Lineage OS Changelog 28 – Fantastic Fourteen, Amazing Applications, Undeniable User-Experience

WRITTEN ON FEBRUARY 14, 2024 BY NOLEN JOHNSON (NPJOHNSON)

21 – Finally old enough to drink (at least in the US)!

Hey y’all! Welcome back!

We’re a bit ahead of schedule this year, we know normally you don’t expect to hear from us until April-ish.

This was largely thanks to some new faces around the scene, some old faces stepping up to the plate, and several newly appointed Project Directors!

With all that said, we have been working extremely hard since Android 14’s release last October to port our features to this new version of Android. Thanks to our hard work adapting to Google’s largely UI-based changes in Android 12/13, and Android 14’s dead-simple device bring-up requirements, we were able to rebase our changes onto Android 14 much more efficiently.

This lets us spend some much overdue time on our apps suite! Applications such as Aperture had their features and UX improved significantly, while many of our aging apps such as Jelly, Dialer, Contacts, Messaging, LatinIME (Keyboard), and Calculator got near full redesigns that bring them into the Material You era!

…and last but not least, yet another new app landed in our apps suite! Don’t get used to it though, or maybe do, we’re not sure yet.

Now, let’s remind everyone about versioning conventions – To match AOSP’s versioning conventions, and due to the fact it added no notable value to the end-user, we dropped our subversion from a branding perspective.

As Android has moved onto the quarterly maintenance release model, this release will be “LineageOS 21”, not 21.0 or 21.1 – though worry not – we are based on the latest and greatest Android 14 version, QPR1.

Additionally, to you developers out there – any repository that is not core-platform, or isn’t expected to change in quarterly maintenance releases will use branches without subversions – e.g., lineage-21 instead of lineage-21.0.

New Features!

  • Security patches from January 2023 to February 2024 have been merged to LineageOS 18.1 through 21.
  • Glimpse of Us: We now have a shining new app, Glimpse! It will become the default gallery app starting from LineageOS 21
  • An extensive list of applications were heavily improved or redesigned:
    • Aperture: A touch of Material You, new video features, and more!
    • Calculator: Complete Material You redesign
    • Contacts: Design adjustments for Material You
    • Dialer: Large cleanups and code updates, Material You and bugfixes
    • Eleven: Some Material You design updates
    • Jelly: Refreshed interface, Material You and per-website location permissions
    • LatinIME: Material You enhancements, spacebar trackpad, fixed number row
    • Messaging: Design adjustments for Material You
  • A brand new boot animation by our awesome designer Vazguard!
  • SeedVault and Etar have both been updated to their newest respective upstream version.
  • WebView has been updated to Chromium 120.0.6099.144.
  • We have further developed our side pop-out expanding volume panel.
  • Our Updater app should now install A/B updates much faster (thank Google!)
  • We have contributed even more changes and improvements back upstream to the FOSS Etar calendar app we integrated some time back!
  • We have contributed even more changes and improvements back upstream to the Seedvault backup app.
  • Android TV builds still ship with an ad-free Android TV launcher, unlike Google’s ad-enabled launcher – most Android TV Google Apps packages now have options to use the Google ad-enabled launcher or our ad-restricted version.
  • Our merge scripts have been largely overhauled, greatly simplifying the Android Security Bulletin merge process, as well as making supporting devices like Pixel devices that have full source releases much more streamlined.
  • Our extract utilities can now extract from OTA images and factory images directly, further simplifying monthly security updates for maintainers on devices that receive security patches regularly.
  • LLVM has been fully embraced, with builds now defaulting to using LLVM bin-utils and optionally, the LLVM integrated assembler. For those of you with older kernels, worry not, you can always opt-out.
  • A global Quick Settings light mode has been developed so that this UI element matches the device’s theme.
  • Our Setup Wizard has seen adaptation for Android 14, with improved styling, more seamless transitions, and significant amounts of legacy code being stripped out.
  • The developer-kit (e.g. Radxa 0, Banana Pi B5, ODROID C4, Jetson X1) experience has been heavily improved, with UI elements and settings that aren’t related to their more restricted hardware feature-set being hidden or tailored!

Amazing Applications!

Calculator

calculator

Our Calculator app has received a UI refresh, bringing it in sync with the rest of our app suite, as well as a few new features:

  • Code cleanup
  • Reworked UI components to look more modern
  • Added support for Material You
  • Fixed some bugs

Glimpse

glimpse

We’ve been working on a new gallery app, called Glimpse, which will replace Gallery2, the AOSP default gallery app.

Thanks to developers SebaUbuntu, luca020400 and LuK1337 who started the development, together with the help of designer Vazguard.

We focused on a clean, simple and modern-looking UI, designed around Material You’s guidelines, making sure all the features that you would expect from a gallery app are there.

It’ll be available on all devices starting from LineageOS 21.

Aperture

This has been the first year for this new application and we feel it has been received well by the community. As promised, we have continued to improve it and add new features, while keeping up with Google’s changes to the CameraX library (even helping them fix some bugs found on some of our maintained devices). We’d like to also thank the community for their work on translations, especially since Aperture strings changed quite often this year.

Here’s a quick list of some of the new features and improvements since the last update:

  • Added a better dialog UI to ask the user for location permissions when needed
  • UI will now rotate to follow the device orientation
  • Added Material You support
  • Improved QR code scanner, now with support for Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi Easy Connect™ QR codes
  • Added support for Google Assistant voice actions
  • Added photo and video mirroring (flipping) options
  • Audio can be muted while recording a video
  • Better error handling, including when no camera is available
  • Added configurable volume button gestures
  • The app will now warn you if the device overheats and is now able to automatically stop recording if the device temperature is too high
  • Added an information chip on top of the viewfinder to show some useful information, like low battery or disabled microphone
  • Added some advanced video processing settings (noise reduction, sharpening, etc.)
  • You can now set the flash to torch mode in photo mode by long-pressing the flash button
  • Added support for HDR video recording

Jelly

jelly

Our browser app has received a UI refresh, bringing it in sync with the rest of our app suite, as well as a few new features:

  • Code cleanup
  • Reworked UI components to look more modern
  • Added support for Material You
  • Fixed some bugs regarding downloading files
  • Added Brave as a search engine and suggestions provider
  • Dropped Google encrypted search engine, as Google defaults to HSTS now
  • Baidu suggestion provider now uses HTTPS
  • Implemented per-website location permissions

Dialer, Messaging, and Contacts

Dialer

Since AOSP abandoned deprecated the Dialer, we have taken over the code base and did heavy cleanups, updating to newer standards (AndroidX) and redesigning:

  • Code cleanup
  • Changed to using Material You design
  • Proper dark and light themes
  • Several bugfixes, specifically with number lookups and the contact list

While Messaging was also deprecated by AOSP, at least the Contacts app was not. Nonetheless we gave both of them an overhaul and made them also follow the system colors and look more integrated.

Careful Commonization

Several of our developers have worked hard on SoC-specific common kernels to base on that can be merged on a somewhat regular basis to pull in the latest features/security patches to save maintainers additional effort.

Go check them out and consider basing your device kernels on them!

Supported SoCs right now are:

SoC (system-on-chip)Kernel VersionAndroid Version 
Qualcomm MSM89963.1811 
Qualcomm MSM8998/MSM89964.413 
Qualcomm SDM8454.913 
Qualcomm SM81504.1413 
Qualcomm SDM6604.1913 
Qualcomm SM82504.1913 
Qualcomm SM83505.413 
Qualcomm SM84505.1013– Coming soon!
Qualcomm SM85505.1513 

Additionally, many legacy devices require interpolating libraries that we colloquially refer to as “shims” – these have long been device and maintainer managed, but this cycle we have decided to commonize them to make the effort easier on everyone and not duplicate effort!

You can check it out here and contribute shims that you think other devices may need or add additional components to additional shims and compatibility layers provided via Gerrit!

Deprecations

Overall, we feel that the 21 branch has reached feature and stability parity with 20 and is ready for initial release.

For the first time in many cycles, all devices that shipped LineageOS 19.1 were either promoted or dropped by the maintainer by the time of this blog post, so LineageOS 19.1 was retired naturally. As such, no new device submissions targeting the 19.1 branch will be able to ship builds (you can still apply and fork your work to the organization, though!).

LineageOS 18.1 builds were still not deprecated this year, as Google’s somewhat harsh requirements of BPF support in all Android 12+ device’s kernels meant that a significant amount of our legacy devices on the build-roster would have died.

LineageOS 18.1, is still on a feature freeze, and building each device monthly, shortly after the Android Security Bulletin is merged for that month.

We will allow new LineageOS 18.1 submissions to be forked to the organization, but we no longer will allow newly submitted LineageOS 18.1 devices to ship.

LineageOS 21 will launch building for a decent selection of devices, with additional devices to come as they are marked as both Charter compliant and ready for builds by their maintainer.

Upgrading to LineageOS 21

To upgrade, please follow the upgrade guide for your device by clicking on it here and then on “Upgrade to a higher version of LineageOS”.

If you’re coming from an unofficial build, you need to follow the good ole’ install guide for your device, just like anyone else looking to install LineageOS for the first time. These can be found at the same place here by clicking on your device and then on “Installation”.

Please note that if you’re currently on an official build, you DO NOT need to wipe your device, unless your device’s wiki page specifically dictates otherwise, as is needed for some devices with massive changes, such as a repartition.

Download portal

While it has been in the making for quite a while and already released a year ago, it’s still news in regards to this blog post. Our download portal has been redesigned and also gained a few functional improvements:

  • Dark mode
  • Downloads of additional images (shown for all devices but not used on all of them, read the instructions to know which ones you need for your device’s installation!)
  • Verifying downloaded files (see here) – if you go with any download not obtained from us, you can still verify it was originally signed by us and thus untampered with

Wiki

The LineageOS Wiki has also been expanded throughout the year and now offers, in addition to the known and tested instructions for all supported devices, some improvements:

  • The device overview allows filtering for various attributes you might be interested in a device (please note: choosing a device only based on that list still does not guarantee any device support beyond the point of when you chose it)
  • The device overview now lists variants of a device and other known marketing names in a more visible way, also allowing for different device information and instructions per variant to be shown
  • The installation instructions have been paginated, giving users less chance to skip a section involuntarily

In addition to that we’d like to take this time to remind users to follow instructions on their device’s respective Wiki Page given the complexity introduced by AOSP changes like System-As-Root, A/B Partition Scheme, Dynamic Partitions, and most recently Virtual A/B found on the Pixel 5 and other devices launching with Android 11, the instructions many of you are used to following from memory are either no longer valid or are missing very critical steps. As of 16.0, maintainers have been expected to run through the full instructions and verify they work on their devices. The LineageOS Wiki was recently further extended, and maintainers were given significantly more options to customize their device’s specific installation, update, and upgrade instructions.

Developers, Developers, Developers

Or, in this case, maintainers, maintainers, maintainers. We want your device submissions!

If you’re a developer and would like to submit your device for officials, it’s easier than ever. Just follow the instructions here.

The above also applies to people looking to bring back devices that were at one point official but are no longer supported – seriously – even if it’s not yet completely compliant, submit it! Maybe we can help you complete it.

After you submit, within generally a few weeks, but in most cases a week, you’ll receive some feedback on your device submission; and if it’s up to par, you’ll be invited to our communications instances and your device will be forked to LineageOS’s official repositories.

Don’t have the knowledge to maintain a device, but want to contribute to the platform? We have lots of other things you can contribute to. For instance, our apps suite is always looking for new people to help improve them, or you can contribute to the wiki by adding more useful information & documentation. Gerrit is always open for submissions! Once you’ve contributed a few things, send an email to devrel(at)lineageos.org detailing them, and we’ll get you in the loop.

Also, if you sent a submission via Gmail over the last few months, due to infrastructural issues, some of them didn’t make it to us, so please resend them!

Generic Targets

We’ve talked about these before, but these are important, so we will cover them again.

Though we’ve had buildable generic targets since 2019, to make LineageOS more accessible to developers, and really anyone interested in giving LineageOS a try, we’ve documented how to use them in conjunction with the Android Emulator/Android Studio!

Additionally, similar targets can now be used to build GSI in mobile, Android TV configurations, and Android Automotive (we’ll talk more about this later) making LineageOS more accessible than ever to devices using Google’s Project Treble. We won’t be providing official builds for these targets, due to the fact the user experience varies entirely based on how well the device manufacturer complied with Treble’s requirements, but feel free to go build them yourself and give it a shot!

Please note that Android 12 (and by proxy Android 13/14) diverged GSI and Emulator targets. Emulator targets reside in lineage_sdk_$arch, while GSI targets reside in lineage_gsi_$arch.

Translations

Bilingual? Trilingual? Anything-lingual?

If you think you can help translate LineageOS to a different language, jump over to our wiki and have a go! If your language is not supported natively in Android, reach out to us on Crowdin and we’ll take the necessary steps to include your language. For instance, LineageOS is the first Android custom distribution that has complete support for the Welsh (Cymraeg) language thanks to its community of translators.

Please, contribute to translations only if you are reasonably literate in the target language; poor translations waste both our time and yours.

Build roster

Added 21 devices

Device nameWikiMaintainersMoved from
ASUS Zenfone 5Z (ZS620KL)Z01Rrohanpurohit, Jackeagle, ThEMarD20
Banana Pi M5 (Tablet)m5_tabnpjohnson, stricted20
Essential PH-1matahaggertk, intervigil, npjohnson, rashed20
F(x)tec Pro¹ Xpro1xBadDaemon, bgcngm, mccreary, npjohnson, qsnc, tdm20
F(x)tec Pro¹pro1BadDaemon, bgcngm, intervigil, mccreary, npjohnson, tdm20
Fairphone 4FP4mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 2 XLtaimenchrmhoffmann, Eamo5, npjohnson, jro197920
Google Pixel 2walleyechrmhoffmann, Eamo5, npjohnson, jro197920
Google Pixel 3 XLcrosshatchrazorloves, cdesai, intervigil, mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 3bluelinerazorloves, cdesai, intervigil, mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 3a XLbonitocdesai, mikeioannina, npjohnson20
Google Pixel 3asargocdesai, mikeioannina, npjohnson20
Google Pixel 4 XLcoralcdesai, Eamo5, mikeioannina, npjohnson20
Google Pixel 4flamecdesai, Eamo5, mikeioannina, npjohnson20
Google Pixel 4a 5Gbramblealeasto, mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 4asunfishPeterCxy, cdesai, mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 5redfinaleasto, mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 5abarbetaleasto, mikeioannina20
Google Pixel 6 Proravenmikeioannina20
Google Pixel 6oriolemikeioannina20
Google Pixel 6abluejaymikeioannina20
Google Pixel 7 Procheetahmikeioannina, npjohnson20
Google Pixel 7panthermikeioannina, neelc20
Google Pixel 7alynxmikeioannina, niclimcy20
Google Pixel 8 Prohuskymikeioannina 
Google Pixel 8shibamikeioannina 
Google Pixel Foldfelixmikeioannina 
Google Pixel TablettangorproLuK1337, mikeioannina, npjohnson, neelc20
Google Pixel XLmarlinnpjohnson, electimon20
Google Pixelsailfishnpjohnson, electimon20
HardKernel ODROID-C4 (Tablet)odroidc4_tabnpjohnson, stricted20
LG G5 (International)h850aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, x86cpu20
LG G5 (T-Mobile)h830aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, x86cpu20
LG G5 (US Unlocked)rs988aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, x86cpu20
LG G6 (EU Unlocked)h870aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, x86cpu20
LG G6 (T-Mobile)h872aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, x86cpu20
LG G6 (US Unlocked)us997aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, x86cpu20
LG V20 (AT&T)h910aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V20 (GSM Unlocked – DirtySanta)us996daleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V20 (GSM Unlocked)us996aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V20 (Global)h990aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V20 (Sprint)ls997aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V20 (T-Mobile)h918aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V20 (Verizon)vs995aleasto, AShiningRay, npjohnson, ROMSG, xxseva44, x86cpu20
LG V30 (Unlocked) / LG V30 (T-Mobile)joanlifehackerhansol, SGCMarkus20
Motorola edge 20 propstarnpjohnson, SGCMarkus20
Motorola edge 20berlinnpjohnson, SGCMarkus20
Motorola edge 2021berlnaSyberHexen20
Motorola edge 30dubaithemard, sb6596, Demon00020
Motorola edge s / Motorola moto g100niodianlujitao20
Motorola moto g200 5G / Motorola Edge S30xpengthemard, rogers260220
Motorola moto g32devonDhina17, mikeioannina20
Motorola moto g42hawaoDhina17, mikeioannina20
Motorola moto g52rhodeDhina17, mikeioannina20
Motorola moto g6 plusevertjro197920
Motorola moto g7 playchannelSyberHexen, deadman96385, erfanoabdi, npjohnson20
Motorola moto g7 pluslakejro1979, npjohnson20
Motorola moto g7 poweroceanSyberHexen, erfanoabdi, npjohnson20
Motorola moto g7rivererfanoabdi, npjohnson, SyberHexen20
Motorola moto x4paytonerfanoabdi, ThEMarD, electimon20
Motorola moto z2 force / Motorola moto z (2018)nasherfanoabdi, npjohnson, qsnc20
Motorola moto z3 playbeckhamjro197920
Motorola moto z3messinpjohnson20
Motorola one actiontroikaStricted, npjohnson20
Motorola one vision / Motorola p50kaneStricted, npjohnson20
Nokia 6.1 (2018)PL2npjohnson, theimpulson20
Nokia 6.1 PlusDRGnpjohnson, theimpulson20
Nubia Mini 5GTP1803ArianK16a, npjohnson20
OnePlus 11 5Gsalamibgcngm 
OnePlus 5cheeseburgertrautamaki20
OnePlus 5Tdumplingtrautamaki, qsnc20
OnePlus 6enchiladaLuK133720
OnePlus 6TfajitaEdwinMoq20
OnePlus 7 ProguacamoleLuK1337, Tortel20
OnePlus 7guacamolebshantanu-sarkar20
OnePlus 7T Prohotdogqsnc20
OnePlus 7ThotdogbLuK133720
OnePlus 8 ProinstantnoodlepLuK133720
OnePlus 8instantnoodlejabashque20
OnePlus 8TkebabLuK133720
OnePlus 9 ProlemonadepLuK1337, bgcngm, mikeioannina20
OnePlus 9lemonademikeioannina, tangalbert919, ZVNexus20
OnePlus 9Rlemonadesmikeioannina20
OnePlus 9RTmartinimikeioannina20
OnePlus NordaviciiMajorP93, KakatkarAkshay20
Radxa Zero (Tablet)radxa0_tabbgcngm, npjohnson, stricted20
Razer Phone 2auramikeioannina, npjohnson20
Razer Phonecherylmikeioannina, npjohnson20
Samsung Galaxy Tab A7 10.4 2020 (LTE)gta4lchrmhoffmann20
Samsung Galaxy Tab A7 10.4 2020 (Wi-Fi)gta4lwifichrmhoffmann20
Samsung Galaxy Tab S5e (LTE)gts4lvbgcngm, LuK133720
Samsung Galaxy Tab S5e (Wi-Fi)gts4lvwifiLuK1337, bgcngm20
Sony Xperia 1 IIpdx203hellobbn20
Sony Xperia 1 IIIpdx215hellobbn20
Sony Xperia 10 PlusmermaidLuK133720
Sony Xperia 10kirinLuK133720
Sony Xperia 5 IIpdx206kyasu, hellobbn20
Sony Xperia 5 IIIpdx214kyasu, hellobbn20
Sony Xperia XA2 PlusvoyagerLuK133720
Sony Xperia XA2 UltradiscoveryLuK133720
Sony Xperia XA2pioneerLuK1337, Stricted, cdesai20
Xiaomi Mi 5geminibgcngm, ikeramat20
Xiaomi Mi 5s PlusnatriumLuK133720
Xiaomi Mi 6sagitArianK16a20
Xiaomi Mi 8 Explorer Editionursabgcngm20
Xiaomi Mi 8 Proequuleusbgcngm20
Xiaomi Mi 8dipperinfrag20
Xiaomi Mi 9 SEgrusSebaUbuntu20
Xiaomi Mi CC 9 / Xiaomi Mi 9 Litepyxisceracz20
Xiaomi Mi CC9 Meitu Editionvela0xCAFEBABE20
Xiaomi Mi MIX 2chironmikeioannina20
Xiaomi Mi MIX 2Spolarisbgcngm20
Xiaomi Mi MIX 3perseusbgcngm, rtx4d20
Xiaomi Poco F1berylliumbgcngm, warabhishek20
Xiaomi Redmi 3S / Xiaomi Redmi 3X / Xiaomi Redmi 4 (India) / Xiaomi Redmi 4X / Xiaomi Redmi Note 5A Prime / Xiaomi Redmi Y1 PrimeMi89370xCAFEBABE20
Xiaomi Redmi 4A / Xiaomi Redmi 5A / Xiaomi Redmi Note 5A Lite / Xiaomi Redmi Y1 LiteMi89170xCAFEBABE20
Xiaomi Redmi 8 / Xiaomi Redmi 8A / Xiaomi Redmi 8A DualMi4390xCAFEBABE20

