Google now blocks Workspace account hijacking attempts automatically

Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) now has stronger protections for risky account actions, automatically blocking hijacking attempts with identity verification prompts and logging them for further investigation.

This added layer of security will block threat actors who gain access to a user’s account to protect personal data and sensitive information belonging to their organization.

The enhanced account protection capabilities are available to all Google Workspace customers, including legacy G Suite Basic and Business customers.

“Google will evaluate the session attempting the action, and if it’s deemed risky, it will be challenged with a ‘Verify it’s You’ prompt,” Google said.

“Through a second and trusted factor, such as a 2-step verification code, users can confirm the validity of the action.”

For instance, this new feature would block sensitive actions such as attempts to change the account’s name until “the true account owner can verify that this was intentional.”

Admins can disable it for users stuck behind login prompts

Google added that admins could also temporarily disable login challenges triggered on sensitive account actions for users who can’t get past the verification prompts.

“In the Admin console under Users > ‘UserName’> Security, admins can toggle login challenges OFF for ten minutes if a user gets stuck behind a ‘verify it’s you prompt’,” the company explained.

“We strongly recommend only using this option if contact with the user is credibly established, such as via a video call.”

It’s also important to mention that this feature only supports users using Google as their identity provider, blocking actions taken within Google products, with SAML users not being supported now.

This update builds on a previous Google Workspace security improvement announced in June, with new alerts added to inform of critical and sensitive changes to admin accounts.

Google has further secured Workspace users from attacks by rolling out new Google Drive warning banners in January to warn them of potentially suspicious files used for malware delivery and phishing attacks.

One year ago, in June 2021, the company also added new Google Drive phishing and malware protections for enterprises that automatically mark all suspicious files, making them only visible to admins and owners.

Source :
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-now-blocks-workspace-account-hijacking-attempts-automatically/

Cisco Talos shares insights related to recent cyber attack on Cisco

UPDATE HISTORY

DATEDESCRIPTION OF UPDATES
Aug. 10th 2022Adding clarifying details on activity involving active directory.
Aug. 10th 2022Update made to the Cisco Response and Recommendations section related to MFA.

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • On May 24, 2022, Cisco became aware of a potential compromise. Since that point, Cisco Security Incident Response (CSIRT) and Cisco Talos have been working to remediate. 
  • During the investigation, it was determined that a Cisco employee’s credentials were compromised after an attacker gained control of a personal Google account where credentials saved in the victim’s browser were being synchronized. 
  • The attacker conducted a series of sophisticated voice phishing attacks under the guise of various trusted organizations attempting to convince the victim to accept multi-factor authentication (MFA) push notifications initiated by the attacker. The attacker ultimately succeeded in achieving an MFA push acceptance, granting them access to VPN in the context of the targeted user. 
  • CSIRT and Talos are responding to the event and we have not identified any evidence suggesting that the attacker gained access to critical internal systems, such as those related to product development, code signing, etc. 
  • After obtaining initial access, the threat actor conducted a variety of activities to maintain access, minimize forensic artifacts, and increase their level of access to systems within the environment. 
  • The threat actor was successfully removed from the environment and displayed persistence, repeatedly attempting to regain access in the weeks following the attack; however, these attempts were unsuccessful. 
  • We assess with moderate to high confidence that this attack was conducted by an adversary that has been previously identified as an initial access broker (IAB) with ties to the UNC2447 cybercrime gang, Lapsus$ threat actor group, and Yanluowang ransomware operators. 
  • For further information see the Cisco Response page here.

INITIAL VECTOR

Initial access to the Cisco VPN was achieved via the successful compromise of a Cisco employee’s personal Google account. The user had enabled password syncing via Google Chrome and had stored their Cisco credentials in their browser, enabling that information to synchronize to their Google account. After obtaining the user’s credentials, the attacker attempted to bypass multifactor authentication (MFA) using a variety of techniques, including voice phishing (aka “vishing”) and MFA fatigue, the process of sending a high volume of push requests to the target’s mobile device until the user accepts, either accidentally or simply to attempt to silence the repeated push notifications they are receiving. Vishing is an increasingly common social engineering technique whereby attackers try to trick employees into divulging sensitive information over the phone. In this instance, an employee reported that they received multiple calls over several days in which the callers – who spoke in English with various international accents and dialects – purported to be associated with support organizations trusted by the user.  

Once the attacker had obtained initial access, they enrolled a series of new devices for MFA and authenticated successfully to the Cisco VPN. The attacker then escalated to administrative privileges, allowing them to login to multiple systems, which alerted our Cisco Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), who subsequently responded to the incident. The actor in question dropped a variety of tools, including remote access tools like LogMeIn and TeamViewer, offensive security tools such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit, Mimikatz, and Impacket, and added their own backdoor accounts and persistence mechanisms. 

POST-COMPROMISE TTPS

Following initial access to the environment, the threat actor conducted a variety of activities for the purposes of maintaining access, minimizing forensic artifacts, and increasing their level of access to systems within the environment. 

Once on a system, the threat actor began to enumerate the environment, using common built-in Windows utilities to identify the user and group membership configuration of the system, hostname, and identify the context of the user account under which they were operating. We periodically observed the attacker issuing commands containing typographical errors, indicating manual operator interaction was occurring within the environment. 

After establishing access to the VPN, the attacker then began to use the compromised user account to logon to a large number of systems before beginning to pivot further into the environment. They moved into the Citrix environment, compromising a series of Citrix servers and eventually obtained privileged access to domain controllers.  

After obtaining access to the domain controllers, the attacker began attempting to dump NTDS from them using “ntdsutil.exe” consistent with the following syntax:

powershell ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\users\public' q q 

They then worked to exfiltrate the dumped NTDS over SMB (TCP/445) from the domain controller to the VPN system under their control.

After obtaining access to credential databases, the attacker was observed leveraging machine accounts for privileged authentication and lateral movement across the environment. 

Consistent with activity we previously observed in other separate but similar attacks, the adversary created an administrative user called “z” on the system using the built-in Windows “net.exe” commands. This account was then added to the local Administrators group. We also observed instances where the threat actor changed the password of existing local user accounts to the same value shown below. Notably, we have observed the creation of the “z” account by this actor in previous engagements prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

C:\Windows\system32\net user z Lh199211* /add 
C:\Windows\system32\net localgroup administrators z /add

This account was then used in some cases to execute additional utilities, such as adfind or secretsdump, to attempt to enumerate the directory services environment and obtain additional credentials. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to extract registry information, including the SAM database on compromised windows hosts.  

reg save hklm\system system 
reg save hklm\sam sam 
reg save HKLM\security sec

On some systems, the attacker was observed employing MiniDump from Mimikatz to dump LSASS. 

tasklist | findstr lsass 
rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump [LSASS_PID] C:\windows\temp\lsass.dmp full

The attacker also took steps to remove evidence of activities performed on compromised systems by deleting the previously created local Administrator account. They also used the “wevtutil.exe” utility to identify and clear event logs generated on the system. 

wevtutil.exe el 
wevtutil.exe cl [LOGNAME]

In many cases, we observed the attacker removing the previously created local administrator account.  

net user z /delete

To move files between systems within the environment, the threat actor often leveraged Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Citrix. We observed them modifying the host-based firewall configurations to enable RDP access to systems. 

netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=remote desktop new enable=Yes

We also observed the installation of additional remote access tools, such as TeamViewer and LogMeIn. 

C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe /i C:\Users\[USERNAME]\Pictures\LogMeIn.msi

The attacker frequently leveraged Windows logon bypass techniques to maintain the ability to access systems in the environment with elevated privileges. They frequently relied upon PSEXESVC.exe to remotely add the following Registry key values:  

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\narrator.exe /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /f 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /f

This enabled the attacker to leverage the accessibility features present on the Windows logon screen to spawn a SYSTEM level command prompt, granting them complete control of the systems. In several cases, we observed the attacker adding these keys but not further interacting with the system, possibly as a persistence mechanism to be used later as their primary privileged access is revoked.  

Throughout the attack, we observed attempts to exfiltrate information from the environment. We confirmed that the only successful data exfiltration that occurred during the attack included the contents of a Box folder that was associated with a compromised employee’s account and employee authentication data from active directory. The Box data obtained by the adversary in this case was not sensitive.  

In the weeks following the eviction of the attacker from the environment, we observed continuous attempts to re-establish access. In most cases, the attacker was observed targeting weak password rotation hygiene following mandated employee password resets. They primarily targeted users who they believed would have made single character changes to their previous passwords, attempting to leverage these credentials to authenticate and regain access to the Cisco VPN. The attacker was initially leveraging traffic anonymization services like Tor; however, after experiencing limited success, they switched to attempting to establish new VPN sessions from residential IP space using accounts previously compromised during the initial stages of the attack. We also observed the registration of several additional domains referencing the organization while responding to the attack and took action on them before they could be used for malicious purposes. 

