A step-by-step guide to transferring domains to Cloudflare

23/06/2023

Transferring your domains to a new registrar isn’t something you do every day, and getting any step of the process wrong could mean downtime and disruption. That’s why this Speed Week we’ve prepared a domain transfer checklist. We want to empower anyone to quickly transfer their domains to Cloudflare Registrar, without worrying about missing any steps along the way or being left with any unanswered questions.

Domain Transfer Checklist

Confirm eligibility

  • Confirm you want to use Cloudflare’s nameservers: We built our registrar specifically for customers who want to use other Cloudflare products. This means domains registered with Cloudflare can only use our nameservers. If your domain requires non-Cloudflare nameservers then we’re not the right registrar for you.
  • Confirm Cloudflare supports your domain’s TLD: You can view the full list of TLDs we currently support hereNote: We plan to support .dev and .app by mid-July 2023.
  • Confirm your domain is not a premium domain or internationalized domain name (IDNs): Cloudflare currently does not support premium domains or internationalized domain names (Unicode).
  • Confirm your domain hasn’t been registered or transferred in the past 60 days: ICANN rules prohibit a domain from being transferred if it has been registered or previously transferred within the last 60 days.
  • Confirm your WHOIS Registrant contact information hasn’t been updated in the past 60 days: ICANN rules also prohibit a domain from being transferred if the WHOIS Registrant contact information was modified in the past 60 days.

Before you transfer

  • Gather your credentials for your current registrar: Make sure you have your credentials for your current registrar. It’s possible you haven’t logged in for many years and you may have to reset your password.
  • Make note of your current DNS settings: Make note of your current DNS settings: When transferring your domain, Cloudflare will automatically scan your DNS records, but you’ll want to capture your current settings in case there are any issues. If your current provider supports it, you could use the standard BIND Zone File format to export your records.
  • Remove WHOIS privacy (if necessary): In most cases, domains may be transferred even if WHOIS privacy services have been enabled. However, some registrars may prohibit the transfer if the WHOIS privacy service has been enabled.
  • Disable DNSSEC: You can disable DNSSEC by removing the DS record at your current DNS host and disabling DNSSEC in the Cloudflare dashboard.
  • Renew your domain if up for renewal in the next 15 days: If your domain is up for renewal, you’ll need to renew it with your current registrar before initiating a transfer to Cloudflare.
  • Unlock the domain: Registrars include a lightweight safeguard to prevent unauthorized users from starting domain transfers – often called a registrar or domain lock. This lock prevents any other registrar from attempting to initiate a transfer. Only the registrant can enable or disable this lock, typically through the administration interface of the registrar.
  • Sign up for Cloudflare: If you don’t already have a Cloudflare account, you can sign up here.
  • Add your domain to Cloudflare: You can add a new domain to your Cloudflare account by following these instructions.
  • Add a valid credit card to your Cloudflare account: If you haven’t already added a payment method into your  Cloudflare dashboard billing profile, you’ll be prompted to add one when you add your domain.
  • Review DNS records at Cloudflare: Once you’ve added your domain, review the DNS records that Cloudflare automatically configured with what you have at your current registrar to make sure nothing was missed.
  • Change your DNS nameservers to Cloudflare: In order to transfer your domain, your nameservers will need to be set to Cloudflare.
  • (optional) Configure Cloudflare Email Routing: If you’re using email forwarding, ensure that you follow this guide to migrate to Cloudflare Email Routing.
  • Wait for your DNS changes to propagate: Registrars can take up to 24 hours to process nameserver updates. You will receive an email when Cloudflare has confirmed that these changes are in place. You can’t proceed with transferring your domain until this process is complete.

Initiating and confirming transfer process

  • Request an authorization code: Cloudflare needs to confirm with your old registrar that the transfer flow is authorized. To do that, your old registrar will provide an authorization code to you. This code is often referred to as an authorization code, auth code, authinfo code, or transfer code. You will need to input that code to complete your transfer to Cloudflare. We will use it to confirm the transfer is authentic.
  • Initiate your transfer to Cloudflare: Visit the Transfer Domains section of your Cloudflare dashboard. Here you’ll be presented with any domains available for transfer. If your domain isn’t showing, ensure you completed all the proceeding steps. If you have, review the list on this page to see if any apply to your domain.
  • Review the transfer price: When you transfer a domain, you are required by ICANN to pay to extend its registration by one year from the expiration date. You will not be billed at this step. Cloudflare will only bill your card when you input the auth code and confirm the contact information at the conclusion of your transfer request.
  • Input your authorization code: In the next page, input the authorization code for each domain you are transferring.
  • Confirm or input your contact information: In the final stage of the transfer process, input the contact information for your registration. Cloudflare Registrar redacts this information by default but is required to collect the authentic contact information for this registration.
  • Approve the transfer with Cloudflare: Once you have requested your transfer, Cloudflare will begin processing it, and send a Form of Authorization (FOA) email to the registrant, if the information is available in the public WHOIS database. The FOA is what authorizes the domain transfer.
  • Approve the transfer with your previous registrar: After this step, your previous registrar will also email you to confirm your request to transfer. Most registrars will include a link to confirm the transfer request. If you follow that link, you can accelerate the transfer operation. If you do not act on the email, the registrar can wait up to five days to process the transfer to Cloudflare. You may also be able to approve the transfer from within your current registrar dashboard.
  • Follow your transfer status in your Cloudflare dashboard: Your domain transfer status will be viewable under Account Home > Overview > Domain Registration for your domain.

After you transfer

We protect entire corporate networks, help customers build Internet-scale applications efficiently, accelerate any website or Internet applicationward off DDoS attacks, keep hackers at bay, and can help you on your journey to Zero Trust.

Visit 1.1.1.1 from any device to get started with our free app that makes your Internet faster and safer.

To learn more about our mission to help build a better Internet, start here. If you’re looking for a new career direction, check out our open positions.

Source :
https://blog.cloudflare.com/a-step-by-step-guide-to-transferring-domains-to-cloudflare/

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

23/06/2023

Internet connections are most often marketed and sold on the basis of “speed”, with providers touting the number of megabits or gigabits per second that their various service tiers are supposed to provide. This marketing has largely been successful, as most subscribers believe that “more is better”. Furthermore, many national broadband plans in countries around the world include specific target connection speeds. However, even with a high speed connection, gamers may encounter sluggish performance, while video conference participants may experience frozen video or audio dropouts. Speeds alone don’t tell the whole story when it comes to Internet connection quality.

Additional factors like latency, jitter, and packet loss can significantly impact end user experience, potentially leading to situations where higher speed connections actually deliver a worse user experience than lower speed connections. Connection performance and quality can also vary based on usage – measured average speed will differ from peak available capacity, and latency varies under loaded and idle conditions.

The new Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality page

A little more than three years ago, as residential Internet connections were strained because of the shift towards working and learning from home due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Cloudflare announced the speed.cloudflare.com speed test tool, which enabled users to test the performance and quality of their Internet connection. Within the tool, users can download the results of their individual test as a CSV, or share the results on social media. However, there was no aggregated insight into Cloudflare speed test results at a network or country level to provide a perspective on connectivity characteristics across a larger population.

Today, we are launching these long-missing aggregated connection performance and quality insights on Cloudflare Radar. The new Internet Quality page provides both country and network (autonomous system) level insight into Internet connection performance (bandwidth) and quality (latencyjitter) over time. (Your Internet service provider is likely an autonomous system with its own autonomous system number (ASN), and many large companies, online platforms, and educational institutions also have their own autonomous systems and associated ASNs.) The insights we are providing are presented across two sections: the Internet Quality Index (IQI), which estimates average Internet quality based on aggregated measurements against a set of Cloudflare & third-party targets, and Connection Quality, which presents peak/best case connection characteristics based on speed.cloudflare.com test results aggregated over the previous 90 days. (Details on our approach to the analysis of this data are presented below.)

Users may note that individual speed test results, as well as the aggregate speed test results presented on the Internet Quality page will likely differ from those presented by other speed test tools. This can be due to a number of factors including differences in test endpoint locations (considering both geographic and network distance), test content selection, the impact of “rate boosting” by some ISPs, and testing over a single connection vs. multiple parallel connections. Infrequent testing (on any speed test tool) by users seeking to confirm perceived poor performance or validate purchased speeds will also contribute to the differences seen in the results published by the various speed test platforms.

And as we announced in April, Cloudflare has partnered with Measurement Lab (M-Lab) to create a publicly-available, queryable repository for speed test results. M-Lab is a non-profit third-party organization dedicated to providing a representative picture of Internet quality around the world. M-Lab produces and hosts the Network Diagnostic Tool, which is a very popular network quality test that records millions of samples a day. Given their mission to provide a publicly viewable, representative picture of Internet quality, we chose to partner with them to provide an accurate view of your Internet experience and the experience of others around the world using openly available data.

Connection speed & quality data is important

While most advertisements for fixed broadband and mobile connectivity tend to focus on download speeds (and peak speeds at that), there’s more to an Internet connection, and the user’s experience with that Internet connection, than that single metric. In addition to download speeds, users should also understand the upload speeds that their connection is capable of, as well as the quality of the connection, as expressed through metrics known as latency and jitter. Getting insight into all of these metrics provides a more well-rounded view of a given Internet connection, or in aggregate, the state of Internet connectivity across a geography or network.

The concept of download speeds are fairly well understood as a measure of performance. However, it is important to note that the average download speeds experienced by a user during common Web browsing activities, which often involves the parallel retrieval of multiple smaller files from multiple hosts, can differ significantly from peak download speeds, where the user is downloading a single large file (such as a video or software update), which allows the connection to reach maximum performance. The bandwidth (speed) available for upload is sometimes mentioned in ISP advertisements, but doesn’t receive much attention. (And depending on the type of Internet connection, there’s often a significant difference between the available upload and download speeds.) However, the importance of upload came to the forefront in 2020 as video conferencing tools saw a surge in usage as both work meetings and school classes shifted to the Internet during the COVID-19 pandemic. To share your audio and video with other participants, you need sufficient upload bandwidth, and this issue was often compounded by multiple people sharing a single residential Internet connection.

Latency is the time it takes data to move through the Internet, and is measured in the number of milliseconds that it takes a packet of data to go from a client (such as your computer or mobile device) to a server, and then back to the client. In contrast to speed metrics, lower latency is preferable. This is especially true for use cases like online gaming where latency can make a difference between a character’s life and death in the game, as well as video conferencing, where higher latency can cause choppy audio and video experiences, but it also impacts web page performance. The latency metric can be further broken down into loaded and idle latency. The former measures latency on a loaded connection, where bandwidth is actively being consumed, while the latter measures latency on an “idle” connection, when there is no other network traffic present. (These specific loaded and idle definitions are from the device’s perspective, and more specifically, from the speed test application’s perspective. Unless the speed test is being performed directly from a router, the device/application doesn’t have insight into traffic on the rest of the network.) Jitter is the average variation found in consecutive latency measurements, and can be measured on both idle and loaded connections. A lower number means that the latency measurements are more consistent. As with latency, Internet connections should have minimal jitter, which helps provide more consistent performance.

Our approach to data analysis

The Internet Quality Index (IQI) and Connection Quality sections get their data from two different sources, providing two different (albeit related) perspectives. Under the hood they share some common principles, though.

IQI builds upon the mechanism we already use to regularly benchmark ourselves against other industry players. It is based on end user measurements against a set of Cloudflare and third-party targets, meant to represent a pattern that has become very common in the modern Internet, where most content is served from distribution networks with points of presence spread throughout the world. For this reason, and by design, IQI will show worse results for regions and Internet providers that rely on international (rather than peering) links for most content.

IQI is also designed to reflect the traffic load most commonly associated with web browsing, rather than more intensive use. This, and the chosen set of measurement targets, effectively biases the numbers towards what end users experience in practice (where latency plays an important role in how fast things can go).

For each metric covered by IQI, and for each ASN, we calculate the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile at 15 minute intervals. At the country level and above, the three calculated numbers for each ASN visible from that region are independently aggregated. This aggregation takes the estimated user population of each ASN into account, biasing the numbers away from networks that source a lot of automated traffic but have few end users.

The Connection Quality section gets its data from the Cloudflare Speed Test tool, which exercises a user’s connection in order to see how well it is able to perform. It measures against the closest Cloudflare location, providing a good balance of realistic results and network proximity to the end user. We have a presence in 285 cities around the world, allowing us to be pretty close to most users.

Similar to the IQI, we calculate the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile for each ASN. But here these three numbers are immediately combined using an operation called the trimean — a single number meant to balance the best connection quality that most users have, with the best quality available from that ASN (users may not subscribe to the best available plan for a number of reasons).

Because users may choose to run a speed test for different motives at different times, and also because we take privacy very seriously and don’t record any personally identifiable information along with test results, we aggregate at 90-day intervals to capture as much variability as we can.