Added 20 devices

Device nameWikiMaintainersMoved from
10.or GGkardebayan 
ASUS ZenFone 8sakeZVNexus, Demon000, DD3Boh19.1
ASUS Zenfone Max Pro M1X00TDVivekachooz19.1
BQ Aquaris X ProbardockproQuallenauge, jmpfbmx18.1
BQ Aquaris XbardockQuallenauge, jmpfbmx18.1
Banana Pi M5 (Android TV)m5stricted 
Dynalink TV Box 4K (2021)wadenpjohnson, bgcngm, stricted, webgeek1234, deadman96385, trautamaki, luca020400, aleasto19.1
Fairphone 3 / Fairphone 3+FP3dk1978, teamb5819.1
Google ADT-3deadpoolnpjohnson, stricted, webgeek1234, deadman96385, trautamaki, luca020400, aleasto19.1
HardKernel ODROID-C4 (Android TV)odroidc4stricted 
Motorola one fusion+ / Motorola one fusion+ (India)liberWilliam, Hasaber819.1
Motorola one zoomparkerHasaber819.1
Nubia Play 5G / Nubia Red Magic 5G Litenx651jCyborg2017 
Nubia Red Magic 5G (Global) / Nubia Red Magic 5G (China) / Nubia Red Magic 5S (Global) / Nubia Red Magic 5S (China)nx659jDD3Boh 
Nubia Red Magic Marsnx619jCyborg2017 
Nubia Red Magicnx609jCyborg2017 
Nubia Z17nx563jBeYkeRYkt, Cyborg201719.1
Nubia Z18 Mininx611jCyborg201719.1
Nubia Z18nx606jCyborg2017 
OnePlus Nord N200dretangalbert91919.1
Radxa Zero (Android TV)radxa0bgcngm, npjohnson, stricted 
SHIFT SHIFT6mqaxolotlamartinz, joey, mikeioannina19.1
Samsung Galaxy A52 4Ga52qSimon151119.1
Samsung Galaxy A52s 5Ga52sxqSimon1511 
Samsung Galaxy A72a72qSimon151119.1
Samsung Galaxy A73 5Ga73xqSimon1511 
Samsung Galaxy F62 / Samsung Galaxy M62f62Linux4 
Samsung Galaxy M52 5Gm52xqSimon1511 
Samsung Galaxy Note 9crownltebaddar9017.1
Samsung Galaxy Note10d1Linux419.1
Samsung Galaxy Note10+ 5Gd2xLinux419.1
Samsung Galaxy Note10+d2sLinux419.1
Samsung Galaxy S10 5GbeyondxLinux419.1
Samsung Galaxy S10beyond1lteLinux419.1
Samsung Galaxy S10+beyond2lteLinux419.1
Samsung Galaxy S10ebeyond0lteLinux419.1
Samsung Galaxy S9starltebaddar9017.1
Samsung Galaxy S9+star2ltebaddar9017.1
Samsung Galaxy Tab A 8.0 (2019)gtowifilifehackerhansol 
Samsung Galaxy Tab S6 Lite (LTE)gta4xlhaggertk, Linux419.1
Samsung Galaxy Tab S6 Lite (Wi-Fi)gta4xlwifiLinux4, haggertk19.1
Sony Xperia XZ2 Compactxz2cdtrunk9019.1
Sony Xperia XZ2 Premiumauroradtrunk9019.1
Sony Xperia XZ2akaridtrunk9019.1
Sony Xperia XZ3akatsukidtrunk9019.1
Walmart onn. TV Box 4K (2021)dopindernpjohnson, bgcngm, stricted, webgeek1234, deadman96385, trautamaki, luca020400, aleasto 
Xiaomi 11 Lite 5G NE / Xiaomi 11 Lite NE 5G / Xiaomi Mi 11 LElisaItsVixano19.1
Xiaomi Mi 10T / Xiaomi Mi 10T Pro / Xiaomi Redmi K30S UltraapollonRamisky, SebaUbuntu19.1
Xiaomi Mi 10T Lite 5G / Xiaomi Mi 10i 5G / Xiaomi Redmi Note 9 Pro 5GgauguinHridaya, Lynnrin19.1
Xiaomi Mi 11 Lite 5GrenoirArianK16a19.1
Xiaomi Mi 11 PromarsFlower Sea 
Xiaomi Mi 11i / Xiaomi Redmi K40 Pro / Xiaomi Redmi K40 Pro+ / Xiaomi Mi 11X ProhaydnAdarshGrewal, erfanoabdi19.1
Xiaomi Mi 9T / Xiaomi Redmi K20 (China) / Xiaomi Redmi K20 (India)davinciArianK16a17.1
Xiaomi Mi A1tissotabhinavgupta37119.1
Xiaomi POCO F2 Pro / Xiaomi Redmi K30 ProlmiSebaUbuntu19.1
Xiaomi POCO F3 / Xiaomi Redmi K40 / Xiaomi Mi 11XaliothSahilSonar, SebaUbuntu, althafvly19.1
Xiaomi POCO M2 Pro / Xiaomi Redmi Note 9S / Xiaomi Redmi Note 9 Pro (Global) / Xiaomi Redmi Note 9 Pro (India) / Xiaomi Redmi Note 9 Pro Max / Xiaomi Redmi Note 10 Litemiatolldereference23, ItsVixano19.1
Xiaomi POCO X3 NFCsuryaShimitar, TheStrechh19.1
Xiaomi POCO X3 ProvayuSebaUbuntu19.1
Xiaomi Redmi 7 / Xiaomi Redmi Y3oncliteDhina1719.1
Xiaomi Redmi 9lancelotsurblazer 
Xiaomi Redmi Note 10 Pro / Xiaomi Redmi Note 10 Pro (India) / Xiaomi Redmi Note 10 Pro Max (India)sweetbasamaryan, danielml3 
Xiaomi Redmi Note 10S / Xiaomi Redmi Note 10S NFC / Xiaomi Redmi Note 10S Latin Americarosemarysurblazer 
Xiaomi Redmi Note 7 Provioletjashvakharia, raghavt2016.0
Xiaomi Redmi Note 9merlinxsurblazer, bengris32 
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Google Nexus 7 2013 (LTE, Repartitioned)debxnpjohnson, surblazer, Elektroschmock, hpnightowl, ROMSG 
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https://lineageos.org/Changelog-28/

NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations

Release Date October 05, 2023
Alert CodeAA23-278A

A plea for network defenders and software manufacturers to fix common problems.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Security Agency (NSA) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) to highlight the most common cybersecurity misconfigurations in large organizations, and detail the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) actors use to exploit these misconfigurations.

Through NSA and CISA Red and Blue team assessments, as well as through the activities of NSA and CISA Hunt and Incident Response teams, the agencies identified the following 10 most common network misconfigurations:

  1. Default configurations of software and applications
  2. Improper separation of user/administrator privilege
  3. Insufficient internal network monitoring
  4. Lack of network segmentation
  5. Poor patch management
  6. Bypass of system access controls
  7. Weak or misconfigured multifactor authentication (MFA) methods
  8. Insufficient access control lists (ACLs) on network shares and services
  9. Poor credential hygiene
  10. Unrestricted code execution

These misconfigurations illustrate (1) a trend of systemic weaknesses in many large organizations, including those with mature cyber postures, and (2) the importance of software manufacturers embracing secure-by-design principles to reduce the burden on network defenders:

  • Properly trained, staffed, and funded network security teams can implement the known mitigations for these weaknesses.
  • Software manufacturers must reduce the prevalence of these misconfigurations—thus strengthening the security posture for customers—by incorporating secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices.[1]

NSA and CISA encourage network defenders to implement the recommendations found within the Mitigations section of this advisory—including the following—to reduce the risk of malicious actors exploiting the identified misconfigurations.

  • Remove default credentials and harden configurations.
  • Disable unused services and implement access controls.
  • Update regularly and automate patching, prioritizing patching of known exploited vulnerabilities.[2]
  • Reduce, restrict, audit, and monitor administrative accounts and privileges.

NSA and CISA urge software manufacturers to take ownership of improving security outcomes of their customers by embracing secure-by-design and-default tactics, including:

  • Embedding security controls into product architecture from the start of development and throughout the entire software development lifecycle (SDLC).
  • Eliminating default passwords.
  • Providing high-quality audit logs to customers at no extra charge.
  • Mandating MFA, ideally phishing-resistant, for privileged users and making MFA a default rather than opt-in feature.[3]

Download the PDF version of this report: PDF, 660 KB

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 13, and the MITRE D3FEND™ cybersecurity countermeasures framework.[4],[5] See the Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques section for tables summarizing the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques, and the Mitigations section for MITRE D3FEND countermeasures.

For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.[6],[7]

Overview

Over the years, the following NSA and CISA teams have assessed the security posture of many network enclaves across the Department of Defense (DoD); Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB); state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments; and the private sector:

  • Depending on the needs of the assessment, NSA Defensive Network Operations (DNO) teams feature capabilities from Red Team (adversary emulation), Blue Team (strategic vulnerability assessment), Hunt (targeted hunt), and/or Tailored Mitigations (defensive countermeasure development).
  • CISA Vulnerability Management (VM) teams have assessed the security posture of over 1,000 network enclaves. CISA VM teams include Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) and CISA Red Team Assessments (RTA).[8] The RVA team conducts remote and onsite assessment services, including penetration testing and configuration review. RTA emulates cyber threat actors in coordination with an organization to assess the organization’s cyber detection and response capabilities.
  • CISA Hunt and Incident Response teams conduct proactive and reactive engagements, respectively, on organization networks to identify and detect cyber threats to U.S. infrastructure.

During these assessments, NSA and CISA identified the 10 most common network misconfigurations, which are detailed below. These misconfigurations (non-prioritized) are systemic weaknesses across many networks.

Many of the assessments were of Microsoft® Windows® and Active Directory® environments. This advisory provides details about, and mitigations for, specific issues found during these assessments, and so mostly focuses on these products. However, it should be noted that many other environments contain similar misconfigurations. Network owners and operators should examine their networks for similar misconfigurations even when running other software not specifically mentioned below.

1. Default Configurations of Software and Applications

Default configurations of systems, services, and applications can permit unauthorized access or other malicious activity. Common default configurations include:

  • Default credentials
  • Default service permissions and configurations settings
Default Credentials

Many software manufacturers release commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) network devices —which provide user access via applications or web portals—containing predefined default credentials for their built-in administrative accounts.[9] Malicious actors and assessment teams regularly abuse default credentials by:

  • Finding credentials with a simple web search [T1589.001] and using them [T1078.001] to gain authenticated access to a device.
  • Resetting built-in administrative accounts [T1098] via predictable forgotten passwords questions.
  • Leveraging default virtual private network (VPN) credentials for internal network access [T1133].
  • Leveraging publicly available setup information to identify built-in administrative credentials for web applications and gaining access to the application and its underlying database.
  • Leveraging default credentials on software deployment tools [T1072] for code execution and lateral movement.

In addition to devices that provide network access, printers, scanners, security cameras, conference room audiovisual (AV) equipment, voice over internet protocol (VoIP) phones, and internet of things (IoT) devices commonly contain default credentials that can be used for easy unauthorized access to these devices as well. Further compounding this problem, printers and scanners may have privileged domain accounts loaded so that users can easily scan documents and upload them to a shared drive or email them. Malicious actors who gain access to a printer or scanner using default credentials can use the loaded privileged domain accounts to move laterally from the device and compromise the domain [T1078.002].

Default Service Permissions and Configuration Settings

Certain services may have overly permissive access controls or vulnerable configurations by default. Additionally, even if the providers do not enable these services by default, malicious actors can easily abuse these services if users or administrators enable them.

Assessment teams regularly find the following:

  • Insecure Active Directory Certificate Services
  • Insecure legacy protocols/services
  • Insecure Server Message Block (SMB) service
Insecure Active Directory Certificate Services

Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is a feature used to manage Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates, keys, and encryption inside of Active Directory (AD) environments. ADCS templates are used to build certificates for different types of servers and other entities on an organization’s network.

Malicious actors can exploit ADCS and/or ADCS template misconfigurations to manipulate the certificate infrastructure into issuing fraudulent certificates and/or escalate user privileges to domain administrator privileges. These certificates and domain escalation paths may grant actors unauthorized, persistent access to systems and critical data, the ability to impersonate legitimate entities, and the ability to bypass security measures.

Assessment teams have observed organizations with the following misconfigurations:

  • ADCS servers running with web-enrollment enabled. If web-enrollment is enabled, unauthenticated actors can coerce a server to authenticate to an actor-controlled computer, which can relay the authentication to the ADCS web-enrollment service and obtain a certificate [T1649] for the server’s account. These fraudulent, trusted certificates enable actors to use adversary-in-the-middle techniques [T1557] to masquerade as trusted entities on the network. The actors can also use the certificate for AD authentication to obtain a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) [T1558.001], which they can use to compromise the server and usually the entire domain.
  • ADCS templates where low-privileged users have enrollment rights, and the enrollee supplies a subject alternative name. Misconfiguring various elements of ADCS templates can result in domain escalation by unauthorized users (e.g., granting low-privileged users certificate enrollment rights, allowing requesters to specify a subjectAltName in the certificate signing request [CSR], not requiring authorized signatures for CSRs, granting FullControl or WriteDacl permissions to users). Malicious actors can use a low-privileged user account to request a certificate with a particular Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and gain a certificate where the SAN matches the User Principal Name (UPN) of a privileged account.

Note: For more information on known escalation paths, including PetitPotam NTLM relay techniques, see: Domain Escalation: PetitPotam NTLM Relay to ADCS Endpoints and Certified Pre-Owned, Active Directory Certificate Services.[10],[11],[12]

Insecure legacy protocols/services

Many vulnerable network services are enabled by default, and assessment teams have observed them enabled in production environments. Specifically, assessment teams have observed Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS), which are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. If these services are enabled in a network, actors can use spoofing, poisoning, and relay techniques [T1557.001] to obtain domain hashes, system access, and potential administrative system sessions. Malicious actors frequently exploit these protocols to compromise entire Windows’ environments.

