Category: Hyper-V

Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool

The Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool is located at https://connectivity.office.com. It’s an adjunct tool to the network assessment and network insights available in the Microsoft 365 admin center under the Health | Connectivity menu.

 Important

It’s important to sign in to your Microsoft 365 tenant as all test reports are shared with your administrator and uploaded to the tenant while you are signed in.

Connectivity test tool.

 Note

The network connectivity test tool supports tenants in WW Commercial but not GCC Moderate, GCC High, DoD or China.

Network insights in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center are based on regular in-product measurements for your Microsoft 365 tenant, aggregated each day. In comparison, network insights from the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test are run locally in the tool.

In-product testing is limited, and running tests local to the user collects more data resulting in deeper insights. Network insights in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center will show that there’s a networking problem at a specific office location. The Microsoft 365 connectivity test can help to identify the root cause of that problem and provide a targeted performance improvement action.

We recommend that these insights be used together where networking quality status can be assessed for each office location in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and more specifics can be found after deployment of testing based on the Microsoft 365 connectivity test.

What happens at each test step

Office location identification

When you click the Run test button, we show the running test page and identify the office location. You can type in your location by city, state, and country or choose to have it detected for you. If you detect the office location, the tool requests the latitude and longitude from the web browser and limits the accuracy to 300 meters by 300 meters before use. It’s not necessary to identify the location more accurately than the building to measure network performance.

JavaScript tests

After office location identification, we run a TCP latency test in JavaScript and we request data from the service about in-use and recommended Microsoft 365 service front door servers. When these tests are completed, we show them on the map and in the details tab where they can be viewed before the next step.

Download the advanced tests client application

Next, we start the download of the advanced tests client application. We rely on the user to launch the client application and they must also have .NET 6.0 Runtime installed.

There are two parts to the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test: the web site https://connectivity.office.com and a downloadable Windows client application that runs advanced network connectivity tests. Most of the tests require the application to be run. It will populate results back into the web page as it runs.

You’ll be prompted to download the advanced client test application from the web site after the web browser tests have completed. Open and run the file when prompted.

Advanced tests client application.

Start the advanced tests client application

Once the client application starts, the web page will update to show this result. Test data will start to be received to the web page. The page updates each time new-data is received and you can review the data as it arrives.

Advanced tests completed and test report upload

When the tests are completed, the web page and the advanced tests client will both show that. If the user is signed in, the test report will be uploaded to the customer’s tenant.

Sharing your test report

The test report requires authentication to your Microsoft 365 account. Your administrator selects how you can share your test report. The default settings allow for sharing of your reports with other user within your organization and the ReportID link is not available. Reports will expire by default after 90 days.

Sharing your report with your administrator

If you’re signed in when a test report occurs, the report is shared with your administrator.

Sharing with your Microsoft account team, support or other personnel

Test reports (excluding any personal identification) are shared with Microsoft employees. This sharing is enabled by default and can be disabled by your administrator in the Health | Network Connectivity page in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center.

Sharing with other users who sign in to the same Microsoft 365 tenant

You can choose users to share your report with. Being able to choose is enabled by default, but it can be disabled by your administrator.

Sharing a link to your test results with a user.

You can share your test report with anyone by providing access to a ReportID link. This link generates a URL that you can send to someone so that they can bring up the test report without signing in. This sharing is disabled by default and must be enabled by your administrator.

Sharing a link to your test results.

Network Connectivity Test Results

The results are shown in the Summary and Details tabs. The summary tab shows a map of the detected network perimeter and a comparison of the network assessment to other Microsoft 365 customers nearby. It also allows for sharing of the test report. Here’s what the summary results view looks like:

Network connectivity test tool summary results.

Here’s an example of the details tab output. On the details tab we show a green circle check mark if the result was compared favorably. We show a red triangle exclamation point if the result exceeded a threshold indicating a network insight. The following sections describe each of the details tab results rows and explain the thresholds used for network insights.

Network connectivity test tool example test results.

Your location information

This section shows test results related to your location.

Your location

The user location is detected from the users web browser. It can also be typed in at the user’s choice. It’s used to identify network distances to specific parts of the enterprise network perimeter. Only the city from this location detection and the distance to other network points are saved in the report.

The user office location is shown on the map view.

Network egress location (the location where your network connects to your ISP)

We identify the network egress IP address on the server side. Location databases are used to look up the approximate location for the network egress. These databases typically have an accuracy of about 90% of IP addresses. If the location looked up from the network egress IP address isn’t accurate, this would lead to a false result. To validate if this error is occurring for a specific IP address, you can use publicly accessible network IP address location web sites to compare against your actual location.

Your distance from the network egress location

We determine the distance from that location to the office location. This is shown as a network insight if the distance is greater than 500 miles (800 kilometers) since that is likely to increase the TCP latency by more than 25 ms and may affect user experience.

The map shows the network egress location in relation to the user office location indicating the network backhaul inside of the enterprise WAN.

Implement local and direct network egress from user office locations to the Internet for optimal Microsoft 365 network connectivity. Improvements to local and direct egress are the best way to address this network insight.

Proxy server information

We identify whether proxy server(s) are configured on the local machine to pass Microsoft 365 network traffic in the Optimize category. We identify the distance from the user office location to the proxy servers.

The distance is tested first by ICMP ping. If that fails, we test with TCP ping and finally we look up the proxy server IP address in an IP address location database. We show a network insight if the proxy server is further than 500 miles (800 kilometers) away from the user office location.

Virtual private network (VPN) you use to connect to your organization

This test detects if you’re using a VPN to connect to Microsoft 365. A passing result will show if you have no VPN, or if you have a VPN with recommended split tunnel configuration for Microsoft 365.

VPN Split Tunnel

Each Optimize category route for Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, and Microsoft Teams is tested to see if It’s tunneled on the VPN. A split out workload avoids the VPN entirely. A tunneled workload is sent over the VPN. A selective tunneled workload has some routes sent over the VPN and some split out. A passing result will show if all workloads are split out or selective tunneled.

Customers in your metropolitan area with better performance

Network latency between the user office location and the Exchange Online service is compared to other Microsoft 365 customers in the same metro area. A network insight is shown if 10% or more of customers in the same metro area have better performance. This means their users will have better performance in the Microsoft 365 user interface.

This network insight is generated on the basis that all users in a city have access to the same telecommunications infrastructure and the same proximity to Internet circuits and Microsoft’s network.

Time to make a DNS request on your network

This shows the DNS server configured on the client machine that ran the tests. It might be a DNS Recursive Resolver server however this is uncommon. It’s more likely to be a DNS forwarder server, which caches DNS results and forwards any uncached DNS requests to another DNS server.

This is provided for information only and does not contribute to any network insight.

Your distance from and/or time to connect to a DNS recursive resolver

The in-use DNS Recursive Resolver is identified by making a specific DNS request and then asking the DNS Name Server for the IP Address that it received the same request from. This IP Address is the DNS Recursive Resolver and it will be looked up in IP Address location databases to find the location. The distance from the user office location to the DNS Recursive Resolver server location is then calculated. This is shown as a network insight if the distance is greater than 500 miles (800 kilometers).

The location looked up from the network egress IP Address may not be accurate and this would lead to a false result from this test. To validate if this error is occurring for a specific IP Address, you can use publicly accessible network IP Address location web sites.

This network insight will specifically impact the selection of the Exchange Online service front door. To address this insight local and direct network egress should be a pre-requisite and then DNS Recursive Resolver should be located close to that network egress.

Exchange Online

This section shows test results related to Exchange Online.

Exchange service front door location

The in-use Exchange service front door is identified in the same way that Outlook does this and we measure the network TCP latency from the user location to it. The TCP latency is shown and the in-use Exchange service front door is compared to the list of best service front doors for the current location. This is shown as a network insight if one of the best Exchange service front door(s) isn’t in use.

Not using one of the best Exchange service front door(s) could be caused by network backhaul before the corporate network egress in which case we recommend local and direct network egress. It could also be caused by use of a remote DNS recursive resolver server in which case we recommend aligning the DNS recursive resolver server with the network egress.

We calculate a potential improvement in TCP latency (ms) to the Exchange service front door. This is done by looking at the tested user office location network latency and subtracting the network latency from the current location to the closets Exchange service front door. The difference represents the potential opportunity for improvement.

Best Exchange service front door(s) for your location

This lists the best Exchange service front door locations by city for your location.

Service front door recorded in the client DNS

This shows the DNS name and IP Address of the Exchange service front door server that you were directed to. It’s provided for information only and there’s no associated network insight.

SharePoint Online

This section shows test results related to SharePoint Online and OneDrive.

The service front door location

The in-use SharePoint service front door is identified in the same way that the OneDrive client does and we measure the network TCP latency from the user office location to it.