At the country level and above, the calculated trimean for each ASN in that region is aggregated. This, again, takes the estimated user population of each ASN into account, biasing the numbers away from networks that have few end users but which may still have technicians using the Cloudflare Speed Test to assess the performance of their network.

The new Internet Quality page includes three views: Global, country-level, and autonomous system (AS). In line with the other pages on Cloudflare Radar, the country-level and AS pages show the same data sets, differing only in their level of aggregation. Below, we highlight the various components of the Internet Quality page.

Global

The top section of the global (worldwide) view includes time series graphs of the Internet Quality Index metrics aggregated at a continent level. The time frame shown in the graphs is governed by the selection made in the time frame drop down at the upper right of the page, and at launch, data for only the last three months is available. For users interested in examining a specific continent, clicking on the other continent names in the legend removes them from the graph. Although continent-level aggregation is still rather coarse, it still provides some insight into regional Internet quality around the world.

Further down the page, the Connection Quality section presents a choropleth map, with countries shaded according to the values of the speed, latency, or jitter metric selected from the drop-down menu. Hovering over a country displays a label with the country’s name and metric value, and clicking on the country takes you to the country’s Internet Quality page. Note that in contrast to the IQI section, the Connection Quality section always displays data aggregated over the previous 90 days.

Country-level

Within the country-level page (using Canada as an example in the figures below), the country’s IQI metrics over the selected time frame are displayed. These time series graphs show the median bandwidth, latency, and DNS response time within a shaded band bounded at the 25th and 75th percentile and represent the average expected user experience across the country, as discussed in the Our approach to data analysis section above.

Below that is the Connection Quality section, which provides a summary view of the country’s measured upload and download speeds, as well as latency and jitter, over the previous 90 days. The colored wedges in the Performance Summary graph are intended to illustrate aggregate connection quality at a glance, with an “ideal” connection having larger upload and download wedges and smaller latency and jitter wedges. Hovering over the wedges displays the metric’s value, which is also shown in the table to the right of the graph.

Below that, the Bandwidth and Latency/Jitter histograms illustrate the bucketed distribution of upload and download speeds, and latency and jitter measurements. In some cases, the speed histograms may show a noticeable bar at 1 Gbps, or 1000 ms (1 second) on the latency/jitter histograms. The presence of such a bar indicates that there is a set of measurements with values greater than the 1 Gbps/1000 ms maximum histogram values.

Autonomous system level

Within the upper-right section of the country-level page, a list of the top five autonomous systems within the country is shown. Clicking on an ASN takes you to the Performance page for that autonomous system. For others not displayed in the top five list, you can use the search bar at the top of the page to search by autonomous system name or number. The graphs shown within the AS level view are identical to those shown at a country level, but obviously at a different level of aggregation. You can find the ASN that you are connected to from the My Connection page on Cloudflare Radar.

Exploring connection performance & quality data

Digging into the IQI and Connection Quality visualizations can surface some interesting observations, including characterizing Internet connections, and the impact of Internet disruptions, including shutdowns and network issues. We explore some examples below.

Characterizing Internet connections

Verizon FiOS is a residential fiber-based Internet service available to customers in the United States. Fiber-based Internet services (as opposed to cable-based, DSL, dial-up, or satellite) will generally offer symmetric upload and download speeds, and the FiOS plans page shows this to be the case, offering 300 Mbps (upload & download), 500 Mbps (upload & download), and “1 Gig” (Verizon claims average wired speeds between 750-940 Mbps download / 750-880 Mbps upload) plans. Verizon carries FiOS traffic on AS701 (labeled UUNET due to a historical acquisition), and in looking at the bandwidth histogram for AS701, several things stand out. The first is a rough symmetry in upload and download speeds. (A cable-based Internet service provider, in contrast, would generally show a wide spread of download speeds, but have upload speeds clustered at the lower end of the range.) Another is the peaks around 300 Mbps and 750 Mbps, suggesting that the 300 Mbps and “1 Gig” plans may be more popular than the 500 Mbps plan. It is also clear that there are a significant number of test results with speeds below 300 Mbps. This is due to several factors: one is that Verizon also carries lower speed non-FiOS traffic on AS701, while another is that erratic nature of in-home WiFi often means that the speeds achieved on a test will be lower than the purchased service level.

Traffic shifts drive latency shifts

On May 9, 2023, the government of Pakistan ordered the shutdown of mobile network services in the wake of protests following the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Our blog post covering this shutdown looked at the impact from a traffic perspective. Within the post, we noted that autonomous systems associated with fixed broadband networks saw significant increases in traffic when the mobile networks were shut down – that is, some users shifted to using fixed networks (home broadband) when mobile networks were unavailable.

Examining IQI data after the blog post was published, we found that the impact of this traffic shift was also visible in our latency data. As can be seen in the shaded area of the graph below, the shutdown of the mobile networks resulted in the median latency dropping about 25% as usage shifted from higher latency mobile networks to lower latency fixed broadband networks. An increase in latency is visible in the graph when mobile connectivity was restored on May 12.

Bandwidth shifts as a potential early warning sign

On April 4, UK mobile operator Virgin Media suffered several brief outages. In examining the IQI bandwidth graph for AS5089, the ASN used by Virgin Media (formerly branded as NTL), indications of a potential problem are visible several days before the outages occurred, as median bandwidth dropped by about a third, from around 35 Mbps to around 23 Mbps. The outages are visible in the circled area in the graph below. Published reports indicate that the problems lasted into April 5, in line with the lower median bandwidth measured through mid-day.

Submarine cable issues cause slower browsing

On June 5, Philippine Internet provider PLDT Tweeted an advisory that noted “One of our submarine cable partners confirms a loss in some of its internet bandwidth capacity, and thus causing slower Internet browsing.” IQI latency and bandwidth graphs for AS9299, a primary ASN used by PLDT, shows clear shifts starting around 06:45 UTC (14:45 local time). Median bandwidth dropped by half, from 17 Mbps to 8 Mbps, while median latency increased by 75% from 37 ms to around 65 ms. 75th percentile latency also saw a significant increase, nearly tripling from 63 ms to 180 ms coincident with the reported submarine cable issue.

Conclusion

Making network performance and quality insights available on Cloudflare Radar supports Cloudflare’s mission to help build a better Internet. However, we’re not done yet – we have more enhancements planned. These include making data available at a more granular geographical level (such as state and possibly city), incorporating AIM scores to help assess Internet quality for specific types of use cases, and embedding the Cloudflare speed test directly on Radar using the open source JavaScript module.

In the meantime, we invite you to use speed.cloudflare.com to test the performance and quality of your Internet connection, share any country or AS-level insights you discover on social media (tag @CloudflareRadar on Twitter or @radar@cloudflare.social on Mastodon), and explore the underlying data through the M-Lab repository or the Radar API.

Watch on Cloudflare TV

https://customer-rhnwzxvb3mg4wz3v.cloudflarestream.com/debcbed2114d086c870059ac604eca49/iframe?preload=true&poster=https%3A%2F%2Fcustomer-rhnwzxvb3mg4wz3v.cloudflarestream.com%2Fdebcbed2114d086c870059ac604eca49%2Fthumbnails%2Fthumbnail.jpg%3Ftime%3D1s%26height%3D600

We protect entire corporate networks, help customers build Internet-scale applications efficiently, accelerate any website or Internet applicationward off DDoS attacks, keep hackers at bay, and can help you on your journey to Zero Trust.

Visit 1.1.1.1 from any device to get started with our free app that makes your Internet faster and safer.

To learn more about our mission to help build a better Internet, start here. If you’re looking for a new career direction, check out our open positions.

 Discuss on Hacker News

Source :
https://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-radar-internet-quality-page/

How Cloud Migration Helps Improve Employee Experience

Last updated: June 26, 2023
DEX ITSM and ITAM

The old saying goes, “practice what you preach.” When Ivanti started its “Customer Zero” initiative, Bob Grazioli, Chief Information Officer, saw it as a perfect opportunity to test the products and services consumed by customers.  

For example, during Ivanti’s move to the cloud, Grazioli and the team experienced the same issues that customers would’ve experienced in their migration process. This first-hand experience allowed them to make improvements along the way. Listen to Grazioli go into detail about other crucial findings in the Customer Zero initiative and how expanding ITSM helps elevate the employee experience. 

Key learnings from Ivanti’s “Customer Zero” program  

https://youtube.com/watch?v=unBhdg2rwkg%3Fenablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“That’s great to call out our Customer Zero program because we’re really proud of it, actually. We are the first customer in Ivanti. We take every one of our tools that are obviously applicable to IT or SaaS and we implement them first, before the customer,  to provide the feedback to our product managers, our engineering team and make sure that that feedback either makes it into the product or eliminates any potential problems that our customers might experience if something obviously wasn’t discovered during our testing.   

But having said that, we have learned an awful lot about actually moving from on-prem to SaaS. If you look at what we’ve done with Customer Zero, our focus now has been to take a look at the Ivanti on-prem products and move ourself to the cloud. Obviously, I manage SaaS, so I’m very biased towards being in the cloud and that is our focus right now. So, we’ve taken patch, we’ve moved that from on-prem to cloud.  

We now have taken our ITSM converged product with workflow management, with all of low-code, no code, we moved that into IT for ITSM. We have our own CMDB that we’re running against Discovery. Going out to our data centers, we have close to what, 40 different geos globally that we manage — thousands and thousands of assets across all of those data centers. Those are all being discovered placed in our own CMBD and managed.   

We’re now deploying GRC for our compliance. We were like a lot of, you know, companies struggle through our SOC 2, SOC 2 type 2, where artifacts are put into certain repositories. We managed those assets. Now we have GRC, where all those artifacts get managed to ITSM. They’re linked to the proper controls. It makes the audit process so much simpler, so much easier for us to get through every year for compliance.    

We’re learning that through the efficiency of moving to cloud from on-prem to SaaS, we’re learning those efficiencies do save us time, have a great ROI in terms of the OpeEx – CapEx equation, if most of you CIOs that go through that, there is a big advantage on the Capex-Opex side.”

Using ITSM to support a broader organization  

https://youtube.com/watch?v=unBhdg2rwkg%3Fstart%3D152%26enablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“And then, just having all of our data in the cloud in ITSM, as I said earlier, becoming a single source of truth for PatchDiscovery, RiskSense [now known as Risk-Based Vulnerability Mangement] vulnerabilities. And obviously, the main focus, all the tickets that are created on the customer facing side, giving us insight into the customer, into what they’re using or what they’re not using. So really, adoption, big part of obviously what you need in SaaS to manage, the real true user experience.   

It really has been eye opening, moving all of our products from on-prem to SaaS, leveraging those SaaS products in our own cloud, gaining that experience, pushing it back to product managers, pushing it back to engineering to produce a better quality product and a better service for all of our customers as they migrate to the cloud.   

So, we kind of blunt any particular problems that our customers would have experienced when they move from on-prem to cloud. Customer Zero – it’s definitely eliminating a lot of issues that customers would have had if they move on-prem to SaaS. And we’re providing valuable telemetry to help improve our product and improve the quality and service to our customers.” 

Important takeaways from Ivanti’s Customer Zero initiative 

https://youtube.com/watch?v=IzbJvG6Izs0%3Fenablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“Well, so we’ve improved our catalog for service requests and so on. That is the evolution of what ITSM should do. But DEX is the key. Having all of those tickets in ITSM that show customer issues or customer successes or what they’re using in our product, etc.

That is the game changer because now, as I said earlier, having DEX out there, looking at all those tickets, analyzing the tickets and then proactively either anticipating a problem with their device or potentially the way a customer is adopting certain technologies that we pushed out into the environment.  

Those tickets are gold for that level of telemetry that allows us to gain the insights we need to provide the customer with a better experience. I think ticket management is really, it’s tough — you don’t want a lot of tickets, obviously, because sometimes that’s not a good thing. But what these tickets represent in terms of knowledge of the customer, it really is instrumental in us making things better, making the service better and having the customer have a better experience.” 

How to use DEX to drive cultural change  

https://youtube.com/watch?v=x71aP3P4OCs%3Fenablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“I mean, we use the word culture, but let’s face it, the generation of customers that are out there today growing up with technology and having the ability to control a lot of that technology right at their fingertips, that’s really what you’re trying to accommodate.  

You don’t want someone to come into your company as an employee and have them not have that same experience. Not have them engaged with technology the same way they can engage at home or anywhere else out in the market. That’s what we’re trying to get to and be for that customer.   

And we’re doing that because today, with the proactive nature that we’re creating within our products. Proactive nature, that’s DEX.  

That’s having all that intelligence to engage the customer with empathy and with a proactive approach to giving them a solution to whatever issue they have. It’s empathy to what they’re going through and then proactively providing them with a fast, reliable solution to whatever experience they’re calling in on. 