After being successfully removed from the environment, the adversary also repeatedly attempted to establish email communications with executive members of the organization but did not make any specific threats or extortion demands. In one email, they included a screenshot showing the directory listing of the Box data that was previously exfiltrated as described earlier. Below is a screenshot of one of the received emails. The adversary redacted the directory listing screenshot prior to sending the email.

BACKDOOR ANALYSIS

The actor dropped a series of payloads onto systems, which we continue to analyze. The first payload is a simple backdoor that takes commands from a command and control (C2) server and executes them on the end system via the Windows Command Processor. The commands are sent in JSON blobs and are standard for a backdoor. There is a “DELETE_SELF” command that removes the backdoor from the system completely. Another, more interesting, command, “WIPE”, instructs the backdoor to remove the last executed command from memory, likely with the intent of negatively impacting forensic analysis on any impacted hosts. 

Commands are retrieved by making HTTP GET requests to the C2 server using the following structure: 

/bot/cmd.php?botid=%.8x

The malware also communicates with the C2 server via HTTP GET requests that feature the following structure: 

/bot/gate.php?botid=%.8x

Following the initial request from the infected system, the C2 server responds with a SHA256 hash. We observed additional requests made every 10 seconds.  

The aforementioned HTTP requests are sent using the following user-agent string: 

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.51 Safari/537.36 Edg/99.0.1150.36 Trailer/95.3.1132.33

The malware also creates a file called “bdata.ini” in the malware’s current working directory that contains a value derived from the volume serial number present on the infected system. In instances where this backdoor was executed, the malware was observed running from the following directory location:  

C:\users\public\win\cmd.exe

The attacker was frequently observed staging tooling in directory locations under the Public user profile on systems from which they were operating.  

Based upon analysis of C2 infrastructure associated with this backdoor, we assess that the C2 server was set up specifically for this attack. 

ATTACK ATTRIBUTION

Based upon artifacts obtained, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) identified, infrastructure used, and a thorough analysis of the backdoor utilized in this attack, we assess with moderate to high confidence that this attack was conducted by an adversary that has been previously identified as an initial access broker (IAB) with ties to both UNC2447 and Lapsus$. IABs typically attempt to obtain privileged access to corporate network environments and then monetize that access by selling it to other threat actors who can then leverage it for a variety of purposes. We have also observed previous activity linking this threat actor to the Yanluowang ransomware gang, including the use of the Yanluowang data leak site for posting data stolen from compromised organizations. 

UNC2447 is a financially-motivated threat actor with a nexus to Russia that has been previously observed conducting ransomware attacks and leveraging a technique known as “double extortion,” in which data is exfiltrated prior to ransomware deployment in an attempt to coerce victims into paying ransom demands. Prior reporting indicates that UNC2447 has been observed operating  a variety of ransomware, including FIVEHANDS, HELLOKITTY, and more. 

Apart from UNC2447, some of the TTPs discovered during the course of our investigation match those of the Lapsus$. Lapsus$ is a threat actor group that is reported to have been responsible for several previous notable breaches of corporate environments. Several arrests of Lapsus$ members were reported earlier this year. Lapsus$ has been observed compromising corporate environments and attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information. 

While we did not observe ransomware deployment in this attack, the TTPs used were consistent with “pre-ransomware activity,” activity commonly observed leading up to the deployment of ransomware in victim environments. Many of the TTPs observed are consistent with activity observed by CTIR during previous engagements. Our analysis also suggests reuse of server-side infrastructure associated with these previous engagements as well. In previous engagements, we also did not observe deployment of ransomware in the victim environments. 

CISCO RESPONSE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cisco implemented a company-wide password reset immediately upon learning of the incident. CTIR previously observed similar TTPs in numerous investigations since 2021. Our findings and subsequent security protections resulting from those customer engagements helped us slow and contain the attacker’s progression. We created two ClamAV signatures, which are listed below.  

  • Win.Exploit.Kolobko-9950675-0  
  • Win.Backdoor.Kolobko-9950676-0 

Threat actors commonly use social engineering techniques to compromise targets, and despite the frequency of such attacks, organizations continue to face challenges mitigating those threats. User education is paramount in thwarting such attacks, including making sure employees know the legitimate ways that support personnel will contact users so that employees can identify fraudulent attempts to obtain sensitive information. 

Given the actor’s demonstrated proficiency in using a wide array of techniques to obtain initial access, user education is also a key part of countering MFA bypass techniques. Equally important to implementing MFA is ensuring that employees are educated on what to do and how to respond if they get errant push requests on their respective phones. It is also essential to educate employees about who to contact if such incidents do arise to help determine if the event was a technical issue or malicious. 

For Duo it is beneficial to implement strong device verification by enforcing stricter controls around device status to limit or block enrollment and access from unmanaged or unknown devices. Additionally, leveraging risk detection to highlight events like a brand-new device being used from unrealistic location or attack patterns like logins brute force can help detect unauthorized access.

Prior to allowing VPN connections from remote endpoints, ensure that posture checking is configured to enforce a baseline set of security controls. This ensures that the connecting devices match  the security requirements present in the environment. This can also prevent rogue devices that have not been previously approved from connecting to the corporate network environment. 

Network segmentation is another important security control that organizations should employ, as it provides enhanced protection for high-value assets and also enables more effective detection and response capabilities in situations where an adversary is able to gain initial access into the environment.  

Centralized log collection can help minimize the lack of visibility that results when an attacker take active steps to remove logs from systems. Ensuring that the log data generated by endpoints is centrally collected and analyzed for anomalous or overtly malicious behavior can provide early indication when an attack is underway.  

In many cases, threat actors have been observed targeting the backup infrastructure in an attempt to further remove an organization’s ability to recover following an attack. Ensuring that backups are offline and periodically tested can help mitigate this risk and ensure an organization’s ability to effectively recover following an attack. 

Auditing of command line execution on endpoints can also provide increased visibility into actions being performed on systems in the environment and can be used to detect suspicious execution of built-in Windows utilities, which is commonly observed during intrusions where threat actors rely on benign applications or utilities already present in the environment for enumeration, privilege escalation, and lateral movement activities.  

MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING

All of the previously described TTPs that were observed in this attack are listed below based on the phase of the attack in which they occurred. 

Initial Access 

ATT&CK Technique : Phishing (T1566)

ATT&CK Technique : Valid Accounts (T1078)

Execution 

ATT&CK Technique : System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002)

Persistence 

ATT&CK Technique : Create Account: Local Account (T1136.001)

ATT&CK Technique : Account Manipulation: Device Registration (T1098.005)

Privilege Escalation 

ATT&CK Technique : Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection (T1546.012)

Defense Evasion 

ATT&CK Technique : Indicator Removal on Host (T1070)

ATT&CK Technique : Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001)

ATT&CK Technique : Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

ATT&CK Technique : Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall (T1562.004)

ATT&CK Technique : Modify Registry (T1112)

Credential Access 

ATT&CK Technique : OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001)

ATT&CK Technique : OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager (T1003.002)

ATT&CK Technique : OS Credential Dumping: NTDS (T1003.003)

ATT&CK Technique : Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation (T1621)

Lateral Movement 

ATT&CK Technique : Remote Services (T1021)

Discovery 

ATT&CK Technique : Query Registry (T1012)

Command and Control 

ATT&CK Technique : Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

ATT&CK Technique : Remote Access Software (T1219)

ATT&CK Technique: Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

ATT&CK Technique : Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy (T1090.003)

Exfiltration 

ATT&CK Technique : Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

The following indicators of compromise were observed associated with this attack. 