Download speed

We measure the download speed for a 15 Mb file from the SharePoint service front door. The result is shown in megabytes per second to indicate what size file in megabytes can be downloaded from SharePoint or OneDrive in one second. The number should be similar to one tenth of the minimum circuit bandwidth in megabits per second. For example if you have a 100mbps internet connection, you may expect 10 megabytes per second (10 MBps).

Buffer bloat

During the 15Mb download we measure the TCP latency to the SharePoint service front door. This is the latency under load and it’s compared to the latency when not under load. The increase in latency when under load is often attributable to consumer network device buffers being loaded (or bloated). A network insight is shown for any bloat of 100ms or more.

Service front door recorded in the client DNS

This shows the DNS name and IP Address of the SharePoint service front door server that you were directed to. It’s provided for information only and there’s no associated network insight.

Microsoft Teams

This section shows test results related to Microsoft Teams.

Media connectivity (audio, video, and application sharing)

This tests for UDP connectivity to the Microsoft Teams service front door. If this is blocked, then Microsoft Teams may still work using TCP, but audio and video will be impaired. Read more about these UDP network measurements, which also apply to Microsoft Teams at Media Quality and Network Connectivity Performance in Skype for Business Online.

Packet loss

Shows the UDP packet loss measured in a 10-second test audio call from the client to the Microsoft Teams service front door. This should be lower than 1.00% for a pass.

Latency

Shows the measured UDP latency, which should be lower than 100ms.

Jitter

Shows the measured UDP jitter, which should be lower than 30ms.

Connectivity

We test for HTTP connectivity from the user office location to all of the required Microsoft 365 network endpoints. These are published at https://aka.ms/o365ip. A network insight is shown for any required network endpoints, which cannot be connected to.

Connectivity may be blocked by a proxy server, a firewall, or another network security device on the enterprise network perimeter. Connectivity to TCP port 80 is tested with an HTTP request and connectivity to TCP port 443 is tested with an HTTPS request. If there’s no response the FQDN is marked as a failure. If there’s an HTTP response code 407 the FQDN is marked as a failure. If there’s an HTTP response code 403 then we check the Server attribute of the response and if it appears to be a proxy server we mark this as a failure. You can simulate the tests we perform with the Windows command-line tool curl.exe.

We test the SSL certificate at each required Microsoft 365 network endpoint that is in the optimize or allow category as defined at https://aka.ms/o365ip. If any tests do not find a Microsoft SSL certificate, then the encrypted network connected must have been intercepted by an intermediary network device. A network insight is shown on any intercepted encrypted network endpoints.

Where an SSL certificate is found that isn’t provided by Microsoft, we show the FQDN for the test and the in-use SSL certificate owner. This SSL certificate owner may be a proxy server vendor, or it may be an enterprise self-signed certificate.

Network path

This section shows the results of an ICMP traceroute to the Exchange Online service front door, the SharePoint Online service front door, and the Microsoft Teams service front door. It’s provided for information only and there’s no associated network insight. There are three traceroutes provided. A traceroute to outlook.office365.com, a traceroute to the customers SharePoint front end or to microsoft.sharepoint.com if one was not provided, and a traceroute to world.tr.teams.microsoft.com.

Connectivity reports

When you are signed in you can review previous reports that you have run. You can also share them or delete them from the list.

Reports.

Network health status

This shows any significant health issues with Microsoft’s global network, which might impact Microsoft 365 customers.

Network health status.

Testing from the Command Line

We provide a command line executable that can be used by your remote deployment and execution tools and run the same tests as are available in the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool web site.

The command line test tool can be downloaded here: Command Line Tool

You can run it by double clicking the executable in Windows File Explorer, or you can start it from a command prompt, or you can schedule it with task scheduler.

The first time you launch the executable you will be prompted to accept the end user license agreement (EULA) before testing is performed. If you have already read and accepted the EULA you can create an empty file called Microsoft-365-Network-Connectivity-Test-EULA-accepted.txt in the current working directory for the executable process when it is launched. To accept the EULA you can type ‘y’ and press enter in the command line window when prompted.

The executable accepts the following command line parameters:

  • -h to show a link to this help documentation
  • -testlist <test> Specifies tests to run. By default only basic tests are run. Valid test names include: all, dnsConnectivityPerf, dnsResolverIdentification, bufferBloat, traceroute, proxy, vpn, skype, connectivity, networkInterface
  • -filepath <filedir> Directory path of test result files. Allowed value is absolute or relative path of an accessible directory
  • -city <city> For the city, state, and country fields the specified value will be used if provided. If not provided then Windows Location Services (WLS) will be queried. If WLS fails the location will be detected fromthe machines network egress
  • -state <state>
  • -country <country>
  • -proxy <account> <password> Proxy account name and password can be provided if you require a proxy to access the Internet

Results

Output of results are written to a JSON file in a folder called TestResults which is created in the current working directory of the process unless it already exists. The filename format for the output is connectivity_test_result_YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM-SS.json. The results are in JSON nodes that match the output shown on the web page for the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool web site. A new result file is created each time you run it and the standalone executable does not upload results to your Microsoft tenant for viewing in the Admin Center Network Connectivity pages. Front door codes, longitudes, and latitudes are not included in the result file.

Launching from Windows File Explorer

You can simply double click on the executable to start the testing and a command prompt window will appear.

Launching from the Command Prompt

On a CMD.EXE command prompt window you can type the path and name of the executable to run it. The filename is Microsoft.Connectivity.Test.exe

Launching from Windows Task Scheduler

In Windows Task Scheduler you can add a task to launch the standalone test executable. You should specify the current working directory of the task to be where you have created the EULA accepted file since the executable will block until the EULA is accepted. You cannot interactively accept the EULA if the process is started in the background with no console.

More details on the standalone executable

The commandline tool uses Windows Location Services to find the users City State Country information for determining some distances. If Windows Location Services is disabled in the control panel then user location based assessments will be blank. In Windows Settings “Location services” must be on and “Let desktop apps access your location” must also be on.

The commandline tool will attempt to install the .NET Framework if it is not already installed. It will also download the main testing executable from the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool and launch that.

Test using the Microsoft Support and Recovery Assistant

Microsoft Support and Recovery Assistant (Assistant) automates all the steps required to execute the command-line version of the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool on a user’s machine and creates a report similar to the one created by the web version of the connectivity test tool. Note, the Assistant runs the command line version of Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool to produce the same JSON result file, but the JSON file is converted into .CSV file format.

Download and Run the Assistant Here

Viewing Test Results

Reports can be accessed in the following ways:

The reports will be available on the below screen once the Assistant has finished scanning the user’s machine. To access these reports, simply click on the “View log” option to view them.

Microsoft Support and Recovery Assistant wizard.

Connectivity test results and Telemetry data are collected and uploaded to the uploadlogs folder. To access this folder, use one of the following methods:

  • Open Run (Windows logo key + R), and run the %localappdata%/saralogs/uploadlogs command as follows:
Run dialog for locating output.
  • In File Explorer, type C:\Users<UserName>\AppData\Local\saralogs\uploadlogs and press Enter as follows:
Windows Explorer Address Bar for output.

Note: <UserName> is the user’s Windows profile name. To view the information about the test results and telemetry, double-click and open the files.

Windows Explorer SARA Output Files.

Types of result files

Microsoft Support and Recovery Assistant creates 2 files:

  1. Network Connectivity Report (CSV) This report runs the raw JSON file against a rule engine to make sure defined thresholds are being met and if they are not met a “warning” or “error” is displayed in the output column of the CSV file. You can view the NetworkConnectivityReport.csv file to be informed about any detected issues or defects. Please see What happens at each test step for details on each test and the thresholds for warnings.
  2. Network Connectivity Scan Report (JSON) This file provides the raw output test results from the command-line version of the Microsoft 365 network connectivity test tool (MicrosoftConnectivityTest.exe).

FAQ

Here are answers to some of our frequently asked questions.

What is required to run the advanced test client?

The advanced test client requires .NET 6.0 Runtime. If you run the advanced test client without that installed you will be directed to the .NET 6.0 installer page. Be sure to install from the Run desktop apps column for Windows. Administrator permissions on the machine are required to install .NET 6.0 Runtime.

The advanced test client uses SignalR to communicate to the web page. For this you must ensure that TCP port 443 connectivity to connectivity.service.signalr.net is open. This URL isn’t published in the https://aka.ms/o365ip because that connectivity isn’t required for a Microsoft 365 client application user.

What is Microsoft 365 service front door?

The Microsoft 365 service front door is an entry point on Microsoft’s global network where Office clients and services terminate their network connection. For an optimal network connection to Microsoft 365, It’s recommended that your network connection is terminated into the closest Microsoft 365 front door in your city or metro.

 Note

Microsoft 365 service front door has no direct relationship to the Azure Front Door Service product available in the Azure marketplace.

What is the best Microsoft 365 service front door?

A best Microsoft 365 service front door (formerly known as an optimal service front door) is one that is closest to your network egress, generally in your city or metro area. Use the Microsoft 365 network performance tool to determine location of your in-use Microsoft 365 service front door and the best service front door(s). If the tool determines your in-use front door is one of the best ones, then you should expect great connectivity into Microsoft’s global network.