Malicious actors can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a target network by responding to passing traffic, effectively poisoning the service so that target computers will communicate with an actor-controlled system instead of the intended one. If the requested system requires identification/authentication, the target computer will send the user’s username and hash to the actor-controlled system. The actors then collect the hash and crack it offline to obtain the plain text password [T1110.002].

Insecure Server Message Block (SMB) service

The Server Message Block service is a Windows component primarily for file sharing. Its default configuration, including in the latest version of Windows, does not require signing network messages to ensure authenticity and integrity. If SMB servers do not enforce SMB signing, malicious actors can use machine-in-the-middle techniques, such as NTLM relay. Further, malicious actors can combine a lack of SMB signing with the name resolution poisoning issue (see above) to gain access to remote systems [T1021.002] without needing to capture and crack any hashes.

2. Improper Separation of User/Administrator Privilege

Administrators often assign multiple roles to one account. These accounts have access to a wide range of devices and services, allowing malicious actors to move through a network quickly with one compromised account without triggering lateral movement and/or privilege escalation detection measures.

Assessment teams have observed the following common account separation misconfigurations:

  • Excessive account privileges
  • Elevated service account permissions
  • Non-essential use of elevated accounts
Excessive Account Privileges

Account privileges are intended to control user access to host or application resources to limit access to sensitive information or enforce a least-privilege security model. When account privileges are overly permissive, users can see and/or do things they should not be able to, which becomes a security issue as it increases risk exposure and attack surface.

Expanding organizations can undergo numerous changes in account management, personnel, and access requirements. These changes commonly lead to privilege creep—the granting of excessive access and unnecessary account privileges. Through the analysis of topical and nested AD groups, a malicious actor can find a user account [T1078] that has been granted account privileges that exceed their need-to-know or least-privilege function. Extraneous access can lead to easy avenues for unauthorized access to data and resources and escalation of privileges in the targeted domain.

Elevated Service Account Permissions

Applications often operate using user accounts to access resources. These user accounts, which are known as service accounts, often require elevated privileges. When a malicious actor compromises an application or service using a service account, they will have the same privileges and access as the service account.

Malicious actors can exploit elevated service permissions within a domain to gain unauthorized access and control over critical systems. Service accounts are enticing targets for malicious actors because such accounts are often granted elevated permissions within the domain due to the nature of the service, and because access to use the service can be requested by any valid domain user. Due to these factors, kerberoasting—a form of credential access achieved by cracking service account credentials—is a common technique used to gain control over service account targets [T1558.003].

Non-Essential Use of Elevated Accounts

IT personnel use domain administrator and other administrator accounts for system and network management due to their inherent elevated privileges. When an administrator account is logged into a compromised host, a malicious actor can steal and use the account’s credentials and an AD-generated authentication token [T1528] to move, using the elevated permissions, throughout the domain [T1550.001]. Using an elevated account for normal day-to-day, non-administrative tasks increases the account’s exposure and, therefore, its risk of compromise and its risk to the network.

Malicious actors prioritize obtaining valid domain credentials upon gaining access to a network. Authentication using valid domain credentials allows the execution of secondary enumeration techniques to gain visibility into the target domain and AD structure, including discovery of elevated accounts and where the elevated accounts are used [T1087].

Targeting elevated accounts (such as domain administrator or system administrators) performing day-to-day activities provides the most direct path to achieve domain escalation. Systems or applications accessed by the targeted elevated accounts significantly increase the attack surface available to adversaries, providing additional paths and escalation options.

After obtaining initial access via an account with administrative permissions, an assessment team compromised a domain in under a business day. The team first gained initial access to the system through phishing [T1566], by which they enticed the end user to download [T1204] and execute malicious payloads. The targeted end-user account had administrative permissions, enabling the team to quickly compromise the entire domain.

3. Insufficient Internal Network Monitoring

Some organizations do not optimally configure host and network sensors for traffic collection and end-host logging. These insufficient configurations could lead to undetected adversarial compromise. Additionally, improper sensor configurations limit the traffic collection capability needed for enhanced baseline development and detract from timely detection of anomalous activity.

Assessment teams have exploited insufficient monitoring to gain access to assessed networks. For example:

  • An assessment team observed an organization with host-based monitoring, but no network monitoring. Host-based monitoring informs defensive teams about adverse activities on singular hosts and network monitoring informs about adverse activities traversing hosts [TA0008]. In this example, the organization could identify infected hosts but could not identify where the infection was coming from, and thus could not stop future lateral movement and infections.
  • An assessment team gained persistent deep access to a large organization with a mature cyber posture. The organization did not detect the assessment team’s lateral movement, persistence, and command and control (C2) activity, including when the team attempted noisy activities to trigger a security response. For more information on this activity, see CSA CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks.[13]

4. Lack of Network Segmentation

Network segmentation separates portions of the network with security boundaries. Lack of network segmentation leaves no security boundaries between the user, production, and critical system networks. Insufficient network segmentation allows an actor who has compromised a resource on the network to move laterally across a variety of systems uncontested. Lack of network segregation additionally leaves organizations significantly more vulnerable to potential ransomware attacks and post-exploitation techniques.

Lack of segmentation between IT and operational technology (OT) environments places OT environments at risk. For example, assessment teams have often gained access to OT networks—despite prior assurance that the networks were fully air gapped, with no possible connection to the IT network—by finding special purpose, forgotten, or even accidental network connections [T1199].

5. Poor Patch Management

Vendors release patches and updates to address security vulnerabilities. Poor patch management and network hygiene practices often enable adversaries to discover open attack vectors and exploit critical vulnerabilities. Poor patch management includes:

  • Lack of regular patching
  • Use of unsupported operating systems (OSs) and outdated firmware
Lack of Regular Patching

Failure to apply the latest patches can leave a system open to compromise from publicly available exploits. Due to their ease of discovery—via vulnerability scanning [T1595.002] and open source research [T1592]—and exploitation, these systems are immediate targets for adversaries. Allowing critical vulnerabilities to remain on production systems without applying their corresponding patches significantly increases the attack surface. Organizations should prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in their environments.[2]

Assessment teams have observed threat actors exploiting many CVEs in public-facing applications [T1190], including:

  • CVE-2019-18935 in an unpatched instance of Telerik® UI for ASP.NET running on a Microsoft IIS server.[14]
  • CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) in an unpatched VMware® Horizon server.[15]
  • CVE-2022-24682, CVE-2022-27924, and CVE-2022-27925 chained with CVE-2022-37042, or CVE-2022-30333 in an unpatched Zimbra® Collaboration Suite.[16]
Use of Unsupported OSs and Outdated Firmware

Using software or hardware that is no longer supported by the vendor poses a significant security risk because new and existing vulnerabilities are no longer patched. Malicious actors can exploit vulnerabilities in these systems to gain unauthorized access, compromise sensitive data, and disrupt operations [T1210].

Assessment teams frequently observe organizations using unsupported Windows operating systems without updates MS17-010 and MS08-67. These updates, released years ago, address critical remote code execution vulnerabilities.[17],[18]

6. Bypass of System Access Controls

A malicious actor can bypass system access controls by compromising alternate authentication methods in an environment. If a malicious actor can collect hashes in a network, they can use the hashes to authenticate using non-standard means, such as pass-the-hash (PtH) [T1550.002]. By mimicking accounts without the clear-text password, an actor can expand and fortify their access without detection. Kerberoasting is also one of the most time-efficient ways to elevate privileges and move laterally throughout an organization’s network.

7. Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods

Misconfigured Smart Cards or Tokens

Some networks (generally government or DoD networks) require accounts to use smart cards or tokens. Multifactor requirements can be misconfigured so the password hashes for accounts never change. Even though the password itself is no longer used—because the smart card or token is required instead—there is still a password hash for the account that can be used as an alternative credential for authentication. If the password hash never changes, once a malicious actor has an account’s password hash [T1111], the actor can use it indefinitely, via the PtH technique for as long as that account exists.

Lack of Phishing-Resistant MFA

Some forms of MFA are vulnerable to phishing, “push bombing” [T1621], exploitation of Signaling System 7 (SS7) protocol vulnerabilities, and/or “SIM swap” techniques. These attempts, if successful, may allow a threat actor to gain access to MFA authentication credentials or bypass MFA and access the MFA-protected systems. (See CISA’s Fact Sheet Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA for more information.)[3]

For example, assessment teams have used voice phishing to convince users to provide missing MFA information [T1598]. In one instance, an assessment team knew a user’s main credentials, but their login attempts were blocked by MFA requirements. The team then masqueraded as IT staff and convinced the user to provide the MFA code over the phone, allowing the team to complete their login attempt and gain access to the user’s email and other organizational resources.

8. Insufficient ACLs on Network Shares and Services

Data shares and repositories are primary targets for malicious actors. Network administrators may improperly configure ACLs to allow for unauthorized users to access sensitive or administrative data on shared drives.

Actors can use commands, open source tools, or custom malware to look for shared folders and drives [T1135].

  • In one compromise, a team observed actors use the net share command—which displays information about shared resources on the local computer—and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on compromised computers. In the same compromise, the actors used a custom tool, CovalentStealer, which is designed to identify file shares on a system, categorize the files [T1083], and upload the files to a remote server [TA0010].[19],[20]
  • Ransomware actors have used the SoftPerfect® Network Scanner, netscan.exe—which can ping computers [T1018], scan ports [T1046], and discover shared folders—and SharpShares to enumerate accessible network shares in a domain.[21],[22]

Malicious actors can then collect and exfiltrate the data from the shared drives and folders. They can then use the data for a variety of purposes, such as extortion of the organization or as intelligence when formulating intrusion plans for further network compromise. Assessment teams routinely find sensitive information on network shares [T1039] that could facilitate follow-on activity or provide opportunities for extortion. Teams regularly find drives containing cleartext credentials [T1552] for service accounts, web applications, and even domain administrators.

Even when further access is not directly obtained from credentials in file shares, there can be a treasure trove of information for improving situational awareness of the target network, including the network’s topology, service tickets, or vulnerability scan data. In addition, teams regularly identify sensitive data and PII on shared drives (e.g., scanned documents, social security numbers, and tax returns) that could be used for extortion or social engineering of the organization or individuals.

9. Poor Credential Hygiene

Poor credential hygiene facilitates threat actors in obtaining credentials for initial access, persistence, lateral movement, and other follow-on activity, especially if phishing-resistant MFA is not enabled. Poor credential hygiene includes:

  • Easily crackable passwords
  • Cleartext password disclosure
Easily Crackable Passwords

Easily crackable passwords are passwords that a malicious actor can guess within a short time using relatively inexpensive computing resources. The presence of easily crackable passwords on a network generally stems from a lack of password length (i.e., shorter than 15 characters) and randomness (i.e., is not unique or can be guessed). This is often due to lax requirements for passwords in organizational policies and user training. A policy that only requires short and simple passwords leaves user passwords susceptible to password cracking. Organizations should provide or allow employee use of password managers to enable the generation and easy use of secure, random passwords for each account.

Often, when a credential is obtained, it is a hash (one-way encryption) of the password and not the password itself. Although some hashes can be used directly with PtH techniques, many hashes need to be cracked to obtain usable credentials. The cracking process takes the captured hash of the user’s plaintext password and leverages dictionary wordlists and rulesets, often using a database of billions of previously compromised passwords, in an attempt to find the matching plaintext password [T1110.002].

One of the primary ways to crack passwords is with the open source tool, Hashcat, combined with password lists obtained from publicly released password breaches. Once a malicious actor has access to a plaintext password, they are usually limited only by the account’s permissions. In some cases, the actor may be restricted or detected by advanced defense-in-depth and zero trust implementations as well, but this has been a rare finding in assessments thus far.

Assessment teams have cracked password hashes for NTLM users, Kerberos service account tickets, NetNTLMv2, and PFX stores [T1555], enabling the team to elevate privileges and move laterally within networks. In 12 hours, one team cracked over 80% of all users’ passwords in an Active Directory, resulting in hundreds of valid credentials.

Cleartext Password Disclosure

Storing passwords in cleartext is a serious security risk. A malicious actor with access to files containing cleartext passwords [T1552.001] could use these credentials to log into the affected applications or systems under the guise of a legitimate user. Accountability is lost in this situation as any system logs would record valid user accounts accessing applications or systems.

Malicious actors search for text files, spreadsheets, documents, and configuration files in hopes of obtaining cleartext passwords. Assessment teams frequently discover cleartext passwords, allowing them to quickly escalate the emulated intrusion from the compromise of a regular domain user account to that of a privileged account, such as a Domain or Enterprise Administrator. A common tool used for locating cleartext passwords is the open source tool, Snaffler.[23]

10. Unrestricted Code Execution

If unverified programs are allowed to execute on hosts, a threat actor can run arbitrary, malicious payloads within a network.

Malicious actors often execute code after gaining initial access to a system. For example, after a user falls for a phishing scam, the actor usually convinces the victim to run code on their workstation to gain remote access to the internal network. This code is usually an unverified program that has no legitimate purpose or business reason for running on the network.

Assessment teams and malicious actors frequently leverage unrestricted code execution in the form of executables, dynamic link libraries (DLLs), HTML applications, and macros (scripts used in office automation documents) [T1059.005] to establish initial access, persistence, and lateral movement. In addition, actors often use scripting languages [T1059] to obscure their actions [T1027.010] and bypass allowlisting—where organizations restrict applications and other forms of code by default and only allow those that are known and trusted. Further, actors may load vulnerable drivers and then exploit the drivers’ known vulnerabilities to execute code in the kernel with the highest level of system privileges to completely compromise the device [T1068].

MITIGATIONS

Network Defenders

NSA and CISA recommend network defenders implement the recommendations that follow to mitigate the issues identified in this advisory. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as well as with the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Mitigations and MITRE D3FEND frameworks.

The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.[24]

