How to install WordPress on QTS 5.0?

WordPress is a free and open-source content management system that allows you to easily create a blog or website. Here are the steps to install WordPress on QTS 5.0.

  1. Open the Control Panel.
  2. Go to Applications > Web Server.
  3. Check Enable Web Server.
  4. Go to the App Center.
  5. Search for and install Container Station.
  6. Search for and install WordPress.
  7. Open WordPress.
  8. Follow the on-screen prompts to configure your WordPress:
    1. Select a language.
    2. Click Continue.
    3. Enter a Site TitleUsernamePassword, and Email. It is also recommended to check Discourage search engines from indexing this site.
      Important: The Username and Password should not be the same as your NAS User name and Password.
    4. Click Install WordPress
  9. Once installed, you will be prompted to log in to WordPress using the Username and Password.
  10. You can now use WordPress on your NAS.

    Source :
    https://www.qnap.com/en/how-to/tutorial/article/how-to-install-wordpress-on-qts-5-0

Online RAID Capacity Upgrade

https://www.youtube.com/embed/V6VFGkeFN8I?enablejsapi=1&origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.qnap.com

A New Challenge for Modern Businesses

For modern businesses, one of the greatest challenges is to select and set up a reliable network-attached storage server to secure and share important data to increase work efficiency. Meanwhile, the necessity to reduce the risk of data loss by backing up data increases the demand for higher capacity storage. With the increasing storage capacity of hard drives, QNAP provides a solution to hot swap lower capacity drives with larger capacity drives so that your QNAP Turbo NAS can grow with your business.

The QNAP Turbo NAS series provides a high-performance and low-TCO (total cost of ownership) solution for modern businesses. In addition to best-in-class hardware specifications and easy-to-use applications, the QNAP Turbo NAS series also offers innovative features such as Online RAID Capacity Upgrade (for example, replace three 500GB hard drives with three 1TB hard drives) and Online RAID Level Migration (for example, RAID level migration from RAID 1 to RAID 5). These advanced features used to be exclusive to corporations with large budgets, but QNAP implements an intuitive way to allow more businesses to enjoy these powerful technologies.

The scenario below demonstrates how users can benefit from using Online RAID Capacity Upgrade.

Use Case

  • Jeffrey bought three 500GB drives for the initial setup of a TVS-882 and used a RAID 5 configuration for these drives.
  • Six months later, the storage needs of his department sharply increased and the current storage capacity of his TVS-882 was no longer enough. At the same time, the price of 1TB hard drives had significantly dropped. Thus, Jeffery decided to buy three 1TB hard drives.
  • Jeffery now wants to upgrade the capacity of his TVS-882 NAS.

Operation procedure

Log in to QTS with an administrator account. Go to  “Storage & Snapshots” > “Storage/Snapshots”. Select the storage pool that will be expanded, then click “Manage“. The “Storage Pool Management” window will appear, select the RAID group that will be expanded and click “Replace Disks One by One” in the “Manage” menu.

Highlight the first disk to be replaced, and click “Change“.

Tips: After you replace hard drives, the description field will show the message “You can replace this drive”. You can now replace the hard drive to a larger one or skip this step if the hard drives have already been replaced.
Caution: When the hard drive synchronization is in process, DO NOT turn off the NAS or swap hard drives.

When the description field displays “Please remove this drive”, remove the hard drive from the NAS. Wait for the NAS to beep twice.

When the description field displays “Please insert the new drive”, insert the new drive to the same drive slot.

After inserting the hard drive, wait for the NAS to beep. The system will start rebuilding.

When the RAID is finished rebuilding, repeat the steps above to replace the other hard drives one by one.

After swapping out hard drives and the rebuilding completes, click “Expand Capacity” to expand the RAID.

Click “OK” to continue.

The NAS will beep and start expanding the capacity.

Depending on the drive sizes, the process may take anywhere from a few hours to tens of hours to complete. Please wait patiently for the process to finish. DO NOT turn off the NAS.

After RAID expansion is finished, the new capacity will be shown and the RAID group status will be “Ready”. The process is now complete and the new storage space is available for use.

Tips: To expand the capacity of closed NAS models (those without accessible drive bays) you need to shut down the NAS, unplug its cables, lay the NAS on a flat surface, open its cover, and then replace the hard drives within. Then replace the cover, plug in the cables, turn on the NAS, and then follow the instruction on the screen.

Source :
https://www.qnap.com/en/how-to/tutorial/article/online-raid-capacity-upgrade

Manually Install QRescue to recover Qlocker-encrypted files on QNAP NAS

Overview:

QRescue is the data recovery tool for Qlocker-encrypted 7z files. It contains:

  • PhotoRec (Open Source Project / GNU General Public License / Project Link):
    File recovery software designed to recover lost files from hard disks and CD-ROMs, and lost pictures (thus the Photo Recovery name) from storage medium.
  • QRescue (Powered by QNAP):
    The script to recover file structures from the encrypted 7z files and PhotoRec files.

Requirements:

  • Download the QRescue app from this link.
    https://download.qnap.com/QPKG/QRescue.zip
  • Prepare an external hard disk drive with a capacity larger than the total used storage space on your NAS.
    • Note: It’s advised to prepare an external HDD with 1.5 to 2x free space than the total used storage space on your NAS. Additional space might be required during the recovery process. If the available space is less than the suggested value, error and other issues may occur.