I think that’s our goal and I think ITSM is evolving to that because again, of the amount of information it’s able to collect and use with all of the AI and ML that we’re applying to it, to really create that more proactive experience with a very intelligent, very tech savvy customer that we have both in and outside our company.   

And that’s happening. That’s the culture, if you will, that I see, that I’m engaged with, and we want to make sure our products can satisfy. ”

Broadening ITSM to support other areas brings with it new levels of proactive troubleshooting and empathy, helping you drive a better digital employee experience.

.

If you’d like to learn more, dive into our ITSM + toolkit and listen to this on-demand webinar on Expanding your ITSM: key learnings for building connected enterprise workflows.  

Source :
https://www.ivanti.com/blog/how-cloud-migration-helps-improve-employee-experience

Configure DoH on your browser

There are several browsers compatible with DNS over HTTPS (DoH). This protocol lets you encrypt your connection to 1.1.1.1 in order to protect your DNS queries from privacy intrusions and tampering.

Some browsers might already have this setting enabled.

​​Mozilla Firefox

  1. Select the menu button > Settings.
  2. In the General menu, scroll down to access Network Settings.
  3. Select Settings.
  4. Select Enable DNS over HTTPS. By default, it resolves to Cloudflare DNS.

​​Google Chrome

  1. Select the three-dot menu in your browser > Settings.
  2. Select Privacy and security > Security.
  3. Scroll down and enable Use secure DNS.
  4. Select the With option, and from the drop-down menu choose Cloudflare (1.1.1.1).

​​Microsoft Edge

  1. Select the three-dot menu in your browser > Settings.
  2. Select Privacy, Search, and Services, and scroll down to Security.
  3. Enable Use secure DNS.
  4. Select Choose a service provider.
  5. Select the Enter custom provider drop-down menu and choose Cloudflare (1.1.1.1).

​​Brave

  1. Select the menu button in your browser > Settings.
  2. Select Security and Privacy > Security.
  3. Enable Use secure DNS.
  4. Select With Custom and choose Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) as a service provider from the drop-down menu.

​​Check if browser is configured correctly

Visit 1.1.1.1 help pageOpen external link and check if Using DNS over HTTPS (DoH) show Yes.

Source :
https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/encryption/dns-over-https/encrypted-dns-browsers/

SeroXen Mechanisms: Exploring Distribution, Risks, and Impact

By: Peter Girnus, Aliakbar Zahravi
June 20, 2023
Read time: 10 min (2790 words)

This is the third installment of a three-part technical analysis of the fully undetectable (FUD) obfuscation engine BatCloak and SeroXen malware. In this entry, we document the techniques used to spread and abuse SeroXen, as well as the security risks, impact, implications of, and insights into highly evasive FUD batch obfuscators.

The remote access trojan (RAT) SeroXen tool can be purchased on the clearnet. During our investigation, we uncovered multiple domains selling not only this nefarious tool but also a cracked version of it hosted on a popular crack forum. We also uncovered individuals on popular video sites such as YouTube and TikTok acting as distributors for this piece of fully undetectable (FUD) malicious software. At the time of writing, many of these videos remain available for viewing.

This is the final installment of a three-part series delving into BatCloak and SeroXen. The first entry, titled “The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression,” looked into the evolution of the BatCloak obfuscation engine, while the second part, titled “SeroXen Incorporates Latest BatCloak Engine Iteration,” discussed the SeroXen malware and its inclusion of the latest iteration of BatCloak to generate an FUD “.bat” loader.

Distribution methods: SeroXen’s online platforms

In this section, we break down the different platforms that SeroXen uses to spread malware.

Website

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Figure 1. SeroXen website

The tool SeroXen sports a sleek website with pages that users might expect from any number of websites selling software on the internet. However, sometime between the last week of May and the first week of June, a new shutdown notice has surfaced on its website due to SeroXen’s popularity and cybercriminal efficacy. Considering the content of the notice, there are strong indications that this shutdown is merely for show and that distribution is still ongoing through other platforms and channels.

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Figure 2. SeroXen’s website shutdown notice

Prior to the shutdown notice, we observed the main SeroXen website offering a comprehensive list of features to prospective consumers. Examining some of the core features advertised by SeroXen shows a rich feature selection, including:

  • A Windows Defender-guaranteed bypass for both scan time and runtime.
  • FUD scan time and runtime evasion against most antivirus engines.
  • Hidden Virtual Network Computing (hVNC).
  • Full modern Windows support.
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Figure 3. SeroXen’s features list

In addition to the sophisticated evasion and FUD component, the inclusion of hVNC is concerning as it is often deployed by highly sophisticated types of malware and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. The hVNC component allows threat actors to operate a hidden or “virtual” desktop rather than the main desktop to keep the malicious sessions in the background running uninterrupted.

Meanwhile, the SeroXen web application provides users with the option to acquire either a monthly license key or a lifetime key using cryptocurrency.

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Figure 4. SeroXen monthly subscription (top) and lifetime (bottom) price options
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Figure 5. SeroXen is currently unavailable for purchase at the website

The SeroXen web application also boasts a product support team available from Monday to Friday following a location for a time zone reference in the US. The Telegram account of the developer is also available for messaging, and the relevant channels are still active. At one point, a Discord account might also have been available for contact, although it was already unavailable at the time of this writing.

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Figure 6. SeroXen’s product support offers

During our investigation, we encountered the disclosure of the developers and contributors associated with SeroXen’s development. Notably, the list includes the individual who also contributed to the creation of batch obfuscators such as Jlaive, BatCrypt, CryBat, Exe2Bat, and ScrubCrypt. This direct linkage therefore establishes a clear association between these historical FUD batch obfuscators and the SeroXen malware. In June, we also noticed that the website’s acknowledgments included the social media handle of the distributor.

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Figure 7. The developers of Jlaive, BatCloak, CryBat, Exe2Bat, ScrubCrypt, and social media distributor’s username acknowledged on the SeroXen website

Social media accounts

While investigating SeroXen’s website, we uncovered a link to a review video hosted on YouTube. 

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Figure 8. Link to SeroXen review hosted on YouTube

The content is presented as a “review” and facilitated by a reseller. More importantly, it functions not only as an evaluation but also as a promotional advertisement coupled with a tutorial showcasing the capabilities of SeroXen. We found a collection of videos that was also attributed to a reseller of the malware. These videos function to endorse and market SeroXen, reinforcing its presence and appeal within the designated market. Details such as knowledge, discounts offered, and claims of being a distributor indicate the increased likelihood of this user being connected to the owner of the web app.

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Figure 9. SeroXen YouTube advertisements
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Figure 10. SeroXen distributor selling the malware on YouTube

Certain prospective customers of SeroXen have demonstrated an inclination toward exploring specific aspects associated with illicit activities. Their expressed interest encompasses the use of SeroXen in the context of engaging in potentially unlawful endeavors within the Roblox community.

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Figure 11. Prospective customer interested in Roblox cookie theft

For context, Roblox is a widely popular video game with a user base of over 214 million active monthly users across the globe, predominantly comprised of minors, with approximately 67% of the player demographic aged below 16 years. In the US, over half of Roblox players are minors. In Figure 10, the significance of the inquiry lies in the potential risks and impact associated with the theft of the .ROBLOSECURITY cookie from an unsuspecting victim. If successfully stolen, this cookie would grant a threat actor the ability to compromise the targeted Roblox account by overriding two-factor authentication (2FA).

This exchange also highlights the risk associated with highly evasive and modular types of malware — namely, a modular design with the ability to load additional components to create a bigger impact on targeted and unwitting victims. In this instance, the reseller mentions the ability to use SeroXen with Hazard, a stealer with many features, including the capability to steal Discord webhooks.

At one point, the distributor sold SeroXen on Discord, but their accounts have a history of being terminated. In an exchange with a prospective customer on YouTube, a YouTube channel owner shows a clear understanding of how this tool will be used for criminal activity, after which they encourage a prospective customer to get in touch with them since they are a reseller. We also uncovered the reseller’s Twitter profile, which hosted more promotional content for SeroXen.

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Figure 12. A reseller’s conversation with a prospective buyer on YouTube (top) and the reseller’s YouTube and Twitter profiles (middle and bottom)

As of this blog entry’s week of publishing, we noted that the social media distributor confirmed that SeroXen’s “sale” (referred to only as “offsale” on the website) is now offline. Still, this mainstream availability and exchange raise substantial concerns, given its occurrence outside the boundaries of underground hacking forums. While researchers and ordinary users alike might expect this kind of complacence and leeway on the darknet, they do not expect the same on a popular mainstream platform such as YouTube. This underscores the potential implications of the exchange, as it indicates that cybercriminals have become bolder in infiltrating mainstream platforms online. In turn, malicious activities and discussions related to illicit cybersecurity practices are now able to infiltrate mainstream online platforms.

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Figure 13. SeroXen’s social media distributor confirms the RAT as unavailable for interested buyers/users

Additionally, during the investigation of this reseller’s YouTube profile we uncovered a batch-to-dropper file uploaded to Virus Total around the time of the latest SeroXen promotional video. The name of the batch file matches the username of this reseller’s YouTube profile. This batch attempts to download an infected batch file from Discord and run the infected file that leads to a SeroXen infection.

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Figure 14. YouTube reseller includes SeroXen developer’s Telegram handle
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Figure 15. Reseller names file after uploading to a public repository, matching it with their YouTube profile name

SeroXen’s forum presence

We also discovered that the author of SeroXen actively engages with prominent hacking enthusiast forums to promote and distribute the malware. This strategic use of established forums catering to the hacking community serves as an additional avenue for the author to market and sell SeroXen, expanding its reach.

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Figure 16. SeroXen advertisement on a popular hacking forum

Upon investigating the post of SeroXen’s developer, we saw that the author of Jlaive, BatCrypt, CryBat, Exe2Bat, and ScrubCrypt was once again acknowledged as playing a part in the development of SeroXen’s FUD capabilities. Additionally, on another forum, we found a cracked version of SeroXen that allows cybercriminals to bypass the payment requirement set up by the malware’s original developers.

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Figure 17. Acknowledgement of developers and contributors in a forum post
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Figure 18. A cracked version of SeroXen

Examining the prevalence and impact of SeroXen

Throughout our investigation of the scope of infections, we discovered a substantial collection of forum posts containing reports from victims who fell prey to the SeroXen infection. This particular strain of malware showed a notable increase in users reporting their infections, with well-meaning individuals advising victims to implement security and antivirus solutions, which all failed to detect any malicious activity. This then perpetuates a distressing cycle of infections driven by the malware’s FUD capabilities.

Understanding SeroXen infections through an analysis of community discussions

We conducted an analysis on Reddit by analyzing reports of SeroXen infections. Many of these posts reported that the users noticed suspicious actions but were powerless to remediate the ongoing infection.

We went through different forum threads and observed a common theme among the scores of individuals whose systems were infected: they were downloading and executing highly suspect pieces of software hosted on Discord and other file-hosting services related to special interests. We also noticed reports of deceptive batch installers (downloaded from GitHub) claiming to be legitimate software installers or tools for highly sought-after applications and interests like Photoshop, image loggers, TikTok, quality-of-life tools, and Tor, among others. The primary intention behind this fraudulent activity is to lure unsuspecting individuals into unintentionally installing malicious programs that lead to compromise. 

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Figure 19. A user’s system is infected after they download the game Counter Strike: Global Offensive (CSGO).
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Figure 20. Samples of users reporting infections

Based on our analysis of the collected samples, one of the largest target communities are gamers playing popular titles such as Roblox, Valorant, Counter Strike, Call of Duty, and Fortnite. These multiplayer online games contain a rich ecosystem of desirable, high-value, and in-game items that make a rich in-game economy, making them a viable target of malicious actors using SeroXen. In particular, theft appears to be the primary motive driving these infections. Over the years, a thriving underground ecosystem has been established for the illicit resale of stolen in-game items, with a particular emphasis on the popular game Roblox via beaming.

What is Roblox beaming?

Within the Roblox community, the unauthorized sale of items, referred to as “beaming” in the community, has proven itself to be an immensely profitable venture for nefarious actors. It is worth noting that certain rare items within Roblox, known as “limiteds,” can command significant prices that reach thousands of dollars in real-world commercial values. Discord has served as fertile ground  for buying and selling these items, allowing cybercriminals to exploit and profit from unsuspecting children who fall victim to their schemes.

During our investigation, we uncovered a thriving underground community using Discord to post stolen cookies to beam victims. Frequently, the practice of beaming is employed to generate content specifically intended for popular online platforms like YouTube and TikTok. Numerous individuals, often including minors, are subjected to beaming for the purpose of entertainment. Over the course of our investigation, we also uncovered many instances of beaming tutorials and how-to videos on both TikTok and YouTube.

