Category: Wifi

RSA Report: Cybersecurity is National Security

The role of government in stopping supply chain attacks and other threats to our way of life.

By Amber Wolff
April 26, 2023

How governments play a vital role in developing regulations, stopping supply chain attacks, and diminishing other threats to our way of life.

While new issues are always emerging in the world of cybersecurity, some have been present since the beginning, such as what role cybersecurity should play in government operations and, conversely, what role government should play in cybersecurity. The answer to this question continues to shift and evolve over time, but each new leap in technology introduces additional considerations. As we move into the AI era, how can government best keep citizens safe without constraining innovation and the free market — and how can the government use its defensive capabilities to retain an edge in the conflicts of tomorrow?

The day’s first session, “Cybersecurity and Military Defense in an Increasingly Digital World,” offered a deep dive into the latter question. Over the past 20 years, military conflicts have moved from involving just Land, Air and Sea to also being fought in Space and Cyber. While superior technology has given us an upper hand in previous conflicts, in some areas our allies — and our adversaries — are catching up or even surpassing us. In each great technological leap, companies and countries alike ascend and recede, and to keep our edge in the conflicts of the future, the U.S. will need to shed complacency, develop the right policies, move toward greater infrastructure security and tap the capabilities of the private sector.

SonicWall in particular is well-positioned to work with the federal government and the military. For years, we’ve helped secure federal agencies and defense deployments against enemies foreign and domestic, and have woked to shorten and simplify the acquisition and procurement process. Our list of certifications includes FIPS 140-2, Common Criteria, DoDIN APL, Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC), USGv6, IPv6 and TAA and others. And our wide range of certified solutions have been used in a number of government use cases, such as globally distributed networks in military deployments and federal agencies, tip-of-the-spear, hub-and-spoke, defense in-depth layered firewall strategies and more.

Because Zero Trust is just as important for federal agencies as it is for private sector organizations, SonicWall offers the SMA 1000, which offers Zero Trust Network Architecture that complies with federal guidelines, including the DoDIN APL, FIPS and CSfC, as well as the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy.

This new strategy was at the center of the day’s next session. In “The National Cyber Strategy as Roadmap to a Secure Cyber Future,” panelists outlined this strategic guidance, which was released just two months ago and offered a roadmap for how the U.S. should protect its digital ecosystem against malicious criminal and nation-state actors. The guidance consists of five pillars, all of which SonicWall is in accord with:

  • Pillar One: Defend Critical Infrastructure
    SonicWall offers several security solutions that align with Pillar One, including firewalls, intrusion prevention, VPN, advanced threat protection, email security, Zero-Trust network access and more. We’re also working to align with and conform to NIST SSDF and NIST Zero Trust Architecture standards.
  • Pillar Two: Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors

SonicWall uses its Email Security to disrupt and mitigate the most common ransomware vector: Phishing. And in 2022 alone, we helped defend against 493.3 million ransomware attacks.

  • Pillar Three: Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience

This pillar shifts liability from end users to software providers that ignore best practices, ship insecure or vulnerable products or integrate unvetted or unsafe third-party software. And as part of our efforts to aign with the NIST SSDF, we’re implementing a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM).

  • Pillar Four: Invest in a Resilient Future

Given CISA’s prominence in this guidance, any regulations created will likely include threat emulation testing, and will likely be mapped to threat techniques, such as MITRE ATT&CK. SonicWall Capture Client (our EDR solution) is powered by SentinelOne, which has been a participant in the MITRE ATT&CK evaluations since 2018 and was a top performer in the 2022 Evaluations.

  • Pillar Five: Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals

An international company, SonicWall recognizes the importance of international partnerships and works to comply with global regulations such as GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS and more. By sharing threat intelligence and collaborating no mitigation strategies, we work with governments and the rest of the cybersecurity community to pursue shared cybersecurity goals.

And with the continued rise in cybercrime, realizing these goals has never been more important. In “The State of Cybersecurity: Year in Review,” Mandiant CEO Kevin Mandia summarized findings from the 1,163 intrusions his company investigated in 2022. The good news, Mandia said, is that we’re detecting threats faster. In just ten years, we’ve gone from averaging 200 days to notice there’s a problem, to just 16 days currently — but at the same time, an increase in the global median dwell time for ransomware shows there’s still work to be done.

Mandia also outined the evolution of how cybercriminals are entering networks, from Unix platforms, to Windows-based attacks, and from phishing, to spearphishing to vulnerabilities — bringing patch management once again to the fore.

Deep within the RSAC Sandbox, where today’s defenders learn, play and test their skills, panelists convened to discuss how to stop attackers’ relentless attempts to shift left. “Software Supply Chain: Panel on Threat Intel, Trends, Mitigation Strategies” explained that while the use of third-party components increases agility, it comes with tremendous risk. More than 96% of software organizations rely on third-party code, 90% of which consists of open source—but the developers of this software are frequently single individuals or small groups who may not have time to incorporate proper security, or even know how. Our current strategy of signing at the end isn’t enough, panelists argued—to truly ensure safety, signing should be done throughout the process (otherwise known as “sign at the station”).

Israel provides an example of how a country can approach the issue of software supply chain vulnerability — among other things, the country has created a GitHub and browser extension allowing developers to check packages for malicious code — but much work would need to be done to implement the Israel model in the U.S. AI also provides some hope, but given its current inability to reliably detect malicious code, we’re still a long way from being able to rely on it. In the meantime, organizations will need to rely on tried-and-true solutions such as SBOMs to help guard against supply chain attacks in the near future.