Demo Video:

Steps: 

Part 1. Configure external HDD with the name “rescue” and create folders with the name “recup1” for recovery.

QRescue will process the recovery process to external drive first, and we need to do some configuration for this recovery process and create the specific destination and folder name.

  1. You need to prepare an external HDD that its usable capacity is larger than the total used storage size of your NAS. This is because you will recover the files to the external device first. Please check your used volume size first by clicking More > About on the QTS desktop.
  2. Insert the external drive to your NAS. Please go to Storage Manager > External Device > Select your external device > Click “Actions” > Click “Format” to format the external drive.
  3. The File System must be “EXT4”, and the Label name must be key in “rescue”. If these configuration is ready, please click “Format

    Notice:
    The QRescue app will use “rescue” as the external drive name. If you use other names, the recovery process might fail.
  4. (Optional) If you disable the admin account or you don’t use admin to login QTS, you might not see the external drive on the File Station. Please go to Control Panel > Privilege > Shared Folder > Edit Shared Folder Permission to enable or change read / write permission for “rescue” folder and to match the account that you log in the NAS.
    • Sample:
      Grant other administrator group account (Example: “_qnap_support” is the administrator group account for read/write permission to external hard drive naming “rescue”).


       
  5. Using File Station to check the volume for the correct external device name.
  6. Create the new folder and name as “recup1” (format: recup+{number}). If you have more than one storage volume, you need to add more folders for recovery.



    Notice:
    The QRescue app will use “recup+{number}” as the folder name. If you use other names, the recovery process might fail.Part 2. Download and Manually Install the QRescue AppThis QRescue app is a special build. Therefore, you need to manually install this app from the QTS App Center.
  7. Please go to this link to download the QRescue app.
    https://download.qnap.com/QPKG/QRescue.zip
  8. Please go to App Center > Click Install Manually > Click Browse to find the QRescue app location on your computer.
  9. After selecting the app location, you can click Install. Wait until the installation completes and open the QRescue app on QTS desktop or side-bar.
  10. When you open the QRescue app, you will see the web console. It can help to run PhotoRec and QRescue to recover your files.Part 3. Run PhotoRecRunning PhotoRec can help you to recover the lost files from hard disks to the external drive. Now you will recover the NAS files to the “recup1” (example: recup+{disk_number}) folder on the external drive.
  11. Type this command and press Enter on your keyboard. You will start to run PhotoRec.
    Command:
    photorec
  12. Use Up/Down arrows to choose the hard drive. And you can start to select the NAS disk for running recovery by PhotoRec.
    • Sample:
      • /dev/mapper/cachedev1 as 1st data volume
      • /dev/mapper/cachedev2 as 2nd data volume
      • /dev/mapper/cachedev20 as 20th data volume
    • Note:
      You can check the number of data volumes in Storage & Snapshots > Storage/Snapshots
  13. Select the “ext4” partition and press “Enter
  14. Select the file system as [ ext2/ext3 ] and click “Enter” key.
  15. Select the space as [ Whole ] and click the “Enter” key.
  16. Now we need to select the external device’s folder as the recovery destination. 
    • Source Destination: /share/external/DEV3301_01/qpkg/QRescue   [QRescue qpkg]
    • Recovery Destination: /share/rescue/recup1 [External Device]
    • Click “..” to go back to the upper level folder
       
      • Sample destination: External disk on QRescue app
      • Sample: External Device (name: rescue) > Destination Folder (name: recup1)
  17. Please click “C” on the keyboard when the destination is “/share/rescue/recup1”.
  18. Start to run the recovery process by PhotoRec. Now you can see the estimated time to completion.
  19. When you finish the PhotoRec, you can press enter when you select  [Quit] or type in “ctrl-c” to exit.
    Part 4. Run QRescueRun QRescue can help you to recover the files retrieved by PhotoRec. Now you will recover the files from the “recup+{number}” folder to the “restore+{number}” folder which auto creates on your external drive.
  20. Type this command and click Enter on your keyboard. You will start to run QRescue.
    Command:
    qrescue.sh
  21. (Optional) If you have two or more data volumes on your NAS, the screen will let you select which data volume you will start the process. Please type the number and press “enter”. If you only have one data volume, you might not see this step.

  22. (Optional) Now you can see the progress for which files were completed in the recovery process.
  23. When all of the QRescue process is completed, the screen will show the result summary and the process for sending the system log.
  24. QRescue app also will send the event log to QuLog Center / System Log and notify you on finishing the whole recovery process. If you have opened the QNAP support ticket, don’t forget to make the feedback for your case. QNAP support team will help you to double check. Thank you very much.

Part 5. Move the recovery data to your NAS.

You can move the recovery data to your NAS by File Station


Source :
https://www.qnap.com/en/how-to/tutorial/article/manually-install-qrescue-to-recover-qlocker-encrypted-files-on-qnap-nas

How to set up myQNAPcloud to remotely access a QNAP NAS

Requirements

Register your NAS with myQNAPcloud

  1. Log in to your QNAP NAS.
  2. Open myQNAPcloud.
  3. Click Get Started.

    The Welcome to myQNAPcloud! window appears.
  4. Follow the steps to register your NAS. Click Next to move to the next step.
    1. Enter your QNAP ID and Password.
    2. Enter a Device name for your NAS.
      Note: This name is used to identify your NAS on myQNAPcloud and must be unique across all users.
    3. Choose what NAS services will be enabled and the Access Control setting.