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Figure 21. A .ROBLOSECURITY cookie posted on Discord for beaming
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Figure 22. Roblox beaming videos on YouTube (top and middle) and TikTok (bottom)
fig23-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 23. Roblox beaming tutorials on TikTok

Furthermore, our findings have revealed that these video platforms frequently function as recruitment platforms, funneling individuals into beaming Discord channels to engage in unethical and detrimental activities.

fig24-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 24. A Roblox beamer recruitment video on TikTok

FUD batch obfuscation techniques coupled with hVNC-capable toolkits provide actors powerful tools not only for stealing content but also for creating significant psychological distress in communities with a significant number of minors.

Examining SeroXen infections with insights from the Microsoft Support community

During our investigation of the prevalence and impact of SeroXen infections, we also examined posts within the Microsoft Support community. We observed striking similarities between the infection chain reported in this community and the discussions in Reddit. Moreover, a deeper understanding of the actions perpetrated revealed two distinct and concerning patterns. The first pattern involved direct extortion tactics, while the second involved the issuance of threats to victims’ lives through swatting.

fig25-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 25. Samples of reports seeking help against an extortion attempt (top) and a threat of swatting (bottom) after hackers gain control of users’ infected systems through SeroXen

Conclusion

Considering the capabilities and potential damage resulting from this tool, the costs for entry are low to null (given the cracked versions available online). This means that both cybercriminals and script kiddies experimenting with malware deployments can avail of SeroXen. Depending on the goals of cybercriminals — whether they care for arrests and notoriety or simply want to spread the tool — the sophistication of the infection routines does not appear to match with the chosen methods for distribution. The almost-amateur approach of using social media for aggressive promotion, considering how it can be easily traced, makes these developers seem like novices by advanced threat actors’ standards. That being said, the real-life consequences of abusing highly evasive malware as a tool to threaten other users via swatting and other threats to personal safety remain highly concerning especially as these developers might interact with online communities populated by minors.

The addition of SeroXen and BatCloak to the malware arsenal of malicious actors highlights the evolution of FUD obfuscators with a low barrier to entry. This can be considered an upcoming trend for a range of cybercriminals who can use a wide range of distribution mechanisms like Discord and social media platforms and their features (such as YouTube and short-from videos in TikTok) to push their preferred types of destructive software for abuse. Additionally, this trend also highlights the potential of highly evasive malware to proliferate in communities that host a significant number of minors who might be ill-equipped to confront destructive pieces of malware. Considering the low-to-nil detections in public repositories once a piece of malware is armed with these tools, this evolution presents new challenges to security teams and organizations alike, especially since FUD obfuscation can be used to deliver any kind of imaginable threat, including those that are not yet known.

Parents and guardians are encouraged to proactively familiarize themselves with the contemporary digital dynamics their children use regularly. This includes gaining an understanding of the various online communities that their children participate in, as well as communicating essential safe online practices and skills to their children. Adults are also encouraged to familiarize themselves with the colloquialisms minors use online and the platforms they frequent. By becoming familiar with these areas and simultaneously equipping children with such knowledge, guardians can play a pivotal role in ensuring everyone’s online safety and well-being.

Trend Vision One™️ enables security teams to continuously identify the attack surface, including known, unknown, managed, and unmanaged cyber assets. It automatically prioritizes risks, including vulnerabilities, for remediation, taking into account critical factors such as the likelihood and impact of potential attacks. Vision One offers comprehensive prevention, detection, and response capabilities backed by AI, advanced threat research, and intelligence. This leads to faster mean time to detect, respond, and remediate, improving the overall security posture and effectiveness.

When uncertain of intrusions, behaviors, and routines, assume compromise or breach immediately to isolate affected artifacts or tool chains. With a broader perspective and rapid response, an organization can address these and keep the rest of its systems protected. Organizations should consider a cutting-edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions such as Trend Micro™ XDR that can detect, scan, and block malicious content across the modern threat landscape.

Our commitment to online safety

Trend Micro is committed to digital safety through our Trend Micro Initiative for Education , our outreach program that aims to improve internet safety awareness, digital literacy, and malware defense capabilities for a safer digital world. Our initiatives and participation for security and safety include but are not limited to:

If you receive a swatting threat or information that an individual is planning to engage in swatting activities, please report it to local law enforcement and/or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at 1-800-CALL-FBI immediately.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-and-impact.html

SeroXen Incorporates Latest BatCloak Engine Iteration

By: Peter Girnus, Aliakbar Zahravi
June 15, 2023
Read time: 7 min (2020 words)

We looked into the documented behavior of SeroXen malware and noted the inclusion of the latest iteration of the batch obfuscation engine BatCloak to generate a fully undetectable (FUD) .bat loader. This is the second part of a three-part series documenting the abuse of BatCloak’s evasion capabilities and interoperability with other malware.

The recent rise of highly sophisticated malware’s ability to evade detection through fully undetectable (FUD) capabilities, low-cost financial accessibility, and minimal skill barriers have created a pervasive threat targeting online communities and organizations. One particular malware known as SeroXen has deployed an advanced, fully undetectable (FUD) technique via highly obfuscated batch files to infect victims with hVNC-(Hidden Virtual Network Computing) capable malware.

This entry is the second installment of a three-part series featuring BatCloak engine, its iterations, and inclusion in SeroXen malware as the main loading mechanism. The first entry, titled “The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression,” looked into the beginnings and evolution of the BatCloak obfuscation engine. The third part of this series, “SeroXen Mechanisms: Exploring Distribution, Risks, and Impact,” analyzes the distribution mechanism of SeroXen and BatCloak, including the security impact and insights of FUD batch obfuscation. As of this writing, a quick online search for SeroXen will show top results for an official website and social media and sharing pages with videos on how to use the remote access trojan (RAT) as if it were a legitimate tool. We will go over these dissemination strategies in the subsequent entry.

SeroXen’s FUD batch patterns

To attain FUD status, the obfuscation patterns employed in SeroXen have shown multilayered tiers in its evolution, evolving from notable predecessors such as Jlaive, BatCloak, CryBat, Exe2Bat, and ScrubCrypt. Notably, the author of these FUD tools is acknowledged as a contributor in various instances, including attributions present on the main SeroXen website and forum posts authored by the individual behind SeroXen.

Examining the SeroXen infection chain

fig1-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 1. SeroXen infection chain

To successfully initiate the infection process, the targeted user is lured into executing a batch file. These lures are often presented as software-specific to enthusiast groups such as gaming communities. The infection process’ efficiency is enhanced because of the batch file’s FUD capability.

We found a compilation of compromised archives associated with cheats pertaining to prominent game titles. Each of these archives harbors a highly obfuscated batch file that serves as the infection vector initiating a SeroXen infection. Alarmingly, none of the archives exhibited any form of security solution detection. In most instances, these malicious archives are hosted on the Discord CDN (content delivery network) catering to specific interested communities, but they could also be hosted on any number of cloud storage options as well as special interest forums.

Taking a visual representation of a SeroXen sample submitted to a public repository under the false pretense of being a popular online video game cheat, the sample showcases the comprehensive concealment capabilities inherent. Through investigative analysis, we found a consistent pattern in the dimensions of SeroXen’s obfuscated batch files, which commonly exhibit sizes ranging from approximately 10MB to 15MB.

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Figure 2. Gaming lures with no detections

Analyzing the obfuscation patterns deployed by SeroXen

To develop a comprehensive understanding of the obfuscation algorithm utilized within SeroXen, we conducted an in-depth examination on a multitude of heavily obfuscated batch files. The figure sample exhibits an obfuscated SeroXen batch payload camouflaged under the guise of a Fortnite hack.

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Figure 3. SeroXen obfuscated batch payload

The batch obfuscation patterns implemented by the SeroXen FUD algorithm can be summarized as follows:

  1. Suppression of console output through the inclusion of the directive “@echo off”
  2. Utilization of sophisticated string manipulation techniques to obfuscate the initial “set” command
  3. Assignment of the “set” command to a user-defined variable
  4. Assignment of equal operations (“=”) to a user-defined variable
  5. Utilization of steps 3 and 4 to assign values to the additional user-defined variables
  6. Concatenation of variables at the conclusion of the obfuscation process to construct a command, which is subsequently executed

Furthermore, our investigation showed that the implementation of layered obfuscation techniques alongside the incorporation of superfluous code fragments or “junk code” were employed to impede the analysis of the batch file hindering detections.

Summary of commands executed during the SeroXen infection process

We break down the core commands concatenated and executed in order to infect the victim as follows:

  1. Ensure all batch commands run are suppressed with “@echo off”
  2. Copy the PowerShell executable from System32 to the current directory
  3. Set the current directory
  4. Name this copied PowerShell after the batch filename with an appended .exe, such as <mal_bat>.exe
  5. Use the PowerShell command to decrypt and execute the encrypted payload
  6. Build the final PowerShell command used to decrypt the final payload
  7. Use the static operator to decrypt the final payload

Analyzing the deobfuscated SeroXen batch files

During our technical analysis of FUD-enabled SeroXen batch payloads, we were able to deobfuscate the commands associated with its execution and patch key points in its operation to dump the deobfuscated version.

fig4-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 4. Deobfuscated SeroXen batch payload

If we compare the deobfuscated sample presented with the highly obfuscated sample (Figure 3), we can demonstrate the core function of the batch script: to generate a series of set commands in an obfuscated manner to evade detection. We see the result of the numerous obfuscated set commands in its deobfuscated equivalent. Throughout the obfuscated batch file, numerous variables are concatenated together to be executed.

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Figure 5. Deobfuscated SeroXen PowerShell commands

Analyzing the final PowerShell decryption command

The PowerShell command to be executed in the FUD obfuscated batch file is a series of hidden PowerShell commands used to decrypt and deliver the .Net loader.

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Figure 6 . Final PowerShell command executed in the SeroXen batch file

The deobfuscated sequence of PowerShell commands decrypt the payload and employ an assembly reflection mechanism to reflectively load it. The essential characteristics of the final sequence of PowerShell commands include:

  1. Decode payload using Base64
  2. Decrypt payload using AES OR XOR algorithm. In the case of AES:
    • Instantiate an AES decryption object with the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode
    • Use a Base64 blob for the key and IV
  3. Unzip the payload
  4. Reflectively load the payload

From the next figure, we demonstrate how the C# loader is decrypted from the deobfuscated batch files, after which we unzip the decrypted archive to drop the .Net binary.

We decoded the payload using Base64, which is then AES-decrypted using the deobfuscated Key and IV and finally gunzipped to reveal the .Net loader. This payload is then loaded into memory using reflection.

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Figure 7. Using Python to decrypt the .Net loader

Deep dive into SeroXen builder

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Figure 8. Obfuscated builder

The SeroXen builder binary file is protected by the Agile .NET. After unpacking the functions and builder resources, this section shows that SeroXen is a modified version of Quasar RAT with a rootkit and other modifications, such as adopting the loader builder Jlaive and BatCloak obfuscation engine to generate a FUD .bat loader. The evolution and technical analysis of Jlaive and BatCloak was discussed in part 1 of this series.

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Figure 9 . Unpacked builder resources (left) and builder function names (right) a modified version of Quasar RAT in its arsenal
fig10-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 10. SeroXen builder adopting Jlaive and BatCloak source codes

As of this writing, SeroXen offers monthly and lifetime key options for purchase online, as well as instructions for using the RAT. We go over this in detail in the third installment of this series as part of the cybercriminals’ distribution strategies.

fig11-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 11. SeroXen builder usage instruction

SeroXen payload generation process

Upon pressing the “build” button, the builder writes the user-given configuration to the pre-compiled file called “client.bin,” and this produces the Quasar RAT payload and passes it to a function called “Crypt.”  

fig12-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 12. SeroXen vs Quasar RAT payload generation

The Crypt function employs the Jlaive crypter multi-stage loader generator and BatCloack obfuscator source code to produce undetectable loaders. This function first reads the Quasar RAT payload content and verifies if it is a valid .NET assembly. Crypt then patches some string and opcode within the binary and encrypts it using the AES algorithm with CBC cipher mode, and saves it as “payload.exe.” 

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Figure 13. Payload encryption and obfuscation process

Much like a Jlaive crypter, the builder takes in user configuration and produces the first loader. This is achieved using a C# template file, “Quasar.Server.Stub.cs,” found embedded within its resources. The author has integrated an extra functionality in this adapted version of the Jlaive CreateCS function such as API unhooking.

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Figure 14. Create C# loader

Apiunhooker.dll is an open-source project called “SharpUnhooker,” which is a C#-based universal API unhooker that automatically Unhooks API Hives (i.e., ntdll.dllkernel32.dlladvapi32.dll, and kernelbase.dll). This technique is used to attempt evading user-land monitoring done by antivirus technologies and/or endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions by cleansing or refreshing API DLLs that loaded during the process.

