Intel Adds Hardware-Enabled Ransomware Detection to 11th Gen vPro Chips

Intel and Cybereason have partnered to build anti-ransomware defenses into the chipmaker’s newly announced 11th generation Core vPro business-class processors.

The hardware-based security enhancements are baked into Intel’s vPro platform via its Hardware Shield and Threat Detection Technology (TDT), enabling profiling and detection of ransomware and other threats that have an impact on the CPU performance.

“The joint solution represents the first instance where PC hardware plays a direct role in ransomware defenses to better protect enterprise endpoints from costly attacks,” Cybereason said.

Exclusive to vPro, Intel Hardware Shield provides protections against firmware-level attacks targeting the BIOS, thereby ensuring that the operating system (OS) runs on legitimate hardware as well as minimizing the risk of malicious code injection by locking down memory in the BIOS when the software is running to help prevent planted malware from compromising the OS.

Intel TDT, on the other hand, leverages a combination of CPU telemetry data and machine learning-based heuristics to identify anomalous attack behavior — including polymorphic malware, file-less scripts, crypto mining, and ransomware infections — in real-time.

“The Intel [CPU performance monitoring unit] sits beneath applications, the OS, and virtualization layers on the system and delivers a more accurate representation of active threats, system-wide,” Intel said. “As threats are detected in real-time, Intel TDT sends a high-fidelity signal that can trigger remediation workflows in the security vendor’s code.”

The development comes as ransomware attacks exploded in number last year, fueled in part by the COVID-19 pandemic, with average payout increasing from about $84,000 in 2019 to about $233,000 last year.

The ransomware infections have also led to a spike in “double extortion,” where cybercriminals steal sensitive data before deploying the ransomware and hold it hostage in hopes that the victims will pay up rather than risk having their information made public — thus completely undermining the practice of recovering from data backups and avoid paying ransoms.

What’s more, malware operators are increasingly extending their focus beyond the operating system of the device to lower layers to potentially deploy bootkits and take complete control of an infected system.

Last month, researchers detailed a new “TrickBoot” feature in TrickBot that can allow attackers to inject malicious code in the UEFI/BIOS firmware of a device to achieve persistence, avoid detection and carry out destructive or espionage-focused campaigns.

Viewed in that light, the collaboration between Intel and Cybereason is a step in the right direction, making it easier to detect and eradicate malware from the chip-level all the way to the endpoint.

“Cybereason’s multi-layered protection, in collaboration with Intel Threat Detection Technology, will enable full-stack visibility to swiftly detect and block ransomware attacks before the data can be encrypted or exfiltrated,” the companies said.

New Attack Could Let Hackers Clone Your Google Titan 2FA Security Keys

Hardware security keys—such as those from Google and Yubico—are considered the most secure means to protect accounts from phishing and takeover attacks.

But a new research published on Thursday demonstrates how an adversary in possession of such a two-factor authentication (2FA) device can clone it by exploiting an electromagnetic side-channel in the chip embedded in it.

The vulnerability (tracked as CVE-2021-3011) allows the bad actor to extract the encryption key or the ECDSA private key linked to a victim’s account from a FIDO Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) device like Google Titan Key or YubiKey, thus completely undermining the 2FA protections.

“The adversary can sign in to the victim’s application account without the U2F device, and without the victim noticing,” NinjaLab researchers Victor Lomne and Thomas Roche said in a 60-page analysis.

“In other words, the adversary created a clone of the U2F device for the victim’s application account. This clone will give access to the application account as long as the legitimate user does not revoke its second factor authentication credentials.”

The whole list of products impacted by the flaw includes all versions of Google Titan Security Key (all versions), Yubico Yubikey Neo, Feitian FIDO NFC USB-A / K9, Feitian MultiPass FIDO / K13, Feitian ePass FIDO USB-C / K21, and Feitian FIDO NFC USB-C / K40.

Besides the security keys, the attack can also be carried out on NXP JavaCard chips, including NXP J3D081_M59_DF, NXP J3A081, NXP J2E081_M64, NXP J3D145_M59, NXP J3D081_M59, NXP J3E145_M64, and NXP J3E081_M64_DF, and their respective variants.

The key-recovery attack, while doubtless severe, needs to meet a number of prerequisites in order to be successful.

An actor will have first to steal the target’s login and password of an account secured by the physical key, then stealthily gain access to Titan Security Key in question, not to mention acquire expensive equipment costing north of $12,000, and have enough expertise to build custom software to extract the key linked to the account.

“It is still safer to use your Google Titan Security Key or other impacted products as a FIDO U2F two-factor authentication token to sign in to applications rather than not using one,” the researchers said.

To clone the U2F key, the researchers set about the task by tearing the device down using a hot air gun to remove the plastic casing and expose the two microcontrollers soldered in it — a secure enclave (NXP A700X chip) that’s used to perform the cryptographic operations and a general-purpose chip that acts as a router between the USB/NFC interfaces and the authentication microcontroller.

Once this is achieved, the researchers say it’s possible to glean the ECDSA encryption key via a side-channel attack by observing the electromagnetic radiations coming off the NXP chip during ECDSA signatures, the core cryptographic operation of the FIDO U2F protocol that’s performed when a U2F key is registered for the first time to work with a new account.

A side-channel attack typically works based on information gained from the implementation of a computer system, rather than exploiting a weakness in the software. Often, such attacks leverage timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, and acoustic signals as a source of data leakage.

By acquiring 6,000 such side-channel traces of the U2F authentication request commands over a six-hour period, the researchers said they were able to recover the ECDSA private key linked to a FIDO U2F account created for the experiment using an unsupervised machine learning model.

Although the security of a hardware security key isn’t diminished by the above attack due to the limitations involved, a potential exploitation in the wild is not inconceivable.

“Nevertheless, this work shows that the Google Titan Security Key (or other impacted products) would not avoid [an] unnoticed security breach by attackers willing to put enough effort into it,” the researchers concluded. “Users that face such a threat should probably switch to other FIDO U2F hardware security keys, where no vulnerability has yet been discovered.”

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