What is an internet egress location?

The internet egress Location is the location where your network traffic exits your enterprise network and connects to the Internet. This is also identified as the location where you have a Network Address Translation (NAT) device and usually where you connect with an Internet Service Provider (ISP). If you see a long distance between your location and your internet egress location, then this may identify a significant WAN backhaul.

Network connectivity in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center

Microsoft 365 network performance insights

Microsoft 365 network assessment

Microsoft 365 Network Connectivity Location Services

Source :
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/Microsoft-365/Enterprise/office-365-network-mac-perf-onboarding-tool?view=o365-worldwide

Active Directory and Active Directory Domain Services Port Requirements

Applies To: Windows Server 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2003 with SP1, Windows Server 2003 with SP2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 Foundation, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista

This guide contains port requirements for various Active Directory® and Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) components. Both writable domain controllers and read-only domain controllers (RODCs) have the same port requirements. For more information about RODCs, see Designing RODCs in the Perimeter Network.

Default dynamic port range

In a domain that consists of Windows Server® 2003–based domain controllers, the default dynamic port range is 1025 through 5000. Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows Server 2008, in compliance with Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) recommendations, increased the dynamic port range for connections. The new default start port is 49152, and the new default end port is 65535. Therefore, you must increase the remote procedure call (RPC) port range in your firewalls. If you have a mixed domain environment that includes a Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows Server 2008 server and Windows Server 2003, allow traffic through ports 1025 through 5000 and 49152 through 65535.

When you see “TCP Dynamic” in the Protocol and Port column in the following table, it refers to ports 1025 through 5000, the default port range for Windows Server 2003, and ports 49152 through 65535, the default port range beginning with Windows Server 2008.

 Note

For more information about the change in the dynamic port range beginning in Windows Server 2008, see article 929851 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=153117).
You can find additional information about this change on the Ask the Directory Services Team blog. See the blog entry Dynamic Client Ports in Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=153113).

Restricting RPC to a specific port

RPC traffic is used over a dynamic port range as described in the previous section, “Default dynamic port range.” To restrict RPC traffic to a specific port, see article 224196 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=133489).

Communication to Domain Controllers

The following table lists the port requirements for establishing DC to DC communication in all versions of Windows Sever beginning with Windows Server 2003.

Additional ports are required for communication between a read-only domain controller (RODC) and a writeable DC.

Protocol and PortAD and AD DS UsageType of traffic
TCP and UDP 389Directory, Replication, User and Computer Authentication, Group Policy, TrustsLDAP
TCP 636Directory, Replication, User and Computer Authentication, Group Policy, TrustsLDAP SSL
TCP 3268Directory, Replication, User and Computer Authentication, Group Policy, TrustsLDAP GC
TCP 3269Directory, Replication, User and Computer Authentication, Group Policy, TrustsLDAP GC SSL
TCP and UDP 88User and Computer Authentication, Forest Level TrustsKerberos
TCP and UDP 53User and Computer Authentication, Name Resolution, TrustsDNS
TCP and UDP 445Replication, User and Computer Authentication, Group Policy, TrustsSMB,CIFS,SMB2, DFSN, LSARPC, NbtSS, NetLogonR, SamR, SrvSvc
TCP 25ReplicationSMTP
TCP 135ReplicationRPC, EPM
TCP DynamicReplication, User and Computer Authentication, Group Policy, TrustsRPC, DCOM, EPM, DRSUAPI, NetLogonR, SamR, FRS
TCP 5722File ReplicationRPC, DFSR (SYSVOL)
UDP 123Windows Time, TrustsWindows Time
TCP and UDP 464Replication, User and Computer Authentication, TrustsKerberos change/set password
UDP DynamicGroup PolicyDCOM, RPC, EPM
UDP 138DFS, Group PolicyDFSN, NetLogon, NetBIOS Datagram Service
TCP 9389AD DS Web ServicesSOAP
UDP 67 and UDP 2535DHCPNoteDHCP is not a core AD DS service but it is often present in many AD DS deployments.DHCP, MADCAP
UDP 137User and Computer Authentication,NetLogon, NetBIOS Name Resolution
TCP 139User and Computer Authentication, ReplicationDFSN, NetBIOS Session Service, NetLogon

Source :
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd772723(v=ws.10)

How to restrict Active Directory RPC traffic to a specific port

This article describes how to restrict Active Directory (AD) replication remote procedure calls (RPC) traffic to a specific port in Windows Server.

Applies to:   all supported versions of Windows Server
Original KB number:   224196

Summary

By default, Active Directory replication remote procedure calls (RPC) occur dynamically over an available port through the RPC Endpoint Mapper (RPCSS) by using port 135. An administrator can override this functionality and specify the port that all Active Directory RPC traffic passes through. This procedure locks down the port.

When you specify ports to use by using the registry entries in More information, both Active Directory server-side replication traffic and client RPC traffic are sent to these ports by the endpoint mapper. This configuration is possible because all RPC interfaces supported by Active Directory are running on all ports on which it’s listening.

 Note

This article doesn’t describe how to configure AD replication for a firewall. Additional ports must be opened to make replication work through a firewall. For example, ports may need to be opened for the Kerberos protocol. To obtain a complete list of the required ports for services across a firewall, see Service overview and network port requirements for Windows.

More information

 Important

This section, method, or task contains steps that tell you how to modify the registry. However, serious problems might occur if you modify the registry incorrectly. Therefore, make sure that you follow these steps carefully. For added protection, back up the registry before you modify it. Then, you can restore the registry if a problem occurs. For more information about how to back up and restore the registry, see How to back up and restore the registry in Windows.

When you connect to an RPC endpoint, the RPC runtime on the client contacts the RPCSS on the server at a well-known port (135). And it obtains the port to connect to for the service supporting desired RPC interface. It assumes that the client doesn’t know the complete binding. It’s the situation with all AD RPC services.

The service registers one or more endpoints when it starts, and has the choice of a dynamically assigned port or a specific port.

If you configure Active Directory and Netlogon to run at port x as in the following entry, it becomes the ports that are registered with the endpoint mapper in addition to the standard dynamic port.

Use Registry Editor to modify the following values on each domain controller where the restricted ports are to be used. Member servers aren’t considered to be logon servers. So static port assignment for NTDS has no effect on member servers.

Member servers do have the Netlogon RPC Interface, but it’s rarely used. Some examples may be remote configuration retrieval, such as nltest /server:member.contoso.com /sc_query:contoso.com.

Registry key 1

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters
Registry value: TCP/IP Port
Value type: REG_DWORD
Value data: (available port)

Restart the computer for the new setting to become effective.

Registry key 2

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters
Registry value: DCTcpipPort
Value type: REG_DWORD
Value data: (available port)

Restart the Netlogon service for the new setting to become effective.

 Note

When you use the DCTcpipPort registry entry, and you set it to the same port as the TCP/IP Port registry entry, you receive Netlogon error event 5809 under NTDS\Parameters. This indicates that the port configured is in use, and you should choose a different port.

You’ll receive the same event when you have a unique port, and you restart the Netlogon service on the domain controller. This behavior is by design. It occurs because of the way the RPC runtime manages its server ports. The port will be used after the restart, and the event can be ignored.

Administrators should confirm that the communication over the specified port is enabled if any intermediate network devices or software is used to filter packets between the domain controllers.

Frequently, you must also manually set the File Replication Service (FRS) RPC port because AD and FRS replication replicate with the same Domain Controllers. The FRS RPC port should use a different port.

Don’t assume that clients only use the Netlogon RPC services and thus only the setting DCTcpipPort is required. Clients are also using other RPC services such as SamRPC, LSARPC, and also the Directory Replication Services (DRS) interface. You should always configure both registry settings and open both ports on the firewall.

Known issues

After you specify the ports, you may encounter the following issues:

To resolve the issues, install the updates mentioned in the articles.

Source :
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/restrict-ad-rpc-traffic-to-specific-port

Spikes in Attacks Serve as a Reminder to Update Plugins

The Wordfence Threat Intelligence team continually monitors trends in the attack data we collect. Occasionally an unusual trend will arise from this data, and we have spotted one such trend standing out over the Thanksgiving holiday in the U.S. and the first weekend in December. Attack attempts have spiked for vulnerabilities in two plugins.

The larger spikes have been from attempts to exploit an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in Kaswara Modern VC Addons <= version 3.0.1, for which a rule was added to the Wordfence firewall and available to Wordfence Premium, Wordfence Care, and Wordfence Response users on April 21, 2021 and released to users of Wordfence Free on May 21, 2021. The other vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload and arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the Adning Advertising plugin with versions <= 1.5.5, with our firewall rule being added on June 25, 2020 and made available to free users on July 25, 2020.