      Your device is registered on myQNAPcloud.

      A summary page displays all the registration details and services guidelines of your NAS.

Remotely access your QNAP NAS with myQNAPcloud

  1. Go to https://www.myqnapcloud.com/.
  2. Sign in using your QNAP Account.
    Note: If you are already signed in you are automatically redirected to My Devices .
  3. Go to My Devices.
    The devices registered to your QNAP Account are displayed.
  4. Click the ”  ” button next to the device to display the device IP and SmartURL.
  5. Click SmartURL.

    A login page for your NAS appears.

Source :
https://www.qnap.com/en/how-to/tutorial/article/how-to-set-up-myqnapcloud-to-remotely-access-a-qnap-nas

How to back up your Mac to QNAP NAS using Time Machine

Requirements:

  • QNAP NAS with QTS 4.3.0 (or later).

There are two ways to back up your Mac to a QNAP NAS: using QTS or HBS 3.

QTS: Go to “Perform Time Machine Backup to your QNAP NAS”.
HBS 3: Go to “Back up Mac with the shared Time Machine account in HBS 3”

  • Perform Time Machine Backup to your QNAP NAS
    • (Optional) Create a designated Time Machine backup user and shared folder
    • Configure Time Machine to use QNAP NAS for backups
  • Back up Mac with the shared Time Machine account in HBS 3
    • Set up shared Time Machine account
    • Configure Time Machine to use QNAP NAS for backups

Perform Time Machine Backup to your QNAP NAS

  • (Optional) Create a designated Time Machine backup user and shared folder
    1. Create a Time Machine backup user.
      Tip: A dedicated Time Machine user account can be created to provide additional security and the ability to set storage quotas for each Mac.
      • Open Control Panel.
      • Go to Privilege > Users.
      • Click Create.
      • Select Create a User.
      • Click Create.
    2. Create a Time Machine backup shared folder.
      • Open Control Panel.
      • Go to Privilege > Shared Folders.
      • Click Create.
      • Select Shared Folder.
      • Enter a Folder Name.
      • Click Next.
      • Give the Time Machine backup user RW access privileges.
      • Click Next.
      • Check Set this folder as the Time Machine backup folder (macOS).
      • Click Finish.
    3. Configure QTS to use SMB 3
      1. Open Control Panel.
      2. Go to Network & File Services > Win/Mac/NFS > Microsoft Networking.
      3. Click Advanced Options.
      4. Under Highest SMB version select SMB 3.
      5. Click Apply.
  • Configure Time Machine to use QNAP NAS for backups
    1. Connect the NAS to your Mac
      • Open Finder on your Mac.
      • Open the Go menu.
      • Click Connect to Server.
      • Enter smb://<NAS name.local or IP address>.
      • Enter the username and password of the backup user account.

        Note:
        If your NAS is a member of a domain then you should log in using the domain name and user account. For example, if your NAS is named qnapnas and you want to connect using local NAS user account nasuser1, then your username is qnapnas\nasuser1.
      • This can be your NAS account or the dedicated Time Machine user account.
      • Select the NAS shared backup folder.
    2. Open Time Machine.
    3. Click Select Backup Disk.
    4. Select the NAS shared backup folder.
    5. Click Use Disk.
    6. Enter the username and password of the backup user account.
      Tip: This can be your NAS account or a dedicated Time Machine user account.
    7. Click Connect.
      Result: You can now use Time Machine to back up this Mac to your NAS.

Back up Mac with a shared Time Machine account in HBS 3

  • Set up the shared Time Machine account
    1. Open HBS 3.
    2. Go to Services > Time Machine.
    3. Check Use shared Time Machine account.
    4. Enter a password for the Time Machine account.
    5. (Optional) Set a storage quota.
    6. Select Maximum
    7. Enter the total capacity in GB.
      Important: If the backup data size is greater than the quota, the Time Machine backup will fail.
    8. Click Apply.
  • Configure Time Machine to use QNAP NAS for backups
    1. Connect the NAS to your Mac
      • Open Finder on your Mac.
      • Open the Go menu.
      • Click Connect to Server.
      • Enter smb://<NAS name.local or IP address>/TMBackup.
      • Enter the username TimeMachine and the password you created earlier.
    2. Open Time Machine.
    3. Click Select Backup Disk.
    4. Select the NAS shared folder TMBackup.
    5. Click Use Disk.
    6. Enter the username TimeMachine and the password you created earlier.

      Note:
      If your NAS is a member of a domain then you should log in using the domain name and user account. For example, if your NAS is named qnapnas and you want to connect using local NAS user account nasuser1, then your username is qnapnas\nasuser1.
    7. Click Connect.
      Result: You can now use Time Machine to back up this Mac to your NAS.

      Tip: Backups can be located under the shared folder TMbackup.

