Cisco Umbrella Enhances Support of DNS Encryption With DNS Over HTTPS

In December 2011, Cisco Umbrella – then going by the name OpenDNS – became the first public DNS resolver to announce support for DNS encryption. Now, a decade later, we’re proud to announce that we’ve added support for DNS over HTTPS (DoH) directly to our core Umbrella resolvers. In addition, we’ve also added support for Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR). These moves allow us to provide our customers with the low-latency and high availability DNS service they expect while also enhancing their security and privacy.

In this blog, we unpack what this latest DNS over HTTPS update means for Cisco Umbrella customers and discuss how they can configure DoH in their network. For more information on the DNS security offered by Cisco Umbrella, register for our on-demand demo of Cisco Umbrella today!

Our History With DNS Encryption

More than a decade ago, we became the first public resolver to announce support for DNSCrypt: a made-for-DNS solution to securing one of the most fundamental parts of internet communication. To this day, Cisco Umbrella continues to be at the forefront of DNS encryption, using DNSCrypt in the default configurations of our endpoint clients and DNS forwarders.

While we still believe that DNSCrypt has a critical place in our infrastructure, the lack of an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard for DNSCrypt has prevented widespread adoption. Recently, developments in encrypted DNS have focused on two different encryption protocols: DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over TLS (DoT).

Using DNS over HTTPS (DoH) With Cisco Umbrella

Unlike DNSCrypt, DoH is an IETF standard for performing DNS queries over a secure, encrypted channel. While it serves a similar purpose to our long-time friend DNSCrypt, its status as an IETF standard makes DNS over HTTPS more common amongst major browsers and operating systems.

Cisco Umbrella first announced support for DoH in May 2020. At that time, we wanted to support our users looking to take advantage of browser-based DNS initiatives. To keep our ability to adapt quickly, we launched DNS over HTTPS support using a set of dedicated resolvers (‘doh.umbrella.com’ and ‘doh.opendns.com’) with their own anycast IPs (146.112.41.5 and 146.112.41.2).

Since that release, the popularity of DoH has picked up steam. Apple added support in September 2020, and Microsoft recently announced that upcoming versions of Windows will support this form of DNS encryption. We’ve seen the result of this popularity on the Cisco Umbrella network, which has prompted our team to add support for DNS over HTTPS directly to Umbrella core resolvers.

Enabling DoH on Cisco Umbrella

Because we support DNS over HTTPS with our core resolvers, Cisco Umbrella customers will continue to experience the low-latency and high availability DNS service for which Umbrella is known. In addition, users can now configure DoH for Cisco Umbrella and OpenDNS on our well-known anycast addresses:

ResolverIPv4IPv6DoH
Umbrella/OpenDNS208.67.222.222
208.67.220.220
2620:119:35::35
2620:119:53::53
https://dns.opendns.com/dns-query
https://dns.umbrella.com/dns-query
FamilyShield208.67.222.123
208.67.220.123
2620:119:35::123
2620:119:53::123
https://familyshield.opendns.com/dns-query
Sandbox208.67.222.2
208.67.220.2
2620:0:ccc::2
2620:0:ccd::2
https://sandbox.opendns.com/dns-query

Additionally, we’ve moved the dedicated DNS over HTTPS hostnames and IPs onto the same core resolvers. This means they will provide the same service as our well-known IPs. And since we’ll continue to support those hostnames and IPs into the future, our existing users need not make any changes.

Using DNS over TLS (DoT) With Cisco Umbrella

While adding support for DNS over HTTPS directly to our core resolvers enabled our users to take advantage of DNS encryption better, it also provides an additional benefit.  We can now handle TLS connections and support DNS over TLS natively in the core resolvers. We’re thrilled to announce that, as of January 28, 2022, support for DoT is live on all Umbrella resolvers globally.

Like DoH, DoT is an IETF standard for performing DNS queries over a secure, encrypted channel. Unlike DoH, however, DoT uses a dedicated port (TCP/853) for its connections. Clients that support DoT will check if their DNS server supports DoT. If it doesn’t, clients will fall back to regular unencrypted DNS (sometimes called Do53). Thus, configuration for DoT is typically just a matter of enabling it in a supported client.

Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR)

With all of these new methods for DNS encryption, clients need an automated means to discover what encryption methods their chosen DNS resolver supports. Tasked with this goal, the Adaptive DNS Discovery (ADD) working group at the IETF has proposed a standard called Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR).