But while AI has tremendous potential to help defenders, it also has terrible potential to aid attackers. In “ChatGPT: A New Generation of Dynamic Machine-Based Attacks,” the speakers highlighted ways that attackers are using the new generation of AI technology to dramatically improve social engineering attempts, expand their efforts to targets in new areas, and even write ransomware and other malicious code. In real time, the speakers demonstrated the difference between previous phishing emails and phishing generated by ChatGPT, including the use of more natural language, the ability to instantly access details about the target and the ability to imitate a leader or colleague trusted by the victim with a minimum of effort. These advancements will lead to a sharp increase in victims of phishing attacks, as well as things like Business Email Compromise.

And while there are guardrails in place to help prevent ChatGPT from being used maliciously, they can be circumvented with breathtaking ease. With the simple adjustment of a prompt, the speakers demonstrated, ransomware and other malicious code can be generated. While this code isn’t functional on its own, it’s just one or two simple adjustments away — and this capability could be used to rapidly increase the speed with which attacks are launched.

These capabilities are especially concerning given the rise in state-sponsored attacks. In “State of the Hack 2023: NSA’s Perspective,” NSA Director of Cybersecurity Rob Joyce addressed a packed house regarding the NSA’s work to prevent the increasing wave of nation-state threats. The two biggest nation-state threats to U.S. cybersecurity continue to be Russia and China, with much of the Russian effort centering around the U.S.’ assistance in the Russia/Ukraine conflict.

As we detailed in our SonicWall 2023 Cyber Threat Report, since the beginning of the conflict, attacks by Russia’s military and associated groups have driven a massive spike in cybercrime in Ukraine. The good news, Joyce said, is that Russia is currently in intelligence-gathering mode when it comes to the U.S., and is specifically taking care not to release large-scale NotPetya-type attacks. But Russia also appears to be playing the long game, and is showing no signs of slowing or scaling back their efforts.

China also appears to be biding its time — but unlike Russia, whose efforts appear to be focused around traditional military dominance, China is seeking technological dominance. Exploitation by China has increased so much that we’ve become numb to it, Joyce argued. And since these nation-state sponsored attackers don’t incur much reputational damage for their misdeeds, they’ve become increasingly brazen in their attacks, going so far as to require any citizen who finds a zero-day to pass details to the government and hosting competitions for building exploits and finding vulnerabilities. And the country is also making efforts to influence international tech standards in an attempt to tip scales in their favor for years to come.

The 2023 RSA Conference has offered a wealth of information on a wide variety of topics, but it will soon draw to a close. Thursday is the last day to visit the SonicWall booth (#N-5585 in Moscone North) and enjoy demos and presentations on all of our latest technology. Don’t head home without stopping by — and don’t forget to check back for the conclusion of our RSAC 2023 coverage!

Source :
https://blog.sonicwall.com/en-us/2023/04/rsa-report-cybersecurity-is-national-security/

Preventing and Detecting Attacks Involving 3CX Desktop App

In this blog entry, we provide technical details and analysis on the 3CX attacks as they happen. We also discuss available solutions which security teams can maximize for early detection and mitigate the impact of 3CX attacks.

By: Trend Micro Research
March 30, 2023
Read time: 7 min (1870 words)

Updated on:

  • April 5, 2:39 a.m. EDT: We added Windows, Mac, and network commands to the Trend Micro Vision One™️ guide in the linked PDF.
  • April 4, 3:29 a.m. EDT: We added Trend Micro XDR filters to the solutions.
  • April 3, 2:33 a.m. EDT: We added details on d3dcompiler_47.dll‘s abuse of CVE-2013-3900 to make it appear legitimately signed.
  • April 1, 1:50 a.m. EDT: We added a guide on how Vision One can be used to search for potential threats associated with the 3CX desktop app. 
  • March 31, 11:07 p.m. EDT: We added technical details, an analysis of the info-stealer payload, and information on Trend Micro XDR capabilities for investigating and mitigating risks associated with the 3CX desktop app.
  • March 31, 3:00 a.m. EDT: We added the execution flow diagram, a link to Trend Micro support page, and a list of Mac IOCs and detection names.
  •  

In late March 2023, security researchers revealed that threat actors abused a popular business communication software from 3CX — in particular, the reports mention that a version of the 3CX VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) desktop client was being employed to target 3CX’s customers as part of an attack.

On its forums, 3CX has posted an update that recommends uninstalling the desktop app and using the Progressive Web App (PWA) client instead. The company also mentioned that they are working on an update to the desktop app.

For a more comprehensive scope of protection against possible attacks associated with the 3CX Desktop App, the Trend Micro XDR platform can help organizations mitigate the impact by collecting and analyzing extensive activity data from various sources. By applying XDR analytics to the data gathered from its native products, Trend Micro XDR generates correlated and actionable alerts.  

Trend Micro customers can also take advantage of Trend Micro Vision One™ to search for and monitor potential threats associated with the 3CX Desktop App, and to better understand observed attack vectors. For more information on how to utilize Trend Micro Vision One features, you may download the PDF guide here.

Additional guidance for Trend Micro customers including help with protection and detection can be found on our support page.