Mitigate Default Configurations of Software and Applications
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Default configurations of software and applicationsModify the default configuration of applications and appliances before deployment in a production environment [M1013],[D3-ACH]. Refer to hardening guidelines provided by the vendor and related cybersecurity guidance (e.g., DISA’s Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and configuration guides).[25],[26],[27]
Default configurations of software and applications: Default CredentialsChange or disable vendor-supplied default usernames and passwords of services, software, and equipment when installing or commissioning [CPG 2.A]. When resetting passwords, enforce the use of “strong” passwords (i.e., passwords that are more than 15 characters and random [CPG 2.B]) and follow hardening guidelines provided by the vendor, STIGsNSA, and/or NIST [M1027],[D3-SPP].[25],[26],[28],[29]
Default service permissions and configuration settings: Insecure Active Directory Certificate ServicesEnsure the secure configuration of ADCS implementations. Regularly update and patch the controlling infrastructure (e.g., for CVE-2021-36942), employ monitoring and auditing mechanisms, and implement strong access controls to protect the infrastructure.If not needed, disable web-enrollment in ADCS servers. See Microsoft: Uninstall-AdcsWebEnrollment (ADCSDeployment) for guidance.[30]If web enrollment is needed on ADCS servers:Enable Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) for Client Authority Web Enrollment. This is done by choosing the “Required” option. For guidance, see Microsoft: KB5021989: Extended Protection for Authentication.[31]Enable “Require SSL” on the ADCS server.Disable NTLM on all ADCS servers. For guidance, see Microsoft: Network security Restrict NTLM in this domain – Windows Security | Microsoft Learn and Network security Restrict NTLM Incoming NTLM traffic – Windows Security.[32],[33]Disable SAN for UPN Mapping. For guidance see, Microsoft: How to disable the SAN for UPN mapping – Windows Server. Instead, smart card authentication can use the altSecurityIdentities attribute for explicit mapping of certificates to accounts more securely.[34]Review all permissions on the ADCS templates on applicable servers. Restrict enrollment rights to only those users or groups that require it. Disable the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag from templates to prevent users from supplying and editing sensitive security settings within these templates. Enforce manager approval for requested certificates. Remove FullControlWriteDacl, and Write property permissions from low-privileged groups, such as domain users, to certificate template objects.
Default service permissions and configuration settings: Insecure legacy protocols/servicesDetermine if LLMNR and NetBIOS are required for essential business operations.If not required, disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy.
Default service permissions and configuration settings: Insecure SMB serviceRequire SMB signing for both SMB client and server on all systems.[25] This should prevent certain adversary-in-the-middle and pass-the-hash techniques. For more information on SMB signing, see Microsoft: Overview of Server Message Block Signing. [35] Note: Beginning in Microsoft Windows 11 Insider Preview Build 25381, Windows requires SMB signing for all communications.[36]
Mitigate Improper Separation of User/Administrator Privilege
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Improper separation of user/administrator privilege:Excessive account privileges,Elevated service account permissions, andNon-essential use of elevated accountsImplement authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) systems [M1018] to limit actions users can perform, and review logs of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. Apply least privilege principles to user accounts and groups allowing only the performance of authorized actions.Audit user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary on a routine basis [CPG 2.D]. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts.Restrict use of privileged accounts to perform general tasks, such as accessing emails and browsing the Internet [CPG 2.E],[D3-UAP]. See NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet (CSI) Defend Privileges and Accounts for more information.[37]Limit the number of users within the organization with an identity and access management (IAM) role that has administrator privileges. Strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles, and policies.Implement time-based access for privileged accounts. For example, the just-in-time access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model) by setting network-wide policy to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level. As needed, individual users can submit requests through an automated process that enables access to a system for a set timeframe. In cloud environments, just-in-time elevation is also appropriate and may be implemented using per-session federated claims or privileged access management tools.Restrict domain users from being in the local administrator group on multiple systems.Run daemonized applications (services) with non-administrator accounts when possible.Only configure service accounts with the permissions necessary for the services they control to operate.Disable unused services and implement ACLs to protect services.
Mitigate Insufficient Internal Network Monitoring
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Insufficient internal network monitoringEstablish a baseline of applications and services, and routinely audit their access and use, especially for administrative activity [D3-ANAA]. For instance, administrators should routinely audit the access lists and permissions for of all web applications and services [CPG 2.O],[M1047]. Look for suspicious accounts, investigate them, and remove accounts and credentials, as appropriate, such as accounts of former staff.[39]Establish a baseline that represents an organization’s normal traffic activity, network performance, host application activity, and user behavior; investigate any deviations from that baseline [D3-NTCD],[D3-CSPP],[D3-UBA].[40]Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them [M1047].Implement a security information and event management (SIEM) system to provide log aggregation, correlation, querying, visualization, and alerting from network endpoints, logging systems, endpoint and detection response (EDR) systems and intrusion detection systems (IDS) [CPG 2.T],[D3-NTA].
Mitigate Lack of Network Segmentation
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Lack of network segmentationImplement next-generation firewalls to perform deep packet filtering, stateful inspection, and application-level packet inspection [D3-NTF]. Deny or drop improperly formatted traffic that is incongruent with application-specific traffic permitted on the network. This practice limits an actor’s ability to abuse allowed application protocols. The practice of allowlisting network applications does not rely on generic ports as filtering criteria, enhancing filtering fidelity. For more information on application-aware defenses, see NSA CSI Segment Networks and Deploy Application-Aware Defenses.[41]Engineer network segments to isolate critical systems, functions, and resources [CPG 2.F],[D3-NI]. Establish physical and logical segmentation controls, such as virtual local area network (VLAN) configurations and properly configured access control lists (ACLs) on infrastructure devices [M1030]. These devices should be baselined and audited to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Leverage properly configured Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) to reduce service exposure to the Internet.[42],[43],[44]Implement separate Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) instances to isolate essential cloud systems. Where possible, implement Virtual Machines (VM) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) to enable micro-segmentation of networks in virtualized environments and cloud data centers. Employ secure VM firewall configurations in tandem with macro segmentation.
Mitigate Poor Patch Management
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Poor patch management: Lack of regular patchingEnsure organizations implement and maintain an efficient patch management process that enforces the use of up-to-date, stable versions of OSs, browsers, and software [M1051],[D3-SU].[45]Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications, internal enterprise endpoints, and servers. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.[2]Automate the update process as much as possible and use vendor-provided updates. Consider using automated patch management tools and software update tools.Where patching is not possible due to limitations, segment networks to limit exposure of the vulnerable system or host.
Poor patch management: Use of unsupported OSs and outdated firmwareEvaluate the use of unsupported hardware and software and discontinue use as soon as possible. If discontinuing is not possible, implement additional network protections to mitigate the risk.[45]Patch the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) and other firmware to prevent exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
Mitigate Bypass of System Access Controls
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Bypass of system access controlsLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent credential compromise and reduce a malicious actor’s ability to move laterally between systems [M1026],[D3-CH]. Implement a method for monitoring non-standard logon events through host log monitoring [CPG 2.G].Implement an effective and routine patch management process. Mitigate PtH techniques by applying patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and newer versions to limit default access of accounts in the local administrator group [M1051],[D3-SU].[46]Enable the PtH mitigations to apply User Account Control (UAC) restrictions to local accounts upon network logon [M1052],[D3-UAP].Deny domain users the ability to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems [M1018],[D3-UAP].Limit workstation-to-workstation communications. All workstation communications should occur through a server to prevent lateral movement [M1018],[D3-UAP].Use privileged accounts only on systems requiring those privileges [M1018],[D3-UAP]. Consider using dedicated Privileged Access Workstations for privileged accounts to better isolate and protect them.[37]
Mitigate Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Weak or misconfigured MFA methods: Misconfigured smart cards or tokens In Windows environments:Disable the use of New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) and other legacy authentication protocols that are susceptible to PtH due to their use of password hashes [M1032],[D3-MFA]. For guidance, see Microsoft: Network security Restrict NTLM in this domain – Windows Security | Microsoft Learn and Network security Restrict NTLM Incoming NTLM traffic – Windows Security.[32],[33]Use built-in functionality via Windows Hello for Business or Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to regularly re-randomize password hashes associated with smartcard-required accounts. Ensure that the hashes are changed at least as often as organizational policy requires passwords to be changed [M1027],[D3-CRO]. Prioritize upgrading any environments that cannot utilize this built-in functionality.As a longer-term effort, implement cloud-primary authentication solution using modern open standards. See CISA’s Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Hybrid Identity Solutions Architecture for more information.[47] Note: this document is part of CISA’s Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project, which provides guidance for FCEB agencies to secure their cloud business application environments and to protect federal information that is created, accessed, shared, and stored in those environments. Although tailored to FCEB agencies, the project’s guidance is applicable to all organizations.[48]
Weak or misconfigured MFA methods: Lack of phishing-resistant MFAEnforce phishing-resistant MFA universally for access to sensitive data and on as many other resources and services as possible [CPG 2.H].[3],[49]
Mitigate Insufficient ACLs on Network Shares and Services
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Insufficient ACLs on network shares and servicesImplement secure configurations for all storage devices and network shares that grant access to authorized users only.Apply the principal of least privilege to important information resources to reduce risk of unauthorized data access and manipulation.Apply restrictive permissions to files and directories, and prevent adversaries from modifying ACLs [M1022],[D3-LFP].Set restrictive permissions on files and folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access [M1022],[D3-LFP].Enable the Windows Group Policy security setting, “Do Not Allow Anonymous Enumeration of Security Account Manager (SAM) Accounts and Shares,” to limit users who can enumerate network shares.
Mitigate Poor Credential Hygiene
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Poor credential hygiene: easily crackable passwords Follow National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) guidelines when creating password policies to enforce use of “strong” passwords that cannot be cracked [M1027],[D3-SPP].[29] Consider using password managers to generate and store passwords.Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure that passwords are “strong” and unique [CPG 2.B],[M1027],[D3-SPP].Use “strong” passphrases for private keys to make cracking resource intensive. Do not store credentials within the registry in Windows systems. Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files.Ensure adequate password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity requirements for Windows service accounts and implement passwords with periodic expiration on these accounts [CPG 2.B],[M1027],[D3-SPP]. Use Managed Service Accounts, when possible, to manage service account passwords automatically.
Poor credential hygiene: cleartext password disclosure Implement a review process for files and systems to look for cleartext account credentials. When credentials are found, remove, change, or encrypt them [D3-FE]. Conduct periodic scans of server machines using automated tools to determine whether sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information, protected health information) or credentials are stored. Weigh the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is of significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may prevent storage of credentials in improper locations.Store hashed passwords using Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP)-15 and Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA) approved algorithms.[50],[51]Consider using group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs) or third-party software to implement secure password-storage applications.
Mitigate Unrestricted Code Execution
MisconfigurationRecommendations for Network Defenders
Unrestricted code executionEnable system settings that prevent the ability to run applications downloaded from untrusted sources.[52]Use application control tools that restrict program execution by default, also known as allowlisting [D3-EAL]. Ensure that the tools examine digital signatures and other key attributes, rather than just relying on filenames, especially since malware often attempts to masquerade as common Operating System (OS) utilities [M1038]. Explicitly allow certain .exe files to run, while blocking all others by default.Block or prevent the execution of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may exploit to execute code in kernel mode. Validate driver block rules in audit mode to ensure stability prior to production deployment [D3-OSM].Constrain scripting languages to prevent malicious activities, audit script logs, and restrict scripting languages that are not used in the environment [D3-SEA]. See joint Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace.[53]Use read-only containers and minimal images, when possible, to prevent the running of commands.Regularly analyze border and host-level protections, including spam-filtering capabilities, to ensure their continued effectiveness in blocking the delivery and execution of malware [D3-MA]. Assess whether HTML Application (HTA) files are used for business purposes in your environment; if HTAs are not used, remap the default program for opening them from mshta.exe to notepad.exe.

Software Manufacturers

NSA and CISA recommend software manufacturers implement the recommendations in Table 11 to reduce the prevalence of misconfigurations identified in this advisory. These mitigations align with tactics provided in joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Security-by-Design and -Default. NSA and CISA strongly encourage software manufacturers apply these recommendations to ensure their products are secure “out of the box” and do not require customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, performing monitoring, and conducting routine updates to keep their systems secure.[1]

MisconfigurationRecommendations for Software Manufacturers
Default configurations of software and applicationsEmbed security controls into product architecture from the start of development and throughout the entire SDLC by following best practices in NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), SP 800-218.[54]Provide software with security features enabled “out of the box” and accompanied with “loosening” guides instead of hardening guides. “Loosening” guides should explain the business risk of decisions in plain, understandable language.
Default configurations of software and applications: Default credentialsEliminate default passwords: Do not provide software with default passwords that are universally shared. To eliminate default passwords, require administrators to set a “strong” password [CPG 2.B] during installation and configuration.
Default configurations of software and applications: Default service permissions and configuration settingsConsider the user experience consequences of security settings: Each new setting increases the cognitive burden on end users and should be assessed in conjunction with the business benefit it derives. Ideally, a setting should not exist; instead, the most secure setting should be integrated into the product by default. When configuration is necessary, the default option should be broadly secure against common threats.
Improper separation of user/administrator privilege:Excessive account privileges,Elevated service account permissions, andNon-essential use of elevated accountsDesign products so that the compromise of a single security control does not result in compromise of the entire system. For example, ensuring that user privileges are narrowly provisioned by default and ACLs are employed can reduce the impact of a compromised account. Also, software sandboxing techniques can quarantine a vulnerability to limit compromise of an entire application.Automatically generate reports for:Administrators of inactive accounts. Prompt administrators to set a maximum inactive time and automatically suspend accounts that exceed that threshold.Administrators of accounts with administrator privileges and suggest ways to reduce privilege sprawl.Automatically alert administrators of infrequently used services and provide recommendations for disabling them or implementing ACLs.
Insufficient internal network monitoring Provide high-quality audit logs to customers at no extra charge. Audit logs are crucial for detecting and escalating potential security incidents. They are also crucial during an investigation of a suspected or confirmed security incident. Consider best practices such as providing easy integration with a security information and event management (SIEM) system with application programming interface (API) access that uses coordinated universal time (UTC), standard time zone formatting, and robust documentation techniques.
Lack of network segmentationEnsure products are compatible with and tested in segmented network environments.
Poor patch management: Lack of regular patchingTake steps to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities by embedding security controls into product architecture from the start of development and throughout the SDLC by following best practices in NIST’s SSDFSP 800-218.[54] Pay special attention to:Following secure coding practices [SSDF PW 5.1]. Use memory-safe programming languages where possible, parametrized queries, and web template languages.Conducting code reviews [SSDF PW 7.2, RV 1.2] against peer coding standards, checking for backdoors, malicious content, and logic flaws.Testing code to identify vulnerabilities and verify compliance with security requirements [SSDF PW 8.2].Ensure that published CVEs include root cause or common weakness enumeration (CWE) to enable industry-wide analysis of software security design flaws.
Poor patch management: Use of unsupported operating OSs and outdated firmwareCommunicate the business risk of using unsupported OSs and firmware in plain, understandable language.
Bypass of system access controlsProvide sufficient detail in audit records to detect bypass of system controls and queries to monitor audit logs for traces of such suspicious activity (e.g., for when an essential step of an authentication or authorization flow is missing).
Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods: Misconfigured Smart Cards or Tokens Fully support MFA for all users, making MFA the default rather than an opt-in feature. Utilize threat modeling for authentication assertions and alternate credentials to examine how they could be abused to bypass MFA requirements.
Weak or Misconfigured MFA Methods: Lack of phishing-resistant MFAMandate MFA, ideally phishing-resistant, for privileged users and make MFA a default rather than an opt-in feature.[3]
Insufficient ACL on network shares and servicesEnforce use of ACLs with default ACLs only allowing the minimum access needed, along with easy-to-use tools to regularly audit and adjust ACLs to the minimum access needed.
Poor credential hygiene: easily crackable passwords Allow administrators to configure a password policy consistent with NIST’s guidelines—do not require counterproductive restrictions such as enforcing character types or the periodic rotation of passwords.[29]Allow users to use password managers to effortlessly generate and use secure, random passwords within products.
Poor credential hygiene: cleartext password disclosureSalt and hash passwords using a secure hashing algorithm with high computational cost to make brute force cracking more difficult.
Unrestricted code executionSupport execution controls within operating systems and applications “out of the box” by default at no extra charge for all customers, to limit malicious actors’ ability to abuse functionality or launch unusual applications without administrator or informed user approval.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, NSA and CISA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. NSA and CISA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 12–Table 21).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA and NSA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

LEARN FROM HISTORY

The misconfigurations described above are all too common in assessments and the techniques listed are standard ones leveraged by multiple malicious actors, resulting in numerous real network compromises. Learn from the weaknesses of others and implement the mitigations above properly to protect the network, its sensitive information, and critical missions.

WORKS CITED

[1]   Joint Guide: Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Security-by-Design and -Default (2023), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/principles_approaches_for_security-by-design-default_508c.pdf
[2]   CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
[3]   CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf
[4]   MITRE, ATT&CK for Enterprise, https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v13/matrices/enterprise/
[5]   MITRE, D3FEND, https://d3fend.mitre.org/
[6]   CISA, Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/best-practices-mitre-attckr-mapping
[7]   CISA, Decider Tool, https://github.com/cisagov/Decider/
[8]   CISA, Cyber Assessment Fact Sheet, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/VM_Assessments_Fact_Sheet_RVA_508C.pdf
[9]   Joint CSA: Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access, https://media.defense.gov/2022/May/17/2002998718/-1/-1/0/CSA_WEAK_SECURITY_CONTROLS_PRACTICES_EXPLOITED_FOR_INITIAL_ACCESS.PDF
[10]  Microsoft KB5005413: Mitigating NTLM Relay Attacks on Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429
[11]  Raj Chandel, Domain Escalation: PetitPotam NTLM Relay to ADCS Endpoints, https://www.hackingarticles.in/domain-escalation-petitpotam-ntlm-relay-to-adcs-endpoints/
[12]  SpecterOps – Will Schroeder, Certified Pre-Owned, https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2
[13]  CISA, CSA: CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a
[14]  Joint CSA: Threat Actors Exploit Progress Telerik Vulnerabilities in Multiple U.S. Government IIS Servers, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-074a
[15]  Joint CSA: Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network, Deploy Crypto Miner, Credential Harvester, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-320a
[16]  Joint CSA: Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-228a
[17]  Microsoft, How to verify that MS17-010 is installed, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-verify-that-ms17-010-is-installed-f55d3f13-7a9c-688c-260b-477d0ec9f2c8
[18]  Microsoft, Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-067 – Critical Vulnerability in Server Service Could Allow Remote Code Execution (958644), https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2008/ms08-067
[19]  Joint CSA: Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-277a
[20]  CISA, Malware Analysis Report: 10365227.r1.v1, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/mar-10365227.r1.v1.clear_.pdf
[21]  Joint CSA: #StopRansomware: BianLian Ransomware Group, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-136a
[22]  CISA Analysis Report: FiveHands Ransomware, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/analysis-reports/ar21-126a
[23]  Snaffler, https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler
[24]  CISA, Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals
[25]  Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/
[26]  NSA, Network Infrastructure Security Guide, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/15/2003018261/-1/-1/0/CTR_NSA_NETWORK_INFRASTRUCTURE_SECURITY_GUIDE_20220615.PDF
[27]  NSA, Actively Manage Systems and Configurations, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180326/-1/-1/0/Actively%20Manage%20Systems%20and%20Configurations.docx%20-%20Copy.pdf
[28]  NSA, Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance, https://www.nsa.gov/cybersecurity-guidance
[29]  National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST), NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management, https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/upd2/final
[30]  Microsoft, Uninstall-AdcsWebEnrollment, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/adcsdeployment/uninstall-adcswebenrollment
[31]  Microsoft, KB5021989: Extended Protection for Authentication, https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/topic/kb5021989-extended-protection-for-authentication-1b6ea84d-377b-4677-a0b8-af74efbb243f
[32]  Microsoft, Network security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-ntlm-authentication-in-this-domain
[33]  Microsoft, Network security: Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM traffic, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-incoming-ntlm-traffic
[34]  Microsoft, How to disable the Subject Alternative Name for UPN mapping, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/disable-subject-alternative-name-upn-mapping
[35]  Microsoft, Overview of Server Message Block signing, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/overview-server-message-block-signing
[36]  Microsoft, SMB signing required by default in Windows Insider, https://aka.ms/SmbSigningRequired
[37]  NSA, Defend Privileges and Accounts, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180330/-1/-1/0/Defend%20Privileges%20and%20Accounts%20-%20Copy.pdf
[38]  NSA, Advancing Zero Trust Maturity Throughout the User Pillar, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/14/2003178390/-1/-1/0/CSI_Zero_Trust_User_Pillar_v1.1.PDF
[39]  NSA, Continuously Hunt for Network Intrusions, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180360/-1/-1/0/Continuously%20Hunt%20for%20Network%20Intrusions%20-%20Copy.pdf
[40]  Joint CSI: Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
[41]  NSA, Segment Networks and Deploy Application-aware Defenses, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180325/-1/-1/0/Segment%20Networks%20and%20Deploy%20Application%20Aware%20Defenses%20-%20Copy.pdf
[42]  Joint CSA: NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across all Operational Technologies and Control Systems, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/23/2002462846/-1/-1/0/OT_ADVISORY-DUAL-OFFICIAL-20200722.PDF
[43]  NSA, Stop Malicious Cyber Activity Against Connected Operational Technology, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/29/2002630479/-1/-1/0/CSA_STOP-MCA-AGAINST-OT_UOO13672321.PDF
[44]  NSA, Performing Out-of-Band Network Management, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/17/2002499616/-1/-1/0/PERFORMING_OUT_OF_BAND_NETWORK_MANAGEMENT20200911.PDF
[45]  NSA, Update and Upgrade Software Immediately, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180319/-1/-1/0/Update%20and%20Upgrade%20Software%20Immediately.docx%20-%20Copy.pdf
[46]  Microsoft, Microsoft Security Advisory 2871997: Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management, https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityAdvisories/2016/2871997
[47]  CISA, Secure Cloud Business Applications Hybrid Identity Solutions Architecture, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/csso-scuba-guidance_document-hybrid_identity_solutions_architecture-2023.03.22-final.pdf
[48]  CISA, Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project, https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/secure-cloud-business-applications-scuba-project
[49]  NSA, Transition to Multi-factor Authentication, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180346/-1/-1/0/Transition%20to%20Multi-factor%20Authentication%20-%20Copy.pdf
[50]  Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), CNSS Policy 15, https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Policies.cfm
[51]  NSA, NSA Releases Future Quantum-Resistant (QR) Algorithm Requirements for National Security Systems, https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/News-Highlights/Article/Article/3148990/nsa-releases-future-quantum-resistant-qr-algorithm-requirements-for-national-se/
[52]  NSA, Enforce Signed Software Execution Policies, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180334/-1/-1/0/Enforce%20Signed%20Software%20Execution%20Policies%20-%20Copy.pdf
[53]  Joint CSI: Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003021689/-1/-1/0/CSI_KEEPING_POWERSHELL_SECURITY_MEASURES_TO_USE_AND_EMBRACE_20220622.PDF
[54]  NIST, NIST SP 800-218: Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1: Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final