The builder subsequently compiles the C# loader stub, adding necessary files and dependencies such as encrypted Quasart RAT (payload.exe) and SharpUnhooker (Apiunhooker.dll) to its resources. 

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Figure 15. C# loader compilation

Next, the builder compresses the C# loader, encrypts it using AES/XOR (depending on the configuration), and encodes it in Base64. Finally, it creates a batch file and includes the encoded C# loader binary into it. It also manages the compression, decoding, and decryption processes using an obfuscated PowerShell script, which is also appended to the batch file.

The batch file’s role is to deobfuscate the PowerShell script and execute it. This PowerShell script scans the content of the batch file for the value following “::“, extracts this value, decodes it, decompresses it, decrypts it, and finally executes it in memory.

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Figure 16. Creating and writing encrypted data to a batch file, and deleting temporary files
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Figure 17. Generating an obfuscated batch loader (top) and PowerShell loader (bottom)

Two PowerShell templates, “Qusar.Server.AESStub.ps1” and “Quasar.Server.XORStub.ps1,” exist in the resource section of the builder. Depending on the configuration, one of these will be loaded and utilized.

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Figure 18. PowerShell stub

Conclusion

In this entry, we include a Yara rule that organizations and security teams can use to detect SeroXen obfuscated batch files. Additionally, here’s a PowerShell script that can reveal the final deobfuscated batch file and commands to be run. It is critically important that this PowerShell script be run in an isolated malware sandbox. This script can be used to deobfuscate the SeroXen batch file where security teams can inspect its output file for the PowerShell command to be executed in the deobfuscation routine. By inspecting this deobfuscated payload, the analyst can grab the Key and IV from the PowerShell command to decrypt the final payload.

Overall, SeroXen is a full-feature remote administration tool (RAT) coded in C# and built using a combination of various open-source projects that work together to generate a FUD payload. Reports have emerged of SeroXen being abused for several infections and attacks. We foresee the evolved BatCloak engine at the core of SeroXen’s FUD capabilities as the BatCloak obfuscation engine continues to evolve and be used as a FUD tool for future malware attacks.

Individuals are strongly advised to adopt a skeptical stance when encountering links and software packages associated with terms such as “cheats,” “hacks,” “cracks,” and other pieces of software related to gaining a competitive edge. Users, developers, gamers, and enthusiasts are also advised to exercise caution when executing batch files obtained from the internet. Additionally, organizations are encouraged to stay vigilant against phishing attacks that might attempt to entice users to download and run batch installers (e.g., scripting and automation of repetitive tasks).

Organizations should consider employing a cutting edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions, such as Trend Micro™ XDR, that can detect, scan, and block malicious content such as SeroXen and BatCloak across the modern threat landscape. An extended detection and response capability across endpoint, servers, workloads, email, network, cloud, and identity observed from a single platform like Trend Vision One™️ can mitigate these risks by considering adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to profile the entirety of a routine. Learn more about how the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) bug bounty program rewards researchers for responsible vulnerability disclosure as well as protects organizations globally and stay up to date on the latest news regarding mission critical security patches.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration.html

Analyzing the FUD Malware Obfuscation Engine BatCloak

By: Peter Girnus, Aliakbar Zahravi
June 09, 2023
Read time: 3 min (681 words)

We look into BatCloak engine, its modular integration into modern malware, proliferation mechanisms, and interoperability implications as malicious actors take advantage of its fully undetectable (FUD) capabilities.

UPDATE as of 6/15/2023 7:30PM (PHT): We’ve updated this entry to include indicators of compromise (IOCs) for BatCloak.

In our recent investigation, we discovered the use of heavily obfuscated batch files utilizing the advanced BatCloak engine to deploy various malware families at different instances. Running analysis and sample collection from September 2022 to June 2023, we found that these batch files are designed to be fully undetectable (FUD) and have demonstrated a remarkable ability to persistently evade security solutions. As a result, threat actors can load various malware families and exploits by leveraging highly obfuscated batch files seamlessly. Our initial research titled “The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression” delves into the continuing evolution of BatCloak, uncovering the modifications that have propelled modern malware to new levels of security evasion.

This is the first entry in a three-part technical research series taking an in-depth look at the continuing evolution of the highly evasive batch obfuscation engine BatCloak. The second part of this series, “SeroXen Incorporates Latest BatCloak Engine Iteration,” will look into the remote access trojan (RAT) SeroXen, a piece of malware gaining popularity for its stealth and, in its latest iterations, targets gamers, enthusiast communities, and organizations. Aside from the RAT’s own tools, we will look into the updated BatCloak engine included as SeroXen’s loading mechanism. The third and last part of this series, “SeroXen Mechanisms: Exploring Distribution, Risks, and Impact,” will detail the distribution mechanisms of SeroXen and BatCloak. We also include our security insights on the community and demographic impact of this level of sophistication when it comes to batch FUD obfuscation.

Defying detection: A preview of BatCloak engine’s efficacy

We analyzed hundreds of batch samples sourced from a public repository. The results showed a staggering 80% of the retrieved samples exhibiting zero detections from security solutions. This finding underscores the ability of BatCloak to evade traditional detection mechanisms employed by security providers. Moreover, when considering the overall sample set of 784, the average detection rate was less than one, emphasizing the challenging nature of identifying and mitigating threats associated with BatCloak-protected pieces of malware.

fig1-analyzing-the-fud-malware-obfuscation-engine-batcloak
Figure 1. BatCloak detection counts from a public repository; samples and detection results collected from September 2022 to June 2023

Understanding the evolving landscape of advanced malware techniques such as FUD obfuscator BatCloak enables us to develop more effective strategies for combating the ever-evolving threats posed by these sophisticated adversaries. These findings highlight the pressing need for enhanced approaches to malware detection and prevention, such as a cutting-edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions.

Security teams and organizations are advised to exercise a zero-trust approach. Teams should implement solutions capable of combining multiple rules, filters, and analysis techniques, including data stacking and machine learning to address the need for precise detection, as these tools can analyze individual and dynamic file signatures and observe patterns via heuristics and behavioral analysis. When uncertain of intrusions, behaviors, and routines, assume compromise or breach immediately to isolate affected artifacts or tool chains. With a broader perspective and rapid response, an organization can address these and keep the rest of its systems protected. Multilayered technologies and solutions, such as Trend Micro XDR™️, efficiently monitor, detect, and block tiered threats and attacks, as well as their clones and modified versions.

Instead of marking the end of an infection or an attack prior to the target because of siloed solutions, an extended detection and response capability across endpoint, servers, workloads, email, network, cloud, and identity observed from a single platform like Trend Vision One™️ can mitigate these risks by considering adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to profile the entirety of a routine. Trend Vision One also correlates with a connected threat intelligence system and rapidly prioritizes and responds with the necessary security and defensive actions as far left of the routine as possible.

Download the first part of our analysis on BatCloak engine here, and the indicators of compromise (IOCs) here and below :

The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression

BatCloak Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

SHA256 of Trojan.BAT.BATCLOAK.A:

4981e6c42e66972a94077e3407823e212b7499f4be14c18e32e446b6bd5566d6
02169ca4a1fcaec423fdf033794f88266f1dec691ee527f91d9ef444b9e8fd00
024121ce693560695ffbb31714145647039dd0a33c7a637614ee3d408dd88c9b
02cd4e343fdfe9246977bd997ae7faa91b469df0bc9ed4c20cc2fa7898cb54e3
036132bcdc00e75dd71b6cba78c976ec50a52fd1b891a4f873bde87269007e0d
05e50707fc035d4045f52538cbd40df61bfc342ce90578780f169b0148e9e48a
06ee424a019da7a98de8ce82fde4b37037fd59f5f72ed882f63e7d054515785c
0a485b2a30d7818cadedc4b5c8d6a04cee2b4e98d58e292c4f6febc25553a43f
0ce9c7a4bc46fe2f92adf194767f02b460283ebd2100a4c4b6d9c8c03f05cc51
0e44555e8804fc351ca7b5369fef719691ebe3ac2e2dee92abe1359b06327ec3
0ea6d6a7f9532f5d6f2f1438349587aae83b7d82f7e92b3daa2b51658183308a
0f379d61a334d1cce8b67940696c527bb76392bdfae9f41bd4ea159aa0e8794e
1264fbc6fb67678c410dcea283342189c3f5a62b2cebfbbef3e5e88cae40c299
1cbab58e69089b40b0eca4aafa33bfb734707885c9d482f58da7fd2f22fa3f07
1ff46fa8630fe6104b6b31e88b4227474faa5b4891952381d745f0b6c1194d9a
2705be6a7e9fe94d0c90127bdd5cd3677af9a713b99ffaa302cd03d835b5b193
2fca9a8b9c2843001dd1f7d668f94f4aef6cf9fbfe0968dabd38c59f7ad7bf1b
378eea991cec20b879983f25c03c72d9c6492759ff0306267bb0af1934cecb5b
3ac9136078f802199506b4ce532fd221201b15d7d4eb84ce8a5128409d821c46
50e7ddd4d1fd4d6f57e5a39f9e31f20ea967a032ab60458af63bb43c0996b67b
545fa399c3d25ddeb9b1ce7dff99faf86b761937681a02377f6b22bab6953f74
57b573189433839f49b3694fb9dde7d6361a70d0d6d01b8bb5c052ac35e64966
5b1d862533bf0c6eddf0add97fe1d91f24489c9d43dba021a6cd433465abe670
5dc6ddbadfe77dae58755ab3524b8366ac52d6e4b0636cd5e88a9ee83fec93dd
66fbf321cb983176ab327c9357ab6970235263ed1f363960aa512adb255ce327
6fb3642107a5e541be64be269c91de20f10b5aba238a3552c0815ca290f0035e
720ec08526839f9f558439edeb86b0e30ed782edf0cfcc9709157e9963801a5c
735e591c7e0667087aff75f9923a7653b4f9661838e947d842171c20773a8913
73630f5690a1882296878e02fb9ef6ca8ab5f85bc60305682a872096ab59685e
7d1b4c45622ec5efebe8d6ef266a8ff8499285162305f2eb8eb3d09362b032dd
7dfe5e29b6278ddefa27217c26e09cd70c9ce2c920e30dd8e11d29b161a59fad
83046ab10ae92c337f7837191014d6f4aa792575947ad2ebbbdde247edabffad
846d4cf9af2e431ca61a7378fca693acc8cdf31348ce3bb09917de12e8a3de95
895d8257fc523a824e2eaf5a62a94e3cf2a3b87b797f696aa028f8443dd7a5e1
8ae18fc31866c3a35ede249b97457598e78cb6a0988df1dd58b9ddb1f3e88c05
8cf47ef94a01172ac5ed78fa657a2406e199691df02d58630d9b845dfd05007c
8df68758b29abe5c0807cc74221617052a175619121c1b41c1462e2e2c12d080
943c7e473924ff1efd4925eb8f2bf745008365f0256567009e5eb6d6b2f17e65
978361f5cea5e7b2ff801b74ed02a7e0a57ed80ac37c01a403b0614e789765c4
9949481d6311a298b4de1ac0d24d85583c8386bd03dc69cbb5995de475859ebc
994a9f76be5355444056833e0fdf5f9408ce6a028578571caa7eaaeb7176d50d
9c51fec7f9c7217fbaffef2e9476b1c74c6f9abdcfd68f58009307d3a1ced344
a07e12074c4013ff9a16b41822b9c2025fd42c2a6bb749f2489d533c73257bea
ab0e910f7470bbe3f612646e420836937bb26dbf87b2df48d47480d2835f384a
abd92088dc5a7a67ed7f0f27fac6b90cd3042f9c1966b3ec35798e3cf9d0b4ec
b0da1288c592b5710ec6e33f0af7dd69f3264e98c7fcdc0089e9a26e1ebf607a
b12ce995e5f3bd33f290be5ccd80ba847fcbde0d41ea53b8cb9f7f7cb25ab98d
b9077ca1640423f6b085d5b72e6bd0aac7877b6f40886db9f5e150cc5ca4bf9f
bb505db4936541c964c4f8c59e520b89ce83db76564f57548eebe8630758888a
c1e77860cd66a98f34ba4cf5bf55370d35bfba1950b6f79a84ab2f90c48fed86
c4ec0641549cdb66a8f9040a53d9ead724a0e2902866b43221e02c2c4fdcb900
c737111db0397904414e315dbe4604f1705b3cd7ee5579d6c0751752de25877d
c9259d18c1ba7e446406e206e0769ed74acc55c0cf40608c3e3d3ef6cc0e56c7
cda4e8d85f718233b93c4cfad2c28d333ffec523ebd32b1af47b6fa7c26345e6
cf8d86c39f7e76c889b6409ed9477c7b91f9424f491fb835f3643d8d55d5fd9e
d3fe2ae10b1c2dd2cf7339ba91bb4fac4454149361a3a9e8069901e3ea56ea8b
d45b5fde0b10a7d8a3227fac8b7af6f01adc8e78d6adc350588b7cebdd1c5894
d84390808d5a83d58d6f5544f9a717e736be234d18b4b607d8b8e842fb935d24
d8cde0701032e03ff9739889872547325881383791961a67ddebf07f8b80ab6a
d9afd0b9174140c001d6b0c60d02f5ba0469a14733a159c0e44045641b814aa1
daa08a205eec4e318c3f3eb6a001ec5ae16d3870ca1f05b3e8bb6838082910d9
de1356d868e63b027791957accaa3087f18901ae87eb01f6f09b7b88e6958e79
df5497ffb3b407397424ce7992ed62d8907d570668c79f9daef40863702349c0
e101b85439062a92773b046bee20d076513b81ddaa946c28096454c9fb934e19
f52ee895d9e8fd600ce4ea05d4a95443c8916af33a1b7b8b668007813fb61f8b
f62a915f1add8b29ebea13db7bc9c9314557f579631d0bebc3dc7044eaf7bbd7
f6a31c5a33d8b8dd38f39e31f27a32616cef12340c5a1b5914f8105abd22a710
fddce59e2c24f44c73c9913ca2415ec95f5a92cb2d94426aa4f8821952f2ddc2
fff222ff3c259db64dbd18e9382cc47ce8577a4069ba05b6db11b6b52d654294

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/analyzing-the-fud-malware-obfuscation-engine-batcloak.html

Human vs Machine Identity Risk Management

By: Trend Micro
June 29, 2023
Read time: 5 min (1290 words)

Risk Management of Human and Machine Identity in a Zero Trust Security Context

In today’s business world’s dynamic and ever-changing digital landscape, organizations encounter escalating security challenges that demand a more business-friendly and pertinent approach. Conventional security measures frequently lead to adverse effects on business operations.