What is the compromised application?

The 3CX app is a private automatic branch exchange (PABX) software that provides several communication functions for its users, including video conferencing, live chat, and call management. The app is available on most major operating systems, including Windows, macOS, and Linux. Additionally, the client is available as a mobile application for both Android and iOS devices, while a Chrome extension and the PWA version of the client allow users to access the software through their browsers.

The issue was said to be limited to the Electron (non-web versions) of their Windows package (versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416) and macOS clients (versions 18.11.1213, 18.12.402, 18.12.407 and 18.12.416).

According to the company’s website, more than 600,000 businesses and over 12 million daily users around the world use 3CX’s VoIP IPBX software.

How does the attack work?

The attack is reportedly a multi-stage chain in which the initial step involves a compromised version of the 3CX desktop app. Based on initial analysis, the MSI package (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A and Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.SMA) is the one that is compromised with possible trojanized DLLs, since the .exe file has the same name.

The infection chain begins with 3CXDesktopApp.exe loading ffmpeg.dll (detected as Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A andTrojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.SMA). Next, ffmpeg.dll reads and decrypts the encrypted code from d3dcompiler_47.dll (detected as Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A and Trojan.Wind64.DEEFACE.SMD3D).

The decrypted code seems to be the backdoor payload that tries to access the IconStorages GiHub page to access an ICO file (detected as Trojan.Win32.DEEFFACE.ICO) containing the encrypted C&C server that the backdoor connects to in order to retrieve the possible final payload. In addition, d3dcompiler_47.dll also abuses CVE-2013-3900 to make it appear that it is legitimately signed.

Figure 1. The detailed execution flow and Trend Micro detections of the malicious files. The MSI installer contains the .exe and two .dll files. The main source of the detection in the MSI installer is "ffmpeg.dll," which is the trojanized DLL.
Figure 1. The detailed execution flow and Trend Micro detections of the malicious files. The MSI installer contains the .exe and two .dll files. The main source of the detection in the MSI installer is “ffmpeg.dll,” which is the trojanized DLL.

As part of its attack routine, it contacts the servers noted in the list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) at the end of this blog entry. These domains are blocked by the Trend Micro Web Reputation Services (WRS).

Execution flow

Upon execution, the MSI package installer will drop the following files that are related to malicious behavior. Trend Micro Smart Scan Pattern (cloud-based) TBL 21474.300.40 can detect these files as Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A.

  • 3CXDesktopApp.exe: A normal file that is abused to load the trojanized DLL
  • ffmpeg.dll: A trojanized DLL used to read, load, and execute a malicious shellcode from d3dcompiler_47.dll
  • d3dcompiler_47.dll: A DLL appended with an encrypted shellcode after the fe ed fa ce hex string

Some conditions are necessary for execution. For example, the sleep timestamp varies depending on the following conditions: First, it checks if the manifest file is present, as well as if it is using a specified date. If the file is not present or if it is using the specified date, the timestamp will generate a random number and use the formula rand() % 1800000 + current date + 604800 (604,800 is seven days).  After the date is computed, the malware will continue its routine.

Upon execution of 3CXDesktopApp.exe, ffmpeg.dll, which seems to be a trojanized or patched DLL, will be loaded. It will still contain its normal functionalities, but it will have an added malicious function that reads d3dcompiler_47.dll to locate an encrypted shellcode after the fe ed fa ce hex strings.

Figure 2
Figure 2. Reading "d3dcompiler_47.dll" and locating the “fe ed fa ce” hex string
Figure 2. Reading “d3dcompiler_47.dll” and locating the “fe ed fa ce” hex string

Upon decryption of the malicious shellcode using RC4 with the key, 3jB(2bsG#@c7, the shellcode will then try to access the GitHub repository that houses the ICO files containing the encrypted C&C strings that use Base64 encoding and AES + GCM encryption at the end of the image.

These B64 strings seem to be C&C domains that the shellcode tries to connect to for downloading other possible payloads. However, we were unable to confirm the exact nature of these payloads since the GitHub repository (raw.githubusercontent[.]com/IconStorages/images/main/) had already been taken down at the time of this writing. Note that the process exits when the page is inaccessible.

Figure 3. Code snippet showing the hard-coded GitHub repository
Figure 3. Code snippet showing the hard-coded GitHub repository
Figure 4. An ICO file from the GitHub repository
Figure 4. An ICO file from the GitHub repository

The above description applies to the Windows version. The behaviour of the Mac version is broadly similar, although it only uses a subset of the Windows C&C domains.

Info-stealer payload analysis

Based on our ongoing analysis of attacks on 3CX and the behaviors observed, the following section details what we know so far about the payload’s attack vector. 

Payloads in investigated 3CX attacks are detected as TrojanSpy.Win64.ICONICSTEALER.THCCABC. Upon analysis of the payload named ICONIC Stealer, we discovered that if it is executed using regsvr32.exe as the DLL loader, it will display the following system error:

Figure 5. Error displayed upon executing the sample using "regsvr32.exe"
Figure 5. Error displayed upon executing the sample using “regsvr32.exe”

Meanwhile, if rundll32.exe is used as the DLL loader, it encounters a WerFault error and displays the following pop-up message:

Figure 6. Error displayed if "rundll32.exe" is used as the DLL loader
Figure 6. Error displayed if “rundll32.exe” is used as the DLL loader

This indicates that the sample must be loaded by a specific application to proceed to its malicious routine.