Kaswara and Adning exploit attempts per day

One thing that makes these spikes interesting is the fact that they are occurring over holidays and weekends. The first spike began on November 24, 2022, which was the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States. This spike lasted for three days. The second spike looked a little different, starting on Saturday, December 3, 2022, dropping on Sunday, and finishing with its peak on Monday. These spikes serve as an important reminder that malicious actors are aware that website administrators are not paying as close attention to their sites on holidays and weekends. This makes holidays and weekends a desirable time for attacks to be attempted.

During these spikes, exploit attempts have been observed against the Kaswara vulnerability on 1,969,494 websites, and on 1,075,458 sites against the Adning vulnerability. In contrast, the normal volume of sites with exploit attempts being blocked is an average of 256,700 for the Kaswara vulnerability, and 374,801 for the Adning vulnerability.

Kaswara and Adning sites comparison with spikes

The Kaswara Modern VC Addons plugin had more than 10,000 installations at the time the vulnerability was disclosed on April 21, 2021, and has since been closed without a patch being released. As long as this plugin is installed, it leaves the site vulnerable to attacks that make it possible for unauthenticated attackers upload malicious files that could ultimately lead to a full site takeover due to the fact that the ability to upload PHP files to servers hosting WordPress makes remote code execution possible. Any WordPress website administrators who are still using the plugin should immediately remove the plugin and replace it with a suitable alternative if the functionality is still required for the site, even if you are protected by the Wordfence firewall, as the plugin has not been maintained and may contain other issues. We estimate that about 8,000 WordPress users are still impacted by a vulnerable version, making them an easy target.

The Adning Advertising plugin had more than 8,000 users when our Threat Intelligence team performed our initial investigation of vulnerability on June 24, 2020. After some analysis, we found two vulnerabilities in the plugin, one that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to upload arbitrary files, also leading to easy site takeover. We also found an unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion vulnerability that could just as easily be used for complete site compromise by deleting the wp-config.php file. After we notified the plugin’s author of the vulnerabilities, they quickly worked to release a patched version within 24 hours. Any users of the Adning Advertising plugin should immediately update to the latest version, currently 1.6.3, but version 1.5.6 is the minimum version that includes the patch. We estimate that about 680 WordPress users are still impacted by a vulnerable version of this plugin.

The key takeaway from these attack attempts is to make sure your website components are kept up to date with the latest security updates. When a theme or plugin, or even the WordPress core, has an update available, it should be updated as soon as safely possible for the website. Leaving unpatched vulnerabilities on the website opens a website up to possible attack.

Cyber Observables

The following are the common observables we have logged in these exploit attempts. If any of these are observed on a website or in logs, it is an indication that one of these vulnerabilities has been exploited. The IP addresses listed are specifically from the spikes we have seen over the Thanksgiving holiday and the first weekend in December.

Kaswara

Top ten IPs
  • 40.87.107.73
  • 65.109.128.42
  • 65.21.155.174
  • 65.108.251.64
  • 5.75.244.31
  • 65.109.137.44
  • 65.21.247.31
  • 49.12.184.76
  • 5.75.252.228
  • 5.75.252.229
Common Uploaded Filenames

There were quite a few variations of randomly named six-letter filenames, two are referenced below, but each one observed used the .zip extension.

  • a57bze8931.zip
  • bala.zip
  • jwoqrj.zip
  • kity.zip
  • nkhnhf.zip
Top Ten User-Agent Strings
  • Mozlila/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G892A Bulid/NRD90M; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/60.0.3112.107 Moblie Safari/537.36
  • Mozlila/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G892A Bulid/NRD90M; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/60.0.3112.107 Moblie Safari/537.36 X-Middleton/1
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.67 Safari/537.36
  • Amazon CloudFront
  • Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.132 Safari/537.36
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2224.3 Safari/537.36
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_8_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2656.18 Safari/537.36
  • Mozilla/5.0 (X11; OpenBSD i386) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.125 Safari/537.36
  • Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/55.0.2919.83 Safari/537.36
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_2) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2762.73 Safari/537.36

Adning

Top Ten IPs
  • 65.109.128.42
  • 65.108.251.64
  • 65.21.155.174
  • 5.75.244.31
  • 65.109.137.44
  • 65.21.247.31
  • 5.75.252.229
  • 65.109.138.122
  • 40.87.107.73
  • 49.12.184.76
Common Uploaded Filenames

Most observed exploit attempts against the Adning plugin appeared to be nothing more than probing for the vulnerability, but in one instance the following filename was observed as a payload.

  • files
Top Ten User-Agent Strings
  • python-requests/2.28.1
  • Mozlila/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G892A Bulid/NRD90M; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/60.0.3112.107 Moblie Safari/537.36
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:88.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/88.0
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
  • python-requests/2.28.1 X-Middleton/1
  • python-requests/2.26.0
  • python-requests/2.27.1
  • Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7; @longcat) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
  • Mozlila/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G892A Bulid/NRD90M; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/60.0.3112.107 Moblie Safari/537.36 X-Middleton/1
  • ALittle Client
Conclusion

In this post we discussed two vulnerabilities that have spiked over the past two weekends. Removing or updating vulnerable plugins is always the best solution, but a Web Application Firewall like the one provided by Wordfence is important to block exploit attempts and can even protect your site from attacks targeting unknown vulnerabilities. The Wordfence firewall protects all Wordfence users, including Wordfence Free, Wordfence Premium, Wordfence Care, and Wordfence Response, against these vulnerabilities. Even with this protection in place, these vulnerabilities are serious as they can lead to full site takeover, and the Kaswara Modern VC Addons should be immediately removed, and the Adning Advertising plugin should immediately be updated.

Source :
https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/12/spikes-in-attacks-serve-as-a-reminder-to-update-plugins/

Google’s Virtual Desktop of the Future

Nick Yeager

Manager, Google Computing

Did you know that most Google employees rely on virtual desktops to get their work done? This represents a paradigm shift in client computing at Google, and was especially critical during the pandemic and the remote work revolution. We’re excited to continue enabling our employees to be productive, anywhere! This post covers the history of virtual desktops and details the numerous benefits Google has seen from their implementation. 

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Background

In 2018, Google began the development of virtual desktops in the cloud. A whitepaper was published detailing how virtual desktops were created with Google Cloud, running on Google Compute Engine, as an alternative to physical workstations. Further research had shown that it was feasible to move our physical workstation fleet to these virtual desktops in the cloud. The research began with user experience analysis – looking into how employee satisfaction of cloud workstations compared with physical desktops. Researchers found that user satisfaction of cloud desktops was higher than that of their physical desktop counterparts! This was a monumental moment for cloud-based client computing at Google, and this discovery led to additional analyses of Compute Engine to understand if it could become our preferred (virtual) workstation platform of the future.

Today, Google’s internal use of virtual desktops has increased dramatically. Employees all over the globe use a mix of virtual Linux and Windows desktops on Compute Engine to complete their work. Whether an employee is writing code, accessing production systems, troubleshooting issues, or driving productivity initiatives, virtual desktops are providing them with the compute they need to get their work done. Access to virtual desktops is simple: some employees access their virtual desktop instances via Secure Shell (SSH), while others use Chrome Remote Desktop — a graphical access tool. 

In addition to simplicity and accessibility, Google has realized a number of benefits from virtual desktops. We’ve seen an enhanced security posture, a boost to our sustainability initiatives, and a reduction in maintenance effort associated with our IT infrastructure. All these improvements were achieved while improving the user experience compared to our physical workstation fleet.

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Example of Google Data Center

Analyzing Cloud vs Physical Desktops

Let’s look deeper into the analysis Google performed to compare cloud virtual desktops and physical desktops. Researchers compared cloud and physical desktops on five core pillars: user experience, performance, sustainability, security, and efficiency.

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User Experience

Before the transition to virtual desktops got underway, user experience researchers wanted to know more about how they would affect employee happiness. They discovered that employees embraced the benefits that virtual desktops offered. This included freeing up valuable desk space to provide an always-on, always available compute experience, accessible from anywhere in the world, and reduced maintenance overhead compared to physical desktops. 

Performance

From a performance perspective, cloud desktops are simply better than physical desktops. For example, running on Compute Engine makes it easy to spin-up on-demand virtual instances with predictable compute and performance – a task that is significantly more difficult with a physical workstation vendor. Virtual desktops rely on a mix of Virtual Machine (VM) families that Google developed based on the performance needs of our users. These include Google Compute Engine E2 high-efficiency instances, which employees might use for day-to-day tasks, to higher-performance N2/N2D instances, which employees might use for more demanding machine learning jobs. Compute Engine offers a VM shape for practically any computing workflow. Additionally, employees no longer have to worry about machine upgrades (to increase performance, for example) because our entire fleet of virtual desktops can be upgraded to new shapes (with more CPU and RAM) with a single config change and a simple reboot — all within a matter of minutes. Plus, Compute Engine continues to add features and new machine types, which means our capabilities only continue to grow in this space.