Hashes (SHA256) 

184a2570d71eedc3c77b63fd9d2a066cd025d20ceef0f75d428c6f7e5c6965f3 

2fc5bf9edcfa19d48e235315e8f571638c99a1220be867e24f3965328fe94a03 

542c9da985633d027317e9a226ee70b4f0742dcbc59dfd2d4e59977bb870058d 

61176a5756c7b953bc31e5a53580d640629980a344aa5ff147a20fb7d770b610 

753952aed395ea845c52e3037f19738cfc9a415070515de277e1a1baeff20647 

8df89eef51cdf43b2a992ade6ad998b267ebb5e61305aeb765e4232e66eaf79a 

8e5733484982d0833abbd9c73a05a667ec2d9d005bbf517b1c8cd4b1daf57190 

99be6e7e31f0a1d7eebd1e45ac3b9398384c1f0fa594565137abb14dc28c8a7f 

bb62138d173de997b36e9b07c20b2ca13ea15e9e6cd75ea0e8162e0d3ded83b7 

eb3452c64970f805f1448b78cd3c05d851d758421896edd5dfbe68e08e783d18 

IP Addresses 

104.131.30[.]201 

108.191.224[.]47 

131.150.216[.]118 

134.209.88[.]140 

138.68.227[.]71 

139.177.192[.]145 

139.60.160[.]20 

139.60.161[.]99 

143.198.110[.]248 

143.198.131[.]210 

159.65.246[.]188 

161.35.137[.]163 

162.33.177[.]27 

162.33.178[.]244 

162.33.179[.]17 

165.227.219[.]211 

165.227.23[.]218 

165.232.154[.]73 

166.205.190[.]23 

167.99.160[.]91 

172.56.42[.]39 

172.58.220[.]52 

172.58.239[.]34 

174.205.239[.]164 

176.59.109[.]115 

178.128.171[.]206 

185.220.100[.]244 

185.220.101[.]10 

185.220.101[.]13 

185.220.101[.]15 

185.220.101[.]16 

185.220.101[.]2 

185.220.101[.]20 

185.220.101[.]34 

185.220.101[.]45 

185.220.101[.]6 

185.220.101[.]65 

185.220.101[.]73 

185.220.101[.]79 

185.220.102[.]242 

185.220.102[.]250 

192.241.133[.]130 

194.165.16[.]98 

195.149.87[.]136 

24.6.144[.]43 

45.145.67[.]170 

45.227.255[.]215 

45.32.141[.]138 

45.32.228[.]189 

45.32.228[.]190 

45.55.36[.]143 

45.61.136[.]207 

45.61.136[.]5 

45.61.136[.]83 

46.161.27[.]117 

5.165.200[.]7 

52.154.0[.]241 

64.227.0[.]177 

64.4.238[.]56 

65.188.102[.]43 

66.42.97[.]210 

67.171.114[.]251 

68.183.200[.]63 

68.46.232[.]60 

73.153.192[.]98 

74.119.194[.]203 

74.119.194[.]4 

76.22.236[.]142 

82.116.32[.]77 

87.251.67[.]41 

94.142.241[.]194 

Domains 

cisco-help[.]cf 

cisco-helpdesk[.]cf 

ciscovpn1[.]com 

ciscovpn2[.]com 

ciscovpn3[.]com 

devcisco[.]com 

devciscoprograms[.]com 

helpzonecisco[.]com 

kazaboldu[.]net 

mycisco[.]cf 

mycisco[.]gq 

mycisco-helpdesk[.]ml 

primecisco[.]com 

pwresetcisco[.]com 

Email Addresses 

costacancordia[@]protonmail[.]com 

POSTED BY NICK BIASINI AT 3:30 PM

Source :
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html

Open Port Vulnerabilities List

Insufficiently protected open ports can put your IT environment at serious risk. Threat actors often seek to exploit open ports and their applications through spoofing, credential sniffing and other techniques. For example, in 2017, cybercriminals spread WannaCry ransomware by exploiting an SMB vulnerability on port 445. Other examples include the ongoing campaigns targeting Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) service running on port 3389.

Handpicked related content:

Read on to learn more about the security risks linked to ports, vulnerable ports that need your attention and ways to enhance the security of open ports.

A Refresher on Ports

Ports are logical constructs that identify a specific type of network service. Each port is linked to a specific protocol, program or service, and has a port number for identification purposes. For instance, secured Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) messages always go to port 443 on the server side, while port 1194 is exclusively for OpenVPN.

The most common transport protocols that have port numbers are Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). TCP is a connection-oriented protocol with built-in re-transmission and error recovery. UDP is a connectionless protocol that doesn’t recover or correct errors in messages; it’s faster  and has less network overhead traffic than TCP. Both TCP and UDP sit at the transport layer of the TCP/IP stack and use the IP protocol to address and route data on the internet. Software and services are designed to use TCP or UDP, depending on their requirements.

TCP and UDP ports are in one of these three states:

  • Open — The port responds to connection requests.
  • Closed — The port is unreachable, indicating that there is no corresponding service running.
  • Filtered — The firewall is monitoring traffic and blocking certain connection requests to the port.

Security Risks Linked to Ports

Numerous incidents have demonstrated that open ports are most vulnerable to attack when the services listening to them are unpatched or insufficiently protected or misconfigured, which can lead to compromised systems and networks. In these cases, threat actors can use open ports to perform various cyberattacks that exploit the lack of authentication mechanisms in the TCP and UDP protocols. One common example is spoofing, where a malicious actor impersonates a system or a service and sends malicious packets, often in combination with IP spoofing and man-in-the-middle-attacks. The campaign against RDP Pipe Plumbing is one of the latest to employ such a tactic. In addition, ports that have been opened on purpose (for instance, on a web server) can be attacked via that port using application-layer attacks such as SQL injection, cross-site request forgery and directory traversal.

Another common technique is the denial of service (DoS) attack, most frequently used in the form of distributed denial of service (DDoS), where attackers send massive numbers of connection requests from various machine to the service on the target in order to deplete its resources.

Vulnerable Ports that Need Your Attention

Any port can be targeted by threat actors, but some are more likely to fall prey to cyberattacks because they commonly have serious shortcomings, such as application vulnerabilities, lack of two-factor authentication and weak credentials.

Here are the most vulnerable ports regularly used in attacks:

Ports 20 and 21 (FTP)

Port 20 and (mainly) port 21 are File Transfer Protocol (FTP) ports that let users send and receive files from servers.

FTP is known for being outdated and insecure. As such, attackers frequently exploit it through:

  • Brute-forcing passwords
  • Anonymous authentication (it’s possible to log into the FTP port with “anonymous” as the username and password)
  • Cross-site scripting
  • Directory traversal attacks

Port 22 (SSH)

Port 22 is for Secure Shell (SSH). It’s a TCP port for ensuring secure access to servers. Hackers can exploit port 22 by using leaked SSH keys or brute-forcing credentials.

Port 23 (Telnet)

Port 23 is a TCP protocol that connects users to remote computers. For the most part, Telnet has been superseded by SSH, but it’s still used by some websites. Since it’s outdated and insecure, it’s vulnerable to many attacks, including credential brute-forcing, spoofing and credential sniffing.

Port 25 (SMTP)

Port 25 is a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) port for receiving and sending emails. Without proper configuration and protection, this TCP port is vulnerable to spoofing and spamming.

Port 53 (DNS)

Port 53 is for Domain Name System (DNS). It’s a UDP and TCP port for queries and transfers, respectively. This port is particularly vulnerable to DDoS attacks.

Ports 137 and 139 (NetBIOS over TCP) and 445 (SMB)

Server Message Block (SMB) uses port 445 directly and ports 137 and 139 indirectly. Cybercriminals can exploit these ports through:

  • Using the EternalBlue exploit, which takes advantage of SMBv1 vulnerabilities in older versions of Microsoft computers (hackers used EternalBlue on the SMB port to spread WannaCry ransomware in 2017)
  • Capturing NTLM hashes
  • Brute-forcing SMB login credentials

Ports 80, 443, 8080 and 8443 (HTTP and HTTPS)

HTTP and HTTPS are the hottest protocols on the internet, so they’re often targeted by attackers. They’re especially vulnerable to cross-site scripting, SQL injections, cross-site request forgeries and DDoS attacks.

Ports 1433,1434 and 3306 (Used by Databases)

These are the default ports for SQL Server and MySQL. They are used to distribute malware or are directly attacked in DDoS scenarios. Quite often, attackers probe these ports to find unprotected database with exploitable default configurations.

Port 3389 (Remote Desktop)

This port is used in conjunction with various vulnerabilities in remote desktop protocols and to probe for leaked or weak user authentication. Remote desktop vulnerabilities are currently the most-used attack type; one example is the BlueKeep vulnerability.

Tips for Strengthening the Security of Open Ports

Luckily, there are ways to enhance the security of open ports. We highly recommend the following six strategies:

1. Patch firewalls regularly.

Your firewall is the gatekeeper to all the other systems and services in your network. Patching keeps your firewalls up to date and repairs vulnerabilities and flaws in your firewall system that cybercriminals could use to gain full access to your systems and data.

2. Check ports regularly.

You should also regularly scan and check your ports. There are three  main ways to do this:

  • Command-line tools — If you have the time to scan and check ports manually, use command-line tools to spot and scan open ports. Examples include Netstat and Network Mapper, both of which can be installed on a wide range of operating systems, including Windows and Linux.
  • Port scanners — If you want faster results, consider using a port scanner. It’s a computer program that checks if ports are open, closed or filtered. The process is simple: The scanner transmits a network request to connect to a specific port and captures the response.
  • Vulnerability scanning tools — Solutions of this type can also be used to discover ports that are open or configured with default passwords.
  1. Track service configuration changes.