Source :
https://www.qnap.com/en/how-to/tutorial/article/how-to-back-up-your-mac-to-qnap-nas-using-time-machine

Moving the Mission Forward: Mandiant Joins Google Cloud

Google’s acquisition of Mandiant is now complete, marking a great moment for our team and for the security community we serve.

As part of Google Cloud, Mandiant now has a far greater capability to close the security gap created by a growing number of adversaries. In my 29 years on the front lines of securing networks, I have seen criminals, nation states, and plain bad actors bring harm to good people. By combining our expertise and intelligence with the scale and resources of Google Cloud, we can make a far greater difference in preventing and countering cyber attacks, while pinpointing new ways to hold adversaries accountable.  

When I founded Mandiant Corporation in 2004, we set out to change how businesses protected themselves from cyber threats. We felt the technologies people depended on to defend ultimately failed to innovate at the pace of the attackers. In order to deliver cyber defenses as dynamic as the threats, we believed you had to have your finger on the pulse of adversaries around the world. To address this need, we set out to respond to as many cyber security breaches as possible. We wanted to learn first-hand how adversaries were circumventing common safeguards with new and novel attacks; monitor the development and deployment of attacker tools, their infrastructure, and their underground economies; and study the attacker’s targeting trends.

Armed with this knowledge and experience, we felt we were best positioned to close the gap between the offense and the defense in the security arms race.  

As we investigated thousands of security incidents over the years, we honed the deep expertise required to find the proverbial needle in the haystack: the trace evidence that something unlawful, unauthorized, or simply unacceptable had occurred. We believed this skill was the foundation to automating security operations through software, so that organizations and governments around the world could easily implement effective security capabilities. 

By joining forces with Google Cloud, we can accelerate this vision. I am very excited that Mandiant and Google Cloud can now work together to leverage our frontline intelligence and security expertise to address a common goal: to relentlessly protect organizations against cyber attacks and provide solutions that allow defenders to operate with confidence in their cyber security posture. More specifically, we can leverage our intelligence differentiator to automate security operations and validate security effectiveness.

Mandiant Remains Relentless

While we are now part of Google Cloud, Mandiant is not going away—in fact, it’s getting stronger. We will maintain our focus on knowing the most about threat actors and extend our reputation for delivering world-class threat intelligence, consulting services, and security solutions. 

Automating Security Operations

Today’s announcement should be welcome news to organizations facing cyber security challenges that have accelerated in frequency, severity, and diversity. I have always believed that organizations can remain resilient in the fight against cyber threats if they have the right combination of expertise, intelligence, and adaptive technology. 

This is why I am a proponent of Google Cloud’s shared fate model. By taking an active stake in the security posture of customers, we can help organizations find and validate potential security issues before they become an incident. Google Cloud and Mandiant have the knowledge and skills to provide an incredibly efficient and effective security operations platform. We are building a “security brain” that scales our team to address the expertise shortage.

Validating Security Effectiveness

Google Cloud’s reach, resources, and focus will accelerate another Mandiant imperative: validating security effectiveness. Organizations today lack the tools needed to validate the effectiveness of security, quantify risk, and exhibit operational competency. Mandiant is working to provide visibility and evidence on the status of how effective security controls are against adversary threats. With this data, organizations have a clear line of sight into optimizing their individual environment against relevant threats.

Advancing Our Mission

Google Cloud has made security the cornerstone of its commitment to users around the world, and the Mandiant acquisition underscores that focus.

We are thrilled to continue moving our mission forward alongside the Google Cloud team. Together, I believe Mandiant and Google Cloud will help reinvent how organizations protect, detect, and respond to threats. This will benefit not only a growing base of customers and partners, but the security community at large.

You can learn more about this milestone moment and the exciting opportunities ahead in this blog post by Google Cloud CEO Thomas Kurian, “Google + Mandiant: Transforming Security Operations and Incident Response.”

Source :
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/mandiant-joins-google-cloud

GIFShell attack creates reverse shell using Microsoft Teams GIFs

A new attack technique called ‘GIFShell’ allows threat actors to abuse Microsoft Teams for novel phishing attacks and covertly executing commands to steal data using … GIFs.

The new attack scenario, shared exclusively with BleepingComputer, illustrates how attackers can string together numerous Microsoft Teams vulnerabilities and flaws to abuse legitimate Microsoft infrastructure to deliver malicious files, commands, and perform exfiltrating data via GIFs. 

As the data exfiltration is done through Microsoft’s own servers, the traffic will be harder to detect by security software that sees it as legitimate Microsoft Team’s traffic.

Overall, the attack technique utilizes a variety of Microsoft Teams flaws and vulnerabilities:

  • Bypassing Microsoft Teams security controls allows external users to send attachments to Microsoft Teams users.
  • Modify sent attachments to have users download files from an external URL rather than the generated SharePoint link.
  • Spoof Microsoft teams attachments to appear as harmless files but download a malicious executable or document.
  • Insecure URI schemes to allow SMB NTLM hash theft or NTLM Relay attacks.
  • Microsoft supports sending HTML base64 encoded GIFs, but does not scan the byte content of those GIFs. This allows malicious commands to be delivered within a normal-looking GIF.
  • Microsoft stores Teams messages in a parsable log file, located locally on the victim’s machine, and accessible by a low-privileged user.
  • Microsoft servers retrieve GIFs from remote servers, allowing data exfiltration via GIF filenames.