However, the advent of Zero Trust security offers organizations the opportunity to embrace a risk-based response strategy that effectively mitigates these risks. The concept of identity is central to the effectiveness of security functions, which serves as a critical factor in guaranteeing the precision and security of transactions and data storage.

Identity and the Evolving Role of Humans and Machines

All security functions are fundamentally centered around identity. The statement, “Who did what to what, when,” encapsulates the core significance of identity in security. The accuracy and integrity of this statement rely on the accuracy and integrity of each identity clause. By ensuring the integrity of these identity clauses, organizations can automate the risk management process with high confidence in the outcomes.

Traditionally, security systems were designed assuming that human operators were solely responsible for all decisions made by machines. However, with the advent of computers and the increasing reliance on automated processes, this operator-centric model has become increasingly inadequate.

While humans and their associated accounts are often the primary targets of security measures, they merely represent the activity of the machines they interact with. In a Zero Trust deployment, embracing the concept of “machine as proxy human” becomes crucial. This approach allows organizations to apply security rules and surveillance to all devices, treating them like a malicious human is operating behind them.

By considering machines as proxy humans within the context of Zero Trust, organizations can extend security measures to encompass all devices and systems within their environment. This includes user devices, servers, IoT devices, and other interconnected components. Organizations can enforce strict access controls by treating machines as potential threat actors, applying behavioral analytics, and continuously monitoring for suspicious activities or deviations from expected behavior.

This shift in mindset enables organizations to proactively detect and respond to potential security threats, regardless of whether they originate from human actors or compromised machines. It allows for a more comprehensive and robust security posture, as security measures are applied at the device level, reducing the risk of unauthorized access, data breaches, and other security incidents.

Recognizing the centrality of identity in security and embracing the concept of “machine as proxy human” in a Zero Trust deployment enhances the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of security measures. By treating all devices as potential threat actors and applying security rules and surveillance accordingly, organizations can strengthen their risk management process, automate security controls, and mitigate the risks associated with human and machine-based security threats.

Applying Zero Trust to Machine-Human Approach

Treating all accounts, human or not, as machine/service accounts offer architectural flexibility in a Zero Trust environment. This approach allows organizations to apply consistent security measures to unknown devices, users, networks, and known entities, regardless of how frequently they change.

However, harmonized identity telemetry is crucial for this machine-human approach to be effective. Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM cards) and additional credentials facilitate Zero Trust management in 4G and 5G environments.

Organizations can incorporate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) into their Zero Trust solution to address the risks associated with the software. A SBOM is a comprehensive inventory that identifies the software components within an organization’s infrastructure, including internally developed and third-party/vendor-provided software.

By implementing a SBOM in a Zero Trust environment, organizations can establish a baseline for expected software behavior. This baseline includes the software’s version, dependencies, and associated digital signatures. Any deviations from this baseline can be identified as potential security threats or indicators of compromise.

One of the significant advantages of incorporating SBOM into a Zero Trust solution is the ability to monitor unexpected behaviors. Organizations can detect any suspicious activities or unauthorized modifications by continuously monitoring the software components and comparing their actual behavior against the established baseline. This proactive monitoring helps incident responders and risk management teams identify potential threats early and respond effectively to mitigate the risks.

Furthermore, SBOM facilitates supply chain component mapping, crucial for incident response and risk management. With a detailed inventory of software components, organizations can trace the origin of each component and identify potential vulnerabilities or compromised elements within their supply chain. This mapping capability enhances incident response capabilities by providing visibility into the interconnectedness of various software components and their potential impact on the organization’s overall security.

Ultimately incorporating SBOM into a Zero Trust solution helps organizations address software-related risks more effectively. By establishing baselines for expected software behavior and monitoring for any deviations, organizations can detect and respond to potential threats promptly. SBOM also facilitates supply chain component mapping, enabling organizations to enhance their incident response capabilities and mitigate the risks associated with software vulnerabilities and compromises.

Recommendations

Zero Trust security offers a surveillance-based approach that continuously checks and cross-references identity, assesses behavioral risk, and compares it to potential losses and revenue. This approach brings several recommendations for organizations looking to enhance their security posture:

  • Changes to executive responsibility and board governance require the adoption of Zero Trust security
    With the increasing importance of cybersecurity in today’s digital landscape, executive leadership, and board members need to prioritize and understand the significance of Zero Trust security. This includes making it a strategic focus and allocating resources for its implementation. By recognizing the value of Zero Trust and incorporating it into governance structures, organizations can ensure a top-down commitment to robust security practices.
  • Zero Trust can help organizations meet government and customer requirements for supply chain resiliency
    Supply chains have become more vulnerable to cyber threats, and government regulations and customer expectations emphasize supply chain resiliency. Zero Trust security measures can provide transparency, control, and trust within the supply chain ecosystem. Organizations can demonstrate their commitment to supply chain security and meet compliance requirements by establishing rigorous authentication, continuous monitoring, and granular access controls.
  • Operational risk management automation tools in Zero Trust can streamline security management and reduce enterprise risk and total cost of ownership
    Zero Trust security frameworks offer automation tools that streamline security management processes. Organizations can reduce human error and enhance operational efficiency by automating tasks such as identity verification, access controls, and threat detection. This automation minimizes security risks and reduces the total cost of ownership associated with managing complex security infrastructures.
  • Simplification of security management in Zero Trust can address the security skills gap by enabling reliance on junior or offshore staff for incident diagnoses
    The shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals is a significant challenge for many organizations. Zero Trust can alleviate this skills gap by simplifying security management and enabling the reliance on junior or offshore staff for incident diagnoses. With streamlined processes, intuitive security controls, and automated monitoring, organizations can empower less experienced staff to effectively handle security incidents, optimizing resources and addressing the skills shortage.

By prioritizing identity integrity and leveraging the benefits of Zero Trust, organizations can establish a robust security framework that maximizes enterprise functionality while minimizing risk. In an increasingly unstable world where cyber threats continue to evolve, adopting a sophisticated, nuanced, and cost-effective security approach such as Zero Trust becomes essential for organizations to thrive and maintain resilience in the face of emerging challenges.

Ready to take your organization’s security to the next level? Download our comprehensive report on “Zero Trust: Enforcing Business Risk Reduction Through Security Risk Reduction” to gain valuable insights and practical strategies for implementing a business-friendly security approach. Discover how Zero Trust can minimize negative impacts, enhance risk management, and safeguard digital assets. Click here to download the report now!

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/human-vs-machine-identity-management.html

Malvertising Used as Entry Vector for BlackCat, Actors Also Leverage SpyBoy Terminator

By: Lucas Silva, RonJay Caragay, Arianne Dela Cruz, Gabriel Cardoso
June 30, 2023
Read time: 7 min (1889 words)

Recently, the Trend Micro incident response team engaged with a targeted organization after having identified highly suspicious activities through the Targeted Attack Detection (TAD) service. In the investigation, malicious actors used malvertising to distribute a piece of malware via cloned webpages of legitimate organizations. In this case, the distribution involved a webpage of the well-known application WinSCP, an open-source Windows application for file transfer.

Advertising platforms like Google Ads enable businesses to display advertisements to target audiences to boost traffic and increase sales. Malware distributors abuse the same functionality in a technique known as malvertising, where chosen keywords are hijacked to display malicious ads that lure unsuspecting search engine users into downloading certain types of malware.

The targeted organization conducted a joint investigation with the Trend team and discovered that cybercriminals performed the following unauthorized and malicious activities within the company’s network:

  • Stole top-level administrator privileges and used these privileges to conduct unauthorized activities
  • Attempted to establish persistence and backdoor access to the customer environment using remote management tools like AnyDesk
  • Attempted to steal passwords and tried to access backup servers

It is highly likely that the enterprise would have been substantially affected by the attack if intervention had been sought later, especially since the threat actors had already succeeded in gaining initial access to domain administrator privileges and started establishing backdoors and persistence.

The following chart represents how the infection starts.

Infection chain of the observed attack
Figure 1. Infection chain of the observed attack

In the following sections, we discuss the details of this case: how threat actors made the initial access, what kind of attacks they carried out, and the lessons that can be drawn from this event.

Deep dive into the infection chain

The infection starts once the user searches for “WinSCP Download” on the Bing search engine. A malicious ad for the WinSCP application is displayed above the organic search results. The ad leads to a suspicious website containing a tutorial on how to use WinSCP for automating file transfer.

A suspicious site from a malvertisement
Figure 2. A suspicious site from a malvertisement

From this first page, the user is then redirected to a cloned download webpage of WinSCP (winsccp[.]com). Once the user selects the “Download” button, an ISO file is downloaded from an infected WordPress webpage (hxxps://events.drdivyaclinic[.]com). Recently, the malicious actor changed their final stage payload URL to the file-sharing service 4shared.

Malicious download site
Figure 3. Malicious download site

The overall infection flow involves delivering the initial loader, fetching the bot core, and ultimately, dropping the payload, typically a backdoor.

In summary, the malicious actor uses the following malvertising infection chain:

  1. A user searches for an application by entering a search term in a search bar (such as Google or Bing). In this example, the user wants to download the WinSCP application and enters the search term “WinSCP Download” on the Bing search bar.
  2.  Above the organic search results, the user finds a malvertisement for the WinSCP application that leads to a malicious website.
  3. Once the user selects the “Download” button, this begins the download of an ISO file to their system.

On Twitter, user @rerednawyerg first spotted the same infection chain mimicking the AnyDesk application. Once the user mounts the ISO, it contains two files, setup.exe and msi.dll. We list the details of these two files here:

  • Setup.exe: A renamed msiexec.exe executable
  • Msi.dll: delayed-loaded DLL (not loaded until a user’s code attempts to reference a symbol contained within the DLL) that will act as a dropper for a real WinSCP installer and a malicious Python execution environment responsible for downloading Cobalt Strike beacons.
The files downloaded once a user mounts the ISO
Figure 4. The files downloaded once a user mounts the ISO

Once setup.exe is executed, it will call the msi.dll that will later extract a Python folder from the DLL RCDATA section as a real installer for WinSCP to be installed on the machine. Two installations of Python3.10 will be created — a legitimate python installation in %AppDataLocal%\Python-3.10.10 and another installation in %Public%\Music\python containing a trojanized python310.dll. Finally, the DLL will create a persistence mechanism to make a run key named “Python” and the value C:\Users\Public\Music\python\pythonw.exe.

The run key named “Python”
Figure 5. The run key named “Python”

When the executable pythonw.exe starts, it loads a modified/trojanized obfuscated python310.dll that contains a Cobalt Strike beacon that connects to 167[.]88[.]164[.]141.

The following command-and-control (C&C) servers are used to obtain the main beacon module:

File nameC&C
pp.pyhxxps://167.88.164.40/python/pp2
work2.pyhxxps://172.86.123.127:8443/work2z
work2-2.pyhxxps://193.42.32.58:8443/work2z
work3.pyhxxps://172.86.123.226:8443/work3z

Multiple scheduled tasks executing batch files for persistence were also created in the machine. These batch files execute Python scripts leading to in-memory execution of Cobalt Strike beacons. Interestingly, the Python scripts use the marshal module to execute a pseudo-compiled (.pyc) code that is leveraged to download and execute the malicious beacon module in memory.