Disclaimer of Endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Trademarks

Active Directory, Microsoft, and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
MITRE ATT&CK is registered trademark and MITRE D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
SoftPerfect is a registered trademark of SoftPerfect Proprietary Limited Company.
Telerik is a registered trademark of Progress Software Corporation.
VMware is a registered trademark of VMWare, Inc.
Zimbra is a registered trademark of Synacor, Inc.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring cybersecurity organizations’ missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov
General Cybersecurity Inquiries: Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov 
Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov
Media Inquiries / Press Desk: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov 

To report suspicious activity contact CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 12–Table 21 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

Technique TitleIDUse
Active Scanning: Vulnerability ScanningT1595.002Malicious actors scan victims for vulnerabilities that be exploited for initial access.
Gather Victim Host InformationT1592Malicious actors gather information on victim client configurations and/or vulnerabilities through vulnerabilities scans and searching the web.
Gather Victim Identity Information: CredentialsT1589.001Malicious actors find default credentials through searching the web.
Phishing for InformationT1598Malicious actors masquerade as IT staff and convince a target user to provide their MFA code over the phone to gain access to email and other organizational resources.
Technique TitleIDUse
External Remote ServicesT1133Malicious actors use default credentials for VPN access to internal networks.
Valid Accounts: Default AccountsT1078.001Malicious actors gain authenticated access to devices by finding default credentials through searching the web.Malicious actors use default credentials for VPN access to internal networks, and default administrative credentials to gain access to web applications and databases.
Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1190Malicious actors exploit CVEs in Telerik UI, VM Horizon, Zimbra Collaboration Suite, and other applications for initial access to victim organizations.
PhishingT1566Malicious actors gain initial access to systems by phishing to entice end users to download and execute malicious payloads.
Trust RelationshipT1199Malicious actors gain access to OT networks despite prior assurance that the networks were fully air gapped, with no possible connection to the IT network, by finding special purpose, forgotten, or even accidental network connections.
Technique TitleIDUse
Software Deployment ToolsT1072Malicious actors use default or captured credentials on software deployment tools to execute code and move laterally.
User ExecutionT1204Malicious actors gain initial access to systems by phishing to entice end users to download and execute malicious payloads or to run code on their workstations.
Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059Malicious actors use scripting languages to obscure their actions and bypass allowlisting.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual BasicT1059.005Malicious actors use macros for initial access, persistence, and lateral movement.
Technique TitleIDUse
Account ManipulationT1098Malicious actors reset built-in administrative accounts via predictable, forgotten password questions.
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Malicious actors analyze topical and nested Active Directory groups to find privileged accounts to target.
Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsT1078.002Malicious actors obtain loaded domain credentials from printers and scanners and use them to move laterally from the network device.
Exploitation for Privilege EscalationT1068Malicious actors load vulnerable drivers and then exploit their known vulnerabilities to execute code in the kernel with the highest level of system privileges to completely compromise the device.
Technique TitleIDUse
Obfuscated Files or Information: Command ObfuscationT1027.010Malicious actors often use scripting languages to obscure their actions.
Technique TitleIDUse
Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557Malicious actors force a device to communicate through actor-controlled systems, so they can collect information or perform additional actions.
Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB RelayT1557.001Malicious actors execute spoofing, poisoning, and relay techniques if Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR), NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS), and Server Message Block (SMB) services are enabled in a network.
Brute Force: Password CrackingT1110.002Malicious actors capture user hashes and leverage dictionary wordlists and rulesets to extract cleartext passwords.
Credentials from Password StoresT1555Malicious actors gain access to and crack credentials from PFX stores, enabling elevation of privileges and lateral movement within networks.
Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111Malicious actors can obtain password hashes for accounts enabled for MFA with smart codes or tokens and use the hash via PtH techniques.
Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationT1621Malicious actors use “push bombing” against non-phishing resistant MFA to induce “MFA fatigue” in victims, gaining access to MFA authentication credentials or bypassing MFA, and accessing the MFA-protected system.
Steal Application Access TokenT1528Malicious actors can steal administrator account credentials and the authentication token generated by Active Directory when the account is logged into a compromised host.
Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesT1649Unauthenticated malicious actors coerce an ADCS server to authenticate to an actor-controlled server, and then relay that authentication to the web certificate enrollment application to obtain a trusted illegitimate certificate.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden TicketT1558.001Malicious actors who have obtained authentication certificates can use the certificate for Active Directory authentication to obtain a Kerberos TGT.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: KerberoastingT1558.003Malicious actors obtain and abuse valid Kerberos TGTs to elevate privileges and laterally move throughout an organization’s network.
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in FilesT1552.001Malicious actors find cleartext credentials that organizations or individual users store in spreadsheets, configuration files, and other documents.
Technique TitleIDUse
Account DiscoveryT1087Malicious actors with valid domain credentials enumerate the AD to discover elevated accounts and where they are used.
File and Directory DiscoveryT1083Malicious actors use commands, such as net share, open source tools, such as SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or custom malware, such as CovalentStealer to discover and categorize files.Malicious actors search for text files, spreadsheets, documents, and configuration files in hopes of obtaining desired information, such as cleartext passwords.
Network Share DiscoveryT1135Malicious actors use commands, such as net share, open source tools, such as SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or custom malware, such as CovalentStealer, to look for shared folders and drives.
Technique TitleIDUse
Exploitation of Remote ServicesT1210Malicious actors can exploit OS and firmware vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized network access, compromise sensitive data, and disrupt operations.
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.002If SMB signing is not enforced, malicious actors can use name resolution poisoning to access remote systems.
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access TokenT1550.001Malicious actors with stolen administrator account credentials and AD authentication tokens can use them to operate with elevated permissions throughout the domain.
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the HashT1550.002Malicious actors collect hashes in a network and authenticate as a user without having access to the user’s cleartext password.
Technique TitleIDUse
Data from Network Shared DriveT1039Malicious actors find sensitive information on network shares that could facilitate follow-on activity or provide opportunities for extortion.

Source :
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-278a

Top 5 Security Misconfigurations Causing Data Breaches in 2023

Edward Kost
updated May 15, 2023

Security misconfigurations are a common and significant cybersecurity issue that can leave businesses vulnerable to data breaches. According to the latest data breach investigation report by IBM and the Ponemon Institute, the average cost of a breach has peaked at US$4.35 million. Many data breaches are caused by avoidable errors like security misconfiguration. By following the tips in this article, you could identify and address a security error that could save you millions of dollars in damages.

Learn how UpGuard can help you detect data breach risks >

What is a Security Misconfiguration?

A security misconfiguration occurs when a system, application, or network device’s settings are not correctly configured, leaving it exposed to potential cyber threats. This could be due to default configurations left unchanged, unnecessary features enabled, or permissions set too broadly. Hackers often exploit these misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, launch malware attacks, or carry out phishing attacks, among other malicious activities.

What Causes Security Misconfigurations?

Security misconfigurations can result from various factors, including human error, lack of awareness, and insufficient security measures. For instance, employees might configure systems without a thorough understanding of security best practices, security teams might overlook crucial security updates due to the growing complexity of cloud services and infrastructures.

Additionally, the rapid shift to remote work during the pandemic has increased the attack surface for cybercriminals, making it more challenging for security teams to manage and monitor potential vulnerabilities.

List of Common Types of Security Configurations Facilitating Data Breaches

Some common types of security misconfigurations include:

1. Default Settings

With the rise of cloud solutions such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure, companies increasingly rely on these platforms to store and manage their data. However, using cloud services also introduces new security risks, such as the potential for misconfigured settings or unauthorized access.

A prominent example of insecure default software settings that could have facilitated a significant breach is the Microsoft Power Apps data leak incident of 2021. By default, Power Apps portal data feeds were set to be accessible to the public.

Unless developers specified for OData feeds to be set to private, virtually anyone could access the backend databases of applications built with Power Apps. UpGuard researchers located the exposure and notified Microsoft, who promptly addressed the leak. UpGuard’s detection helped Microsoft avoid a large-scale breach that could have potentially compromised 38 million records.

Read this whitepaper to learn how to prevent data breaches >

2. Unnecessary Features

Enabling features or services not required for a system’s operation can increase its attack surface, making it more vulnerable to threats. Some examples of unnecessary product features include remote administration tools, file-sharing services, and unused network ports. To mitigate data breach risks, organizations should conduct regular reviews of their systems and applications to identify and disable or remove features that are not necessary for their operations.

Additionally, organizations should practice the principle of least functionality, ensuring that systems are deployed with only the minimal set of features and services required for their specific use case.

3. Insecure Permissions

Overly permissive access controls can allow unauthorized users to access sensitive data or perform malicious actions. To address this issue, organizations should implement the principle of least privilege, granting users the minimum level of access necessary to perform their job functions. This can be achieved through proper role-based access control (RBAC) configurations and regular audits of user privileges. Additionally, organizations should ensure that sensitive data is appropriately encrypted both in transit and at rest, further reducing the risk of unauthorized access.

4. Outdated Software

Failing to apply security patches and updates can expose systems to known vulnerabilities. To protect against data breaches resulting from outdated software, organizations should have a robust patch management program in place. This includes regularly monitoring for available patches and updates, prioritizing their deployment based on the severity of the vulnerabilities being addressed, and verifying the successful installation of these patches.

Additionally, organizations should consider implementing automated patch management solutions and vulnerability scanning tools to streamline the patching process and minimize the risk of human error.

5. Insecure API Configurations

APIs that are not adequately secured can allow threat actors to access sensitive information or manipulate systems. API misconfigurations – like the one that led to T-Mobile’s 2023 data breach, are becoming more common. As more companies move their services to the cloud, securing these APIs and preventing the data leaks they facilitate is becoming a bigger challenge.

To mitigate the risks associated with insecure API configurations, organizations should implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms, such as OAuth 2.0 or API keys, to ensure only authorized clients can access their APIs. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities in their API configurations.

Finally, adopting a secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC) and employing API security best practices, such as rate limiting and input validation, can help prevent data breaches stemming from insecure APIs.

Learn how UpGuard protects against third-party breaches >

How to Avoid Security Misconfigurations Impacting Your Data Breach Resilience

To protect against security misconfigurations, organizations should:

1. Implement a Comprehensive Security Policy

Implement a cybersecurity policy covering all system and application configuration aspects, including guidelines for setting permissions, enabling features, and updating software.

2. Implement a Cyber Threat Awareness Program

An essential security measure that should accompany the remediation of security misconfigurations is employee threat awareness training. Of those who recently suffered cloud security breaches, 55% of respondents identified human error as the primary cause.

With your employees equipped to correctly respond to common cybercrime tactics that preceded data breaches, such as social engineering attacks and social media phishing attacks, your business could avoid a security incident should threat actors find and exploit an overlooked security misconfiguration.

Phishing attacks involve tricking individuals into revealing sensitive information that could be used to compromise an account or facilitate a data breach. During these attacks, threat actors target account login credentials, credit card numbers, and even phone numbers to exploit Multi-Factor authentication.

Learn the common ways MFA can be exploited >

Phishing attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with cybercriminals using automation and other tools to target large numbers of individuals. 

Here’s an example of a phishing campaign where a hacker has built a fake login page to steal a customer’s banking credentials. As you can see, the fake login page looks almost identical to the actual page, and an unsuspecting eye will not notice anything suspicious.

Real Commonwealth Bank Login Page
Real Commonwealth Bank Login Page.
Fake Commonwealth Bank Login Page
Fake Commonwealth Bank Login Page

Because this poor cybersecurity habit is common amongst the general population, phishing campaigns could involve fake login pages for social media websites, such as LinkedIn, popular websites like Amazon, and even SaaS products. Hackers implementing such tactics hope the same credentials are used for logging into banking websites.

Cyber threat awareness training is the best defense against phishing, the most common attack vector leading to data breaches and ransomware attacks.

Because small businesses often lack the resources and expertise of larger companies, they usually don’t have the budget for additional security programs like awareness training. This is why, according to a recent report, 61% of small and medium-sized businesses experienced at least one cyber attack in the past year, and 40% experienced eight or more attacks.

Luckily, with the help of ChatGPT, small businesses can implement an internal threat awareness program at a fraction of the cost. Industries at a heightened risk of suffering a data breach, such as healthcare, should especially prioritize awareness of the cyber threat landscape.

Learn how to implement an internal cyber threat awareness campaign >

3. Use Multi-Factor Authentication

MFA and strong access management control to limit unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

Previously compromised passwords are often used to hack into accounts. MFA adds additional authentication protocols to the login process, making it difficult to compromise an account, even if hackers get their hands on a stolen password

4. Use Strong Access Management Controls

Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems ensure users only have access to the data and applications they need to do their jobs and that permissions are revoked when an employee leaves the company or changes roles.

The 2023 Thales Dara Threat Report found that 28% of respondents found IAM to be the most effective data security control preventing personal data compromise.

5. Keep All Software Patched and Updated

Keep all environments up-to-date by promptly applying patches and updates. Consider patching a “golden image” and deploying it across your environment. Perform regular scans and audits to identify potential security misconfigurations and missing patches.

An attack surface monitoring solution, such as UpGuard, can detect vulnerable software versions that have been impacted by zero-days and other known security flaws.

6. Deploy Security Tools

Security tools, such as intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) and security information and event management (SIEM) solutions, to monitor and respond to potential threats.

It’s essential also to implement tools to defend against tactics often used to complement data breach attempts, for example. DDoS attacks – a type of attack where a server is flooded with fake traffic to force it offline, allowing hackers to exploit security misconfigurations during the chaos of excessive downtime.

Another important security tool is a data leak detection solution for discovering compromised account credentials published on the dark web. These credentials, if exploited, allow hackers to compress the data breach lifecycle, making these events harder to detect and intercept.

Dara leaks compressing the data breach lifecycle.

Learn how to detect and prevent data leaks >

7. Implement a Zero-Trust Architecture

One of the main ways that companies can protect themselves from cloud-related security threats is by implementing a Zero Trust security architecture. This approach assumes all requests for access to resources are potentially malicious and, therefore, require additional verification before granting access.

Learn how to implement a Zero-Trust Architecture >

A Zero-Trust approach to security assumes that all users, devices, and networks are untrustworthy until proven otherwise.

8. Develop a Repeatable Hardening Process

Establish a process that can be easily replicated to ensure consistent, secure configurations across production, development, and QA environments. Use different passwords for each environment and automate the process for efficient deployment. Be sure to address IoT devices in the hardening process. 

These devices tend to be secured with their default factory passwords, making them highly vulnerable to DDoS attacks.

9. Implement a Secure Application Architecture

Design your application architecture to obfuscate general access to sensitive resources using the principle of network segmentation.

Learn more about network segmentation >

Cloud infrastructure has become a significant cybersecurity issue in the last decade. Barely a month goes by without a major security breach at a cloud service provider or a large corporation using cloud services.

10. Maintain a Structured Development Cycle

Facilitate security testing during development by adhering to a well-organized development process. Following cybersecurity best practices this early in the development process sets the foundation for a resilient security posture that will protect your data even as your company scales.

Implement a secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC) that incorporates security checkpoints at each stage of development, including requirements gathering, design, implementation, testing, and deployment. Additionally, train your development team in secure coding practices and encourage a culture of security awareness to help identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities before they make their way into production environments.

11. Review Custom Code

If using custom code, employ a static code security scanner before integrating it into the production environment. These scanners can automatically analyze code for potential vulnerabilities and compliance issues, reducing the risk of security misconfigurations.

Additionally, have security professionals conduct manual reviews and dynamic testing to identify issues that may not be detected by automated tools. This combination of automated and manual testing ensures that custom code is thoroughly vetted for security risks before deployment.