Sustainability

Google cares deeply about sustainability and has been carbon neutral since 2007. Moving from physical desktops to virtual desktops on Compute Engine brings us closer to Google sustainability goals of a net-neutral desktop computing fleet. Our internal facilities team has praised virtual desktops as a win for future workspace planning, because a reduction in physical workstations could also mean a reduction in first-time construction costs of new buildings, significant (up to 30%) campus energy reductions, and even further reductions in costs associated with HVAC needs and circuit size needs at our campuses. Lastly, a reduction in physical workstations also contributes to a reduction in physical e-waste and a reduction in the carbon associated with transporting workstations from their factory of origin to office locations. At Google’s scale, these changes lead to an immense win from a sustainability standpoint. 

Security

By their very nature, virtual desktops mitigate the ability for a bad actor to exfiltrate data or otherwise compromise physical desktop hardware since there is no desktop hardware to compromise in the first place. This means attacks such as USB attacks, evil maid attacks, and similar techniques for subverting security that require direct hardware access become worries of the past. Additionally, the transition to cloud-based virtual desktops also brings with it an enhanced security posture through the use of Google Cloud’s myriad security features including Confidential Computing, vTPMs, and more. 

Efficiency

In the past, it was not uncommon for employees to spend days waiting for IT to deliver new machines or fix physical workstations. Today, cloud-based desktops can be created instantaneously on-demand and resized on-demand. They are always accessible, and virtually immune from maintenance-related issues. IT no longer has to deal with concerns like warranty claims, break-fix issues, or recycling. This time savings enables IT to focus on higher priority initiatives all while reducing their workload. With an enterprise the size of Google, these efficiency wins added up quickly. 

Considerations to Keep in Mind

Although Google has seen significant benefits with virtual desktops, there are some considerations to keep in mind before deciding if they are right for your enterprise. First, it’s important to recognize that migrating to a virtual fleet requires a consistently reliable and performant client internet connection. For remote/global employees, it’s important they’re located geographically near a Google Cloud Region (to minimize latency). Additionally, there are cases where physical workstations are still considered vital. These cases include users who need USB and other direct I/O access for testing/debugging hardware and users who have ultra low-latency graphics/video editing or CAD simulation needs. Finally, to ensure interoperability between these virtual desktops and the rest of our computing fleet, we did have to perform some additional engineering tasks to integrate our asset management and other IT systems with the virtual desktops. Whether your enterprise needs such features and integration should be carefully analyzed before considering a solution such as this. However, should you ultimately conclude that cloud-based desktops are the solution for your enterprise, we’re confident you’ll realize many of the benefits we have!

Tying It All Together

Although moving Google employees to virtual desktops in the clouds was a significant engineering undertaking, the benefits have been just as significant.  Making this switch has boosted employee productivity and satisfaction, enhanced security, increased efficiency, and provided noticeable improvements in performance and user experience. In short, cloud-based desktops are helping us transform how Googlers get their work done. During the pandemic, we saw the benefits of virtual desktops in a critical time. Employees had access to their virtual desktop from anywhere in the world, which kept our workforce safer and reduced transmission vectors for COVID-19. We’re excited for a future where more and more of our employees are computing in the cloud as we continue to embrace the work-from-anywhere model and as we continue to add new features and enhanced capabilities to Compute Engine!

Source :
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/developers-practitioners/googles-virtual-desktop-future

Palo Alto Networks Secures Nutanix Cloud Clusters for Microsoft Azure

Securing your hybrid multi-cloud environment just got easier. We are excited to announce Palo Alto Networks VM-Series Virtual Next-Generation Firewalls (NGFWs) are now available on Nutanix Cloud Clusters (NC2)™ for Microsoft Azure with Nutanix Flow Virtual Networking™.

NC2 on Azure leverages a new bare metal-as-a-service (BMaaS) offering, which is jointly engineered by Nutanix® and Microsoft® teams for cloud-like infrastructure consumption without the need to purchase more hardware up-front. It leverages the power of the hybrid cloud to extend workloads to Azure seamlessly from on-premises. NC2 provides a consistent experience to provision and manage Nutanix clusters on-premises or deployed in Azure, enabling workload mobility across clouds.

During last month’s Microsoft Ignite, Nutanix announced the availability of NC2 on Microsoft Azure to easily extend on-premises data and workloads to Azure, creating a true hybrid cloud. With Palo Alto Networks VM-Series virtual firewall insertion, you can secure your Nutanix AHV workloads on overlay networks deployed using VPCs (virtual private clouds) within Flow Virtual Networking. Nutanix AHV provides a modern, secure virtualization platform for all your virtual machines (VM) and container workloads without additional licensing or investment on Nutanix hyperconverged infrastructure (HCI).

Simplify Multi-Cloud Security with VM-Series Virtual NGFWs

With VM-Series virtual firewalls, your Nutanix AHV workloads will have advanced security features that deliver the required application layer of security for total coverage. Leverage network security and visibility across your hybrid cloud – both on-premises and on Microsoft Azure – without complex reconfiguration. With this validation, you can gain consistent security and visibility across your hybrid cloud environment.

You can find the perfect balance of security, speed and value through the advanced Cloud-Delivered Security Services available with the VM-Series Virtual Firewall. Get simple security for public clouds, private clouds and on-premises data for total coverage and protection from known and unknown threats.

Palo Alto Networks VM-Series Virtual Firewalls are monitored, configured and managed by Palo Alto Networks Panorama™ firewall management tools. With Panorama, you gain network security capabilities that provide a single pane of glass to manage security and policies while alleviating the need to jump between interfaces. You can now easily manage the security postures of their virtual environments, physical data centers and even public clouds.

Prevent Lateral Movement with Microsegmentation and Nutanix Flow Network Security™

As your virtualized and cloud environments grow, so does your attack surface. This increases the risk of bad actors gaining access to your internal network. Once attackers bypass perimeter security controls, they can move laterally across the environment in search of data to steal or hold for ransom. Because of this, it’s essential to redefine your security approach to include lateral, east-west, network traffic and perimeter network security.

With Nutanix Flow Network Security, you can leverage advanced network security using microsegmentation, or managed virtual-machine-level software firewalls, to gain visibility into your workloads on your virtual networks. Even when a VM moves across segments or clouds, the risk of network threats, malware and ransomware is reduced with a unified security policy approach.

Flow Network Security is an application-centric microsegmentation solution that protects east-west traffic to your environments by allowing you to control east-west VM-to-VM traffic. It reduces the risk of threats spreading laterally across the data center and enforces a perimeter around every individual VM.

Check It Out For Yourself

In this use case, all external traffic for subnets and VMs of the VPC traverse through the VM-Series Virtual Firewall. Configured application layer (L7) security policies are enforced via the policy-based routing capability available in the Flow Virtual Networking VPC’s section.

Flow chart showing Nutanix AHV Cluster, Flow Virtual Networking, External Network, Microsoft Azure.
Azure flow chart of Virtual Networking for Nutanix AHV Cluster.

Workload mobility doesn’t have to mean complex security reconfiguration. As NC2 on Microsoft Azure extends your on-premises deployments, Palo Alto Networks ensures that you have the seamless security and visibility you need to safeguard your hybrid cloud environment.

Find Out How to Do More

See how Palo Alto Networks and Nutanix work together to deliver enhanced security capabilities and integrated solutions that secure the enterprise. Learn more about our VM-Series Virtual Firewalls and other Nutanix integrations, which give customers access to next-generation security controls that stop threats before they cause damage.

Source :
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2022/11/nutanix-cloud-clusters-for-microsoft-azure/

Protect Your iOS Devices with Cortex XDR Mobile

Cortex XDR 3.5 and Cortex XDR Agent 7.9 Deliver Stronger Security, Better Search and Broader Coverage, Including iOS Support

Your employees probably expect to work from anywhere, at any time they want, on any device. With the rise of remote work, users are accessing business apps and data from mobile devices more than ever before. Cortex XDR Mobile for iOS lets you protect your users from mobile threats, such as malicious URLs in text messages and malicious or unwanted spam calls.

Cortex XDR Mobile for iOS is just one of over 40 new features in our Cortex XDR 3.5 and Cortex XDR Agent 7.9 releases. In addition to iOS protection, we’ve bolstered endpoint security, improved the flexibility of XQL Search, and expanded visibility and normalization to additional data sources. Even more new advancements make it easier than ever to manage alert exceptions and granularly control access to alerts and incidents.

Let’s dive in and take a deeper look at the new capabilities of Cortex XDR 3.5 and Cortex XDR Agent 7.9.

iOS Protection with Cortex XDR Mobile

With the rapid shift to remote work, flexible BYOD policies are a must have, now, for many companies. Whether employees are working at home, from a café, or in a corporate office, they often have a phone within reach, and for good reason. 62% of U.S. workers say mobile phones or tablets help them be productive at work, according to a broad 2021 survey.

Phishing and Smishing and Spam, Oh My!