GIFShell – a reverse shell via GIFs

The new attack chain was discovered by cybersecurity consultant and pentester Bobby Rauch, who found numerous vulnerabilities, or flaws, in Microsoft Teams that can be chained together for command execution, data exfiltration, security control bypasses, and phishing attacks.

The main component of this attack is called ‘GIFShell,’ which allows an attacker to create a reverse shell that delivers malicious commands via base64 encoded GIFs in Teams, and exfiltrates the output through GIFs retrieved by Microsoft’s own infrastructure.

To create this reverse shell, the attacker must first convince a user to install a malicious stager that executes commands, and uploads command output via a GIF url to a Microsoft Teams web hook.  However, as we know, phishing attacks work well in infecting devices, Rauch came up with a novel phishing attack in Microsoft Teams to aid in this, which we describe in the next section.

GIFShell works by tricking a user into loading a malware executable called the “stager” on their device that will continuously scan the Microsoft Teams logs located at $HOME\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Teams\IndexedDB\https_teams.microsoft.com_0.indexeddb.leveldb\*.log.

Microsoft Teams log folder
Microsoft Teams log folder
Source: BleepingComputer

All received messages are saved to these logs and are readable by all Windows user groups, meaning any malware on the device can access them.

Once the stager is in place, a threat actor would create their own Microsoft Teams tenant and contact other Microsoft Teams users outside of their organization. Attackers can easily achieve this as Microsoft allows external communication by default in Microsoft Teams.

To initiate the attack, the threat actor can use Rauch’s GIFShell Python script to send a message to a Microsoft Teams user that contains a specially crafted GIF. This legitimate GIF image has been modified to include commands to execute on a target’s machine.

When the target receives the message, the message and the GIF will be stored in Microsoft Team’s logs, which the malicious stager monitors.

When the stager detects a message with a GIF, it will extract the base64 encoded commands and execute them on the device. The GIFShell PoC will then take the output of the executed command and convert it to base64 text.

This base64 text is used as the filename for a remote GIF embedded in a Microsoft Teams Survey Card that the stager submits to the attacker’s public Microsoft Teams webhook.

As Microsoft Teams renders flash cards for the user, Microsoft’s servers will connect back to the attacker’s server URL to retrieve the GIF, which is named using the base64 encoded output of the executed command.

The GIFShell server running on the attacker’s server will receive this request and automatically decode the filename allowing the attackers to see the output of the command run on the victim’s device, as shown below.

For example, a retrieved GIF file named ‘dGhlIHVzZXIgaXM6IA0KYm9iYnlyYXVjaDYyNzRcYm9iYnlyYXVJa0K.gif’ would decode to the output from the ‘whoami’ command executed on the infected device:

the user is: 
bobbyrauch6274\bobbyrauIkBáë

The threat actors can continue using the GIFShell server to send more GIFs, with further embedded commands to execute, and continue to receive the output when Microsoft attempts to retrieve the GIFs.

As these requests are made by the Microsoft website, urlp.asm.skype.com, used for regular Microsoft Teams communication, the traffic will be seen as legitimate and not detected by security software.

This allows the GIFShell attack to covertly exfiltrate data by mixing the output of their commands with legitimate Microsoft Teams network communication.

Even worse, as Microsoft Teams runs as a background process, it does not even need to be opened by the user to receive the attacker’s commands to execute.

The Microsoft Teams logs folder have also been found accessed by other programs, including business monitoring software, such as Veriato, and potentially malware.

Microsoft acknowledged the research but said it would not be fixed as no security boundaries were bypassed.

“For this case, 72412, while this is great research and the engineering team will endeavor to improve these areas over time, these all are post exploitation and rely on a target already being compromised,” Microsoft told Rauch in an email shared with BleepingComputer.

“No security boundary appears to be bypassed.  The product team will review the issue for potential future design changes, but this would not be tracked by the security team.”

Abusing Microsoft teams for phishing attacks

As we previously said, the GIFShell attack requires the installation of an executable that executes commands received within the GIFs.

To aid in this, Rauch discovered Microsoft Teams flaws that allowed him to send malicious files to Teams users but spoof them to look as harmless images in phishing attacks.

“This research demonstrates how it is possible to send highly convincing phishing attachments to victims through Microsoft Teams, without any way for a user to pre-screen whether the linked attachment is malicious or not,” explains Rauch in his writeup on the phishing method.

As we previously said in our discussion about GIFShell, Microsoft Teams allows Microsoft Teams users to message users in other Tenants by default. 

However, to prevent attackers from using Microsoft Teams in malware phishing attacks, Microsoft does not allow external users to send attachments to members of another tenant.

While playing with attachments in Microsoft Teams, Rauch discovered that when someone sends a file to another user in the same tenant, Microsoft generates a Sharepoint link that is embedded in a JSON POST request to the Teams endpoint.

This JSON message, though, can then be modified to include any download link an attacker wants, even external links. Even worse, when the JSON is sent to a user via Teams’ conversation endpoint, it can also be used to send attachments as an external user, bypassing Microsoft Teams’ security restrictions.

For example, the JSON below has been modified to show a file name of Christmas_Party_Photo.jpeg but actually delivers a remote Christmas_Party_Photo.jpeg………….exe executable.