The Trend Vision One™ platform was able to generate the following Workbench for the previously mentioned kill chain.

Kill chain for the executed malware
Figure 6. Kill chain for the executed malware

The threat actor used a few other tools for discovery in the customer’s environment. First, they used AdFind, a tool designed to retrieve and display information from Active Directory (AD) environments. In the hands of a threat actor, AdFind can be misused for enumeration of user accounts, privilege escalation, and even password hash extraction.

In this case, the threat actor used it to fetch information on the operating system using the command adfind.exe -f objectcategory=computer -csv name cn OperatingSystem dNSHostName. The command specifies that it wants to retrieve the values of the name, common name (CN), operating system, and dNSHostName attributes for each computer object and output its result in a CSV format.

The threat actor used the following PowerShell command to gather user information and to save it into a CSV file:

Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | Select -Property EmailAddress,GivenName,Surname,DisplayName,sAMAccountName,Title,Department,OfficePhone,MobilePhone,Fax,Enabled,LastLogonDate | Export-CSV “C:\users\public\music\ADusers.csv” -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8

We also observed that the threat actor used AccessChk64, a command-line tool developed by Sysinternals that is primarily used for checking the security permissions and access rights of objects in Windows. Although the threat actor’s purpose for using the tool in this instance is not clear, it should be noted that the tool can be used for gaining insights on what permissions are assigned to users and groups, as well as for privilege escalation and the identification of files, directories, or services with weak access control settings. 

The threat actor then used findstr, a command-line tool in Windows used for searching strings or regular expressions within files by using the command findstr /S /I cpassword \\<REDACTED>\sysvol\<REDACTED>\policies\*.xml.

It is possible that the purpose of this command is to identify any XML files that contain the string cpassword. This is interesting from a security context since cpassword is associated with a deprecated method of storing passwords in Group Policy Preferences within AD.

How finsdtr is used in the attack
Figure 7. How finsdtr is used in the attack

We also observed the execution of scripts with PowerShell. For instance, the command IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString(‘hxxp://127[.]0[.]0[.]1:40347/’); Invoke-FindLocalAdminAccess -Thread 50” it invokes a PowerShell function called Invoke-FindLocalAdminAccess and passes the parameter -Thread with a value of 50. This function is likely part of a script that performs actions related to finding local administrator access on a system.

Another PowerShell script used by the threat actor was PowerViewPowerView, which belongs to the PowerSploit collection of scripts used to assist in penetration testing and security operations, focuses on AD reconnaissance and enumeration and is commonly used by threat actors to gather information about the AD environment.

PowerShell Expand-Archive command was used to extract the ZIP files.  

powershell -w hidden -command Expand-Archive C:\users\public\videos\python.zip -DestinationPath C:\users\public\videos\python

WMI was used to launch CoBeacon remotely across the environment. 

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C wmic /NODE:”<REDACTED>” process call create C:\users\public\videos\python\pythonw.exe C:\users\public\videos\python\work2-2.py

To obtain high-privileged credentials and escalate privileges, the threat actor used a Python script also containing the marshal module to execute a pseudo-compiled code for LaZagne. Another script to obtain Veeam credentials following the same structure was also identified in the environment.

PsExec, BitsAdmin, and curl were used to download additional tools and to move laterally across the environment.

The threat actor dropped a detailed KillAV BAT script (KillAV is a type of malicious software specifically designed to disable or bypass antivirus or antimalware programs installed on a target system) to tamper with Trend protections. However, due to the agent’s Self-Protection features and VSAPI detections, the attempt failed. The threat actors also made attempts to stop Windows Defender through a different KillAV BAT script.

Finally, the threat actor installed the AnyDesk remote management tool (renamed install.exe) in the environment to maintain persistence.

Remote management tool installed for persistence
Figure 8. Remote management tool installed for persistence

After a diligent and proactive response, the attacker was successfully evicted from the network before they could reach their goal or execute their final payload. The incident response team also presented immediate countermeasures as well as medium- and long-term security procedures for implementation.

BlackCat uses the same tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)

In another investigation, following the same TTPs described previously described, we were able to identify that this activity led to a BlackCat (aka ALPHV) infection. Along with other types of malware and tools already mentioned, we were able to identify the use of the anti-antivirus or anti-endpoint detection and response (EDR) SpyBoy terminator in an attempt to tamper with protection provided by agents.

In order to exfiltrate the customer data, the threat actor used PuTTY Secure Copy client (PSCP) to transfer the gathered information. Investigating one of the C&C domains used by the threat actor behind this infection also led to the discovery of a possible related Cl0p ransomware file.

Files indicating possible Cl0p ransomware file
Figure 9. Files indicating possible Cl0p ransomware file

Conclusion and recommendations

In recent years, attackers have become increasingly adept at exploiting vulnerabilities that victims themselves are unaware of and have started employing behaviors that organizations do not anticipate. In addition to a continuous effort to prevent any unauthorized access, early detection and response within an organization’s network is critical. Immediacy in remediation is also essential, as delays in reaction time could lead to serious damage.

By understanding attack scenarios in detail, organizations can not only identify vulnerabilities that could lead to compromise and critical damage but also take necessary measures to prevent them.

Organizations can protect themselves by taking the following security measures:

  • Educate employees about phishing. Conduct training sessions to educate employees about phishing attacks and how to identify and avoid them. Emphasize the importance of not selecting suspicious links and not downloading files from unknown sources.
  • Monitor and log activities. Implement a centralized logging system to collect and analyze logs from various network devices and systems. Monitor network traffic, user activities, and system logs to detect any unusual or suspicious behavior.
  • Define normal network traffic for normal operations. Defining normal network traffic will help identify abnormal network traffic, such as unauthorized access.
  • Improve incident response and communication. Develop an incident response plan to guide your organization’s response in case of future breaches. Establish clear communication channels to inform relevant stakeholders, including employees, customers, and regulatory bodies, about a breach and the steps being taken to address it.
  • Engage with a cybersecurity professional. If your organization lacks the expertise or resources to handle the aftermath of a breach effectively, consider engaging with a reputable cybersecurity firm to assist with incident response, forensic analysis, and security improvements.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The full list of IOCs can be found here and below :

Malvertising Used as Entry Vector for BlackCat, Actors Also Leverage SpyBoy Terminator

[+] File IOCs
SHA-256									Detection name
25467df66778077cc387f4004f25aa20b1f9caec2e73b9928ec4fe57b6a2f63c 	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
4a4d20d107ee8e23ce1ebe387854a4bfe766fc99f359ed18b71d3e01cb158f4a 	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
13090722ba985bafcccfb83795ee19fd4ab9490af1368f0e7ea5565315c067fe 	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
8859a09fdc94d7048289d2481ede4c98dc342c0a0629cbcef2b91af32d52acb5  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
bacbe893b668a63490d2ad045a69b66c96dcacb500803c68a9de6cca944affef  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
c7a5a4fb4f680974f3334f14e0349522502b9d5018ec9be42beec5fa8c1597fe  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
3ce4ed3c7bd97b84045bdcfc84d3772b4c3a29392a9a2eee9cc17d8a5e5403ce  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
21e7bcc03c607e69740a99d0e9ae8223486c73af50f4c399c8d30cce4d41e839  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
e5db80c01562808ef2ec1c4b8f3f033ac0ed758d 				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
cfbde85bdb62054b5b9eb4438c3837b9f1a69f61 				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
3b14559a6e33fce120a905fde57ba6ed268a51f1  				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
aae1b17891ec215a0e238f881be862b4f598e46c  				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
c82b28daeb33d94ae3cafbc52dbb801c4a5b8cfa  				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
d2663fc6966c197073c7315264602b4c6ba9c192  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO
c7568d00ae38b3a4691a413ed439a0e3fb5664b1  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO
61e41be7a9889472f648a5a3d0b0ab69e2e056c5  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO
69ffad6be67724b1c7e8f65e8816533a96667a36  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
c1516915431cb55703b5a88d94ef6de0ac67190a  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
a7b1853348346d5d56f4c33f313693a18b6af457  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
ac8e3146f41845a56584ce5e8e172a56d59aa804  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
e5d434dfa2634041cdbdac1dec58fcd49d629513  				Trojan.BAT.KILLAV.WLEBG
42da9e9e3152c1d995d8132674368da4be78bf6a  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO.dldr
5cbb6978c9d01c8a6ea65caccb451bf052ed2acd  				HackTool.Win32.Adfind.VSNW1FE23
a9310c3f039c4e2184848f0eb8e65672f9f11240  				TrojanSpy.Python.CREAL.A
5e36a649c82fa41a600d51fe99f4aa8911b87828  				HackTool.Python.LaZagne.AD
5263a135f09185aa44f6b73d2f8160f56779706d  				HackTool.PS1.VeeamCreds.A
75d02e81cc326e6a0773bc11ffa6fa2f6fa5343e  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
9d85cb2c6f1fccc83217837a63600b673da1991a  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
2f2eb89d3e6726c6c62d6153e2db1390b7ae7d01  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
7d500a2cd8ea7e455ae1799cb4142bb2abac3ae1  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
0362c710e4813020147f5520a780a15ef276e229  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
fb2ef2305511035e1742f689fce928c424aa8b7d  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069 
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
7874d722a6dbaef9e5f9622d495f74957da358da  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069 
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
06e3f86369046856b56d47f45ea2f7cf8e240ac5  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069 
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
36b454592fc2b8556c2cb983c41af4d2d8398ea2  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF068
337ca5eefe18025c6028d617ee76263279650484  				TROJ_GEN.R002C0DCS23
e862f106ed8e737549ed2daa95e5b8d53ed50f87  				TROJ_GEN.R002C0PFK23
2a85cdfb1c3434d73ece7fe60d6d2d5c9b7667dd  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF068
d883be0ee79dec26ef8c04e0e2857a516cff050c  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
a0f1a8462cb9105660af2d4240e37a27b5a9afad  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
ab0eade9b8d24b09e32aa85f78a51b777861debc  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
0cc0e1cbf4923d2ce7179064c244fe138dcb3ce8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
3789a218c966f175067242975e1cb44abdef81ec  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
83c5f8821f9a07e0318beaa4bcf0b7ef21127aa8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
08f63693bb40504b71fe3e4e4d9e7142c011aeb1  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
b34bb1395199c7b168d9204833fdfd13d542706d  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
5c6aa1a5bd7572ac8e91eaa5c9d6096f302f775b  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
9480a79b0b6f164b1148c56f43f3d505ee0b7ef3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
7874d722a6dbaef9e5f9622d495f74957da358da  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
9b1ebbe03949e0c16338595b1772befe276cd10d  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
801950ed376642e537466795f92b04e13a4fcc2a  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
1ca4e3fdcdf8a9ab095cfa0629750868eb955eb7  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
42920e4d15428d4e7a8f52ae703231bdf0aec241  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
06e3f86369046856b56d47f45ea2f7cf8e240ac5  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
f42e97901a1a3b87b4f326cb9e6cbdb98652d900  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
d125c4f82e0bbf369caf1be524250674a603435c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
03d7bc24d828abaf1a237b3f418517fada8ae64f  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
c133992ea87f83366e4af5401a341365190df4e7  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b35be51d727d8b6f8132850f0d044b838fec001d  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
fd84cf245f7a60c38ac7c92e36458c5ea4680809  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
946c0a0c613c8ac959d94bb2fd152c138fc752da  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
7b3051f8d09d53e7c5bc901262f5822f1999caae  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
eeff22b4a442293bf0f5ef05154e8d4c7a603005  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
2547d2deedc385f7557d5301c19413e1cbf58cf8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
0437f84967de62d8959b89d28a56e40247b595d8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
105d33c00847ccd0fb230f4a7457e8ab6fb035fc  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5831b3a830690c603fd093329dce93b9a7e83ad3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
a5c164b734a8b61d8af70257e23d16843a4c72e3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
1aff9fd8fdc0eae3c09a3ee6b4df2cdb24306498  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
3d4051c65d1b5614af737cb72290ec15b71b75bd  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
a116ef48119c542a2d864f41dbbb66e18d5cd4e6  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
508e7522db24cca4913aeed8218975c539d3b0a4  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
72603dadebc12de4daf2e12d28059c4a3dcf60d0  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
930bd974a2d01393636fdb91ca9ac53256ff6690  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
a9a03d39705bd1d31563d7a513a170c99f724923  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
c14bd9ad77d8beca07fb17dc34f8a5f636e621b5  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
01b122eb0edb6274b3743458e375e34126fd2f9a  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b98bb7b4c3b823527790cb62e26d14d34d3e499b  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
381058a5075ce06605350172e72c362786e8c5e3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
75e9d507b1a1606a3647fe182c4ed3a153cecc2c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
cd485054625ea8ec5cf1fe0e1f11ede2e23dde00  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
c9cdfdc45b04cca45b64fedca7c372f73b42cab2  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
31d4dadd11fe52024b1787a20b56700e7fd257f8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
0fe306dc12ba6441ba2a5cab1b9d26638c292f9c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
bc0fb6b220045f54d34331345d1302f9a00b3580  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b4f59fe2ee3435b9292954d1c3ef7e74c233abea  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
aee0b252334b47a6e382ce2e01de9191de2e6a7a  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
92673b91d2c86309f321ade6a86f0c9e632346d8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
de7fb8efa05ddf5f21a65e940717626b1c3d6cb4  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5f455dcdca66df9041899708289950519971bb76  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5ed1b9810ee12d2b9b358dd09c6822588bbb4a83  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
c779a4a98925bc2f7feac91c1867a3f955462fc2  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
cb358aa4ed50db8270f3ee7ea5848b8c16fa21fe  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5ec6b30dacfced696c0145a373404e63763c2fa8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
f2f5137c28416f76f9f4b131f85252f8273baee8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
12534212c7d4b3e4262edc9dc2a82c98c2121d04  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
bc09ee8b42ac3f6107ab5b51a2581a9161e53925  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
152400be759355ec8dd622ec182c29ce316eabb1  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
379e497d0574fd4e612339440b603f380093655c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
141c7b9be4445c1aad70ec35ae3fe02f5f8d37ac  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
27e9e6a54d73dcb28b5c7dfb4e2e05aaba913995  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
ad981cd18f58e12db7c9da661181f6eb9a1754f3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
4829eaa38bd061773ceefe175938a2c0d75a75f3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b0d61d1eba9ebf6b7eabcd62b70936d1a343178e  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
014c277113c4b8c4605cb91b29302cdedbc2044e  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
974c1684cf0f3a46af12ba61836e4c161fd48cb5  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
913414069259e760e201d0520ce35fe22cf3c285  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note