If you own a smartphone (like 85% of Americans do) you’ve probably received suspicious text messages claiming your bank or Amazon or PayPal account has been blocked. Or you’ve received messages saying that you need to click a link to complete a USPS shipment. And if you are receiving these messages, you can assume your users are also receiving similar messages. It’s only a matter of time before a user clicks one of these links and supplies their credentials, possibly even the same credentials they use at work. These smishing attacks, or phishing performed through SMS, are on the rise.If your organization is like many others, you’ve probably deployed an email security solution that filters spam and phishing URLs. However, you may not be protecting your mobile devices – BYOD or corporate-owned – from spam calls and phishing attacks.Screenshot of being protected by Cortex XDR, showing security events.

With Cortex XDR Mobile for iOS, you can now secure iOS devices from advanced threats like smishing. The Cortex XDR agent blocks malicious URLs in SMS messages with URL filtering powered by Unit 42 threat intelligence. It can also block spam calls, safeguarding your users from unwanted and potentially fraudulent calls. Users can also report a spam call or message, allowing the Cortex XDR administrator to block the phone number.

Hunting Down Jailbroken Devices

Some of your iPhone users might “jailbreak” their phones to remove software restrictions imposed by Apple. Once they gain root access to their phones, they can install software not available in the App Store. Jailbreaking increases the risk of downloading malware. It can also create stability issues.

The Cortex XDR agent detects jailbroken devices, including evasion techniques designed to thwart security tools. Overall, the Cortex XDR provides strong protection for iPhones and iPads, while balancing privacy and usability requirements.

Now you can protect a broad set of endpoints, mobile devices and cloud workloads in your organization, including Windows, Linux, Mac, Android, Chrome and now iOS, with the Cortex XDR agent.

In-Process Shellcode Protection

Threat actors can attempt to bypass endpoint security controls using shellcode to load malicious code into memory. Cortex XDR’s patent-pending in-process shellcode protection module blocks these attempts. To understand how, let’s look at a common attack sequence.

After threat actors have gained initial access to a host, they typically perform a series of steps, including analyzing the host operating system and delivering a malicious payload to the host.

They may use a stager to deliver the payload directly into memory rather than installing malware on the host machine. By loading the payload directly into memory, they can circumvent many antivirus solutions that will either ignore or perform more limited security checks on memory.

Many red team tools or hacking tools, such as Cobalt Strike, Sliver or Brute Ratel, have made it easier for attackers to perform these sophisticated steps.

If a process, including a benign process, executes and allocates memory in a suspicious way, the Cortex XDR agent will single out that memory allocation and extract and analyze the buffer. If the Cortex XDR agent detects any signature or indicator that the payload is malicious, the agent conducts additional analysis on the process and shellcode, including analyzing the behavior of the code and the process, using EDR data enrichment.

If the Cortex XDR agent determines the shellcode or the process loaded by the shellcode are malicious, it will terminate the process that loaded the shellcode and the allocated memory. By killing the process chain, or the “causality,” Cortex XDR prevents the malicious software from executing.

In-process shellcode protection is a patent-pending technology that helps detect and prevent the use of hacking tools and malware.

Our in-process shellcode protection will block red team and hacking tools from loading malicious code, without needing to individually identify and block each tool.

This means that if a never-before-seen hacking tool is released, Cortex XDR can prevent the tool from using shellcode to load a payload into memory.

Cortex XDR will terminate the implant once it’s loaded on the machine before it can do anything malicious.

Financial Malware and Cryptomining Protection

Whether stealing from bank accounts or mining for cryptocurrency, cybercriminals always have new tricks up their collective sleeves. To combat these dangerous threats, we’ve added two new behavior-based protection modules in Cortex XDR Agent 7.9. Let’s take a brief look at these threats and how you can mitigate them with Cortex XDR.

Banking Trojans emerged over a decade ago, typically stealing banking credentials by manipulating web browser sessions and logging keystrokes. Criminals deployed large networks of Trojans, such as Zeus, Trickbot, Emotet and Dridex, over the years. They infected millions of computers, accessed bank accounts, and transferred funds from victims. Now, threat actors often use these Trojans to deliver other types of malware to victims’ devices, like ransomware.

Cryptojacking, or malicious and unauthorized mining for cryptocurrency, is an easy way for threat actors to make money. Threat actors often target cloud services to mine cryptocurrency because cloud services provide greater scale, allowing them to mine cryptocurrency faster than a traditional endpoint. According to Unit 42 research, 23% of organizations with cloud assets are affected by cryptojacking, and it’s still the most common attack on unsecured Kubernetes clusters.

The new banking malware threat protection and cryptominers protection modules in the Cortex XDR agent automatically detect and stop the behaviors associated with these attacks. For example, to block banking malware, the module will block attempts to infect web browsers during process creation, as well as block other browser injection techniques. The cryptominers protection module will detect unusual cryptographic API or GPU access and other telltale signs of cryptojacking.

Both of these modules augment existing banking and cryptomining protection already available with Cortex XDR. You can enable, disable or set these modules to alert-only mode on Windows, Linux and macOS endpoints. You can also create exceptions per module or module rule for granular policy control.

Scope-Based Access Control for Alerts and Incidents

To address data privacy and security requirements, you might wish to control which Cortex XDR alerts and incidents your users can view. With Cortex XDR 3.5, you can control which alerts and incidents users can access based on endpoint and endpoint group tags.

Screenshot showing the update user page.

You can tag endpoints or endpoint groups by geographic location, organization, business unit, department or any other segmentation of your choice. Then, you can flexibly manage access to alerts and incidents based on the tags you’ve defined.

Alert Management Made Simple

Cortex XDR 3.5 provides several enhancements to ease alert management and reduce noise. First, you can now view and configure alert exclusions and agent exception policies from a central location. You are able to configure which alerts to suppress. You can also configure exceptions to IOC and BIOC rules to prevent matching events from triggering alerts.

A new Disable Prevention Rules feature enables you to granularly exclude prevention actions triggered by specific security modules. The Legacy Exceptions window shows legacy “allow list rules,” which are still available.

Screenshot of Cortex XDR page on IOC/BIOC suppression rules. XQL Search Integration with Vulnerability Assessment

To help you quickly hunt down threats and discover high risk assets, we have enhanced our XQL search capability. Now you can uncover vulnerable endpoints and gain valuable exposure context for investigations by viewing Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), as well as installed applications per endpoint. You can also list all CVEs detected in your organization, together with the endpoints and applications impacted by each CVE.

In addition, XQL search supports several new options that offer greater flexibility and control to streamline investigation and response. Notably, a new top stage command reveals the top values for a specific field quickly, with minimal memory usage. By default the top stage command displays the top ten results.

For a complete list of new features, see the Cortex XDR 3.5 and Cortex XDR Agent 7.9 release notes. To learn more about the in-process shellcode protection feature, attend the session “Today’s Top Endpoint Threats, and Advancements to Stop Them” on Tuesday, December 13, at 10:30 AM PST at the Ignite ’22 Conference.

Source :
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2022/12/ios-devices-with-cortex-xdr-mobile/

LockBit 3.0 ‘Black’ attacks and leaks reveal wormable capabilities and tooling

Reverse-engineering reveals close similarities to BlackMatter ransomware, with some improvements

A postmortem analysis of multiple incidents in which attackers eventually launched the latest version of LockBit ransomware (known variously as LockBit 3.0 or ‘LockBit Black’), revealed the tooling used by at least one affiliate. Sophos’ Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team has observed both ransomware affiliates and legitimate penetration testers use the same collection of tooling over the past 3 months.

Leaked data about LockBit that showed the backend controls for the ransomware also seems to indicate that the creators have begun experimenting with the use of scripting that would allow the malware to “self-spread” using Windows Group Policy Objects (GPO) or the tool PSExec, potentially making it easier for the malware to laterally move and infect computers without the need for affiliates to know how to take advantage of these features for themselves, potentially speeding up the time it takes them to deploy the ransomware and encrypt targets.

A reverse-engineering analysis of the LockBit functionality shows that the ransomware has carried over most of its functionality from LockBit 2.0 and adopted new behaviors that make it more difficult to analyze by researchers. For instance, in some cases it now requires the affiliate to use a 32-character ‘password’ in the command line of the ransomware binary when launched, or else it won’t run, though not all the samples we looked at required the password.

We also observed that the ransomware runs with LocalServiceNetworkRestricted permissions, so it does not need full Administrator-level access to do its damage (supporting observations of the malware made by other researchers).

Most notably, we’ve observed (along with other researchers) that many LockBit 3.0 features and subroutines appear to have been lifted directly from BlackMatter ransomware.

Is LockBit 3.0 just ‘improved’ BlackMatter?

Other researchers previously noted that LockBit 3.0 appears to have adopted (or heavily borrowed) several concepts and techniques from the BlackMatter ransomware family.

We dug into this ourselves, and found a number of similarities which strongly suggest that LockBit 3.0 reuses code from BlackMatter.