Microsoft Teams JSON to spoof an attachment
Microsoft Teams JSON to spoof an attachment
Source: Bobby Rauch

When the attachment is rendered in Teams, it is displayed as Christmas_Party_Photo.jpeg, and when highlighting it, it will continue to show that name, as shown below.

Spoofing a JPEG file
Spoofing a JPEG file
Source: Bobby Rauch

However, when the user clicks on the link, the attachment will download the executable from the attacker’s server.

In addition to using this Microsoft Teams spoofing phishing attack to send malicious files to external users, attackers can also modify the JSON to use Windows URIs, such as ms-excel:, to automatically launch an application to retrieve a document.

Rauch says this would allow attackers to trick users into connecting to a remote network share, letting threat actors steal NTLM hashes, or local attackers perform an NTLM relay attack to elevate privileges.

“These allowed, potentially unsafe URI schemes, combined with the lack of permissions enforcement and attachment spoofing vulnerabilities, can allow for a One Click RCE via NTLM relay in Microsoft Teams,” Rauch explains in his report on the spoofing attack.

Microsoft not immediately fixing bugs

Rauch told BleepingComputer that he disclosed the flaws to Microsoft in May and June of 2022, and despite Microsoft saying they were valid issues, they decided not to fix them immediately.

When BleepingComputer contacted Microsoft about why the bugs were not fixed, we were not surprised by their response regarding the GIFShell attack technique, as it requires the device to already be compromised with malware.

“This type of phishing is important to be aware of and as always, we recommend that users practice good computing habits online, including exercising caution when clicking on links to web pages, opening unknown files, or accepting file transfers.

We’ve assessed the techniques reported by this researcher and have determined that the two mentioned do not meet the bar for an urgent security fix. We’re constantly looking at new ways to better resist phishing to help ensure customer security and may take action in a future release to help mitigate this technique.” – a Microsoft spokesperson. 

However, we were surprised that Microsoft did not consider the ability of external attackers to bypass security controls and send attachments to another tenant as not something that should be immediately fixed.

Furthermore, not immediately fixing the ability to modify JSON attachment cards so that Microsoft Teams recipients could be tricked to download files from remote URLs was also surprising.

However, Microsoft has left the door open to resolving these issues, telling BleepingComputer that they may be serviced in future versions.

“Some lower severity vulnerabilities that don’t pose an immediate risk to customers are not prioritized for an immediate security update, but will be considered for the next version or release of Windows,” explained Microsoft in a statement to BleepingComputer.

Source :
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gifshell-attack-creates-reverse-shell-using-microsoft-teams-gifs/

Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software Unauthenticated Access to Messaging Services Vulnerability

  • A vulnerability in the binding configuration of Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software containers could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker who has access to the VPN0 logical network to also access the messaging service ports on an affected system.This vulnerability exists because the messaging server container ports on an affected system lack sufficient protection mechanisms. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the messaging service ports of the affected system. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be able to send network traffic to interfaces within the VPN0 logical network. This network may be restricted to protect logical or physical adjacent networks, depending on device deployment configuration. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view and inject messages into the messaging service, which can cause configuration changes or cause the system to reload.Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are workarounds that address this vulnerability.This advisory is available at the following link:
    https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-vmanage-msg-serv-AqTup7vs

Affected Products

  • Vulnerable ProductsThis vulnerability affects Cisco devices if they are running a vulnerable release of Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software.For information about which Cisco software releases are vulnerable, see the Fixed Software section of this advisory.Products Confirmed Not VulnerableOnly products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory are known to be affected by this vulnerability.Cisco has confirmed that this vulnerability does not affect the following Cisco products:
    • IOS XE SD-WAN Software
    • SD-WAN vBond Orchestrator Software
    • SD-WAN vEdge Cloud Routers
    • SD-WAN vEdge Routers
    • SD-WAN vSmart Controller Software

Workarounds

  • There is a workaround that addresses this vulnerability.Administrators can use access control lists (ACLs) to block ports 4222, 6222, and 8222, which are used by Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software messaging services. They may be configured in the following ways depending on deployment:
    • Configure ACLs on Cisco IOS devices. For information about preventing exploitation of Cisco IOS devices, see Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
    • Configure ACLs at the firewall that protects Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software. For information about Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) ACL configuration, see Cisco ASA Series Firewall CLI Configuration Guide: Access Control Lists.
    • Cisco Cloud Controllers ACLs (Inbound Rules allowed list) are managed through the Self-Service Portal. Customers will have to review their ACL configurations on the Self-Service Portal to ensure that they are correct. This does not involve updating the controller version. By default, Cisco-hosted devices are protected against the issue described in the advisory unless the customer has explicitly allowed access. For more information, see Cisco SD-WAN Cloud Hosted Controllers Provisioning.
    While these workarounds have been deployed and were proven successful in a test environment, customers should determine the applicability and effectiveness in their own environment and under their own use conditions. Customers should be aware that any workaround or mitigation that is implemented may negatively impact the functionality or performance of their network based on intrinsic customer deployment scenarios and limitations. Customers should not deploy any workarounds or mitigations before first evaluating the applicability to their own environment and any impact to such environment.

