accessible to the public.

Unless developers specified for OData feeds to be set to private, virtually anyone could access the backend databases of applications built with Power Apps. UpGuard researchers located the exposure and notified Microsoft, who promptly addressed the leak. UpGuard’s detection helped Microsoft avoid a large-scale breach that could have potentially compromised 38 million records.

Read this whitepaper to learn how to prevent data breaches >

2. Unnecessary Features

Enabling features or services not required for a system’s operation can increase its attack surface, making it more vulnerable to threats. Some examples of unnecessary product features include remote administration tools, file-sharing services, and unused network ports. To mitigate data breach risks, organizations should conduct regular reviews of their systems and applications to identify and disable or remove features that are not necessary for their operations.

Additionally, organizations should practice the principle of least functionality, ensuring that systems are deployed with only the minimal set of features and services required for their specific use case.

3. Insecure Permissions

Overly permissive access controls can allow unauthorized users to access sensitive data or perform malicious actions. To address this issue, organizations should implement the principle of least privilege, granting users the minimum level of access necessary to perform their job functions. This can be achieved through proper role-based access control (RBAC) configurations and regular audits of user privileges. Additionally, organizations should ensure that sensitive data is appropriately encrypted both in transit and at rest, further reducing the risk of unauthorized access.

4. Outdated Software

Failing to apply security patches and updates can expose systems to known vulnerabilities. To protect against data breaches resulting from outdated software, organizations should have a robust patch management program in place. This includes regularly monitoring for available patches and updates, prioritizing their deployment based on the severity of the vulnerabilities being addressed, and verifying the successful installation of these patches.

Additionally, organizations should consider implementing automated patch management solutions and vulnerability scanning tools to streamline the patching process and minimize the risk of human error.

5. Insecure API Configurations

APIs that are not adequately secured can allow threat actors to access sensitive information or manipulate systems. API misconfigurations – like the one that led to T-Mobile’s 2023 data breach, are becoming more common. As more companies move their services to the cloud, securing these APIs and preventing the data leaks they facilitate is becoming a bigger challenge.

To mitigate the risks associated with insecure API configurations, organizations should implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms, such as OAuth 2.0 or API keys, to ensure only authorized clients can access their APIs. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities in their API configurations.

Finally, adopting a secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC) and employing API security best practices, such as rate limiting and input validation, can help prevent data breaches stemming from insecure APIs.

Learn how UpGuard protects against third-party breaches >

How to Avoid Security Misconfigurations Impacting Your Data Breach Resilience

To protect against security misconfigurations, organizations should:

1. Implement a Comprehensive Security Policy

Implement a cybersecurity policy covering all system and application configuration aspects, including guidelines for setting permissions, enabling features, and updating software.

2. Implement a Cyber Threat Awareness Program

An essential security measure that should accompany the remediation of security misconfigurations is employee threat awareness training. Of those who recently suffered cloud security breaches, 55% of respondents identified human error as the primary cause.

With your employees equipped to correctly respond to common cybercrime tactics that preceded data breaches, such as social engineering attacks and social media phishing attacks, your business could avoid a security incident should threat actors find and exploit an overlooked security misconfiguration.

Phishing attacks involve tricking individuals into revealing sensitive information that could be used to compromise an account or facilitate a data breach. During these attacks, threat actors target account login credentials, credit card numbers, and even phone numbers to exploit Multi-Factor authentication.

Learn the common ways MFA can be exploited >

Phishing attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with cybercriminals using automation and other tools to target large numbers of individuals. 

Here’s an example of a phishing campaign where a hacker has built a fake login page to steal a customer’s banking credentials. As you can see, the fake login page looks almost identical to the actual page, and an unsuspecting eye will not notice anything suspicious.

Real Commonwealth Bank Login Page
Real Commonwealth Bank Login Page.
Fake Commonwealth Bank Login Page
Fake Commonwealth Bank Login Page

Because this poor cybersecurity habit is common amongst the general population, phishing campaigns could involve fake login pages for social media websites, such as LinkedIn, popular websites like Amazon, and even SaaS products. Hackers implementing such tactics hope the same credentials are used for logging into banking websites.

Cyber threat awareness training is the best defense against phishing, the most common attack vector leading to data breaches and ransomware attacks.

Because small businesses often lack the resources and expertise of larger companies, they usually don’t have the budget for additional security programs like awareness training. This is why, according to a recent report, 61% of small and medium-sized businesses experienced at least one cyber attack in the past year, and 40% experienced eight or more attacks.

Luckily, with the help of ChatGPT, small businesses can implement an internal threat awareness program at a fraction of the cost. Industries at a heightened risk of suffering a data breach, such as healthcare, should especially prioritize awareness of the cyber threat landscape.

Learn how to implement an internal cyber threat awareness campaign >

3. Use Multi-Factor Authentication

MFA and strong access management control to limit unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

Previously compromised passwords are often used to hack into accounts. MFA adds additional authentication protocols to the login process, making it difficult to compromise an account, even if hackers get their hands on a stolen password

4. Use Strong Access Management Controls

Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems ensure users only have access to the data and applications they need to do their jobs and that permissions are revoked when an employee leaves the company or changes roles.