Anti-debugging trick

Blackmatter and Lockbit 3.0 use a specific trick to conceal their internal functions calls from researchers. In both cases, the ransomware loads/resolves a Windows DLL from its hash tables, which are based on ROT13.

It will try to get pointers from the functions it needs by searching the PEB (Process Environment Block) of the module. It will then look for a specific binary data marker in the code (0xABABABAB) at the end of the heap; if it finds this marker, it means someone is debugging the code, and it doesn’t save the pointer, so the ransomware quits.

After these checks, it will create a special stub for each API it requires. There are five different types of stubs that can be created (randomly). Each stub is a small piece of shellcode that performs API hash resolution on the fly and jumps to the API address in memory. This adds some difficulties while reversing using a debugger.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s 0xABABABAB marker

SophosLabs has put together a CyberChef recipe for decoding these stub shellcode snippets.

Output of a CyberChef recipe
The first stub, as an example (decoded with CyberChef)

Obfuscation of strings

Many strings in both LockBit 3.0 and BlackMatter are obfuscated, resolved during runtime by pushing the obfuscated strings on to the stack and decrypting with an XOR function. In both LockBit and BlackMatter, the code to achieve this is very similar.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s string obfuscation (image credit: Chuong Dong)

Georgia Tech student Chuong Dong analyzed BlackMatter and showed this feature on his blog, with the screenshot above.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s string obfuscation, in comparison

By comparison, LockBit 3.0 has adopted a string obfuscation method that looks and works in a very similar fashion to BlackMatter’s function.

API resolution

LockBit uses exactly the same implementation as BlackMatter to resolve API calls, with one exception: LockBit adds an extra step in an attempt to conceal the function from debuggers.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s dynamic API resolution (image credit: Chuong Dong)

The array of calls performs precisely the same function in LockBit 3.0.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s dynamic API resolution

Hiding threads

Both LockBit and BlackMatter hide threads using the NtSetInformationThread function, with the parameter ThreadHideFromDebugger. As you probably can guess, this means that the debugger doesn’t receive events related to this thread.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit employs the same ThreadHideFromDebugger feature as an evasion technique

Printing

LockBit, like BlackMatter, sends ransom notes to available printers.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit can send its ransom notes directly to printers, as BlackMatter can do

Deletion of shadow copies

Both ransomware will sabotage the infected computer’s ability to recover from file encryption by deleting the Volume Shadow Copy files.

LockBit calls the IWbemLocator::ConnectServer method to connect with the local ROOT\CIMV2 namespace and obtain the pointer to an IWbemServices object that eventually calls IWbemServices::ExecQuery to execute the WQL query.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter code for deleting shadow copies (image credit: Chuong Dong)

LockBit’s method of doing this is identical to BlackMatter’s implementation, except that it adds a bit of string obfuscation to the subroutine.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s deletion of shadow copies

Enumerating DNS hostnames

Both LockBit and BlackMatter enumerate hostnames on the network by calling NetShareEnum.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter calls NetShareEnum() to enumerate hostnames… (image credit: Chuong Dong)

In the source code for LockBit, the function looks like it has been copied, verbatim, from BlackMatter.

Screenshot of disassembler code
…as does LockBit

Determining the operating system version

Both ransomware strains use identical code to check the OS version – even using the same return codes (although this is a natural choice, since the return codes are hexadecimal representations of the version number).

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s code for checking the OS version (image credit: Chuong Dong)
Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s OS enumeration routine

Configuration

Both ransomware contain embedded configuration data inside their binary executables. We noted that LockBit decodes its config in a similar way to BlackMatter, albeit with some small differences.

For instance, BlackMatter saves its configuration in the .rsrc section, whereas LockBit stores it in .pdata. 

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s config decryption routine (image credit: Chuong Dong)

And LockBit uses a different linear congruential generator (LCG) algorithm for decoding.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s config decryption routine

Some researchers have speculated that the close relationship between the LockBit and BlackMatter code indicates that one or more of BlackMatter’s coders were recruited by LockBit; that LockBit bought the BlackMatter codebase; or a collaboration between developers. As we noted in our white paper on multiple attackers earlier this year, it’s not uncommon for ransomware groups to interact, either inadvertently or deliberately.

Either way, these findings are further evidence that the ransomware ecosystem is complex, and fluid. Groups reuse, borrow, or steal each other’s ideas, code, and tactics as it suits them. And, as the LockBit 3.0 leak site (containing, among other things, a bug bounty and a reward for “brilliant ideas”) suggests, that gang in particular is not averse to paying for innovation.

LockBit tooling mimics what legitimate pentesters would use

Another aspect of the way LockBit 3.0’s affiliates are deploying the ransomware shows that they’re becoming very difficult to distinguish from the work of a legitimate penetration tester – aside from the fact that legitimate penetration testers, of course, have been contracted by the targeted company beforehand, and are legally allowed to perform the pentest.

The tooling we observed the attackers using included a package from GitHub called Backstab. The primary function of Backstab is, as the name implies, to sabotage the tooling that analysts in security operations centers use to monitor for suspicious activity in real time. The utility uses Microsoft’s own Process Explorer driver (signed by Microsoft) to terminate protected anti-malware processes and disable EDR utilities. Both Sophos and other researchers have observed LockBit attackers using Cobalt Strike, which has become a nearly ubiquitous attack tool among ransomware threat actors, and directly manipulating Windows Defender to evade detection.

Further complicating the parentage of LockBit 3.0 is the fact that we also encountered attackers using a password-locked variant of the ransomware, called lbb_pass.exe , which has also been used by attackers that deploy REvil ransomware. This may suggest that there are threat actors affiliated with both groups, or that threat actors not affiliated with LockBit have taken advantage of the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder. At least one group, BlooDy, has reportedly used the builder, and if history is anything to go by, more may follow suit.

LockBit 3.0 attackers also used a number of publicly-available tools and utilities that are now commonplace among ransomware threat actors, including the anti-hooking utility GMER, a tool called AV Remover published by antimalware company ESET, and a number of PowerShell scripts designed to remove Sophos products from computers where Tamper Protection has either never been enabled, or has been disabled by the attackers after they obtained the credentials to the organization’s management console.

We also saw evidence the attackers used a tool called Netscan to probe the target’s network, and of course, the ubiquitous password-sniffer Mimikatz.

Incident response makes no distinction

Because these utilities are in widespread use, MDR and Rapid Response treats them all equally – as though an attack is underway – and immediately alerts the targets when they’re detected.

We found the attackers took advantage of less-than-ideal security measures in place on the targeted networks. As we mentioned in our Active Adversaries Report on multiple ransomware attackers, the lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) on critical internal logins (such as management consoles) permits an intruder to use tooling that can sniff or keystroke-capture administrators’ passwords and then gain access to that management console.

It’s safe to assume that experienced threat actors are at least as familiar with Sophos Central and other console tools as the legitimate users of those consoles, and they know exactly where to go to weaken or disable the endpoint protection software. In fact, in at least one incident involving a LockBit threat actor, we observed them downloading files which, from their names, appeared to be intended to remove Sophos protection: sophoscentralremoval-master.zip and sophos-removal-tool-master.zip. So protecting those admin logins is among the most critically important steps admins can take to defend their networks.

For a list of IOCs associated with LockBit 3.0, please see our GitHub.

Acknowledgments

Sophos X-Ops acknowledges the collaboration of Colin Cowie, Gabor Szappanos, Alex Vermaning, and Steeve Gaudreault in producing this report.

Source :
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/11/30/lockbit-3-0-black-attacks-and-leaks-reveal-wormable-capabilities-and-tooling/

Best Practices for Securing Your Network from Ransomware

Discover the seven network security measures that can help mitigate the risk of a ransomware attack.

66% of organizations were hit by ransomware last year* demonstrating that adversaries have become considerably more capable at executing attacks at scale than ever before. 

Modern attacks leverage legitimate IT tools such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain access to networks, making initial detection notoriously difficult. The root of the problem is that there’s too much implicit trust in the use of these tools which has repeatedly proven unwise.  

Implementing robust network security measures is a sure-fire way to mitigate this risk. In our new whitepaper, Best Practices for Securing Your Network from Ransomware, and in this article, we share practical network security tips to help elevate your ransomware protection. 

1. Micro-segment your network

Micro-segmenting allows you to limit the lateral movement of threats. One way to achieve this is to create small zones or VLANs and connect them via managed switches and a firewall to apply anti-malware and IPS protection between segments. This lets you identify and block threats attempting to move laterally across your network. 

2. Replace remote-access VPN with a Zero Trust Network Access solution (ZTNA)

ZTNA is the modern replacement for remote-access VPN. It eliminates the inherent trust and broad access that VPN provides, instead using the principles of Zero Trust: trust nothing, verify everything. To learn more about the benefits of ZTNA over VPN, read our article here. 