Many services on your network connect to various ports, so it is important to monitor the running states of installed services and continuously track changes to service configuration settings. Services can be vulnerable when they are unpatched or misconfigured.

Using Netwrix Change Tracker, you can harden your systems by tracking unauthorized changes and other suspicious activities. In particular, it provides the following functionality:

  • Actionable alerting about configuration changes
  • Automatic recording, analyzing, validating and verifying of every change
  • Real-time change monitoring
  • Constant application vulnerability monitoring

4. Use IDP and IPS tools.

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) can help you prevent attackers from exploiting your ports. They monitor your network, spot possible cybersecurity incidents, log information about them and report the incidents to security administrators. IPS complements your firewalls by identifying suspicious incoming traffic and logging and blocking the attack.

5. Use SSH Keys.

Another option is to use SSH keys. These access credentials are more secure than passwords because decrypting SSH is very difficult, if not impossible. There are two types of SSH keys:

  • Private or identity keys, which identify users and give them access
  • Public or authorized keys, which determine who can access your system

You can use public-key cryptographic algorithms and key generation tools to create SSH keys.

6. Conduct penetration tests and vulnerability assessments.

Consider conducting penetration tests and vulnerability assessments to protect your ports. Although both of these techniques are used to spot vulnerabilities in IT infrastructure, they are quite different. Vulnerability scans only identify and report vulnerabilities, while penetration tests exploit security gaps to determine how attackers can gain unauthorized access to your system.

FAQs

What is an open port vulnerability?

An open port vulnerability is a security gap caused by an open port. Without proper configuration and protection, attackers can use open ports to access your systems and data.

Which ports are most vulnerable?

Certain ports and their applications are more likely to be targeted because they often have weaker credentials and defenses. Common vulnerable ports include:

  • FTP (20, 21)
  • SSH (22)
  • Telnet (23)
  • SMTP (25)
  • DNS (53)
  • NetBIOS over TCP (137, 139)
  • SMB (445)
  • HTTP and HTTPS (80, 443, 8080, 8443)
  • Ports 1433, 1434 and 3306
  • Remote desktop (3389)

Is port 80 a security risk?

Port 80 isn’t inherently a security risk. However, if you leave it open and don’t have the proper configurations in place, attackers can easily use it to access your systems and data. Unlike port 443 (HTTPS), port 80 is unencrypted, making it easy for cybercriminals to access, leak and tamper with sensitive data.

Source :
https://blog.netwrix.com/2022/08/04/open-port-vulnerabilities-list/

LockBit Ransomware Abuses Windows Defender to Deploy Cobalt Strike Payload

A threat actor associated with the LockBit 3.0 ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation has been observed abusing the Windows Defender command-line tool to decrypt and load Cobalt Strike payloads.

According to a report published by SentinelOne last week, the incident occurred after obtaining initial access via the Log4Shell vulnerability against an unpatched VMware Horizon Server.

“Once initial access had been achieved, the threat actors performed a series of enumeration commands and attempted to run multiple post-exploitation tools, including Meterpreter, PowerShell Empire, and a new way to side-load Cobalt Strike,” researchers Julio Dantas, James Haughom, and Julien Reisdorffer said.

CyberSecurity

LockBit 3.0 (aka LockBit Black), which comes with the tagline “Make Ransomware Great Again!,” is the next iteration of the prolific LockBit RaaS family that emerged in June 2022 to iron out critical weaknesses discovered in its predecessor.

It’s notable for instituting what’s the first-ever bug bounty for a RaaS program. Besides featuring a revamped leak site to name-and-shame non-compliant targets and publish extracted data, it also includes a new search tool to make it easier to find specific victim data.

LockBit Ransomware

The use of living-off-the-land (LotLtechniques by cyber intruders, wherein legitimate software and functions available in the system are used for post-exploitation, is not new and is usually seen as an attempt to evade detection by security software.

Earlier this April, a LockBit affiliate was found to have leveraged a VMware command-line utility called VMwareXferlogs.exe to drop Cobalt Strike. What’s different this time around is the use of MpCmdRun.exe to achieve the same goal.

MpCmdRun.exe is a command-line tool for carrying out various functions in Microsoft Defender Antivirus, including scanning for malicious software, collecting diagnostic data, and restoring the service to a previous version, among others.

CyberSecurity

In the incident analyzed by SentinelOne, the initial access was followed by downloading a Cobalt Strike payload from a remote server, which was subsequently decrypted and loaded using the Windows Defender utility.

“Tools that should receive careful scrutiny are any that either the organization or the organization’s security software have made exceptions for,” the researchers said.

“Products like VMware and Windows Defender have a high prevalence in the enterprise and a high utility to threat actors if they are allowed to operate outside of the installed security controls.”

The findings come as initial access brokers (IABs) are actively selling access to company networks, including managed service providers (MSPs), to fellow threat actors for profit, in turn offering a way to compromise downstream customers.

In May 2022, cybersecurity authorities from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S. warned of attacks weaponizing vulnerable managed service providers (MSPs) as an “initial access vector to multiple victim networks, with globally cascading effects.”

“MSPs remain an attractive supply chain target for attackers, particularly IABs,” Huntress researcher Harlan Carvey said, urging companies to secure their networks and implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/08/lockbit-ransomware-abuses-windows.html

What is ransomware and how can you defend your business from it?

Ransomware is a kind of malware used by cybercriminals to stop users from accessing their systems or files; the cybercriminals then threaten to leak, destroy or withhold sensitive information unless a ransom is paid.

Ransomware attacks can target either the data held on computer systems (known as locker ransomware) or devices (crypto-ransomware). In both instances, once a ransom is paid, threat actors typically provide victims with a decryption key or tool to unlock their data or device, though this is not guaranteed.

Oliver Pinson-Roxburgh, CEO of Defense.com, the all-in-one cybersecurity platform, shares knowledge and advice in this article on how ransomware works, how damaging it can be, and how your business can mitigate ransomware attacks from occurring.

What does a ransomware attack comprise?

There are three key elements to a ransomware attack:

Access

In order to deploy malware to encrypt files and gain control, cybercriminals need to initially gain access to an organization’s systems.

Trigger

The attackers have control of the data as soon as the malicious software is activated. The data is encrypted and no longer accessible by the targeted organization.

Demand

The victims will receive an alert that their data is encrypted and cannot be accessed until a ransom is paid.

Big business for cybercriminals

The motives of cybercriminals deploying malware may vary but the end goal is typically that of financial gain.

What is the cost of being targeted by ransomware?

The average pay-out from ransomware attacks has risen from $312,000/£260,000 in 2020 to $570,000/£476,000 in 2021 – an increase of 83%. One report also showed that 66% of organisations surveyed were victims of ransomware attacks in 2021, nearly double that of 2020 (37%). This highlights the need for businesses to understand the risks and implement stronger defenses to combat the threats.

Ransomware continues to rank amongst the most common cyberattacks in 2022, due to its lucrative nature and fairly low level of effort required from the perpetrators. This debilitating attack causes an average downtime of 3 weeks and can have major repercussions for an organization, for its finances, operations and reputation.

Because there is no guarantee that cybercriminals will release data after a ransom is paid, it is crucial to protect your data and keep offline backups of your files. It’s also very important to proactively monitor and protect entry points that a hacker may exploit, to reduce the possibility of being targeted in the first place.

Who is at risk of being a target of ransomware?

In the past, cybercriminals have typically targeted high-profile organizations, large corporations and government agencies with ransomware. This is known as ‘big game hunting’ and works on the premise that these companies are far more likely to pay higher ransoms and avoid unwanted scrutiny from the media and public. Certain organizations, such as hospitals, are higher-value targets because they are far more likely to pay a ransom and to do so quickly because they need access to important data urgently.

However, ransomware groups are now shifting their focus to smaller businesses, in response to increased pressure from law enforcement who are cracking down on well-known ransomware groups such as REvil and Conti. Smaller companies are seen as easy targets that may lack effective cybersecurity defenses to prevent a ransomware attack, making it easier to penetrate and exploit them.

Ultimately, threat actors are opportunists and will consider most organizations as targets, regardless of their size. If a cybercriminal notices a vulnerability, the company is fair game.

How is ransomware deployed?

Phishing attacks

The most common delivery method of ransomware is via phishing attacks. Phishing is a form of social engineering and is an effective method of attack as it relies on deceit and creating a sense of urgency. Threat actors trick employees into opening suspicious attachments in emails and this is often achieved by imitating either senior-level employees or other trusted figures of authority.