ICONIC Stealer then checks for a file named config.json under the folder “3CXDesktopApp.”

Figure 7. Checking for "config.json"
Figure 7. Checking for “config.json”

ICONIC Stealer was then observed to steal the following system information:

  • HostName
  • DomainName
  • OsVersion

The gathered data will then be converted into a text-string format.

Figure 8. Converting gathered data into a text-string format
Figure 8. Converting gathered data into a text-string format

ICONIC Stealer then proceeds to its last behavior, which steals browser data. It uses the function shown in Figure 9 to traverse the infected system using predefined directories related to the browser’s history and other browser-related information.

Figure 9. Function for traversing the infected system
Figure 9. Function for traversing the infected system

The following figure shows a list of predefined strings:

Figure 10. List of predefined strings
Figure 10. List of predefined strings

The system directories on the following list compose the targets identified in the partial analysis of the ICONIC Stealer’s behavior. More information will be provided as this blog is updated. 

  • AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data
  •  
  • AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
  •  
  • AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data
  •  
  • AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
BrowserTarget information
ChromeHistory
EdgeHistory
BraveHistory
Firefoxplaces.sqlite

Table 1. The targeted section of each browser. Note that “places.sqlite” stores the annotations, bookmarks, favorite icons, input history, keywords, and the browsing history of visited pages for Mozilla Firefox.

ICONIC Stealer was also found with the capability to limit the retrieved data to the first five hundred entries to ensure that the most recent browser activity is the data that is retrieved:

Figure 11. Limiting data to the first 500 entries
Figure 11. Limiting data to the first 500 entries

“UTF-16LE”, ‘SELECT url, title FROM urls ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT

“UTF-16LE”, ‘500’,0

“UTF-16LE”, ‘SELECT url, title FROM moz_places ORDER BY id DESC

“UTF-16LE”, ‘LIMIT 500’,0

Figure 12. Retrieved results stored on an allocated buffer
Figure 12. Retrieved results stored on an allocated buffer

The gathered data will be passed to the main loader module to POST then back to the C&C server embedded in the main module.

What is its potential impact?

Due to its widespread use and its importance in an organization’s communication system, threat actors can cause major damage (for example, by monitoring or rerouting both internal and external communication) to businesses that use this software.

What can organizations do about it?

Organizations that are potentially affected should stop using the vulnerable version if possible and apply the patches or mitigation workarounds if these are available. IT and security teams should also scan for confirmed compromised binaries and builds and monitor for anomalous behavior in 3CX processes, with a particular focus on C&C traffic. 

Meanwhile, enabling behavioral monitoring in security products can help detect the presence of the attack within the system.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

SHA256File name / detailsDetection name
dde03348075512796241389dfea5560c20a3d2a2eac95c894e7bbed5e85a0acc
Installer: aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868		3cxdesktopapp-18.12.407.msi (Windows)Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A
fad482ded2e25ce9e1dd3d3ecc3227af714bdfbbde04347dbc1b21d6a3670405
Installer: 59e1edf4d82fae4978e97512b0331b7eb21dd4b838b850ba46794d9c7a2c0983		(Windows)Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A
c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02ffmpeg.dll Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A
7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896ffmpeg.dll Trojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A
11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03d3dcompiler.dllTrojan.Win64.DEEFFACE.A
4e08e4ffc699e0a1de4a5225a0b4920933fbb9cf123cde33e1674fde6d61444f Trojan.Win32.DEEFFACE.ICO
8ab3a5eaaf8c296080fadf56b265194681d7da5da7c02562953a4cb60e147423 StealerTrojanSpy.Win64.ICONICSTEALER.THCCABC

Here is the list of IOCs for Mac users: 

SHA256File nameDetection name
5a017652531eebfcef7011c37a04f11621d89084f8f9507201f071ce359bea3f3CX Desktop App-darwin-x64-18.11.1213.zipTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A
5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051ed3142903CXDesktopApp-18.11.1213.dmgTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A
fee4f9dabc094df24d83ec1a8c4e4ff573e5d9973caa676f58086c99561382d7libffmpeg.dylibTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A
5009c7d1590c1f8c05827122172583ddf924c53b55a46826abf66da46725505achild macho file of libffmpeg.dylibTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A
e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec3CXDesktopApp-18.12.416.dmgTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A
a64fa9f1c76457ecc58402142a8728ce34ccba378c17318b3340083eeb7acc67libffmpeg.dylibTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A
87c5d0c93b80acf61d24e7aaf0faae231ab507ca45483ad3d441b5d1acebc43cchild macho file of libffmpeg.dylibTrojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A


The following domains are blocked by Trend Micro Web Reputation Services (WRS)

  • akamaicontainer[.]com
  • akamaitechcloudservices[.]com
  • azuredeploystore[.]com
  • azureonlinecloud[.]com
  • azureonlinestorage[.]com
  • dunamistrd[.]com
  • glcloudservice[.]com
  • journalide[.]org
  • msedgepackageinfo[.]com
  • msstorageazure[.]com
  • msstorageboxes[.]com
  • officeaddons[.]com
  • officestoragebox[.]com
  • pbxcloudeservices[.]com
  • pbxphonenetwork[.]com
  • pbxsources[.]com
  • qwepoi123098[.]com
  • sbmsa[.]wiki
  • sourceslabs[.]com
  • visualstudiofactory[.]com
  • zacharryblogs[.]com