12. Utilize a Minimal Platform

Remove unused features, insecure frameworks, and unnecessary documentation, samples, or components from your platform. Adopt a “lean” approach to your software stack by only including components that are essential for your application’s functionality.

This reduces the attack surface and minimizes the chances of security misconfigurations. Furthermore, keep an inventory of all components and their associated security risks to better manage and mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

13. Review Cloud Storage Permissions

Regularly examine permissions for cloud storage, such as S3 buckets, and incorporate security configuration updates and reviews into your patch management process. This process should be a standard inclusion across all cloud security measures. Ensure that access controls are properly configured to follow the principle of least privilege, and encrypt sensitive data both in transit and at rest.

Implement monitoring and alerting mechanisms to detect unauthorized access or changes to your cloud storage configurations. By regularly reviewing and updating your cloud storage permissions, you can proactively identify and address potential security misconfigurations, thereby enhancing your organization’s data breach resilience.

How UpGuard Can Help

UpGuard’s IP monitoring feature monitors all IP addresses associated with your attack surface for security issues, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities. UpGuard’s attack surface monitoring solution can also identify common misconfigurations and security issues shared across your organization and its subsidiaries, including the exposure of WordPress user names, vulnerable server versions, and a range of attack vectors facilitating first and third data breaches.

UpGuard's Risk Profile feature displays security vulnerabilities associated with end-of-life software.
UpGuard’s Risk Profile feature displays security vulnerabilities associated with end-of-life software.

To further expand its mitigation of data breach threat categories, UpGuard offersa data leak detection solution that scans ransomware blogs on the dark web for compromised credentials, and any leaked data could help hackers breach your network and sensitive resources.

UpGuard's ransomware blog detection feature.
UpGuard’s ransomware blog detection feature.

Source :
https://www.upguard.com/blog/security-misconfigurations-causing-data-breaches

The Current Security State of Private 5G Networks

By: Trend Micro
August 18, 2023
Read time: 3 min (931 words)

Private 5G networks offer businesses enhanced security, reliability, and scalability. Learn more about why private 5G could be the future of secure networking.

Private 5G networks offer businesses enhanced security, reliability, and scalability. Learn more about why private 5G could be the future of secure networking.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/h/private-5g-network-security.html

All about the TeamViewer company profile

By JeanK

Last Updated: 

A TeamViewer company profile allows the ability within the TeamViewer Management Console to manage user permissions and access centrally.

Company admins can add existing users to the license and create new TeamViewer accounts. Both will allow users to log into any TeamViewer application and license the device so they may make connections.

Before starting

It is highly recommended to utilize a Master Account for a company profile, which will be the account that manages all licenses and users.

Please see the following article: Using a Master Account for the TeamViewer Management Console

This article applies to TeamViewer customers with a Premium, Corporate, or Tensor plan.

Benefits of a company profile

Managing users as the company administrator of a company profile also gives access to:

Licensing

Each company profile must have one TeamViewer Core multi-user license activated; this license can be combined with other licenses of the TeamViewer product family (e.g., Assist AR, Remote Management, IoT, etc. ), but cannot be combined with another TeamViewer Core license.

📌Note: If a company admin attempts to activate a second TeamViewer license, they will need to choose between keeping the existing license or replacing it with the new license.

image.png

📌Note: In some cases (with older company profiles and an active perpetual license), multiple core TeamViewer licenses may be activated to one company profile. One subscription license may be added to an existing perpetual license for such company profiles.

License management

Through the TeamViewer Management Console, company admins can manage the licensing of their users directly, including:

  • Assign/un-assign the license to various members of the company profile.
  • Reserve one or more channels for specific teams or persons via Channel Groups.

💡Hint: To ensure the license on your company profile best matches your use case, we highly recommend reaching out to our TeamViewer licensing experts. You may find local numbers here.

 

How to create a company profile

To create a company profile, please follow the instructions below:

  1. Log into the Management Console
  2. On the left-hand side, under the Company header, select User management
  3. In the text box provided, enter the desired company name and click Create.
    • 📌Note: The name of a company profile must be unique and cannot be re-used. If another company profile already uses a name, an error will appear, requesting another name be used instead. 
  4. Once the company profile is created, User management will load with the user that created the company profile as a company administrator.

How to add a new user

To add a new user, please follow the instructions below:

  1. Under User management, click the icon of a person with a + sign. Click on Add user.
  2. On the General tab, add the user’s name and email address and enter a password for the user and click Add user.
    • 💡Hint: Other settings for the user can be adjusted under Advanced, Licenses, and Permissions.
  3. The user will now appear under the User management tab. An email is sent to the user with instructions on activating their account.
    • 📌Note: If the user does not activate their account via email, they will receive an error that the account has not yet been activated when trying to sign in.

How to add an existing user

Users that already have an existing TeamViewer account can request to join a company profile using a few simple steps:

  1. Under User management, click the icon of a person with a + sign. Select Add existing account.
  2. A pop-up will appear, including a URL. Please send this URL to the user you want to add: https://login.teamviewer.com/cmd/joincompany
  3. Once the user opens the link within a browser, they must sign in with their TeamViewer account. Once logged in, they will be prompted to enter the email address of the company administrator. Once completed, they must tick the box I allow to transfer my account and click Join Company.
  4. The company admin will receive a join request via email. The user will appear in user management, where the company admin can approve or decline the addition of the user to the company profile

📌Notes:

  • Every user that joins a company profile will be informed that the company admin will take over full management of their account, including the ability to connect to and control all their devices. It is recommended never to join a company profile the user does not know or fully trust.
  • A user can only be part of one company profile.

How to set user permissions

Users of a company profile have multiple options that can be set by the current company admin, including promoting other users to administrator or company administrator. Permissions are set for each user individually. To access user permissions:

  1. In the User management tab, hovering the cursor over the desired user’s account will produce a three-dots menu (⋮) to the far right of the account. Click this menu and select Edit user from the drop-down.
  2. Once in Edit user, select the Permissions tab. Overall permissions for the account can be changed using the drop-down under the Role header.
image.png

Four options are available:

  • Company administrator: Can make changes to company settings, other administrator accounts, and user accounts.
  • User administrator: Can make changes to other user accounts but cannot change company settings or company administrator accounts.
  • Member: Cannot change the company profile or other users.
  • Customized permissions: The company admin sets permissions for each aspect of the account.

Once the appropriate role is selected, click Save in the window’s upper-left corner.

📌Note: Changes to user permissions are automatic once saved.

How to remove/deactivate/delete users

Along with adding new or existing accounts, company admins can remove, deactivate, or even delete users from the company profile.

📌Note: A current company admin of that license can only remove a TeamViewer account currently connected to a company profile. TeamViewer Customer Support is unable to remove any account from a company profile.

To remove, deactivate or delete an account, please follow the instructions below:

  1. In the User management tab, hovering the cursor over the desired user’s account will produce a three-dots menu (⋮) to the far right of the account. In the drop-down menu that appears are the three options
  2. Select Delete accountRemove user or Deactivate user.
image.png

Consequences of deleting an account

When an account is deleted, the account is not only removed from the company profile but deleted from TeamViewer altogether. The user can no longer use the account or access any information associated with it as it no longer exists.

📌Note: When an account is deleted, the email address associated with the account can be re-used to create a new TeamViewer account.

image.png

When a TeamViewer account is deleted from a company profile:

  • Connection reports, custom modules, and TeamViewer/Remote management policies will be transferred to the current company admin.
  • Web API Tokens for the deleted user are logged out, and their company functionality is removed
  • License activations are removed from the deleted user’s account
  • Shared groups from the deleted user’s account are deleted.

Once the company admin checks the box to confirm that this process cannot be undone, the Delete account button becomes available. Once pressed, the account is deleted.

📌Note: Deletion of any TeamViewer account deletion is irreversible. Only a new account can be created after deletion. All user data will be lost.

Remove user

When an account is removed, the account is removed from the company profile and reverted to a free TeamViewer account. The account is reverted to a free account, and the user is still able to log in with the account. All information associated with the account is still accessible.

When an account is removed from a company profile:

  • Connection reports, custom modules, and TeamViewer /Remote management policies will be transferred to the current company admin.
  • Contacts in the contact book are transferred to the current company admin
  • Web API Tokens for the user’s account are logged out and their company functionality is removed
  • License activations are removed from the user’s account

📌Note: Groups & devices in the Computers & Contacts of the removed user’s account are not affected. Any groups shared also will remain shared.

Once the company admin checks the box to confirm that this process cannot be undone, the Remove user button becomes available. Once pressed, the account is removed from the company profile and reverted to a free TeamViewer account.

📌Note: Once a user account is removed from the current company profile, it can request to join another company profile.

Deactivate user

When an account is deactivated, the account is reverted to inactive. The deactivated account is still associated with the company profile but cannot be used to log into TeamViewer on a free or licensed device. The account is rendered completely unusable.

📌Note: When an account is deactivated, the email address associated with the account cannot be used to create a new free TeamViewer account.

💡Hint: To view inactivated users within the company profile, select the drop-down menu under User Status and check the box for Inactive. All inactive users will now appear in user management.

How to reactivate inactive users

When Deactivate user is selected, the account disappears from user management. They are, however, still a part of the Company Profile and can be reactivated back to the license instantly at any time.

image.png
  1. To view inactivated users within the company profile, select the menu under User Status and check the box for Inactive. All inactive users will now appear in user management.
  2. Once the user is located, hover the cursor over the account. Select the three-dots menu (⋮) to the right of the user’s account and select Activate user
  3. The user’s original permissions status is reverted, and the account can again be used with any TeamViewer device.
image.png

Troubleshooting

Below you will find answers to some common issues encountered when interacting with a company profile.

▹User(s) on a company profile show a free license

In some cases, older users on a company profile may appear as ‘free’ users, especially after upgrading or changing a license. The company admin can resolve this:

  1. Log in to the TeamViewer Management Console under https://login.teamviewer.com
  2. Click Company administration on the left-hand side:
  3. Select the Licenses tab and locate the license. Hovering the cursor over the license will produce a three-dots menu (⋮). Click the menu and select Assign from the drop-down.
  4. The users who show ‘free’ will appear in Unassigned. Select the desired users and click the Add button at the bottom of the page.
image.png

📌Note: Affected users should log out and then back in to see the licensing changes.

▹Your account is already associated with a company 

If a user who is already associated with one company profile attempts to join another company profile, the following pop-up will appear:

image.png

The user’s account must be removed from the current company profile to resolve this. The steps required vary depending on whether it is their active or expired company profile or if they are associated with a company profile created by another account.

SCENARIO 1: As company administrator of an active company profile

If a user who created a company profile wishes to delete the company profile associated with their account, they will need to perform the following steps:

  1. Log in to the TeamViewer Management Console under https://login.teamviewer.com
  2. Click User Management in the upper left corner 
  3. Remove all other accounts: Before deleting a company profile, the company admin must remove all other accounts. Perform these steps for each user on the company profile
  4. Remove the company admin account: Once all other accounts have been removed, the company admin will remove their account. This will delete the company profile altogether
  5. The user is immediately logged out and can now follow the process to add their account to an existing company profile

SCENARIO 2: As company administrator of an expired company profile

In some cases, the user may have created a company profile on an older license that is no longer used or active. In such cases, the company profile will appear as expired in the Management Console.

In such cases, it is still possible to delete the company profile:

  1. Log in to the TeamViewer Management Console under https://login.teamviewer.com
  2. Click Company administration on the left-hand side.
  3. On the General tab, select Delete company.
  4. A pop-up will appear confirming the request to delete the company profile. Check the box at the bottom to validate, and select Delete company.

SCENARIO 3: The account is a member of a company profile

📌Note: Only a company administrator can remove a user from their company profile – not even TeamViewer can remove a user from a company profile, regardless of the request’s origin.

If the user is a member of another company profile, they will need to contact the company admin of that license to request removal.

Once removed, they can then request to join the correct company profile.

Source :
https://community.teamviewer.com/English/kb/articles/3573-all-about-the-teamviewer-company-profile

Teamviewer Block and allowlist

By .Carol.fg.

Last Updated: 

You have the possibility to restrict remote access to your device by using the Block and Allowlist feature in the TeamViewer full version and the TeamViewer Host.

You can find the feature easily by clicking in your TeamViewer full version on the Gear icon (⚙) in the upper right corner of the TeamViewer (Classic) application, then Security ➜ Block and Allowlist.

Let´s begin with the difference between a blocklist and an allowlist.

This article applies to all TeamViewer (Classic) users.

What is a Blocklist?

The Blocklist generally lets you prevent certain partners or devices from establishing a connection to your computer. TeamViewer accounts or TeamViewer IDs on the blocklist cannot connect to your computer.

📌Note: You will still be able to set up outgoing TeamViewer sessions with partners on the blocklist.

What is an Allowlist?

If you add TeamViewer accounts to the Allowlist, only these accounts will be able to connect to your computer. The possibility of a connection to your computer through other TeamViewer accounts or TeamViewer IDs will be denied

If you have joined a company profile with your TeamViewer account, you can also place the entire company profile on the Allowlist. Thus only the TeamViewer accounts that are part of the company profile can access this device.

📌Note: To work with a company profile you will need a TeamViewer Premium or Corporate license

 

How to set up a Blocklist?

If you would like to deny remote access to your device to specific persons or TeamViewer IDs, we recommend setting up a Blocklist.

You can find the feature easily by clicking in your TeamViewer full version on the Gear icon (⚙) in the upper right corner of the TeamViewer (Classic) application, then Security ➜ Block and Allowlist ➜ Click on Configure…

A new window will open. Activate the first option Deny access for the following partners and click on Add 

Blocklist_01.png

📌Note: If you activate the Also apply for meetings check box, these settings will also be applied to meetings. Contacts from your blocklist are excluded from being able to join your meetings.

After clicking on Add, you can either choose partners saved on your Computers & Contacts list or add TeamViewer IDs/contacts manually to your blocklist.

Blocklist_02.png
Blocklist_03.PNG

How to set up an Allowlist?

If you would like to allow only specific TeamViewer accounts or TeamViewer IDs remote access to your device, we recommend setting up an Allowlist.

You can find the feature easily by clicking in your TeamViewer full version on the Gear icon (⚙) in the upper right corner of the TeamViewer (Classic) application, then Security ➜ Block and Allowlist ➜ Click on Configure…

A new window will open. Activate the second option Allow access only for the following partners and click on Add 

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📌Note: If you activate the Also apply for meetings check box, these settings will also be applied to meetings. Only contacts from your allowlist will then be able to join your meetings.

After clicking on Add, you can either choose partners saved on your Computers & Contacts list, add TeamViewer IDs/contacts manually to your blocklist, or add the whole company you are part of (only visible if you are part of a company profile). 

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How to delete blocklisted/allowlisted partners?

If you no longer wish to have certain partners block or allowlisted, you can easily remove them from the list.

To do so navigate in your TeamViewer full version to the Gear icon (⚙) in the upper right corner of the TeamViewer (Classic) application, then Security ➜ Block and Allowlist ➜ Click on Configure… and choose whether you would like to remove partners from the Blocklist or from the Allowlist by choosing either Deny access for the following partners (Blocklist) or Allow access only for the following partner (Allowlist). Now click on the partners you would like to remove and finally click Remove  OK

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📌Note: You can choose multiple partners at once by pressing CTRG when clicking on the different partners.

Learn more about how you can benefit from a Master Allowlist: Why Master Allowlists are So Effective to Secure Customers

Source :
https://community.teamviewer.com/English/kb/articles/29739-block-and-allowlist

Why High Tech Companies Struggle with SaaS Security

It’s easy to think high-tech companies have a security advantage over other older, more mature industries. Most are unburdened by 40 years of legacy systems and software. They draw some of the world’s youngest, brightest digital natives to their ranks, all of whom consider cybersecurity issues their entire lives.

Perhaps it is due to their familiarity with technology that causes them to overlook SaaS security configurations. During the last Christmas holiday season, Slack had some private code stolen from its GitHub repository. According to Slack, the stolen code didn’t impact production, and no customer data was taken.

Still, the breach should serve as a warning sign to other tech companies. Stolen tokens allowed threat actors to access the GitHub instance and download the code. If this type of attack can happen to Slack on GitHub, it can happen to any high-tech company. Tech companies must take SaaS security seriously to prevent resources from leaking or being stolen.

App Breaches: A Recurring Story#

Slack’s misfortune with GitHub wasn’t the first time a GitHub breach occurred. Back in April, a stolen OAuth token from Heroku and Travis CI-maintained OAuth applications were stolen, leading to an attacker downloading data from dozens of private code repositories.

MailChimp, a SaaS app used to manage email campaigns, experienced three breaches over 12 months spanning 2022-23. Customer data was stolen by threat actors, who used that data in attacks against cryptocurrency companies.

SevenRooms had over 400 GB of sensitive data stolen from its CRM platform, PayPal notified customers in January that unauthorized parties accessed accounts using stolen login credentials, and Atlassian saw employee data and corporate data exposed in a February breach.

Clearly, tech companies aren’t immune to data breaches. Protecting their proprietary code, customer data, and employee records that are stored within SaaS applications should be a top priority.

Reliance on SaaS Applications#

A strong SaaS posture is important for any company, but it is particularly important for organizations that store their proprietary code in SaaS applications. This code is especially tempting to threat actors, who would like nothing more than to monetize their efforts and ransom the code back to its creators.

Tech companies also tend to rely on a large number and mix of SaaS applications, from collaboration platforms to sales and marketing tools, legal and finance, data warehouses, cybersecurity solutions, and many more – making it even more challenging to secure the entire stack.