Fixed Software

  • Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory. Customers may only install and expect support for software versions and feature sets for which they have purchased a license. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license:
    https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/end-user-license-agreement.htmlAdditionally, customers may only download software for which they have a valid license, procured from Cisco directly, or through a Cisco authorized reseller or partner. In most cases this will be a maintenance upgrade to software that was previously purchased. Free security software updates do not entitle customers to a new software license, additional software feature sets, or major revision upgrades.When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories page, to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.Customers Without Service ContractsCustomers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who make purchases through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco TAC: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/web/tsd-cisco-worldwide-contacts.htmlCustomers should have the product serial number available and be prepared to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade.Fixed ReleasesCustomers are advised to upgrade to an appropriate fixed software release as indicated in the following table(s):Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software ReleaseFirst Fixed ReleaseEarlier than 20.3Migrate to a fixed release.20.3Migrate to a fixed release.20.620.6.420.7Migrate to a fixed release.20.8Migrate to a fixed release.20.920.9.1Note: It is the customer’s responsibility to upgrade their cloud controllers to the latest version in which this vulnerability is fixed.The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) validates only the affected and fixed release information that is documented in this advisory.

Exploitation and Public Announcements

  • The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.

Source

  • Cisco would like to thank Orange Business for reporting this vulnerability.

URL

Revision History

KB5004442—Manage changes for Windows DCOM Server Security Feature Bypass (CVE-2021-26414)

Summary

The Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) Remote Protocol is a protocol for exposing application objects using remote procedure calls (RPCs). DCOM is used for communication between the software components of networked devices.  

Hardening changes in DCOM were required for CVE-2021-26414. Therefore, we recommended that you verify if client or server applications in your environment that use DCOM or RPC work as expected with the hardening changes enabled.

To address the vulnerability described in CVE-2021-26414, you must install updates released September 14, 2021 or later and enable the registry key described below in your environment. We recommended that you complete testing in your environment and enable these hardening changes as soon as possible. If you find issues during testing, you must contact the vendor for the affected client or server software for an update or workaround before early 2022.

Note We recommend that you update your devices to the latest security update available to take advantage of the advanced protections from the latest security threats.

Timeline

Update releaseBehavior change
June 8, 2021Hardening changes disabled by default but with the ability to enable them using a registry key.
June 14, 2022Hardening changes enabled by default but with the ability to disable them using a registry key.
March 14, 2023Hardening changes enabled by default with no ability to disable them. By this point, you must resolve any compatibility issues with the hardening changes and applications in your environment.

Registry setting to enable or disable the hardening changes

During the timeline phases in which you can enable or disable the hardening changes for CVE-2021-26414, you can use the following registry key:

  • Path : HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole\AppCompat
  • Value Name: “RequireIntegrityActivationAuthenticationLevel”
  • Type: dword
  • Value Data: default = 0x00000000 means disabled. 0x00000001 means enabled. If this value is not defined, it will default to enabled.

Note You must enter Value Data in hexadecimal format. 

Important You must restart your device after setting this registry key for it to take effect.

Note Enabling the registry key above will make DCOM servers enforce an Authentication-Level of RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY or higher for activation.

Note This registry value does not exist by default; you must create it. Windows will read it if it exists and will not overwrite it.

New DCOM error events

To help you identify the applications that might have compatibility issues after we enable DCOM security hardening changes, we added new DCOM error events in the System log; see the tables below. The system will log these events if it detects that a DCOM client application is trying to activate a DCOM server using an authentication level that is less than RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY. You can trace to the client device from the server-side event log and use client-side event logs to find the application.

Server events

Event IDMessage
10036“The server-side authentication level policy does not allow the user %1\%2 SID (%3) from address %4 to activate DCOM server. Please raise the activation authentication level at least to RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY in client application.”(%1 – domain, %2 – user name, %3 – User SID, %4 – Client IP Address)

Client events

Event IDMessage
10037“Application %1 with PID %2 is requesting to activate CLSID %3 on computer %4 with explicitly set authentication level at %5. The lowest activation authentication level required by DCOM is 5(RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY). To raise the activation authentication level, please contact the application vendor.”
10038“Application %1 with PID %2 is requesting to activate CLSID %3 on computer %4 with default activation authentication level at %5. The lowest activation authentication level required by DCOM is 5(RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY). To raise the activation authentication level, please contact the application vendor.”(%1 – Application Path, %2 – Application PID, %3 – CLSID of the COM class the application is requesting to activate, %4 – Computer Name, %5 – Value of Authentication Level)

Availability

These error events are only available for a subset of Windows versions; see the table below.

Windows versionAvailable on or after these dates
Windows Server 2022September 27, 2021KB5005619
Windows 10, version 2004, Windows 10, version 20H2, Windows 10, version 21H1September 1, 2021KB5005101
Windows 10, version 1909August 26, 2021KB5005103
Windows Server 2019, Windows 10, version  1809August 26, 2021KB5005102
Windows Server 2016, Windows 10, version 1607September 14, 2021KB5005573
Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1October 12, 2021KB5006714

Source :
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5004442-manage-changes-for-windows-dcom-server-security-feature-bypass-cve-2021-26414-f1400b52-c141-43d2-941e-37ed901c769c

PSA: Nearly 5 Million Attacks Blocked Targeting 0-Day in BackupBuddy Plugin

Late evening, on September 6, 2022, the Wordfence Threat Intelligence team was alerted to the presence of a vulnerability being actively exploited in BackupBuddy, a WordPress plugin we estimate has around 140,000 active installations. This vulnerability makes it possible for unauthenticated users to download arbitrary files from the affected site which can include sensitive information.