Trend Micro XDR uses the following filters to protect customers from 3CX-related attacks:

FilterIDOS
Compromised 3CX Application File IndicatorsF6669macOS, Windows
DLL Sideloading of 3CX ApplicationF6668Windows
Web Reputation Services Detection for Compromised 3CX ApplicationF6670macOS, Windows
Suspicious Web Access of Possible Compromised 3CX ApplicationF6673Windows
Suspicious DNS Query of Possible Compromised 3CX ApplicationF6672Windows

Trend Micro Malware Detection Patterns for Endpoint, Servers (Apex One, Worry-Free Business Security Services, Worry-Free Business Security Standard/Advanced, Deep Security with anti-malware, among others), Mail, and Gateway (Cloud App Security, ScanMail for Exchange, IMSVA):

  • Starting with Trend Micro Smart Scan Pattern (cloud-based) TBL 21474.200.40, known trojanized versions of this application are being detected as Trojan Win64.DEEFFACE.A. 
  • The Mac version of this threat is detected as Trojan.MacOS.FAKE3L3CTRON.A.

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/information-on-attacks-involving-3cx-desktop-app.html

UniFi Network – 802.1X Control (Advanced)

This article describes how to configure 802.1X Control on UniFi switches to authenticate wired client devices. 

Requirements & Notes

  • A UniFi gateway or UniFi OS Console with a built-in gateway is required to run RADIUS.
  • A third-party RADIUS server can be used by creating a new RADIUS profile.
  • 802.1X Control mode ‘Auto’ requires the usage of a third-party RADIUS server.
  • The fallback VLAN is used when a client device fails to authenticate.

Configuring MAC-Based Authentication

1. Enable 802.1X Control for all or individual UniFi switches and optionally specify the Fallback VLAN.

  • All – Settings > Networks > Global Switch Settings > 802.1X Control
  • Individual – UniFi Devices > select switch > Settings > Advanced > 802.1X Control

2. Select the Default RADIUS profile when using a UniFi gateway or Create New RADIUS profile when using a third-party RADIUS server.

3. Create the RADIUS users that match the MAC addresses of the wired clients.

Settings > Profiles > RADIUS > Default > Create New RADIUS User

  • Username – Mac address in capital letters without any dashes or colons, for example ABCDEF123456.
  • Password – Mac Address in capital letters without any dashes or colons, for example ABCDEF123456.
  • VLAN ID – 0
  • Tunnel Type – None
  • Tunnel Medium Type – None
mceclip0.png

4. Create a new Port Profile and select MAC-based under the Advanced settings.

Settings > Profiles > Switch Ports > Create New Port Profile

  • Native Network – Default or specific network
  • Allowed Networks – None
  • Voice Network – None
  • 802.1X Control (Advanced) – MAC-based
mceclip0.png

5. Apply the 802.1X Control profile to the port(s) on the UniFi switch where a wired client device is connected.

UniFi Devices > select switch > Ports > Port Manager > select port(s) > Port Profile 

Source :
https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/115004589707-UniFi-Network-802-1X-Control-Advanced-

Patch CVE-2023-23397 Immediately: What You Need To Know and Do

We break down the basic information of CVE-2023-23397, the zero-day, zero-touch vulnerability that was rated 9.8 on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) scale.

Update as of 03/22/3023 2:50PM PHT: Updated the prevention and mitigation section for an additional step.

CVE-2023-23397 is a critical privilege elevation/authentication bypass vulnerability in Outlook, released as part of the March Patch Tuesday set of fixes. The vulnerability, which affects all versions of Windows Outlook, was given a 9.8 CVSS rating and is one of two zero-day exploits disclosed on March 14. We summarize the points that security teams need to know about this vulnerability and how they can mitigate the risks of this gap.

What is it?

CVE-2023-23397 is an elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook. It is a zero-touch exploit, meaning the security gap requires low complexity to abuse and requires no user interaction.

fig1-patch-cve-2023-23397-immeditaely-what-you-need-to-know-do-faq
Figure 1. General exploitation routine of CVE-2023-23397

How is CVE-2023-23397 exploited?

The attacker sends a message to the victim with an extended Message Application Program Interface (MAPI) property with a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path to a remote attacker-controlled Server Message Block (SMB, via TCP 445). Share-hosted on a server controlled by the attacker, the vulnerability is exploited whether the recipient has seen the message or not. The attacker remotely sends a malicious calendar invite represented by .msg — the message format that supports reminders in Outlook — to trigger the vulnerable API endpoint PlayReminderSound using “PidLidReminderFileParameter” (the custom alert sound option for reminders).

When the victim connects to the attacker’s SMB server, the connection to the remote server sends the user’s New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) negotiation message automatically, which the attacker can use for authentication against other systems that support NTLM authentication.

NTLMv2 hashes are the latest protocol Windows uses for authentication, and it is used for a number of services with each response containing a hashed representation of users’ information, such as the username and password. As such, threat actors can attempt a NTLM relay attack to gain access to other services, or a full compromise of domains if the compromised users are admins. While online services such as Microsoft 365 are not susceptible to this attack because they do not support NTLM authentication, the Microsoft 365 Windows Outlook app is still vulnerable.

How easy is it to exploit?