Tech employees heavily depend on SaaS apps to do their day-to-day work; this requires security teams to strictly govern identities and their access. Moreover, these users tend to log into their SaaS apps through different devices to maintain efficiency, which may pose a risk to the organization based on the device’s level of hygiene. On top of this, tech employees tend to connect third-party applications to the core stack without thinking twice, granting these apps high risk scopes.

Learn how Adaptive Shield can help you secure your entire SaaS stack.

Controlling SaaS Access After Layoffs#

The high-tech industry is known for periods of hyper-growth, followed by downsizing. Over the past few months, we’ve seen Facebook, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Shopify and others announce layoffs.

Deprovisioning employees from SaaS applications is a critical element in data security. While much of the offboarding of employees is automated, SaaS applications that are not connected to the company directory don’t automatically revoke access. Even those applications that are connected may have admin accounts that are outside the company’s SSO. While the primary SSO account may be disconnected, the user’s admin access through the app’s login screen is often accessible.

Organic Hyper Growth and M&As#

At the same time, the industry is ripe with mergers and acquisition announcements. As a result of M&As, the acquiring company needs to create a baseline for SaaS security and monitor all SaaS stacks of merged or acquired companies, while enabling business continuity. Whether the hyper growth is organic or through an M&A, organizations need to be able to ensure access is right-sized for their users, at scale and rapidly.

Identity Threat Detection & Response#

The majority of data breaches impacting tech companies stem from stolen credentials and tokens. The threat actor enters the system through the front door, using valid credentials of the user.

Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) picks up suspicious events that would otherwise go unnoticed. An SSPM (SaaS Security Posture Management) solution with threat detection engines in place will alert when there is an Indicator of Compromise (IOC). These IOCs are based on cross-referencing of activities such as user geolocation, time, frequency, recurring attempts to login, excessive activities and more.

Securing High Tech’s SaaS#

Maintaining a high SaaS security posture is challenging for high tech companies, who may mistakenly believe they are equipped and well trained to prevent SaaS attacks. SaaS Security Posture Management is essential to preventing SaaS breaches, while an SSPM with ITDR capabilities will go a long way toward ensuring that your SaaS data is secure.

Learn how Adaptive Shield can help you secure your entire SaaS stack.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2023/05/why-high-tech-companies-struggle-with.html

LockBit 3.0 ‘Black’ attacks and leaks reveal wormable capabilities and tooling

Reverse-engineering reveals close similarities to BlackMatter ransomware, with some improvements

A postmortem analysis of multiple incidents in which attackers eventually launched the latest version of LockBit ransomware (known variously as LockBit 3.0 or ‘LockBit Black’), revealed the tooling used by at least one affiliate. Sophos’ Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team has observed both ransomware affiliates and legitimate penetration testers use the same collection of tooling over the past 3 months.

Leaked data about LockBit that showed the backend controls for the ransomware also seems to indicate that the creators have begun experimenting with the use of scripting that would allow the malware to “self-spread” using Windows Group Policy Objects (GPO) or the tool PSExec, potentially making it easier for the malware to laterally move and infect computers without the need for affiliates to know how to take advantage of these features for themselves, potentially speeding up the time it takes them to deploy the ransomware and encrypt targets.

A reverse-engineering analysis of the LockBit functionality shows that the ransomware has carried over most of its functionality from LockBit 2.0 and adopted new behaviors that make it more difficult to analyze by researchers. For instance, in some cases it now requires the affiliate to use a 32-character ‘password’ in the command line of the ransomware binary when launched, or else it won’t run, though not all the samples we looked at required the password.

We also observed that the ransomware runs with LocalServiceNetworkRestricted permissions, so it does not need full Administrator-level access to do its damage (supporting observations of the malware made by other researchers).

Most notably, we’ve observed (along with other researchers) that many LockBit 3.0 features and subroutines appear to have been lifted directly from BlackMatter ransomware.

Is LockBit 3.0 just ‘improved’ BlackMatter?

Other researchers previously noted that LockBit 3.0 appears to have adopted (or heavily borrowed) several concepts and techniques from the BlackMatter ransomware family.

We dug into this ourselves, and found a number of similarities which strongly suggest that LockBit 3.0 reuses code from BlackMatter.

Anti-debugging trick

Blackmatter and Lockbit 3.0 use a specific trick to conceal their internal functions calls from researchers. In both cases, the ransomware loads/resolves a Windows DLL from its hash tables, which are based on ROT13.

It will try to get pointers from the functions it needs by searching the PEB (Process Environment Block) of the module. It will then look for a specific binary data marker in the code (0xABABABAB) at the end of the heap; if it finds this marker, it means someone is debugging the code, and it doesn’t save the pointer, so the ransomware quits.

After these checks, it will create a special stub for each API it requires. There are five different types of stubs that can be created (randomly). Each stub is a small piece of shellcode that performs API hash resolution on the fly and jumps to the API address in memory. This adds some difficulties while reversing using a debugger.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s 0xABABABAB marker

SophosLabs has put together a CyberChef recipe for decoding these stub shellcode snippets.

Output of a CyberChef recipe
The first stub, as an example (decoded with CyberChef)

Obfuscation of strings

Many strings in both LockBit 3.0 and BlackMatter are obfuscated, resolved during runtime by pushing the obfuscated strings on to the stack and decrypting with an XOR function. In both LockBit and BlackMatter, the code to achieve this is very similar.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s string obfuscation (image credit: Chuong Dong)

Georgia Tech student Chuong Dong analyzed BlackMatter and showed this feature on his blog, with the screenshot above.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s string obfuscation, in comparison

By comparison, LockBit 3.0 has adopted a string obfuscation method that looks and works in a very similar fashion to BlackMatter’s function.

API resolution

LockBit uses exactly the same implementation as BlackMatter to resolve API calls, with one exception: LockBit adds an extra step in an attempt to conceal the function from debuggers.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s dynamic API resolution (image credit: Chuong Dong)

The array of calls performs precisely the same function in LockBit 3.0.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s dynamic API resolution

Hiding threads

Both LockBit and BlackMatter hide threads using the NtSetInformationThread function, with the parameter ThreadHideFromDebugger. As you probably can guess, this means that the debugger doesn’t receive events related to this thread.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit employs the same ThreadHideFromDebugger feature as an evasion technique

Printing

LockBit, like BlackMatter, sends ransom notes to available printers.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit can send its ransom notes directly to printers, as BlackMatter can do

Deletion of shadow copies

Both ransomware will sabotage the infected computer’s ability to recover from file encryption by deleting the Volume Shadow Copy files.

LockBit calls the IWbemLocator::ConnectServer method to connect with the local ROOT\CIMV2 namespace and obtain the pointer to an IWbemServices object that eventually calls IWbemServices::ExecQuery to execute the WQL query.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter code for deleting shadow copies (image credit: Chuong Dong)

LockBit’s method of doing this is identical to BlackMatter’s implementation, except that it adds a bit of string obfuscation to the subroutine.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s deletion of shadow copies

Enumerating DNS hostnames

Both LockBit and BlackMatter enumerate hostnames on the network by calling NetShareEnum.

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter calls NetShareEnum() to enumerate hostnames… (image credit: Chuong Dong)

In the source code for LockBit, the function looks like it has been copied, verbatim, from BlackMatter.

Screenshot of disassembler code
…as does LockBit

Determining the operating system version

Both ransomware strains use identical code to check the OS version – even using the same return codes (although this is a natural choice, since the return codes are hexadecimal representations of the version number).

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s code for checking the OS version (image credit: Chuong Dong)
Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s OS enumeration routine

Configuration

Both ransomware contain embedded configuration data inside their binary executables. We noted that LockBit decodes its config in a similar way to BlackMatter, albeit with some small differences.

For instance, BlackMatter saves its configuration in the .rsrc section, whereas LockBit stores it in .pdata

Screenshot of disassembler code
BlackMatter’s config decryption routine (image credit: Chuong Dong)

And LockBit uses a different linear congruential generator (LCG) algorithm for decoding.

Screenshot of disassembler code
LockBit’s config decryption routine

Some researchers have speculated that the close relationship between the LockBit and BlackMatter code indicates that one or more of BlackMatter’s coders were recruited by LockBit; that LockBit bought the BlackMatter codebase; or a collaboration between developers. As we noted in our white paper on multiple attackers earlier this year, it’s not uncommon for ransomware groups to interact, either inadvertently or deliberately.

Either way, these findings are further evidence that the ransomware ecosystem is complex, and fluid. Groups reuse, borrow, or steal each other’s ideas, code, and tactics as it suits them. And, as the LockBit 3.0 leak site (containing, among other things, a bug bounty and a reward for “brilliant ideas”) suggests, that gang in particular is not averse to paying for innovation.

LockBit tooling mimics what legitimate pentesters would use

Another aspect of the way LockBit 3.0’s affiliates are deploying the ransomware shows that they’re becoming very difficult to distinguish from the work of a legitimate penetration tester – aside from the fact that legitimate penetration testers, of course, have been contracted by the targeted company beforehand, and are legally allowed to perform the pentest.

The tooling we observed the attackers using included a package from GitHub called Backstab. The primary function of Backstab is, as the name implies, to sabotage the tooling that analysts in security operations centers use to monitor for suspicious activity in real time. The utility uses Microsoft’s own Process Explorer driver (signed by Microsoft) to terminate protected anti-malware processes and disable EDR utilities. Both Sophos and other researchers have observed LockBit attackers using Cobalt Strike, which has become a nearly ubiquitous attack tool among ransomware threat actors, and directly manipulating Windows Defender to evade detection.

Further complicating the parentage of LockBit 3.0 is the fact that we also encountered attackers using a password-locked variant of the ransomware, called lbb_pass.exe , which has also been used by attackers that deploy REvil ransomware. This may suggest that there are threat actors affiliated with both groups, or that threat actors not affiliated with LockBit have taken advantage of the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder. At least one group, BlooDy, has reportedly used the builder, and if history is anything to go by, more may follow suit.

LockBit 3.0 attackers also used a number of publicly-available tools and utilities that are now commonplace among ransomware threat actors, including the anti-hooking utility GMER, a tool called AV Remover published by antimalware company ESET, and a number of PowerShell scripts designed to remove Sophos products from computers where Tamper Protection has either never been enabled, or has been disabled by the attackers after they obtained the credentials to the organization’s management console.

We also saw evidence the attackers used a tool called Netscan to probe the target’s network, and of course, the ubiquitous password-sniffer Mimikatz.

Incident response makes no distinction

Because these utilities are in widespread use, MDR and Rapid Response treats them all equally – as though an attack is underway – and immediately alerts the targets when they’re detected.

We found the attackers took advantage of less-than-ideal security measures in place on the targeted networks. As we mentioned in our Active Adversaries Report on multiple ransomware attackers, the lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) on critical internal logins (such as management consoles) permits an intruder to use tooling that can sniff or keystroke-capture administrators’ passwords and then gain access to that management console.

It’s safe to assume that experienced threat actors are at least as familiar with Sophos Central and other console tools as the legitimate users of those consoles, and they know exactly where to go to weaken or disable the endpoint protection software. In fact, in at least one incident involving a LockBit threat actor, we observed them downloading files which, from their names, appeared to be intended to remove Sophos protection: sophoscentralremoval-master.zip and sophos-removal-tool-master.zip. So protecting those admin logins is among the most critically important steps admins can take to defend their networks.

For a list of IOCs associated with LockBit 3.0, please see our GitHub.

Acknowledgments

Sophos X-Ops acknowledges the collaboration of Colin Cowie, Gabor Szappanos, Alex Vermaning, and Steeve Gaudreault in producing this report.

Source :
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/11/30/lockbit-3-0-black-attacks-and-leaks-reveal-wormable-capabilities-and-tooling/

7 Cyber Security Tips for SMBs

When the headlines focus on breaches of large enterprises like the Optus breach, it’s easy for smaller businesses to think they’re not a target for hackers. Surely, they’re not worth the time or effort?

Unfortunately, when it comes to cyber security, size doesn’t matter.

Assuming you’re not a target leads to lax security practices in many SMBs who lack the knowledge or expertise to put simple security steps in place. Few small businesses prioritise cybersecurity, and hackers know it. According to Verizon, the number of smaller businesses being hit has climbed steadily in the last few years – 46% of cyber breaches in 2021 impacted businesses with fewer than 1,000 employees.

Cyber security doesn’t need to be difficult#

Securing any business doesn’t need to be complex or come with a hefty price tag. Here are seven simple tips to help the smaller business secure their systems, people and data.

1 — Install anti-virus software everywhere#

Every organisation has anti-virus on their systems and devices, right? Unfortunately, business systems such as web servers get overlooked all too often. It’s important for SMBs to consider all entry points into their network and have anti-virus deployed on every server, as well as on employees’ personal devices.

Hackers will find weak entry points to install malware, and anti-virus software can serve as a good last-resort backstop, but it’s not a silver bullet. Through continuous monitoring and penetration testing you can identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities before hackers do, because it’s easier to stop a burglar at the front door than once they’re in your home.

2 — Continuously monitor your perimeter#

Your perimeter is exposed to remote attacks because it’s available 24/7. Hackers constantly scan the internet looking for weaknesses, so you should scan your own perimeter too. The longer a vulnerability goes unfixed, the more likely an attack is to occur. With tools like Autosploit and Shodan readily available, it’s easier than ever for attackers to discover internet facing weaknesses and exploit them.

Even organisations that cannot afford a full-time, in-house security specialist can use online services like Intruder to run vulnerability scans to uncover weaknesses.

Intruder is a powerful vulnerability scanner that provides a continuous security review of your systems. With over 11,000 security checks, Intruder makes enterprise-grade scanning easy and accessible to SMBs.

Intruder will promptly identify high-impact flaws, changes in the attack surface, and rapidly scan your infrastructure for emerging threats.

3 — Minimise your attack surface#

Your attack surface is made up of all the systems and services exposed to the internet. The larger the attack surface, the bigger the risk. This means exposed services like Microsoft Exchange for email, or content management systems like WordPress can be vulnerable to brute-forcing or credential-stuffing, and new vulnerabilities are discovered almost daily in such software systems. By removing public access to sensitive systems and interfaces which don’t need to be accessible to the public, and ensuring 2FA is enabled where they do, you can limit your exposure and greatly reduce risk.

A simple first step in reducing your attack surface is by using a secure virtual private network (VPN). By using a VPN, you can avoid exposing sensitive systems directly to the internet whilst maintaining their availability to employees working remotely. When it comes to risk, prevention is better than cure – don’t expose anything to the internet unless it’s absolutely necessary!

4 — Keep software up to date#

New vulnerabilities are discovered daily in all kinds of software, from web browsers to business applications. Just one unpatched weakness could lead to full compromise of a system and a breach of customer data; as TalkTalk discovered when 150,000 of its private data records were stolen.

According to a Cyber Security Breaches Survey, businesses that hold electronic personal data of their customers are more likely than average to have had breaches. Patch management is an essential component of good cyber hygiene, and there are tools and services to help you check your software for any missing security patches.

5 — Back up your data #

Ransomware is on the increase. In 2021, 37% of businesses and organisations were hit by ransomware according to research by Sophos. Ransomware encrypts any data it can access, rendering it unusable, and can’t be reversed without a key to decrypt the data.

Data loss is a key risk to any business either through malicious intent or a technical mishap such as hard disk failure, so backing up data is always recommended. If you back up your data, you can counter attackers by recovering your data without needing to pay the ransom, as systems affected by ransomware can be wiped and restored from an unaffected backup without the attacker’s key.

6 — Keep your staff security aware#

Cyber attackers often rely on human error, so it’s vital that staff are trained in cyber hygiene so they recognise risks and respond appropriately. The Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2022 revealed that the most common types of breaches were staff receiving fraudulent emails or phishing attacks (73%), followed by people impersonating the organisation in emails or online (27%), viruses, spyware and malware (12%), and ransomware (4%).

Increasing awareness of the benefits of using complex passwords and training staff to spot common attacks such as phishing emails and malicious links, will ensure your people are a strength rather than a vulnerability.

— Protect yourself relative to your risk#

Cyber security measures should always be appropriate to the organisation. For example, a small business which handles banking transactions or has access to sensitive information such as healthcare data should employ far more stringent security processes and practices than a pet shop.

That’s not to say a pet shop doesn’t have a duty to protect customer data, but it’s less likely to be a target. Hackers are motivated by money, so the bigger the prize the more time and effort will be invested to achieve their gains. By identifying your threats and vulnerabilities with a tool like Intruder, you can take appropriate steps to mitigate and prioritize which risks need to be addressed and in which order.

It’s time to raise your cyber security game#

Attacks on large companies dominate the news, which feeds the perception that SMBs are safe, when the opposite is true. Attacks are increasingly automated, so SMBs are just as vulnerable targets as larger enterprises, more so if they don’t have adequate security processes in place. And hackers will always follow the path of least resistance. Fortunately, that’s the part Intruder made easy…

About Intruder#

Intruder is a cyber security company that helps organisations reduce their attack surface by providing continuous vulnerability scanning and penetration testing services. Intruder’s powerful scanner is designed to promptly identify high-impact flaws, changes in the attack surface, and rapidly scan the infrastructure for emerging threats. Running thousands of checks, which include identifying misconfigurations, missing patches, and web layer issues, Intruder makes enterprise-grade vulnerability scanning easy and accessible to everyone. Intruder’s high-quality reports are perfect to pass on to prospective customers or comply with security regulations, such as ISO 27001 and SOC 2.

Intruder offers a 14-day free trial of its vulnerability assessment platform. Visit their website today to take it for a spin!