Malvertising

Malicious advertising is another tactic used by cybercriminals to deploy ransomware, where ad space is purchased and infected with malware that is then displayed on trusted and legitimate websites. Once the ad is clicked, or even in some cases when a user accesses a website that’s hosting malware, that device is infected by malware that scans the device for vulnerabilities to exploit.

Exploiting vulnerable systems

Ransomware can also be deployed by exploiting unpatched and outdated systems, as was the case in 2017, when a security vulnerability in Microsoft Windows, EternalBlue (MS17-010), led to the global WannaCry ransomware attack that spread to over 150 countries.

It was the biggest cyberattack to hit the NHS: it cost £92m in damages plus the added costs of IT support restoring data and systems affected by the attack, and it directly impacted patient care through cancelled appointments.

Four key methods to defend your business against ransomware

It is crucial that businesses are aware of how a ransomware attack may affect their organization, and how they can prevent cybercriminals from breaching their systems and holding sensitive data to ransom. Up to 61% of organizations with security teams consisting of 11–25 employees are said to be most concerned about ransomware attacks.

The NHS could have avoided being impacted by the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017 by heeding warnings and migrating away from outdated software, ensuring strategies were in place to strengthen their security posture.

It’s essential that your business takes a proactive approach to cybersecurity by implementing the correct tools to help monitor, detect, and mitigate suspicious activity across your network and infrastructure. This will reduce the number and impact of data breaches and cyberattacks.

Defense.com recommend these four fundamental tactics to help prevent ransomware attacks and stay one step ahead of the hackers:1 — Training

Cybersecurity awareness training is pivotal for businesses of all sizes as it helps employees to spot potentially malicious emails or activity.

Social engineering tactics, such as phishing and tailgating, are common and successful due to human error and employees not spotting the risks. It’s vital for employees to be vigilant around emails that contain suspicious links or contain unusual requests to share personal data, often sent by someone pretending to be a senior-level employee.

Security training also encourages employees to query visitors to your offices to prevent ransomware attacks via physical intrusion.

Implementing cybersecurity awareness training will help your business routinely educate and assess your employees on fundamental security practices, ultimately creating a security culture to reduce the risk of data breaches and security incidents.2 — Phishing simulators

These simulator tools support your security awareness training by delivering fake but realistic phishing emails to employees. Understanding how prone your staff are to falling for a real cybercriminal’s tactics allows you to fill gaps in their training.

When you combine phishing simulators with security training, your organization can lessen the chance of falling victim to a ransomware attack. The combination of training and testing puts you in a better position to prevent the cunning attempts of cybercriminals to infiltrate your IT systems and plant malware.3 — Threat monitoring

You can make your business less of a target for cybercriminals by actively monitoring potential threats. Threat Intelligence is a threat monitoring tool that collates data from various sources, such as penetration tests and vulnerability scans, and uses this information to help you defend against potential malware and ransomware attacks. This overview of your threat landscape shows which areas are most at risk of a cyberattack or a data breach.

Being proactive ensures you stay one step ahead of hackers and by introducing threat monitoring tools to your organization, you ensure any suspicious behaviour is detected early for remediation.4 — Endpoint protection

Endpoint protection is key to understanding which of your assets are vulnerable, to help protect them and repel malware attacks like ransomware. More than just your typical antivirus software, endpoint protection offers advanced security features that protect your network, and the devices on it, against threats such as malware and phishing campaigns.

Anti-ransomware capabilities should be included in endpoint protection so it can effectively prevent attacks by monitoring suspicious behaviour such as file changes and file encryption. The ability to isolate or quarantine any affected devices can also be a very useful feature for stopping the spread of malware.

In summary

With ransomware groups continually looking for vulnerabilities to exploit, it’s important that businesses develop robust strategies to prevent ransomware threats: ensure your staff takes regular security awareness training, set up threat monitoring tools to detect and alert you of vulnerabilities, and implement endpoint protection to protect your devices across your network.

Following the above guidelines will increase your chances of safeguarding your business against ransomware attacks that could cost your organization a substantial amount of money and reputational damage.

Defense.com believes world-class cyber protection should be accessible to all companies, regardless of size. For more information, visit Defense.com.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/08/what-is-ransomware-how-to-defend-your.html

How to reset Windows Update components on Windows 10

Windows Update is an essential component of Windows 10, as it provides the ability to download and install the latest updates with bug fixes, security patches, and drivers. Also, it is the mechanism to download new feature updates and preview builds. However, there will be times when your device may not download or install updates because of a specific error message, Windows Update not connecting to the Microsoft servers and other problems.

Typically, users may encounter this type of problem when the Windows Update agent-related services stop working, Windows 10 has an issue with the update cache, or some components get corrupted. You can reset Windows Update on Windows 10 to fix most problems in these situations.

In this guide, you will learn the steps to reset the Windows Update components using the “Windows Update Troubleshooter” utility. Also, you will learn the instructions to use Command Prompt to fix Windows Update manually to get security patches, drivers, and features downloading again on your computer. However, before using the Command Prompt option, make sure to use the instructions to install the most recent update manually, Service Stack Update (SSU), and repair system files first. 

How to reset Windows Update using Troubleshooter tool

To reset Windows Update using the troubleshooter, use these steps:

  1. Download the Windows Update Troubleshooter from Microsoft.
  2. Double-click the WindowsUpdateDiagnostic.diagcab file to run the troubleshooter.
  3. Select the Windows Update option.
  4. Click the Next button.Windows Update TroubleshooterWindows Update Troubleshooter
  5. Click the Try troubleshooting as an administrator option (if applicable). Re-select the option and click the Next button again.
  6. Click the Close button.
  7. Open Windows Update Troubleshooter again.
  8. Select the Windows Networking Diagnostics option to resolve any networking issues preventing updates from downloading.
  9. Click the Next button.
  10. Click the Close button.
  11. Restart the computer.

Once the computer restarts, try to update Windows 10 one more time, and now it should work as expected.

How to fix Windows Update installing latest update manually

To install an update manually, which can help to fix problems with Windows Update on Windows 10, use these steps:

  1. Open the Windows 10 update history website.
  2. In the left pane, browse the latest update for your version of Windows 10 and note the update’s KB number.Quick tip: You can check your current version on Settings > System > About, and under the “Windows Specifications” section, confirm the version information.
  3. Open the Microsoft Update Catalog website.
  4. Search for the knowledge base (KB) number of the update.Download Windows Update manuallyDownload Windows Update manually
  5. Download the update for the version of Windows 10 that you have (32-bit (x86) or 64-bit (x64)).
  6. Double-click the file to install the update.
  7. Restart the computer.

Once you complete the steps, the device should have the latest update installed. The update should have also fixed the problem with Windows Update. You can check by clicking the Check for updates button on the Windows Update settings page.

How to fix Windows Update installing latest Servicing Stack Update (SSU)

To make sure the computer has the most recent Servicing Stack Update to fix Windows Update problems, use these steps:

  1. Open Settings.
  2. Click on System.
  3. Click on About.
  4. Under the “System type” section, check whether you have the 32-bit or 64-bit version of Windows 10.Windows 10 architecture settingsWindows 10 architecture settings
  5. Open the Microsoft Update Catalog website.
  6. Download the most recent Servicing Stack Update for the version you have (32-bit (x86) or 64-bit (x64)).
  7. Double-click the file to install the update.
  8. Restart your computer.

After you restart the computer, you should now be able to download and install the update using the Settings app.

How to fix Windows Update repairing corrupted system files

To repair system files using the Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) and System File Checker (SFC) tools to fix Windows Update problems, use these steps:

  1. Open Start.
  2. Search for Command Prompt, right-click the top result, and select the Run as administrator option.
  3. Type the following DISM command to repair corrupted system files and press Enter:dism.exe /Online /Cleanup-image /Restorehealth
  4. Type the following SFC command to repair system files and press Enter:sfc /scannowWindows Update dism and sfc repairWindows Update dism and sfc repair

After you complete the steps, the Windows Update components should start working again, and you can check for updates again to verify.