3. Implement the strongest possible protection

Always deploy the highest level of protection on your firewall, endpoints, servers, mobile devices, and remote access tools. In particular: 

  • Ensure your firewall has TLS 1.3 inspection, next-gen IPS, and streaming DPI with machine learning and sandboxing for protection from the latest zero-day threats 
  • Ensure your endpoints have modern next-gen protection capabilities to guard against credential theft, exploits, and ransomware 

4. Reduce the surface area of cyberattacks

We recommend that you review your firewall rules and eliminate any remote access or RDP system access through VPN, NAT, or port-forwarding, and ensure that any traffic flows are properly protected. Eliminating exposure from remote access goes a long way in reducing the number of in-roads for attackers to launch ransomware attacks. 

5. Keep your firmware and software patched and up-to-date 

This is important for both your network infrastructure (such as your firewall or remote-access software or clients) and your systems given that every update includes important security patches for previously discovered vulnerabilities.  

6. Use multi-factor authentication (MFA)

Ensure your network operates on a zero-trust model where every user and device has to continually earn trust by verifying their identity. Also, enforce a strong password policy and consider adopting authentication solutions like Windows Hello for Business.  

7. Instantly respond to cyberattacks

Use automation technologies and human expertise to accelerate cyber incident response and remediation. Ensure your network security infrastructure helps you automatically respond to active attacks so you can isolate a compromised host before it can cause serious damage.  

An increasingly popular way to achieve this is via a managed detection and response (MDR) service. MDR is a fully managed, 24/7 service delivered by experts who specialize in detecting and responding to cyberattacks that technology solutions alone cannot prevent.  To learn more on the benefits of MDR, read our article here. 

Learn more

To explore these best practices in greater detail and to learn how Sophos network security solutions elevate your ransomware protection, download our whitepaper here. 

Sophos provides everything you need to fully secure your network from attacks, including firewalls, ZTNA, switches, wireless, remote-edge devices, messaging protection, MDR, next-gen endpoint protection, EDR and XDR. Plus, everything’s managed via a single cloud management console — Sophos Central — and works together to deliver Synchronized Security and cross-product threat detection and response. 

For more information and to discuss how Sophos can help you, speak with one of our advisors or visit www.sophos.com today. 

* The State of Ransomware 2022, Sophos

Source :
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/11/28/best-practices-for-securing-your-network-from-ransomware/

The Reality of SMB Cloud Security in 2022

4,986 IT professionals in small and mid-sized organizations (SMBs) share their real-world experiences

For most small and mid-sized organizations, the reality of ‘moving to the cloud’ has been a gradual transition of on-premises resources to the cloud, with many now running hybrid environments.

To understand the reality of cloud security today for SMBs, Sophos commissioned a survey of 4,984 IT professionals across 31 countries whose organizations use Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). This vendor-agnostic study was conducted by Vanson Bourne, a leading independent research agency.

The findings highlight considerable gaps in cloud defenses for SMB organizations together with opportunities for improvement. They also demonstrate the real-world benefits of strong cloud practice on an organization’s experience of cyberthreats.

The Cloud Is a Growing Target for Cyberattacks

As use of the cloud increases, so does the focus it receives from cyber criminals. The survey revealed major changes in IaaS users’ experience of cyberattacks over the last year:

  • 56% experienced an increase in volume of attacks on their organization
  • 59% experienced an increase in complexity of attacks on their organization
  • 53% experienced an increase in impact of attacks on their organization
  • 67% reported that their organization was hit by ransomware

It is clear that the challenge facing defenders in the cloud is increasing rapidly.

Strong Cloud Practice Reduces Threat Exposure

The good news is that advanced IaaS users are twice as likely to report a decrease in attack volume, complexity and impact over the last year than beginners. For example, 38% of advanced users reported that the impact of attacks had decreased over the last year compared to 19% of beginners.

With regards to volume, complexity, and impact, how has your organization’s experience of cyberattacks changed over the last year? (4,984 respondents that define themselves as Infrastructure as a Service users).

The data also reveals that advanced cloud users are far less likely to have experienced an increase in the volume, complexity, and impact of an attack; for example, 61% of beginners reported an increase in attack impact compared to only 43% of advanced users.

 Attack Surface Weaknesses Revealed

Resource misconfigurations and unpatched vulnerabilities leave the door wide open for ransomware actors and other adversaries to get into your environment and carry out their attack.

Unfortunately, most SMBs are highly exposed in this area. Only 37% of survey respondents said their organization tracks and detects resource misconfigurations in their IaaS infrastructure. What’s more, fewer than half (47%) said they routinely scan IaaS resources for software vulnerabilities.

IT Teams Are Blind to Resources and Configurations

Adversaries commonly exploit stolen credentials and access data to access and compromise accounts. Once inside an organization, it’s often fairly easy for them to escalate privileges and move laterally across the victim’s infrastructure to carry out their attack.

Having visibility of all your resources and their configurations so you can quickly spot compromise and then take action is an important element of an effective cloud security strategy.

However, the survey reveals that this is a major security gap for almost two in three cloud users. Interestingly – and concerningly – there is little variation according to level of cloud experience: 34% of beginner and intermediate IaaS users have visibility of all resources and their configurations in their IaaS infrastructure, and this rises to just 37% for advanced users. This is a clear opportunity for organizations to elevate their cloud defenses.

Percentage of respondents that said their organization has visibility of all IaaS resources and their configurations

 24/7 Threat Detection and Response Capabilities

The reality is that not all threats can be prevented automatically as attackers increasingly exploit legitimate IT tools and unpatched vulnerabilities to avoid triggering protection solutions. Stopping today’s most advanced attacks requires a combination of technology and human expertise.

Threat detection and response is a 24/7 activity with adversaries conducting attacks at any time of day or night. However, the study revealed very few organizations have the necessary resources to hunt down and neutralize active adversaries around the clock.

In fact, only one in three (33%) IaaS users says their organization has the resources to continuously detect, investigate and remove threats in their IaaS infrastructure. And only one in four (40%) has processes in place to respond to IaaS infrastructure security incidents 24/7, with intermediate and advanced IaaS users a little better positioned than beginners.

Percentage of respondents that said their organization has processes in place to respond to security incidents in their IaaS infrastructure 24/7.

As the challenges facing defenders continues to grow, many organizations are turning to managed detection and response (MDR) services, with Gartner anticipating that 50% of organizations will use MDR by 2025*.

 Secure Access To Cloud Resources

The role of the firewall in securing access to on-premises resources is already well established. When it comes to securing the cloud, you need to apply the same principles you used for hardware firewalls to virtual firewalls.

Given the parallels between traditional and virtual firewalls it is perhaps surprising that the survey revealed that fewer than half of organizations have strong defenses in place here: only 40% have IPS in place to secure their IaaS infrastructure and just 44% use a WAF to protect web-facing applications and APIs.

Interestingly, this is one area where we see advanced users reporting much higher adoption of best practices than beginner and intermediate users. Almost half (49%) of advanced IaaS users have IPS in place compared to 34% of beginners, and 53% of advanced users deploy WAF to secure their cloud-based resources compared with just 40% of those in the early stages of their IaaS journey.

Percentage of respondents that said their organization has IPS in place to defend their IaaS infrastructure against known threats
Percentage of respondents that said they use web application firewalls (WAF) to protect web-facing applications and APIs

To Sum Up

Just as the use of the cloud is an ongoing process of transition for many organizations, so is cloud security. Many of the principles are the same as for traditional on-premises security, with adaptations to reflect the differences in cloud usage and threat risk.

By addressing the security gaps highlighted in this research, small and mid-sized organizations can elevate their defenses and minimize their risk of experiencing a major cloud security incident.

 How Sophos Can Help

Sophos is a global cloud security specialist, working with all leading cloud providers including AWS, Azure, Google Cloud (GCP) and Oracle. Today, Sophos secures over 530,000 organizations around the world and we are proud to be the only vendor named a Gartner Peer Insights Customers’ Choice for both endpoint and network security**.  Our cloud security solutions include:

  • Sophos Cloud Native Security (CNS) provides complete cloud security coverage, enabling you to protect all your servicers, from on-premises to single and multi-cloud, Windows to Linux.
  • Sophos Firewall offers powerful network visibility, protection, and response to secure your public, private, and hybrid cloud environments. With preconfigured virtual machines in both Azure and AWS, you can be up and running quickly.
  • Sophos MDR is our market-leading 24/7 managed detection and response service. We use the tools you already have in place, including your cloud provider telemetry, to identify and stop advanced, human-led attacks before they can impact your business.

For more information on Sophos solutions and to arrange a test drive, speak to your Sophos adviser or visit www.sophos.com.

* Gartner Market Guide for Managed Detection and Response 2021

**Gartner Peer Insights content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences with the vendors listed on the platform, should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Gartner Peer Insights Customers’ Choice constitute the subjective opinions of individual end-user reviews, ratings, and data applied against a documented methodology; they neither represent the views of, nor constitute an endorsement by, Gartner or its affiliates.

Source :
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/11/29/the-reality-of-smb-cloud-security-in-2022/