After reviewing historical data, we determined that attackers started targeting this vulnerability on August 26, 2022, and that we have blocked 4,948,926 attacks targeting this vulnerability since that time.

The vulnerability affects versions 8.5.8.0 to 8.7.4.1, and has been fully patched as of September 2, 2022 in version 8.7.5. Due to the fact that this is an actively exploited vulnerability, we strongly encourage you to ensure your site has been updated to the latest patched version 8.7.5 which iThemes has made available to all site owners running a vulnerable version regardless of licensing status.

All Wordfence customers, including Wordfence PremiumWordfence CareWordfence Response, and Wordfence Free users, have been, and will continue to be, protected against any attackers trying to exploit this vulnerability due to the Wordfence firewall’s built-in directory traversal and file inclusion firewall rules. Wordfence PremiumCare, & Response, customers receive enhanced protection as attackers heavily targeting the vulnerability are blocked by the IP Blocklist.

Vulnerability Details

Description: Arbitrary File Download/Read
Affected Plugin: BackupBuddy
Plugin Slug: backupbuddy
Plugin Developer: iThemes
Affected Versions: 8.5.8.0 – 8.7.4.1
CVE ID: CVE-2022-31474
CVSS Score: 7.5 (High)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Fully Patched Version: 8.7.5

The BackupBuddy plugin for WordPress is designed to make back-up management easy for WordPress site owners. One of the features in the plugin is to store back-up files in multiple different locations, known as Destinations, which includes Google Drive, OneDrive, and AWS just to name a few. There is also the ability to store back-up downloads locally via the ‘Local Directory Copy’ option. Unfortunately, the method to download these locally stored files was insecurely implemented making it possible for unauthenticated users to download any file stored on the server.

More specifically the plugin registers an admin_init hook for the function intended to download local back-up files and the function itself did not have any capability checks nor any nonce validation. This means that the function could be triggered via any administrative page, including those that can be called without authentication (admin-post.php), making it possible for unauthenticated users to call the function. The back-up path is not validated and therefore an arbitrary file could be supplied and subsequently downloaded.

Due to this vulnerability being actively exploited, and its ease of exploitation, we are sharing minimal details about this vulnerability.

Indicators of Compromise

The Wordfence firewall has blocked over 4.9 million exploit attempts targeting this vulnerability since August 26, 2022, which is the first indication we have that this vulnerability was being exploited. We are seeing attackers attempting to retrieve sensitive files such as the /wp-config.php and /etc/passwd file which can be used to further compromise a victim.

The top 10 Attacking IP Addresses are as follows:

  • 195.178.120.89 with 1,960,065 attacks blocked
  • 51.142.90.255 with 482,604 attacks blocked
  • 51.142.185.212 with 366770 attacks blocked
  • 52.229.102.181 with 344604 attacks blocked
  • 20.10.168.93 with 341,309 attacks blocked
  • 20.91.192.253 with 320,187 attacks blocked
  • 23.100.57.101 with 303,844 attacks blocked
  • 20.38.8.68 with 302,136 attacks blocked
  • 20.229.10.195 with 277,545 attacks blocked
  • 20.108.248.76 with 211,924 attacks blocked

A majority of the attacks we have observed are attempting to read the following files:

  • /etc/passwd
  • /wp-config.php
  • .my.cnf
  • .accesshash

We recommend checking for the ‘local-download’ and/or the ‘local-destination-id’ parameter value when reviewing requests in your access logs. Presence of these parameters along with a full path to a file or the presence of ../../ to a file indicates the site may have been targeted for exploitation by this vulnerability. If the site is compromised, this can suggest that the BackupBuddy plugin was likely the source of compromise.

Conclusion

In today’s post, we detailed a zero-day vulnerability being actively exploited in the BackupBuddy plugin that makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to steal sensitive files from an affected site and use the information obtained in those files to further infect a victim. This vulnerability was patched yesterday and we strongly recommend updating to the latest version of the plugin, currently version 8.7.5, right now since this is an actively exploited vulnerability.

All Wordfence customers, including Wordfence PremiumWordfence CareWordfence Response, and Wordfence Free users, have been, and will continue to be, protected against any attackers trying to exploit this vulnerability due to the Wordfence firewall’s built-in directory traversal and file inclusion firewall rules.

If you believe your site has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability or any other vulnerability, we offer Incident Response services via Wordfence Care. If you need your site cleaned immediately, Wordfence Response offers the same service with 24/7/365 availability and a 1-hour response time. Both these products include hands-on support in case you need further assistance.

If you know a friend or colleague who is using this plugin on their site, we highly recommend forwarding this advisory to them to help keep their sites protected, as this is a serious vulnerability that is actively being exploited in the wild.

We will continue to monitor the situation and follow up as more information becomes available.

Source :
https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/09/psa-nearly-5-million-attacks-blocked-targeting-0-day-in-backupbuddy-plugin/