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter  and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/11/7-cyber-security-tips-for-smbs.html

Alert (AA22-277A) Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization

Summary

Actions to Help Protect Against APT Cyber Activity:

• Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on all user accounts.
• Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality.
• Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on network assets.
• Audit account usage.

From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization’s enterprise network. During incident response activities, CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization’s network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim’s sensitive data.

This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides APT actors tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) identified during the incident response activities by CISA and a third-party incident response organization. The CSA includes detection and mitigation actions to help organizations detect and prevent related APT activity. CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend DIB sector and other critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations in this CSA to ensure they are managing and reducing the impact of cyber threats to their networks.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 692 KB

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see the following files:

Technical Details

Threat Actor Activity

NoteThis advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the APT cyber activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework.

From November 2021 through January 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement on a DIB Sector organization’s enterprise network. The victim organization also engaged a third-party incident response organization for assistance. During incident response activities, CISA and the trusted –third-party identified APT activity on the victim’s network.

Some APT actors gained initial access to the organization’s Microsoft Exchange Server as early as mid-January 2021. The initial access vector is unknown. Based on log analysis, the actors gathered information about the exchange environment and performed mailbox searches within a four-hour period after gaining access. In the same period, these actors used a compromised administrator account (“Admin 1”) to access the EWS Application Programming Interface (API). In early February 2021, the actors returned to the network and used Admin 1 to access EWS API again. In both instances, the actors used a virtual private network (VPN).

Four days later, the APT actors used Windows Command Shell over a three-day period to interact with the victim’s network. The actors used Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data, including sensitive contract-related information from shared drives, for eventual exfiltration. The actors manually collected files using the command-line tool, WinRAR. These files were split into approximately 3MB chunks located on the Microsoft Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.

During the same period, APT actors implanted Impacket, a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols, on another system. The actors used Impacket to attempt to move laterally to another system.

In early March 2021, APT actors exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to install 17 China Chopper webshells on the Exchange Server. Later in March, APT actors installed HyperBro on the Exchange Server and two other systems. For more information on the HyperBro and webshell samples, see CISA MAR-10365227-2 and -3.

In April 2021, APT actors used Impacket for network exploitation activities. See the Use of Impacket section for additional information. From late July through mid-October 2021, APT actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate the remaining sensitive files. See the Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer section for additional information.

APT actors maintained access through mid-January 2022, likely by relying on legitimate credentials.

Use of Impacket

CISA discovered activity indicating the use of two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py. These tools use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, respectively, for creating a semi-interactive shell with the target device. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on the remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network.

The APT cyber actors used existing, compromised credentials with Impacket to access a higher privileged service account used by the organization’s multifunctional devices. The threat actors first used the service account to remotely access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via Outlook Web Access (OWA) from multiple external IP addresses; shortly afterwards, the actors assigned the Application Impersonation role to the service account by running the following PowerShell command for managing Exchange:

powershell add-pssnapin *exchange*;New-ManagementRoleAssignment – name:”Journaling-Logs” -Role:ApplicationImpersonation -User:<account>

This command gave the service account the ability to access other users’ mailboxes.

The APT cyber actors used virtual private network (VPN) and virtual private server (VPS) providers, M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to remotely access the Microsoft Exchange server. Use of these hosting providers, which serves to conceal interaction with victim networks, are common for these threat actors. According to CISA’s analysis of the victim’s Microsoft Exchange server Internet Information Services (IIS) logs, the actors used the account of a former employee to access the EWS. EWS enables access to mailbox items such as email messages, meetings, and contacts. The source IP address for these connections is mostly from the VPS hosting provider, M247.

Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer

The threat actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate sensitive files.

CovalentStealer is designed to identify file shares on a system, categorize the files, and upload the files to a remote server. CovalentStealer includes two configurations that specifically target the victim’s documents using predetermined files paths and user credentials. CovalentStealer stores the collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder, includes a configuration file to specify the types of files to collect at specified times and uses a 256-bit AES key for encryption. See CISA MAR-10365227-1 for additional technical details, including IOCs and detection signatures.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. CISA uses the ATT&CK Framework as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies. Table 1 lists the ATT&CK techniques employed by the APT actors.

Initial Access
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Execution
Technique TitleIDUse
Windows Management InstrumentationT1047Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands.
Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059Actors abused command and script interpreters to execute commands.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellT1059.001Actors abused PowerShell commands and scripts to map shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command ShellT1059.003Actors abused the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.The actors used Impacket tools, which enable a user with credentials to run commands on the remote device through the Command Shell.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PythonT1059.006The actors used two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py.
Shared ModulesT1129Actors executed malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths.
System ServicesT1569Actors abused system services to execute commands or programs on the victim’s network.
Persistence
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.
Create or Modify System ProcessT1543Actors were observed creating or modifying system processes.
Privilege Escalation
Technique TitleIDUse
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Defense Evasion
Technique TitleIDUse
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005Actors masqueraded the archive utility WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe to evade defenses and observation.
Indicator Removal on HostT1070Actors deleted or modified artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses.
Indicator Removal on Host: File DeletionT1070.004Actors used the del.exe command with the /f parameter to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.
Valid AccountsT1078Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System ChecksT1497.001Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify ToolsT1562.001Actors used the taskkill command to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine which application was associated with the Process ID.
Hijack Execution FlowT1574Actors were observed using hijack execution flow.
Discovery
Technique TitleIDUse
System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016Actors used the systeminfo command to look for details about the network configurations and settings and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.The threat actor used route print to display the entries in the local IP routing table.
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection DiscoveryT1016.001Actors checked for internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways.
System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033Actors attempted to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly use a system, or whether a user is actively using the system.
System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049Actors used the netstat command to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP.
Process DiscoveryT1057Actors used the tasklist command to get information about running processes on a system and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.The actors used tasklist.exe and find.exe to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers.”
System Information DiscoveryT1082Actors used the ipconfig command to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.
File and Directory DiscoveryT1083Actors enumerated files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System ChecksT1497.001Actors used Windows command shellcommands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments.
Lateral Movement
Technique TitleIDUse
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.002Actors used Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB) and then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Collection
Technique TitleIDUse
Archive Collected Data: Archive via UtilityT1560.001Actor used PowerShell commands and WinRAR to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration.
Data from Network Shared DriveT1039Actors likely used net share command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit, the powershell dircommand to map shared drives to a specified path and retrieve items from another, and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest.The actors used dir.exe to display a list of a directory’s files and subdirectories matching a certain text string.
Data Staged: Remote Data StagingT1074.002The actors split collected files into approximately
3 MB chunks located on the Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory.
Command and Control
Technique TitleIDUse
Non-Application Layer ProtocolT1095Actors used a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and Command and Control (C2) server or among infected hosts within a network.
Ingress Tool TransferT1105Actors used the certutil command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet.The actors employed CovalentStealer to exfiltrate the files.
ProxyT1090Actors are known to use VPN and VPS providers, namely M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to access a network remotely.
Exfiltration
Technique TitleIDUse
Schedule TransferT1029Actors scheduled data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals and blend traffic patterns with normal activity.
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageT1567.002The actor’s CovalentStealer tool stores collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder.

DETECTION

Given the actors’ demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise environments, CISA, FBI, and NSA encourage organizations to:

  • Monitor logs for connections from unusual VPSs and VPNs. Examine connection logs for access from unexpected ranges, particularly from machines hosted by SurfShark and M247.
  • Monitor for suspicious account use (e.g., inappropriate or unauthorized use of administrator accounts, service accounts, or third-party accounts). To detect use of compromised credentials in combination with a VPS, follow the steps below:
    • Review logs for “impossible logins,” such as logins with changing username, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP addresses do not align to the expected user’s geographic location.
    • Search for “impossible travel,” which occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses that are a significant geographic distance apart (i.e., a person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two IP addresses in the time between logins). Note: This detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply VPN solutions before connecting to networks.
    • Search for one IP used across multiple accounts, excluding expected logins.
      • Take note of any M247-associated IP addresses used along with VPN providers (e.g., SurfShark). Look for successful remote logins (e.g., VPN, OWA) for IPs coming from M247- or using SurfShark-registered IP addresses.
    • Identify suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or applying user account mitigations.
    • Search for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts.
    • Search for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity.
  • Review the YARA rules provided in MAR-10365227-1 to assist in determining whether malicious activity has been observed.
  • Monitor for the installation of unauthorized software, including Remote Server Administration Tools (e.g., psexec, RdClient, VNC, and ScreenConnect).
  • Monitor for anomalous and known malicious command-line use. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for commands used by the actors to interact with the victim’s environment.
  • Monitor for unauthorized changes to user accounts (e.g., creation, permission changes, and enabling a previously disabled account).

CONTAINMENT AND REMEDIATION

Organizations affected by active or recently active threat actors in their environment can take the following initial steps to aid in eviction efforts and prevent re-entry:

  • Report the incident. Report the incident to U.S. Government authorities and follow your organization’s incident response plan.
  • Reset all login accounts. Reset all accounts used for authentication since it is possible that the threat actors have additional stolen credentials. Password resets should also include accounts outside of Microsoft Active Directory, such as network infrastructure devices and other non-domain joined devices (e.g., IoT devices).
  • Monitor SIEM logs and build detections. Create signatures based on the threat actor TTPs and use these signatures to monitor security logs for any signs of threat actor re-entry.
  • Enforce MFA on all user accounts. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all accounts without exception to the greatest extent possible.
  • Follow Microsoft’s security guidance for Active DirectoryBest Practices for Securing Active Directory.
  • Audit accounts and permissions. Audit all accounts to ensure all unused accounts are disabled or removed and active accounts do not have excessive privileges. Monitor SIEM logs for any changes to accounts, such as permission changes or enabling a previously disabled account, as this might indicate a threat actor using these accounts.
  • Harden and monitor PowerShell by reviewing guidance in the joint Cybersecurity Information Sheet—Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace.

Mitigations

Mitigation recommendations are usually longer-term efforts that take place before a compromise as part of risk management efforts, or after the threat actors have been evicted from the environment and the immediate response actions are complete. While some may be tailored to the TTPs used by the threat actor, recovery recommendations are largely general best practices and industry standards aimed at bolstering overall cybersecurity posture.

Segment Networks Based on Function

  • Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Proper network segmentation significantly reduces the ability for ransomware and other threat actor lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks. (See CISA’s Infographic on Layering Network Security Through Segmentation and NSA’s Segment Networks and Deploy Application-Aware Defenses.)
  • Isolate similar systems and implement micro-segmentation with granular access and policy restrictions to modernize cybersecurity and adopt Zero Trust (ZT) principles for both network perimeter and internal devices. Logical and physical segmentation are critical to limiting and preventing lateral movement, privilege escalation, and exfiltration.

Manage Vulnerabilities and Configurations

  • Update softwareincluding operating systemsapplicationsand firmwareon network assets. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities and critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment.
  • Implement a configuration change control process that securely creates device configuration backups to detect unauthorized modifications. When a configuration change is needed, document the change, and include the authorization, purpose, and mission justification. Periodically verify that modifications have not been applied by comparing current device configurations with the most recent backups. If suspicious changes are observed, verify the change was authorized.

Search for Anomalous Behavior

  • Use cybersecurity visibility and analytics tools to improve detection of anomalous behavior and enable dynamic changes to policy and other response actions. Visibility tools include network monitoring tools and host-based logs and monitoring tools, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool. EDR tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
  • Monitor the use of scripting languages (e.g., Python, Powershell) by authorized and unauthorized users. Anomalous use by either group may be indicative of malicious activity, intentional or otherwise.

Restrict and Secure Use of Remote Admin Tools

  • Limit the number of remote access tools as well as who and what can be accessed using them. Reducing the number of remote admin tools and their allowed access will increase visibility of unauthorized use of these tools.
  • Use encrypted services to protect network communications and disable all clear text administration services(e.g., Telnet, HTTP, FTP, SNMP 1/2c). This ensures that sensitive information cannot be easily obtained by a threat actor capturing network traffic.

Implement a Mandatory Access Control Model

  • Implement stringent access controls to sensitive data and resources. Access should be restricted to those users who require access and to the minimal level of access needed.

Audit Account Usage

  • Monitor VPN logins to look for suspicious access (e.g., logins from unusual geo locations, remote logins from accounts not normally used for remote access, concurrent logins for the same account from different locations, unusual times of the day).
  • Closely monitor the use of administrative accounts. Admin accounts should be used sparingly and only when necessary, such as installing new software or patches. Any use of admin accounts should be reviewed to determine if the activity is legitimate.
  • Ensure standard user accounts do not have elevated privileges Any attempt to increase permissions on standard user accounts should be investigated as a potential compromise.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze the performance of your detection and prevention technologies.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

RESOURCES

CISA offers several no-cost scanning and testing services to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. See cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services.

U.S. DIB sector organizations may consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration for eligible organizations. For more information on how to enroll in these services, email dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CISA, FBI, and NSA acknowledge Mandiant for its contributions to this CSA.

APPENDIX: WINDOWS COMMAND SHELL ACTIVITY

Over a three-day period in February 2021, APT cyber actors used Windows Command Shell to interact with the victim’s environment. When interacting with the victim’s system and executing commands, the threat actors used /q and /c parameters to turn the echo off, carry out the command specified by a string, and stop its execution once completed.

On the first day, the threat actors consecutively executed many commands within the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data for eventual exfiltration (see Table 2).

CommandDescription / Use
net shareUsed to create, configure, and delete network shares from the command-line.[1] The threat actor likely used this command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit.
powershell dirAn alias (shorthand) for the PowerShell Get-ChildItem cmdlet. This command maps shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another.[2] The threat actor added additional switches (aka options, parameters, or flags) to form a “one liner,” an expression to describe commonly used commands used in exploitation: powershell dir -recurse -path e:\<redacted>|select fullname,length|export-csv c:\windows\temp\temp.txt. This particular command lists subdirectories of the target environment when.
systeminfoDisplays detailed configuration information [3], tasklist – lists currently running processes [4], and ipconfig – displays all current Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP network configuration values and refreshes Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Domain Name System (DNS) settings, respectively [5]. The threat actor used these commands with specific switches to determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine: systeminfo > vmware & date /T, tasklist /v > vmware & date /T, and ipconfig /all >> vmware & date /.
route printUsed to display and modify the entries in the local IP routing table. [6] The threat actor used this command to display the entries in the local IP routing table.
netstatUsed to display active TCP connections, ports on which the computer is listening, Ethernet statistics, the IP routing table, IPv4 statistics, and IPv6 statistics.[7] The threat actor used this command with three switches to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP: netstat -anp tcp.
certutilUsed to dump and display certification authority (CA) configuration information, configure Certificate Services, backup and restore CA components, and verify certificates, key pairs, and certificate chains.[8] The threat actor used this command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet: certutil -urlcache -split -f https://microsoft.com temp.html.
pingSends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echoes to verify connectivity to another TCP/IP computer.[9] The threat actor used ping -n 2 apple.com to either test their internet connection or to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments or network restrictions.
taskkillUsed to end tasks or processes.[10] The threat actor used taskkill /F /PID 8952 to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine what this process was as the process identifier (PID) numbers are dynamic.
PowerShell Compress-Archive cmdletUsed to create a compressed archive or to zip files from specified files and directories.[11] The threat actor used parameters indicating shared drives as file and folder sources and the destination archive as zipped files. Specifically, they collected sensitive contract-related information from the shared drives.

On the second day, the APT cyber actors executed the commands in Table 3 to perform discovery as well as collect and archive data.

CommandDescription / Use
ntfsinfo.exeUsed to obtain volume information from the New Technology File System (NTFS) and to print it along with a directory dump of NTFS meta-data files.[12]
WinRAR.exeUsed to compress files and subsequently masqueraded WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe.[13]

On the third day, the APT cyber actors returned to the organization’s network and executed the commands in Table 4.

CommandDescription / Use
powershell -ep bypass import-module .\vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume eThreat actors ran a PowerShell command with parameters to change the execution mode and bypass the Execution Policy to run the script from PowerShell and add a module to the current section: powershell -ep bypass import-module .\vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume e. This module appears to acquire and export the Master File Table (MFT) for volume E for further analysis by the cyber actor.[14]
set.exeUsed to display the current environment variable settings.[15] (An environment variable is a dynamic value pointing to system or user environments (folders) of the system. System environment variables are defined by the system and used globally by all users, while user environment variables are only used by the user who declared that variable and they override the system environment variables (even if the variables are named the same).
dir.exeUsed to display a list of a directory’s files and subdirectories matching the eagx* text string, likely to confirm the existence of such file.
tasklist.exe and find.exeUsed to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers”.[16][17][18]
ping.exeUsed to send two ICMP echos to amazon.com. This could have been to detect or avoid virtualization and analysis environments, circumvent network restrictions, or test their internet connection.[19]
del.exe with the /f parameterUsed to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.[20]

References

[1] Microsoft Net Share

[2] Microsoft Get-ChildItem

[3] Microsoft systeminfo

[4] Microsoft tasklist

[5] Microsoft ipconfig

[6] Microsoft Route

[7] Microsoft netstat

[8] Microsoft certutil

[9] Microsoft ping

[10] Microsoft taskkill

[11] Microsoft Compress-Archive

[12] NTFSInfo v1.2

[13] rarlab

[14] Microsoft Import-Module

[15] Microsoft set (environment variable)

[16] Microsoft tasklist

[17] Mitre ATT&CK – Sofware: TaskList

[18] Microsoft find

[19] Microsoft ping

[20] Microsoft del

Revisions

October 4, 2022: Initial version

Source :
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-277a