How to reset Windows Update using Command Prompt

To reset Windows Update manually using Command Prompt on Windows 10, use these steps:

  1. Open Start.
  2. Search for Command Prompt, right-click the top result, and select the Run as administrator option.
  3. Type the following commands to stop the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS), Windows Update service, and Cryptographic service, and press Enter on each line:net stop bits net stop wuauserv net stop appidsvc net stop cryptsvcStop Windows Update servicesStop Windows Update servicesQuick tip: You may need to run the command more than once until you see the message that the service has stopped successfully.
  4. Type the following command to delete all the qmgr*.dat files created by BITS from your PC. and press Enter:Del “%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\*.*”Reset Windows Update commandsReset Windows Update commands
  5. Type Y to confirm the deletion.
  6. Type the following commands to clear the Windows Update cache to allow Windows 10 to re-download the updates, instead of using the files already downloaded on the system that might be damaged and press Enter on each line:rmdir %systemroot%\SoftwareDistribution /S /Q rmdir %systemroot%\system32\catroot2 /S /QQuick tip: We use the remove directory rmdir command with the /S option to delete the specified directory and all subdirectories within the main folder, and the /Q option deletes directories quietly without confirmation. If you get the message “The process cannot access the file because it is being used by another process,” then repeat step No. 1 and try again, as one of the services might have restarted unexpectedly.
  7. Type the following commands to reset the BITS and Windows Update services to their default security descriptor, and press Enter on each line:sc.exe sdset bits D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;AU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;PU) sc.exe sdset wuauserv D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;AU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;PU)
  8. Type the following command to move to the System32 folder and press Enter:cd /d %windir%\system32
  9. Type the following commands to register all the corresponding BITS and Windows Update DLL files on the Registry and press Enter on each line:regsvr32.exe /s atl.dll regsvr32.exe /s urlmon.dll regsvr32.exe /s mshtml.dll regsvr32.exe /s shdocvw.dll regsvr32.exe /s browseui.dll regsvr32.exe /s jscript.dll regsvr32.exe /s vbscript.dll regsvr32.exe /s scrrun.dll regsvr32.exe /s msxml.dll regsvr32.exe /s msxml3.dll regsvr32.exe /s msxml6.dll regsvr32.exe /s actxprxy.dll regsvr32.exe /s softpub.dll regsvr32.exe /s wintrust.dll regsvr32.exe /s dssenh.dll regsvr32.exe /s rsaenh.dll regsvr32.exe /s gpkcsp.dll regsvr32.exe /s sccbase.dll regsvr32.exe /s slbcsp.dll regsvr32.exe /s cryptdlg.dll regsvr32.exe /s oleaut32.dll regsvr32.exe /s ole32.dll regsvr32.exe /s shell32.dll regsvr32.exe /s initpki.dll regsvr32.exe /s wuapi.dll regsvr32.exe /s wuaueng.dll regsvr32.exe /s wuaueng1.dll regsvr32.exe /s wucltui.dll regsvr32.exe /s wups.dll regsvr32.exe /s wups2.dll regsvr32.exe /s wuweb.dll regsvr32.exe /s qmgr.dll regsvr32.exe /s qmgrprxy.dll regsvr32.exe /s wucltux.dll regsvr32.exe /s muweb.dll regsvr32.exe /s wuwebv.dllQuick note: The regsvr32 helps to register “.DLL” files as command components in the Registry, and we use the /S option to specify the tool to run the command silently without prompting additional messages.
  10. Type the following commands to reset the network configurations that might be part of the problem (but do not restart your computer just yet), and press Enter on each line:netsh winsock reset netsh winsock reset proxyReset network adapter on Windows 10Reset network adapter on Windows 10
  11. Type the following commands to restart the BITS, Windows Update, and Cryptographic services, and press Enter on each line:net start bits net start wuauserv net start appidsvc net start cryptsvc
  12. Restart the computer.

Once you complete the steps, Windows Update should have reset, and it should be working again on your Windows 10 device.

You can also use the above instructions to fix the update problems when Surface Pro 8, Pro 7, Laptop 4, Studio, or any other Surface cannot seem to download a new firmware update.

Source :
https://pureinfotech.com/reset-windows-update-windows-10-fix-downloads-installs/

Uncovering a macOS App Sandbox escape vulnerability: A deep dive into CVE-2022-26706

Microsoft uncovered a vulnerability in macOS that could allow specially crafted codes to escape the App Sandbox and run unrestricted on the system. We shared these findings with Apple through Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) via Microsoft Security Vulnerability Research (MSVR) in October 2021. A fix for this vulnerability, now identified as CVE-2022-26706, was included in the security updates released by Apple on May 16, 2022. Microsoft shares the vulnerability disclosure credit with another researcher, Arsenii Kostromin (0x3c3e), who discovered a similar technique independently.

We encourage macOS users to install these security updates as soon as possible. We also want to thank the Apple product security team for their responsiveness in fixing this issue.

The App Sandbox is Apple’s access control technology that application developers must adopt to distribute their apps through the Mac App Store. Essentially, an app’s processes are enforced with customizable rules, such as the ability to read or write specific files. The App Sandbox also restricts the processes’ access to system resources and user data to minimize the impact or damage if the app becomes compromised. However, we found that specially crafted codes could bypass these rules. An attacker could take advantage of this sandbox escape vulnerability to gain elevated privileges on the affected device or execute malicious commands like installing additional payloads.

We found the vulnerability while researching potential ways to run and detect malicious macros in Microsoft Office on macOS. For backward compatibility, Microsoft Word can read or write files with an “~$” prefix. Our findings revealed that it was possible to escape the sandbox by leveraging macOS’s Launch Services to run an open –stdin command on a specially crafted Python file with the said prefix.

Our research shows that even the built-in, baseline security features in macOS could still be bypassed, potentially compromising system and user data. Therefore, collaboration between vulnerability researchers, software vendors, and the larger security community remains crucial to helping secure the overall user experience. This includes responsibly disclosing vulnerabilities to vendors.

In addition, insights from this case study not only enhance our protection technologies, such as Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, but they also help strengthen the security strategies of software vendors and the computing landscape at large. This blog post thus provides details of our research and overviews of similar sandbox escape vulnerabilities reported by other security researchers that helped enrich our analysis.

How macOS App Sandbox works

In a nutshell, macOS apps can specify sandbox rules for the operating system to enforce on themselves. The App Sandbox restricts system calls to an allowed subset, and the said system calls can be allowed or disallowed based on files, objects, and arguments. Simply put, the sandbox rules are a defense-in-depth mechanism that dictates the kind of operations an application can or can’t do, regardless of the type of user running it. Examples of such operations include:

  • the kind of files an application can or can’t read or write;
  • whether the application can access specific resources such as the camera or the microphone, and;
  • whether the application is allowed to perform inbound or outbound network connections.
Diagram comparing how user data and system resources access an app without and with App Sandbox.Without App Sandbox, all user data and system resources will have unrestricted access to the app.With App Sandbox, only the data and resources confined within the said sandbox will have unrestricted access to the app. All other user data and resources won't have access.
Figure 1. Illustration of a sandboxed app, from the App Sandbox documentation (photo credit: Apple)

Therefore, the App Sandbox is a useful tool for all macOS developers in providing baseline security for their applications, especially for those that have large attack surfaces and run user-provided code. One example of these applications is Microsoft Office.

Sandboxing Microsoft Office in macOS

Attackers have targeted Microsoft Office in their attempts to gain a foothold on devices and networks. One of their techniques is abusing Office macros, which they use in social engineering attacks to trick users into downloading malware and other payloads.

On Windows systems, Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Office helps secure Microsoft Office against such macro abuse by isolating the host environment using Hyper-V. With this feature enabled, an attacker must first be equipped with a Hyper-V guest-to-host vulnerability to affect the host system—a very high bar compared to simply running a macro. Without a similar isolation technology and default setting on macOS, Office must rely on the operating system’s existing mitigation strategies. Currently, the most promising technology is the macOS App Sandbox.

Viewing the Microsoft sandbox rules is quite straightforward with the codesign utility. Figure 2 below shows the truncated sandbox rules for Microsoft Word:

Partial screenshot of a command line interface showing different keys and values related to the App Sandbox rules for Microsoft Word in macOS.
Figure 2. Viewing the Microsoft Word sandbox rules with the codesign utility

One of the rules dictates the kind of files the application is allowed to read or write. As seen in the screenshot of the syntax below, Word is allowed to read or write files with filenames that start with the “~$” prefix. The reason for this rule is rooted in the way Office works internally and remains intact for backward compatibility.

Partial screenshot of a command line interface showing the read/write App Sandbox rule for Microsoft Word in macOS.
Figure 3. File read and write sandbox rule for Microsoft Word

Despite the security restrictions imposed by the App Sandbox’s rules on applications, it’s possible for attackers to bypass the said rules and let malicious codes “escape” the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on an affected device. These codes could be hidden in a specially crafted Word macro, which, as mentioned earlier, is one of the attackers’ preferred entry points.

Previously reported Office-specific sandbox escape vulnerability

For example, in 2018, MDSec reported a vulnerability in Microsoft Office on macOS that could allow an attacker to bypass the App Sandbox. As explained in their blog post, MDSec’s proof-of-concept (POC) exploit took advantage of the fact that Word could drop files with arbitrary contents to arbitrary directories (even after passing traditional permission checks), as long as these files’ filenames began with a “~$” prefix. This bypass was relatively straightforward: have a specially crafted macro drop a .plist file in the user’s LaunchAgents directory.