The basics of DDR are simple. When a DNS client first finds out its DNS server, it will send a DNS query for a special use domain name, ‘_dns.resolver.arpa’, using a special DNS query type (type 64, or ‘SVCB’). The DNS server will respond with the different types of encryption it supports, and any configuration information the client needs. The client can pick the kind of encryption it prefers, verify that all the information is secure, and then start encrypting DNS.

Cisco Umbrella is very proud to be the first public resolver to announce support for DDR. We developed it in close collaboration with Microsoft to ensure that encrypted resolver selection works smoothly end to end. We look forward to DDR support being added to more clients and operating systems in the future.

Our DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS services are now discoverable via DDR, and any supported client can start using it now.

Enhance Your DNS Security Today

Just as with our decade of support for DNSCrypt, Cisco Umbrella views encryption of DNS queries in transit as a core component of DNS security, along with the use of DNSSEC for securing the data in the queries itself. We’ve been pleased to see the industry and client begin to add direct support for DNS encryption, and we can’t wait to see standards like DoH, DoT, and DDR take off and become more widely adopted.

If you want to learn more about the DNS security that Cisco Umbrella provides, view our on-demand demo today!

Source :
https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/enhancing-support-dns-encryption-with-dns-over-https

Cybersecurity Threat Spotlight: Emotet, RedLine Stealer, and Magnat Backdoor

Security and IT teams may be fresh off their holiday breaks, but threat actors have kept busy over the last month. In this edition of the Cybersecurity Threat Spotlight, we’re highlighting the Trojans, loaders, information stealers, and backdoors that we’re seeing online.

Want to learn more about how Cisco Umbrella can defend your enterprise against these threats? Request a personalized demo today!


Threat Name: Emotet

Threat Type: Trojan/Loader

Attack Chain:

A graphic showing the attack chain for Emotet: Malspam to Weaponized Document/Archive to Malicious Macros to Emotet Loader to CobaltStrike to Conti Ransomware. The graphic indicates that Cisco Umbrella protects users against Weaponized Document/Archive, Emotet Loader, and Cobalt Strike.

Description: Emotet is a banking Trojan that was first detected in 2014. Emotet has evolved into a massive botnet that delivers large amounts of malspam with malicious document attachments that lead to the Emotet Trojan. The Trojan also functions as a dropper for second-stage payloads, including – but not limited to – TrickBot, Qakbot, and Ryuk. Emotet has can steal SMTP credentials and email content. The threat actors reply to legitimate conversations in a victim’s email account, injecting replies that include malicious attachments.

Emotet Spotlight: In November, security researchers observed the return of the Emotet loader, which had been inactive since January 2021 after a law enforcement takedown. Emotet is a loader botnet that uses a Loader-as-a-Service model. Emotet’s main advantage is its modular system, which enables a highly targeted approach based on the requirements of the delivered payload. Unfortunately, the botnet has historically been leveraged by adversaries conducting sophisticated ransomware attacks.

At this point, security researchers observe strong connections between Emotet and Conti Ransomware. This can indicate that two cybercriminal syndicates are or will be establishing a new partnership. Historically, Conti was known to rely on sustainable methods of operation. Emotet has proven to be able to provide initial access and a strong foothold in multiple corporate networks. This can become the new trend in adversaries, and it will likely have a major impact on the threat landscape in 2022.

Target Geolocations: Worldwide
Target Data: User Credentials, Browser Data, Sensitive Information
Target Businesses: Any
Exploits: N/A

Mitre ATT&CK for Emotet

Initial Access:
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment or Spearphishing Link, Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
Discovery:
Account Discovery
Process Discovery
Persistence:
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Execution:
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Windows Command Shell, Visual Basic
User Execution: Malicious Link, Malicious File
Windows Management Instrumentation
Evasion:
Obfuscated Files or Information
Software Packing
Collection:
Archive Collected Data
Email Collection: Local Email Collection
Credential Access:
Brute Force: Password Guessing
Credentials From Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Network Sniffing
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Command and Control:
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Non-Standard Port
Exfiltration:
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Lateral Movement:
Exploitation of Remote Services
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Privilege Escalation:
Process Injection: Dynamic-Link Library Injection

IOCs:

Domains (Active)

cars-taxonomy[.]mywebartist[.]eu
crownadvertising[.]ca
giadinhviet[.]com
hpoglobalconsulting[.]com
immoinvest[.]com[.]br
itomsystem[.]in
pasionportufuturo[.]pe
thetrendskill[.]com
visteme[.]mx
cursossemana[.]com
callswayroofco[.]com
dipingwang[.]com
yougandan[.]com