User interaction is not necessary to trigger (even before message preview) it, nor does it require high privileges. CVE-2023-23397 is a zero-touch vulnerability that is triggered when the victim client is prompted and notified (e.g., when an appointment or task prompts five minutes before the designated time). It is difficult to block outbound SMB traffic for remote users. The attacker could use the same credentials to gain access to other resources. We elaborate on this example in our webinar (at 04:23 of the video).

Is it in the wild? What versions and operating systems (OS) are affected?

There have been reports of limited attacks abusing this gap. Microsoft has been coordinating with the affected victims to remediate this concern. All supported versions of Microsoft Outlook for Windows are affected. Other versions of Microsoft Outlook, such as Android, iOS, Mac, as well as Outlook on the web and other M365 services, are not affected.

What are the possible attack scenarios?

fig2-patch-cve-2023-23397-immeditaely-what-you-need-to-know-do-faq
Figure 2. Beyond the exploit use scenario 1: Data and information theft via NTLM relay attack

1. Lateral movement, malicious navigation using the relayed NTLM hashes

Relay attacks gained notoriety as a use case for Mimikatz using the NTLM credential dumping routine via the sekurlsa module. In addition, pass-the-hat (PtH) (or pass-the hash) attacks and variations of data and information theft can be done. Once attackers are in the system, they can use the network for lateral movement and navigate the organization’s lines over SMB. 

fig1-patch-cve-2023-23397-immeditaely-what-you-need-to-know-do-faq
Figure 3. Beyond the exploit use scenario 2: WebDAV directory traversal for remote code execution (RCE)

2. WebDAV directory traversal for payload attacker routines

It’s possible for an attacker to leverage WebDAV services in cases where no valid SMB service for Outlook exists (i.e., is not configured) in the client. This is an alternative to the Web/HTTP service that can also be read as a UNC path by .msg and/or Outlook Calendar items. Attackers can set up a malicious WebDAV server to respond to affected victim clients with malicious pages. These pages may contain code that can range from leveraging a directory traversal technique similar to the Microsoft vulnerability CVE-2022-34713 (dubbed as DogWalk) to push any form of payload for remote code execution such as webshells.

What can I do to prevent and mitigate the risk of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397?

Here are some steps that security administrators can perform to reduce the risk of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397:

  • Apply the vendor patches immediately. Microsoft has released a patch as part of their March 2023 Monthly Security Update.
  • Block TCP 445/SMB outbound from your network. This will prevent the sending of NTLM authentication messages to remote file shares. If this cannot be done, we recommend monitoring outbound traffic over port 445 for unknown external IP addresses, then identifying and blocking them.
  • Customers can disable the WebClient service. Note that this will block all WebDAV connections, including intranet.
  • Add users to the Protected Users Security Group. This prevents the use of NTLM as an authentication mechanism, but note that this could impact applications that rely on NTLM in your environment.
  • Enforce SMB signing on clients and servers to prevent a relay attack.
  • Other researchers have noted that disabling the “Show reminders” setting in Outlook can prevent the leak of NTLM credentials.

How can I check if I’m affected?

Microsoft has provided a PowerShell script as a solution to the issue. The script is designed to scan emails, calendar entries, and task items, and to verify if they have the “PidLidReminderFileParameter” property. By running the script, administrators can locate problematic items that have this property and subsequently remove them or delete them permanently. Download the script here: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/blob/a4c096e8b6e6eddeba2f42910f165681ed64adf7/docs/Security/CVE-2023-23397.md.

Which Trend Micro solutions can address this vulnerability?

  • Trend Micro Malware Detection Patterns (VSAPI, Predictive Learning, Behavioral Monitoring and Web Reputation Service) for Endpoint, Servers, Mail, and Gateway (e.g., Apex One, Worry-Free Business Security Services, Worry-Free Business Security Standard/Advanced, Deep Security with anti-malware, etc.):
    • Starting with Trend Micro Smart Scan Pattern version 21474.296.07, known exploits associated with this vulnerability are being detected as Trojan.Win32.CVE202323397.
  • Trend Micro Vision One: Use this solution as an investigation tool. In the “Search App,” select “Endpoint Activity Data” and enter the following query: – dpt: 445 AND eventSubId: 204 AND processCmd: *OUTLOOK*. This can be saved and added to a watchlist if desired.
  • Cloud One Workload Security and Deep Security: IPS Rule 1009058, which will need to be changed to Prevent. 
  • TippingPoint Filters:
    • 28471 SMB: SMBv1 Successful Protocol Negotiation
    • 28472 SMB: SMBv2 Successful Protocol Negotiation
    • Please note: Enabling these filters in Block mode will interrupt legitimate SMB traffic. Customers are advised to add exceptions for their Private IP address space.
  • Trend Micro Deep Discovery Inspector: Rule 4479 NTLM v1 Authentication – SMB (Request).
    • If NTLM v1 is configured by default, customers can use this rule to monitor attempts for outgoing NTLM handshakes. Please note this rule only detects and does not block, so it is best used as an investigative tool for follow-up.

Details for all available Trend Micro solutions are available here: https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/000292525?language=en_US.

To learn more about this vulnerability, you may view our technical webinar here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j44vIhklTp4

Source :
https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/patch-cve-2023-23397-immediately-what-you-need-to-know-and-do.html

General Remote Desktop connection troubleshooting

Use these steps when a Remote Desktop client can’t connect to a remote desktop but doesn’t provide messages or other symptoms that would help identify the cause.