The LaunchAgents directory is a well-known persistence mechanism in macOS. PLIST files that adhere to a specific structure describe (that is, contain the metadata of) macOS launch agents initiated by the launchd process when a user signs in. Since these launch agents will be the children of launchd, they won’t inherit the sandbox rules enforced onto Word, and therefore will be out of the Office sandbox.

Shortly after the above vulnerability was reported, Microsoft deployed a fix that denied file writes to the LaunchAgents directory and other folders with similar implications. The said disclosure also prompted us to look into different possible sandbox escapes in Microsoft Word and other applications.

Exploring Launch Services as means of escaping the sandbox

In 2020, several blog posts described a generic sandbox escape vulnerability in macOS’s /usr/bin/open utility, a command commonly used to launch files, folders, and applications just as if a user double-clicked them. While open is a handy command, it doesn’t create child processes on its own. Instead, it performs an inter-process communication (IPC) with the macOS Launch Services, whose logic is implemented in the context of the launchd process. Launch Services then performs the heavy lifting by resolving the handler and launching the right app. Since launchd creates the process, it’s not restricted by the caller’s sandbox, similar to how MDSec’s POC exploit worked in 2018.

However, using open for sandbox escape purposes isn’t trivial because the destination app must be registered within Launch Services. This means that, for example, one couldn’t run files like osascript outside the sandbox using open. Our internal offensive security team therefore decided to reassess the open utility for sandbox escape purposes and use it in a larger end-to-end attack simulation.

Our obvious first attempt in creating a POC exploit was to create a macro that launches a shell script with the Terminal app. Surprisingly, the POC didn’t work because files dropped from within the sandboxed Word app were automatically given the extended attribute com.apple.quarantine (the same one used by Safari to keep track of internet-downloaded files, as well as by Gatekeeper to block malicious files from executing), and Terminal simply refused to run files with that attribute. We also tried using Python scripts, but the Python app had similar issues running files having the said attribute.

Our second attempt was to use application extensibility features. For example, Terminal would run the default macOS shell (zsh), which would then run arbitrary commands from files like ~/.zshenv before running its own command line. This meant that dropping a .zshenv file in the user’s home directory and launching the Terminal app would cause the sandbox escape. However, due to Word’s sandbox rules, dropping a .zshenv file wasn’t straightforward, as the rules only allowed an application to write to files that begin with the “~$” prefix.

However, there is an interesting way of writing such a file indirectly. macOS was shipped with an application called Archive Utility responsible of extracting archive files (such as ZIP files). Such archives were extracted without any user interaction, and the files inside an archive were extracted in the same directory as the archive itself. Therefore, our second POC worked as follows:

  1. Prepare the payload by creating a .zshenv file with arbitrary commands and placing it in a ZIPfile. Encode the ZIPfile contents in a Word macro and drop those contents into a file “~$exploit.zip” in the user’s home directory.
  2. Launch Archive Utility with the open command on the “~$exploit.zip” file. Archive Utility ran outside the sandbox (since it’s the child process of /usr/bin/open) and was therefore permitted to create files with arbitrary names. By default, Archive Utility extracted the files next to the archive itself—in our case, the user’s home directory. Therefore, this step successfully created a .zshenv file with arbitrary contents in the user’s home directory.
  3. Launch the Terminal app with the open command. Since Terminal hosted zsh and zsh ran commands from the .zshenv file, the said file could escape the Word sandbox successfully.
Screenshot of a command line interface showing proof-of-concept exploit code.
Figure 4. Preparing a Word macro with our sandbox escape for an internal Red Team operation

Perception Point’s CVE-2021-30864

In October 2021, Perception Point published a blog post that discussed a similar finding (and more elegant, in our opinion). In the said post, Perception Point released details about their sandbox escape (now identified as CVE-2021-30864), which used the following facts:

  1. Every sandboxed process had its own container directory that’s used as a “scratch space.” The sandboxed process could write arbitrary files, including arbitrary filenames, to that directory unrestricted.
  2. The open command had an interesting –env option that could set or override arbitrary environment variables for the launched app.

Therefore, Perception Point’s POC exploit was cleverly simple:

  1. Drop a .zshenv file in the container directory. This was allowed because sandbox rules weren’t enforced on that directory.
  2. Launch Terminal with the open command but use the –env option to override the HOME environment variable to point to the container directory. This made zsh consider the user’s home directory to be the container directory, and run commands from the planted .zshenv file.

Apple has since patched the vulnerability Perception Point reported in the latest version of macOS, Monterey. While we could still create the “~$exploit.zip” file in the user’s home directory, using open to launch the Archive Utility on the ZIP file now resulted in it being extracted to the Downloads folder. While this is an interesting behavior, we could no longer use it for sandbox escape purposes.

Final exploit attempt: Revisiting the ‘open’ command

After discovering that Apple has fixed both variants that abuse .zshenv, , we decided to examine all the command line options of the open command. Soon after, we came across the following:

Screenshot of a command line interface with the following text:--stdin PATH
Launches the application with stdin connected to PATH.
Figure 5. The –stdin option in the open utility as presented by its manual entry

As mentioned earlier, we couldn’t run Python with a dropped .py file since Python refuses to run files with the “com.apple.quarantine” extended attribute. We also considered abusing the PYTHONSTARTUP environment variable, but Apple’s fix to CVE-2021-30864 apparently prevented that option, too. However, stdin bypassed the “com.apple.quarantine” extended attribute restriction, as there was no way for Python to know that the contents from its standard input originated from a quarantined file.

Our POC exploit thus became simply as follows:

  1. Drop a “~$exploit.py” file with arbitrary Python commands.
  2. Run open –stdin=’~$exploit.py’ -a Python, which runs the Python app with our dropped file serving as its standard input. Python happily runs our code, and since it’s a child process of launchd, it isn’t bound to Word’s sandbox rules.
Screenshot of a proof-of-concept exploit code.
Figure 6. Sample minimal POC exploit code

We also came up with a version that’s short enough to be a Twitter post:

Screenshot of a proof-of-concept exploit code.
Figure 7. “Tweetable” POC exploit

Detecting App Sandbox escapes with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Since our initial discovery of leveraging Launch Services in macOS for generic sandbox escapes, we have been using our POC exploits in Red Team operations to emulate end-to-end attacks against Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, improve its capabilities, and challenge our detections. Shortly after our Red Team used our first POC exploit, our Blue Team members used it to train artificial intelligence (AI) models to detect our exploit not only in Microsoft Office but also on any app used for a similar Launch Services-based sandbox escape.

After we learned of Perception Point’s technique and created our own new exploit technique (the Python POC), our Red Team saw another opportunity to fully test our own detection durability. Indeed, the same set of detection rules that handled our first sandbox escape vulnerability still turned out to be durable—even before the vulnerability related to our second POC exploit was patched.

Partial screenshot of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detecting an Office sandbox escape vulnerability.The left panel shows the Alert Story with timestamps. The right panel shows the Alert details, including category, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, detection source, service source, detection status, and other information.
Figure 8. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detecting Office sandbox escape

For Defender for Endpoint customers, such detection durability feeds into the product’s threat and vulnerability management capabilities, which allows them to quickly discover, prioritize, and remediate misconfigurations and vulnerabilities—including those affecting non-Windows devices—through a unified security console.

Learn how Microsoft Defender for Endpoint delivers a complete endpoint security solution across all platforms.

Jonathan Bar Or
Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team


Source :
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/13/uncovering-a-macos-app-sandbox-escape-vulnerability-a-deep-dive-into-cve-2022-26706/

A Simple Formula for Getting Your IT Security Budget Approved

Although there is a greater awareness of cybersecurity threats than ever before, it is becoming increasingly difficult for IT departments to get their security budgets approved. Security budgets seem to shrink each year and IT pros are constantly being asked to do more with less. Even so, the situation may not be hopeless. There are some things that IT pros can do to improve the chances of getting their security budgets approved.

Presenting the Problem in a Compelling Way

If you want to get your proposed security budget approved, you will need to present security problems in a compelling way. While those who are in charge of the organization’s finances are likely aware of the need for good security, they have probably also seen enough examples of “a security solution in search of a problem” to make them skeptical of security spending requests. If you want to persuade those who control the money, then you will need to convince them of three things:

  1. You are trying to protect against a real issue that presents a credible threat to the organization’s wellbeing.
  2. Your proposed solution will be effective and that it isn’t just a “new toy for the IT department to play with”
  3. Your budget request is both realistic and justified.