Domains (Historical)

adorwelding[.]zmotpro[.]com
alfadandoinc[.]com
alfaofarms[.]com
av-quiz[.]tk
ceshidizhi[.]xyz
ckfoods[.]netdevanture[.]com[.]sg
evgeniys[.]ru
goodtech[.]cetxlabs[.]com
html[.]gugame[.]net
huskysb[.]com
im2020[.]vip
jamaateislami[.]com
laptopinpakistan[.]com
linebot[.]gugame[.]net
lpj917[.]com
manak[.]edunetfoundation[.]org
newsmag[.]danielolayinkas[.]com
onlinemanager[.]site
parentingkiss[.]com
pibita[.]net
primtalent[.]com
protracologistics[.]com
ranvipclub[.]net
ridcyf[.]com
server[.]zmotpro[.]com
staviancjs[.]com
team[.]stagingapps[.]xyz
thepilatesstudionj[.]com
vcilimitado[.]com
vegandietary[.]com
voltaicplasma[.]com
www[.]168801[.]xyz
www[.]caboturnup[.]com
xanthelasmaremoval[.]com
yoho[.]love

IPs (Active)

151[.]80[.]142[.]33
87 [.] 248 [.] 77 [.] 159
159 [.] 65 [.] 76 [.] 245

IPs (Historical)

105[.]247[.]100[.]215
118[.]244[.]214[.]210
120[.]150[.]206[.]156
12[.]57[.]239[.]19
139[.]162[.]157[.]8
139[.]59[.]242[.]76
169[.]64[.]242[.]153
173[.]90[.]152[.]220
179[.]52[.]236[.]96
181[.]119[.]30[.]35
181[.]229[.]155[.]11
185[.]129[.]3[.]211
185[.]97[.]32[.]6
186[.]176[.]182[.]192
186[.]4[.]234[.]27
189[.]130[.]50[.]85
189[.]234[.]165[.]149
190[.]128[.]27[.]233
200[.]27[.]55[.]100
200[.]56[.]104[.]44
208[.]180[.]149[.]228
208[.]180[.]246[.]147
216[.]176[.]21[.]143
216[.]251[.]1[.]1
23[.]254[.]203[.]51
24[.]206[.]17[.]102
37[.]120[.]175[.]15
45[.]123[.]3[.]54
50[.]100[.]215[.]149
50[.]125[.]99[.]70
51[.]75[.]168[.]89
54[.]39[.]176[.]22
54[.]39[.]181[.]130
67[.]215[.]49[.]234
67[.]43[.]253[.]189
86[.]98[.]71[.]86
92[.]207[.]145[.]74
96[.]246[.]206[.]16

Additional Information:

Back from the dead: Emotet re-emerges, begins rebuilding to wrap up 2021
Corporate Loader “Emotet”: History of “X” Project Return for Ransomware

Which Cisco Products Can Block:

Cisco Secure Endpoint
Cisco Secure Email
Cisco Secure Firewall/Secure IPS
Cisco Secure Malware Analytics
Cisco Umbrella
Cisco Secure Web Appliance


Threat Name: RedLine Stealer

Threat Type: Information Stealer

Attack Chain:

A graphic showing the attack chain for RedLine Stealer: Malspam Link/Trojanized App Download to RedLine Malware to Information Stealing to Command and Control. The graphic indicates that Cisco Umbrella protects against Malspam Link/Trojanized App Download, RedLine Malware, and Command and Control.

Description: RedLine is an information stealer available as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on Russian underground forums. It steals information like login credentials, autocomplete fields, passwords, and credit card information from browsers. It also collects information about the user and their system, like the username, location, hardware configuration, and installed security software. Finally, a recent update to RedLine also adds the ability to stead cryptocurrency cold wallets. RedLine appears to be under active development, with frequent introductions of new features.

RedLine Spotlight: Security researchers discovered that most stolen credentials currently sold on the dark web underground markets had been collected using RedLine Stealer malware. RedLine Stealer attempts to harvest information from browsers – like passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and VPN services – and system information – like hardware configuration and location. Over the past year, RedLine has been enhanced with the addition of new features. It is now capable of loading other malware software and running commands while periodically sending updates containing new information from the infected host to its C2. The main goal of cybercrime campaigns utilizing RedLine Stealer appears to be the sale of stolen data to other cybercriminals who weaponize it in their own attacks.