The 2023 Thales Dara Threat Report found that 28% of respondents found IAM to be the most effective data security control preventing personal data compromise.

5. Keep All Software Patched and Updated

Keep all environments up-to-date by promptly applying patches and updates. Consider patching a “golden image” and deploying it across your environment. Perform regular scans and audits to identify potential security misconfigurations and missing patches.

An attack surface monitoring solution, such as UpGuard, can detect vulnerable software versions that have been impacted by zero-days and other known security flaws.

6. Deploy Security Tools

Security tools, such as intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) and security information and event management (SIEM) solutions, to monitor and respond to potential threats.

It’s essential also to implement tools to defend against tactics often used to complement data breach attempts, for example. DDoS attacks – a type of attack where a server is flooded with fake traffic to force it offline, allowing hackers to exploit security misconfigurations during the chaos of excessive downtime.

Another important security tool is a data leak detection solution for discovering compromised account credentials published on the dark web. These credentials, if exploited, allow hackers to compress the data breach lifecycle, making these events harder to detect and intercept.

Dara leaks compressing the data breach lifecycle.

Learn how to detect and prevent data leaks >

7. Implement a Zero-Trust Architecture

One of the main ways that companies can protect themselves from cloud-related security threats is by implementing a Zero Trust security architecture. This approach assumes all requests for access to resources are potentially malicious and, therefore, require additional verification before granting access.

Learn how to implement a Zero-Trust Architecture >

A Zero-Trust approach to security assumes that all users, devices, and networks are untrustworthy until proven otherwise.

8. Develop a Repeatable Hardening Process

Establish a process that can be easily replicated to ensure consistent, secure configurations across production, development, and QA environments. Use different passwords for each environment and automate the process for efficient deployment. Be sure to address IoT devices in the hardening process. 

These devices tend to be secured with their default factory passwords, making them highly vulnerable to DDoS attacks.

9. Implement a Secure Application Architecture

Design your application architecture to obfuscate general access to sensitive resources using the principle of network segmentation.

Learn more about network segmentation >

Cloud infrastructure has become a significant cybersecurity issue in the last decade. Barely a month goes by without a major security breach at a cloud service provider or a large corporation using cloud services.

10. Maintain a Structured Development Cycle

Facilitate security testing during development by adhering to a well-organized development process. Following cybersecurity best practices this early in the development process sets the foundation for a resilient security posture that will protect your data even as your company scales.

Implement a secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC) that incorporates security checkpoints at each stage of development, including requirements gathering, design, implementation, testing, and deployment. Additionally, train your development team in secure coding practices and encourage a culture of security awareness to help identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities before they make their way into production environments.

11. Review Custom Code

If using custom code, employ a static code security scanner before integrating it into the production environment. These scanners can automatically analyze code for potential vulnerabilities and compliance issues, reducing the risk of security misconfigurations.

Additionally, have security professionals conduct manual reviews and dynamic testing to identify issues that may not be detected by automated tools. This combination of automated and manual testing ensures that custom code is thoroughly vetted for security risks before deployment.

12. Utilize a Minimal Platform

Remove unused features, insecure frameworks, and unnecessary documentation, samples, or components from your platform. Adopt a “lean” approach to your software stack by only including components that are essential for your application’s functionality.

This reduces the attack surface and minimizes the chances of security misconfigurations. Furthermore, keep an inventory of all components and their associated security risks to better manage and mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

13. Review Cloud Storage Permissions

Regularly examine permissions for cloud storage, such as S3 buckets, and incorporate security configuration updates and reviews into your patch management process. This process should be a standard inclusion across all cloud security measures. Ensure that access controls are properly configured to follow the principle of least privilege, and encrypt sensitive data both in transit and at rest.

Implement monitoring and alerting mechanisms to detect unauthorized access or changes to your cloud storage configurations. By regularly reviewing and updating your cloud storage permissions, you can proactively identify and address potential security misconfigurations, thereby enhancing your organization’s data breach resilience.

How UpGuard Can Help

UpGuard’s IP monitoring feature monitors all IP addresses associated with your attack surface for security issues, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities. UpGuard’s attack surface monitoring solution can also identify common misconfigurations and security issues shared across your organization and its subsidiaries, including the exposure of WordPress user names, vulnerable server versions, and a range of attack vectors facilitating first and third data breaches.

UpGuard's Risk Profile feature displays security vulnerabilities associated with end-of-life software.
UpGuard’s Risk Profile feature displays security vulnerabilities associated with end-of-life software.

To further expand its mitigation of data breach threat categories, UpGuard offersa data leak detection solution that scans ransomware blogs on the dark web for compromised credentials, and any leaked data could help hackers breach your network and sensitive resources.

UpGuard's ransomware blog detection feature.
UpGuard’s ransomware blog detection feature.

Source :
https://www.upguard.com/blog/security-misconfigurations-causing-data-breaches

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