Use Data to Your Advantage

One of the best ways to convince those who are in charge that there is a credible cyber threat against the organization is to provide them with quantifiable metrics. Don’t resort to gathering statistics from the Internet. Your organization’s financial staff is probably smart enough to know that most of those statistics are manufactured by security companies who are trying to sell a product or service. Instead, gather your own metrics from inside your organization by using tools that are freely available for download.

Specops for example, offers a free Password Auditor that can generate reports demonstrating the effectiveness of your organization’s password policy and existing password security vulnerabilities. This free tool can also help you to identify other vulnerabilities, such as accounts that are using passwords that are known to have been leaked or passwords that do not adhere to compliance standards or industry best practices.

Example of Specops Password Auditor results in an Active Directory environment

Of course, this is just one of the many free security tools that are available for download. In any case, it is important to use metrics from within your own organization to demonstrate the fact that the security problem that you are trying to solve is real.

Highlight What a Solution Would Do

Once you demonstrate the problem to those who are in charge of the organization’s finances, do not make the mistake of leaving them guessing as to how you are planning on solving the problem. Be prepared to clearly explain what tools you are planning on using, and how those tools will solve the problem that you have demonstrated.

It’s a good idea to use visuals to demonstrate the practicality of your proposed solution. Be sure to explain how the problem is solved in non-technical language and enhance your argument with examples that are specific to your organization.

Estimated Time of Implementation and Seeing Results

We have probably all heard horror stories of IT projects that have gone off the rails. Organizations sometimes spend millions of dollars and invest years of planning into IT projects that never ultimately materialize. That being the case, it is important to set everyone’s mind at ease by showing them exactly how long it will take to get your proposed solution up and running and then how much additional time will be needed in order to achieve the desired result.

When you are making these projections, be careful to be realistic and not to make promises based on an overly ambitious implementation schedule. You should also be prepared to explain how you arrived at your projection. Keep in mind upcoming projects, company-wide goals, and fiscal year ideals when factoring in timing.

Demonstrate the Estimated Savings

Although security is of course a concern for most organizations, those who are in charge of an organization’s finances typically want to see some sort of return on investment. As such, it is important to consider how your proposed solution might save the company money. A few ideas might include:

  • Saving the IT department time, thereby reducing the number of overtime hours worked
  • Avoiding a regulatory penalty that could cost the organization a lot of money
  • Bringing down insurance premiums because data is being better protected

Of course, these are just ideas. Every situation is different, and you will need to consider how your security project can produce a return on investment given your own unique circumstances. It is important to include a cost-saving element for clarity sake, even if it is citing the average cost of a data breach in your industry.

Show You’ve Done Your Homework with a Pricing Comparison

As you pitch your proposed solution, stakeholders are almost certain to ask whether there might be a less expensive product that would accomplish your objectives. As such, it’s important to spend some time researching the solutions offered by competing vendors. Here are a few things that you should be prepared to demonstrate:

  • The total cost for implementing each potential solution (this may include licensing, labor, support, and hardware costs)
  • Why you are proposing a particular solution even if it is not the least expensive
  • If your solution is the least expensive, then be prepared to explain what you might be giving up by using the cheapest vendor.
  • What each vendor offers relative to the others

A Few Quick Tips

As you make your budgetary pitch, keep in mind that those to whom you are presenting likely have a limited understanding of IT concepts. Avoid using unnecessary technical jargon and be prepared to clearly explain key concepts, but without sounding condescending in the process.

It’s also smart to anticipate any questions that may be asked of you and have answers to those questions ready to go. This is especially true if there is a particular question that makes you a little bit uncomfortable.

Present your information clearly, confidently, and in a concise manner (I.e., make it quick!) so you can make your case without wasting time.

Source:
https://thehackernews.com/2022/07/a-simple-formula-for-getting-your-it.html

5 Key Things We Learned from CISOs of Smaller Enterprises Survey

New survey reveals lack of staff, skills, and resources driving smaller teams to outsource security.

As business begins its return to normalcy (however “normal” may look), CISOs at small and medium-size enterprises (500 – 10,000 employees) were asked to share their cybersecurity challenges and priorities, and their responses were compared the results with those of a similar survey from 2021.

Here are the 5 key things we learned from 200 responses:

— Remote Work Has Accelerated the Use of EDR Technologies

In 2021, 52% of CISOs surveyed were relying on endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. This year that number has leapt to 85%. In contrast, last year 45% were using network detection and response (NDR) tools, while this year just 6% employ NDR. Compared to 2021, double the number of CISOs and their organizations are seeing the value of extended detection and response (XDR) tools, which combine EDR with integrated network signals. This is likely due to the increase in remote work, which is more difficult to secure than when employees work within the company’s network environment.

— 90% of CISOs Use an MDR Solution

There is a massive skills gap in the cybersecurity industry, and CISOs are under increasing pressure to recruit internally. Especially in small security teams where additional headcount is not the answer, CISOs are turning to outsourced services to fill the void. In 2021, 47% of CISOs surveyed relied on a Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP), while 53% were using a managed detection and response (MDR) service. This year, just 21% are using an MSSP, and 90% are using MDR.

— Overlapping Threat Protection Tools are the #1 Pain Point for Small Teams

The majority (87%) of companies with small security teams struggle to manage and operate their threat protection products. Among these companies, 44% struggle with overlapping capabilities, while 42% struggle to visualize the full picture of an attack when it occurs. These challenges are intrinsically connected, as teams find it difficult to get a single, comprehensive view with multiple tools.

— Small Security Teams Are Ignoring More Alerts

Small security teams are giving less attention to their security alerts. Last year 14% of CISOs said they look only at critical alerts, while this year that number jumped to 21%. In addition, organizations are increasingly letting automation take the wheel. Last year, 16% said they ignore automatically remediated alerts, and this year that’s true for 34% of small security teams.

— 96% of CISOs Are Planning to Consolidate Security Platforms

Almost all CISOs surveyed have consolidation of security tools on their to-do lists, compared to 61% in 2021. Not only does consolidation reduce the number of alerts – making it easier to prioritize and view all threats – respondents believe it will stop them from missing threats (57%), reduce the need for specific expertise (56%), and make it easier to correlate findings and visualize the risk landscape (46%). XDR technologies have emerged as the preferred method of consolidation, with 63% of CISOs calling it their top choice.

Download 2022 CISO Survey of Small Cyber Security Teams to see all the results.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/07/5-key-things-we-learned-from-cisos-of.html

Spectre and Meltdown Attacks Against OpenSSL

The OpenSSL Technical Committee (OTC) was recently made aware of several potential attacks against the OpenSSL libraries which might permit information leakage via the Spectre attack.1 Although there are currently no known exploits for the Spectre attacks identified, it is plausible that some of them might be exploitable.

Local side channel attacks, such as these, are outside the scope of our security policy, however the project generally does introduce mitigations when they are discovered. In this case, the OTC has decided that these attacks will not be mitigated by changes to the OpenSSL code base. The full reasoning behind this is given below.

The Spectre attack vector, while applicable everywhere, is most important for code running in enclaves because it bypasses the protections offered. Example enclaves include, but are not limited to:

The reasoning behind the OTC’s decision to not introduce mitigations for these attacks is multifold:

  • Such issues do not fall under the scope of our defined security policy. Even though we often apply mitigations for such issues we do not mandate that they are addressed.
  • Maintaining code with mitigations in place would be significantly more difficult. Most potentially vulnerable code is extremely non-obvious, even to experienced security programmers. It would thus be quite easy to introduce new attack vectors or fix existing ones unknowingly. The mitigations themselves obscure the code which increases the maintenance burden.
  • Automated verification and testing of the attacks is necessary but not sufficient. We do not have automated detection for this family of vulnerabilities and if we did, it is likely that variations would escape detection. This does not mean we won’t add automated checking for issues like this at some stage.
  • These problems are fundamentally a bug in the hardware. The software running on the hardware cannot be expected to mitigate all such attacks. Some of the in-CPU caches are completely opaque to software and cannot be easily flushed, making software mitigation quixotic. However, the OTC recognises that fixing hardware is difficult and in some cases impossible.
  • Some kernels and compilers can provide partial mitigation. Specifically, several common compilers have introduced code generation options addressing some of these classes of vulnerability:
    • GCC has the -mindirect-branch-mfunction-return and -mindirect-branch-register options
    • LLVM has the -mretpoline option
    • MSVC has the /Qspectre option

  1. Nicholas Mosier, Hanna Lachnitt, Hamed Nemati, and Caroline Trippel, “Axiomatic Hardware-Software Contracts for Security,” in Proceedings of the 49th ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), 2022.

Posted by OpenSSL Technical Committee May 13th, 2022 12:00 am

Source :
https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2022/05/13/spectre-meltdown/