[+] Network IOCs
Distribution URLs
https://cuororeresteadntno.com/how-to-work-with-ftp-ftps-connection-through-winscp/ = 78. Malware Accomplice
https://airplexacrepair.com/the-key-to-secure-remote-desktop-connections-a-comprehensive-guide/ = 78. Malware Accomplice
https://maker-events.com/automating-file-transfers-with-winscp/ = 78. Malware Accomplice

Redirects Domains:
https://winsccp.com/WLPuVHrN = 79. Disease Vector
https://anydeesk.net = 79. Disease Vector

Payload Download
https://events.drdivyaclinic.com/wp-content/task/update/WinSCP-5.21.8-Setup.iso = 79. Disease Vector
https://www.4shared.com/web/directDownload/wd0Bbaw6jq/gx1qdBDA.ab8ba6f7d1af2d0a5d81cf42aefe8e51 = 79. Disease Vector
https://www.yb-lawyers.com/wp-content/ter/anyconnect/AnyDesk.iso = 79. Disease Vector
https://mm.onemakan.ml//wp/wp-content/winscp/smart/WinSCP-5.21.8-Setup.iso = 79. Disease Vector

IPs AnyDesk.iso:
104.234.11.236 = 78. Malware Accomplice
157.254.195.108 = 78. Malware Accomplice

IPs WinSCP-5.21.8-Setup.iso:
157.254.195.83 = 78. Malware Accomplice

COBEACON C2: 
167.88.164.141 = 91. C&C Server
https://167.88.164.40/python/pp2 = 91. C&C Server
https://172.86.123.127:8443/work2z = 91. C&C Server
https://172.86.123.127:8443/work2
https://172.86.123.226:8443/work3z = 91. C&C Server
https://172.86.123.226:8443/work3
https://193.42.32.58:8443/work2z = 91. C&C Server
https://193.42.32.58/python/pp
https://193.42.32.58:8443/zakrep
https://104.234.147.134/python/pp3.py = 91. C&C Server
http://45.12.253.50:447/work2
https://45.66.230.240/python/pp3.py = 91. C&C Server
https://45.66.230.240:8443/work1
http://45.66.230.240/python/pp
https://firstclassbale.com/python/pp3.py = 91. C&C Server

Other COBEACON C2 Using the Same Watermark (587247372)
104.234.11.226 = 91. C&C Server
104.234.11.236
141.98.6.56 = 91. C&C Server
166.0.95.43 = 91. C&C Server
167.88.164.91 = 91. C&C Server
193.42.32.143 = 91. C&C Server
45.12.253.51 = 91. C&C Server
45.12.253.50
45.66.230.215 = 91. C&C Server
45.81.39.175 = 91. C&C Server
45.81.39.176 = 91. C&C Server
84.54.50.116 = 91. C&C Server
85.217.144.233
aleagroupdevelopment.com = 91. C&C Server
azurecloudup.online = 91. C&C Server
cloudupdateservice.online = 91. C&C Server
devnetapp.com = 91. C&C Server
situotech.com = 91. C&C Server

URLs accessed by Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO.dldr
http://104.234.147.134/python/python.zip
https://167.88.164.40/python/python.zip = 79. Disease Vector
http://172.86.123.226/python/python.zip = 79. Disease Vector
https://45.66.230.240/python/python.zip
https://closeyoueyes.com/python/python.zip
https://firstclassbale.com/python/python.zip
https://167.88.164.40/python/unzip.bat = 79. Disease Vector
http://172.86.123.226/python/unzip.bat = 79. Disease Vector
http://104.234.147.134/python/unzip.bat
https://45.66.230.240/python/unzip.bat
https://closeyoueyes.com/python/unzip.bat
https://firstclassbale.com/python/unzip.bat
https://167.88.164.40/python/pp3.py = 79. Disease Vector
http://172.86.123.226/python/pp3.py = 79. Disease Vector
ccloseyoueyes.com/python/pp3.py
http:////bigallpack.com/union/desktop



Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/malvertising-used-as-entry-vector-for-blackcat-actors-also-lever.html

How Zero Trust Can Help Your Organization: Strengthening Security and Supply Chain Assurance

By: Trend Micro
June 27, 2023
Read time: 4 min (1183 words)

Organizations face increasingly sophisticated cyber threats and vulnerabilities in today’s rapidly evolving digital landscape. Traditional security models can no longer protect sensitive data and mitigate risks. This is where Zero Trust comes into play, offering a comprehensive approach to security that can help organizations tackle emerging challenges.

In this article, we will explore how Zero Trust can benefit your organization, focusing on its ability to enhance security, secure supply chains, and align with international regulatory frameworks.

How Zero Trust Helps Your Organization

Zero Trust is designed to seek and eliminate shadow IT and inefficiencies within an organization. This approach can help reduce both operational and capital costs, effectively minimizing enterprise risks. Zero Trust also improves data hygiene by identifying systems with higher-than-average data risks, ensuring a more secure data environment.

Implementing Zero Trust also allows organizations to reduce the risk of brand-impacting security incidents and customer-facing outages. Zero Trust ensures uninterrupted business operations. Moreover, it provides fine-grained control over roaming and data sovereignty, granting organizations greater flexibility and security.

Moreover, Zero Trust enables multiple business functions to utilize a single access method. This consolidation improves security measures while reducing customers’ effort to complete transactions, ultimately enhancing the overall customer experience.

Zero Trust can be leveraged in numerous use cases, addressing different organizational security and risk management needs. Its versatility and adaptability make it a practical approach to securing digital environments effectively.

Secure Supply Chain Assurance: Importance and Zero Trust Applications

Zero Trust is crucial in securing the supply chain, as it helps identify revenue-impacting vulnerability chains within an enterprise. These chains can include business processes, security processes, and supply chains, collectively referred to as the attack surface.

Organizations can proactively identify and break potential kill chains within the supply chain by utilizing Zero Trust principles. Attack Surface Mapping and Cyber Asset Attack Surface Mapping (CAASM) enable the scanning and mitigating of current, potential, and near-miss supply chain attacks, reducing the risk of cascading failures.

Attack Surface Mapping involves identifying and mapping all the possible entry points, weaknesses, and exposure areas in an organization’s network, systems, and applications. It provides a comprehensive view of the organization’s attack surface, including external-facing systems and internal assets and connections.

Cyber Asset Attack Surface Mapping (CAASM) focuses explicitly on the assets within an organization’s supply chain. It examines the digital assets and dependencies in the supply chain ecosystem, including third-party vendors, partners, and interconnected systems. By analyzing the attack surface of the supply chain, organizations can identify potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit.

These mapping techniques enable organizations to proactively scan and assess their current security posture, identify potential risks, and prioritize mitigation efforts. Organizations can take appropriate measures to strengthen their defenses, patch vulnerabilities, and implement security controls by understanding the attack surface and potential attack vectors.

Zero Trust Frameworks: DISA NSA vs. NIST

Zero Trust frameworks can vary based on organizational needs and security requirements. The DISA NSA Zero Trust Reference Architecture is suitable for large critical infrastructure entities, while the NIST approach caters to entities in the early stages of their security maturity journey.

The DISA NSA framework provides a comprehensive and adaptable blueprint, focusing on Device Trust, User Trust, Data Trust, and Network Trust. Organizations can establish trust across various infrastructure components by implementing rigorous authentication, authorization, and continuous monitoring. This approach enhances risk management accuracy and reduces infrastructure costs, making it suitable for large critical infrastructure entities.

On the other hand, the NIST approach follows a risk-based strategy, emphasizing continuous monitoring, granular access controls, and dynamic policy enforcement. It promotes a “never trust, always verify” mindset, advocating for robust authentication mechanisms, network segmentation, and encryption. This framework offers flexibility and scalability, making it well-suited for organizations at various stages of their security maturity journey.

To leverage the strengths of both frameworks, organizations can incorporate complementary design elements tailored to their specific needs. Organizations can establish a robust Zero Trust architecture that addresses their unique security requirements by combining the DISA NSA and NIST approaches.

Ultimately, implementing Zero Trust principles provides organizations with a proactive and holistic security approach, reducing the risk of breaches, protecting sensitive data, and ensuring the resilience of their infrastructure. By embracing these frameworks, organizations can strengthen their security posture and effectively combat the ever-evolving cyber threats of today’s digital landscape.

Zero Trust and International Regulatory Frameworks

Zero Trust is a security framework that has gained significant attention and adoption in recent years. It aligns with various international regulatory frameworks, ensuring organizations meet stringent data protection, privacy, and security requirements.

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Zero Trust principles align closely with the core principles of GDPR, which emphasize the protection of personal data, privacy, and accountability. By implementing Zero Trust measures, organizations establish robust security controls, mitigate the risk of data breaches, and protect personal data. Through solid authentication, access controls, data segmentation, and encryption, Zero Trust helps organizations meet GDPR requirements, ensuring compliance with data protection regulations.

California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)

The CCPA highlights the importance of safeguarding consumers’ personal information. Zero Trust principles provide valuable contributions to adequate data protection and privacy practices. With strong authentication mechanisms, data segmentation, and encryption, organizations can enhance their data security measures and meet CCPA obligations. Zero Trust’s emphasis on continuous monitoring and granular access controls ensures that organizations maintain control over the processing and sharing of personal information, thus meeting CCPA compliance requirements.

Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)

PCI DSS establishes rigorous security measures to protect cardholder data. Zero Trust provides a solid foundation for meeting PCI DSS requirements by focusing on secure access controls, continuous monitoring, and encryption. Zero Trust’s “never trust, always verify” principle aligns with the need for stringent authentication mechanisms and restricted access to cardholder data. Organizations can establish a robust security posture by implementing Zero Trust and maintaining compliance with the PCI DSS standards.

Zero Trust principles offer organizations a powerful approach to achieving compliance with international regulatory frameworks. By aligning with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Zero Trust enhances data protection, privacy, and security practices.
Conclusion

In an era of increasing cyber threats and supply chain vulnerabilities, adopting a Zero Trust approach is essential for organizations aiming to strengthen their security measures and ensure the integrity of their supply chains. By implementing Zero Trust principles, organizations can enhance security, streamline business functions, and align with international regulatory frameworks.

The versatility of Zero Trust frameworks, such as DISA NSA and NIST, allows organizations to tailor their security strategies to their specific needs. Embracing Zero Trust is a proactive step towards safeguarding sensitive data and critical operations and a crucial component of building trust with customers and partners in an ever-evolving digital landscape.

Download our comprehensive report on Zero Trust frameworks and their implementation strategies today. Gain valuable insights, practical guidance, and actionable steps to strengthen security measures. Click here to download the report and stay one step ahead in the ever-evolving digital landscape.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/prevent-supply-chain-attacks.html

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