Target Geolocations: Any
Target Data: User Credentials, Browser Data, Financial and Personal Information, Cryptocurrency Wallets
Target Businesses: Any
Exploits: N/A

MITRE ATT&CK for RedLine

Initial Access:
Phishing
Trojanized Applications
Credential Access:
Credentials from Password Stores
Steal Web Session Cookie
Unsecured Credentials
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Discovery:
Account Discovery
Software Discovery
Process Discovery
System Time Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Location Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Persistence:
Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Execution:
User Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Evasion:
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Collection:
Screen Capture
Command and Control:
Non-Standard Port
Non-Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration:
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

IOCs

Domains (Historical)

userauto[.]space
22231jssdszs[.]fun
hssubnsx[.]xyz
dshdh377dsj[.]fun

IPs (Active)

185[.]215[.]113[.]114

IPs (Historical)

37[.]0[.]8[.]88
193[].142[.]59[.]119
136[.]144[.]41[.]201

Additional Information

RedLine Stealer identified as primary source of stolen credentials on two dark web markets
Redline Stealer
Shining a Light on RedLine Stealer Malware and Identity Data Found in Criminal Shops

Which Cisco Products Can Block:
Cisco Secure Endpoint
Cisco Secure Email
Cisco Secure Firewall/Secure IPS
Cisco Secure Malware Analytics
Cisco Umbrella
Cisco Secure Web Appliance


Threat Name: Magnat Backdoor

Threat Type: BackDoor

Attack Chain:[1]

Graphic showing the attack chain for Magnat BackDoor: Malvertising to Download Fake Installer to Dee-Obfuscation to RDP Backdoor/Information Stealer/Chrome Extension Installer to Command and Control. The graphic indicates that Umbrella protects users against Malvertising, Download Fake Installer, RDP Backdoor/Information Stealer, and Command and Control

Description: Magnat BackDoor is an AutoIt-based installer that prepares a system for remote Microsoft Desktop Access and forwards the RDP service port on an outbound SSH tunnel. This installer’s actions pave the way for the attacker to access the system remotely via RDP. The malware applies this technique by setting up a scheduled task that periodically contacts a C2 server and sets up the tunnel if instructed by the C2 response.

Magnat BackDoor Spotlight: Cisco Talos recently observed a malicious campaign offering fake installers of popular software as bait to get users to execute the malware on their systems. This campaign includes a set of malware distribution campaigns that started in late 2018 and have targeted Canada, the U.S., Australia, and some European Union countries. Two undocumented malware families (a BackDoor and a Google Chrome extension) are consistently delivered together in these campaigns. An unknown actor with the alias “magnat” is likely the author of these new families and has consistently developed and improved them. The attacker’s motivations appear to be financial gain from selling stolen credentials, executing fraudulent transactions, and providing Remote Desktop Access to systems.

Target Geolocations: Canada, U.S., Australia, E.U. Countries
Target Data: Credentials, Sensitive Data
Target Businesses: Any

MITRE ATT&ACK for Magnat BackDoor

Initial Access:
Malvertising
Persistence:
Scheduled Task/Job
Execution:
Scheduled Task/Job
Evasion:
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Command and Control:
Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration:
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

IOCs

Domains (Active)

chocolatepuma[.]casa
wormbrainteam[.]club
430lodsfb[.]xyz
softstatistic[.]xyz
happyheadshot[.]club
aaabasick[.]fun
nnyearhappy[.]club
teambrainworm[.]club
yanevinovat[.]club
fartoviypapamojetvse[.]club
hugecarspro[.]space
burstyourbubble[.]icu
boogieboom[.]host
cgi-lineup[.]website
newdawnera[.]fun
bhajhhsy6[.]site
iisnbnd7723hj[.]digital
sdcdsujnd555w[.]digital

Additional Information:

Magnat campaigns use malvertising to deliver information stealer, backdoor and malicious Chrome extension

Which Cisco Products Can Block:
Cisco Secure Endpoint
Cisco Secure Firewall/Secure IPS
Cisco Secure Malware Analytics
Cisco Umbrella


[1] While Cisco products can protect against RDP BackDoor and Information Stealer, they do not protect against Chrome Extension Installers

Source :
https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/cybersecurity-threat-spotlight-emotet-redline-stealer-magnat-backdoor

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