Check the status of the RDP protocol

Check the status of the RDP protocol on a local computer

To check and change the status of the RDP protocol on a local computer, see How to enable Remote Desktop.

 Note

If the remote desktop options are not available, see Check whether a Group Policy Object is blocking RDP.

Check the status of the RDP protocol on a remote computer

 Important

Follow this section’s instructions carefully. Serious problems can occur if the registry is modified incorrectly. Before you start modifying the registry, back up the registry so you can restore it in case something goes wrong.

To check and change the status of the RDP protocol on a remote computer, use a network registry connection:

  1. First, go to the Start menu, then select Run. In the text box that appears, enter regedt32.
  2. In the Registry Editor, select File, then select Connect Network Registry.
  3. In the Select Computer dialog box, enter the name of the remote computer, select Check Names, and then select OK.
  4. Navigate to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server and to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services.
    Registry Editor, showing the fDenyTSConnections entry
    • If the value of the fDenyTSConnections key is 0, then RDP is enabled.
    • If the value of the fDenyTSConnections key is 1, then RDP is disabled.
  5. To enable RDP, change the value of fDenyTSConnections from 1 to 0.

Check whether a Group Policy Object (GPO) is blocking RDP on a local computer

If you can’t turn on RDP in the user interface or the value of fDenyTSConnections reverts to 1 after you’ve changed it, a GPO may be overriding the computer-level settings.

To check the group policy configuration on a local computer, open a Command Prompt window as an administrator, and enter the following command:

Windows Command PromptCopy

gpresult /H c:\gpresult.html

After this command finishes, open gpresult.html. In Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop Services\Remote Desktop Session Host\Connections, find the Allow users to connect remotely by using Remote Desktop Services policy.

  • If the setting for this policy is Enabled, Group Policy is not blocking RDP connections.
  • If the setting for this policy is Disabled, check Winning GPO. This is the GPO that is blocking RDP connections. An example segment of gpresult.html, in which the domain-level GPO Block RDP is disabling RDP.An example segment of gpresult.html, in which Local Group Policy is disabling RDP.

Check whether a GPO is blocking RDP on a remote computer

To check the Group Policy configuration on a remote computer, the command is almost the same as for a local computer:

Windows Command PromptCopy

gpresult /S <computer name> /H c:\gpresult-<computer name>.html

The file that this command produces (gpresult-<computer name>.html) uses the same information format as the local computer version (gpresult.html) uses.

Modifying a blocking GPO

You can modify these settings in the Group Policy Object Editor (GPE) and Group Policy Management Console (GPM). For more information about how to use Group Policy, see Advanced Group Policy Management.

To modify the blocking policy, use one of the following methods:

  • In GPE, access the appropriate level of GPO (such as local or domain), and navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Remote Desktop Services > Remote Desktop Session Host > Connections > Allow users to connect remotely by using Remote Desktop Services.
    1. Set the policy to either Enabled or Not configured.
    2. On the affected computers, open a command prompt window as an administrator, and run the gpupdate /force command.
  • In GPM, navigate to the organizational unit (OU) in which the blocking policy is applied to the affected computers and delete the policy from the OU.

Check the status of the RDP services

On both the local (client) computer and the remote (target) computer, the following services should be running:

  • Remote Desktop Services (TermService)
  • Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector (UmRdpService)

You can use the Services MMC snap-in to manage the services locally or remotely. You can also use PowerShell to manage the services locally or remotely (if the remote computer is configured to accept remote PowerShell cmdlets).

Remote Desktop services in the Services MMC snap-in. Do not modify the default service settings.

On either computer, if one or both services are not running, start them.

 Note

If you start the Remote Desktop Services service, click Yes to automatically restart the Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector service.

Check that the RDP listener is functioning

 Important

Follow this section’s instructions carefully. Serious problems can occur if the registry is modified incorrectly. Before you starty modifying the registry, back up the registry so you can restore it in case something goes wrong.

Check the status of the RDP listener

For this procedure, use a PowerShell instance that has administrative permissions. For a local computer, you can also use a command prompt that has administrative permissions. However, this procedure uses PowerShell because the same cmdlets work both locally and remotely.

  1. To connect to a remote computer, run the following cmdlet:PowerShellCopyEnter-PSSession -ComputerName <computer name>
  2. Enter qwinsta. The qwinsta command lists the processes listening on the computer's ports.
  3. If the list includes rdp-tcp with a status of Listen, the RDP listener is working. Proceed to Check the RDP listener port. Otherwise, continue at step 4.
  4. Export the RDP listener configuration from a working computer.
    1. Sign in to a computer that has the same operating system version as the affected computer has, and access that computer’s registry (for example, by using Registry Editor).
    2. Navigate to the following registry entry:
      HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp
    3. Export the entry to a .reg file. For example, in Registry Editor, right-click the entry, select Export, and then enter a filename for the exported settings.
    4. Copy the exported .reg file to the affected computer.
  5. To import the RDP listener configuration, open a PowerShell window that has administrative permissions on the affected computer (or open the PowerShell window and connect to the affected computer remotely).
    1. To back up the existing registry entry, enter the following cmdlet:PowerShellCopycmd /c 'reg export "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-tcp" C:\Rdp-tcp-backup.reg'
    2. To remove the existing registry entry, enter the following cmdlets:PowerShellCopyRemove-Item -path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-tcp' -Recurse -Force
    3. To import the new registry entry and then restart the service, enter the following cmdlets:PowerShellCopycmd /c 'regedit /s c:\<filename>.reg' Restart-Service TermService -Force Replace <filename> with the name of the exported .reg file.
  6. Test the configuration by trying the remote desktop connection again. If you still can’t connect, restart the affected computer.
  7. If you still can’t connect, check the status of the RDP self-signed certificate.

Check the status of the RDP self-signed certificate

  1. If you still can’t connect, open the Certificates MMC snap-in. When you are prompted to select the certificate store to manage, select Computer account, and then select the affected computer.
  2. In the Certificates folder under Remote Desktop, delete the RDP self-signed certificate. Remote Desktop certificates in the MMC Certificates snap-in.
  3. On the affected computer, restart the Remote Desktop Services service.
  4. Refresh the Certificates snap-in.
  5. If the RDP self-signed certificate has not been recreated, check the permissions of the MachineKeys folder.

Check the permissions of the MachineKeys folder

  1. On the affected computer, open Explorer, and then navigate to C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\.
  2. Right-click MachineKeys, select Properties, select Security, and then select Advanced.
  3. Make sure that the following permissions are configured:
    • Builtin\Administrators: Full control
    • Everyone: Read, Write

Check the RDP listener port

On both the local (client) computer and the remote (target) computer, the RDP listener should be listening on port 3389. No other applications should be using this port.

 Important

Follow this section’s instructions carefully. Serious problems can occur if the registry is modified incorrectly. Before you starty modifying the registry, back up the registry so you can restore it in case something goes wrong.

To check or change the RDP port, use the Registry Editor:

  1. Go to the Start menu, select Run, then enter regedt32 into the text box that appears.
    • To connect to a remote computer, select File, and then select Connect Network Registry.
    • In the Select Computer dialog box, enter the name of the remote computer, select Check Names, and then select OK.
  2. Open the registry and navigate to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\<listener>. The PortNumber subkey for the RDP protocol.
  3. If PortNumber has a value other than 3389, change it to 3389. ImportantYou can operate Remote Desktop services using another port. However, we don’t recommend you do this. This article doesn’t cover how to troubleshoot that type of configuration.
  4. After you change the port number, restart the Remote Desktop Services service.

Check that another application isn’t trying to use the same port

For this procedure, use a PowerShell instance that has administrative permissions. For a local computer, you can also use a command prompt that has administrative permissions. However, this procedure uses PowerShell because the same cmdlets work locally and remotely.

  1. Open a PowerShell window. To connect to a remote computer, enter Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <computer name>.
  2. Enter the following command:PowerShellCopycmd /c 'netstat -ano | find "3389"' The netstat command produces a list of ports and the services listening to them.
  3. Look for an entry for TCP port 3389 (or the assigned RDP port) with a status of Listening. NoteThe process identifier (PID) for the process or service using that port appears under the PID column.
  4. To determine which application is using port 3389 (or the assigned RDP port), enter the following command:PowerShellCopycmd /c 'tasklist /svc | find "<pid listening on 3389>"' The tasklist command reports details of a specific process.
  5. Look for an entry for the PID number that is associated with the port (from the netstat output). The services or processes that are associated with that PID appear on the right column.
  6. If an application or service other than Remote Desktop Services (TermServ.exe) is using the port, you can resolve the conflict by using one of the following methods:
    • Configure the other application or service to use a different port (recommended).
    • Uninstall the other application or service.
    • Configure RDP to use a different port, and then restart the Remote Desktop Services service (not recommended).

Check whether a firewall is blocking the RDP port

Use the psping tool to test whether you can reach the affected computer by using port 3389.

  1. Go to a different computer that isn’t affected and download psping from https://live.sysinternals.com/psping.exe.
  2. Open a command prompt window as an administrator, change to the directory in which you installed psping, and then enter the following command:Copypsping -accepteula <computer IP>:3389
  3. Check the output of the psping command for results such as the following:
    • Connecting to <computer IP>: The remote computer is reachable.
    • (0% loss): All attempts to connect succeeded.
    • The remote computer refused the network connection: The remote computer is not reachable.
    • (100% loss): All attempts to connect failed.
  4. Run psping on multiple computers to test their ability to connect to the affected computer.
  5. Note whether the affected computer blocks connections from all other computers, some other computers, or only one other computer.
  6. Recommended next steps:
    • Engage your network administrators to verify that the network allows RDP traffic to the affected computer.
    • Investigate the configurations of any firewalls between the source computers and the affected computer (including Windows Firewall on the affected computer) to determine whether a firewall is blocking the RDP port.

Recommended content

Source :
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/troubleshoot/rdp-error-general-troubleshooting

3 Overlooked Cybersecurity Breaches

Here are three of the worst breaches, attacker tactics and techniques of 2022, and the security controls that can provide effective, enterprise security protection for them.

#1: 2 RaaS Attacks in 13 Months#

Ransomware as a service is a type of attack in which the ransomware software and infrastructure are leased out to the attackers. These ransomware services can be purchased on the dark web from other threat actors and ransomware gangs. Common purchasing plans include buying the entire tool, using the existing infrastructure while paying per infection, or letting other attackers perform the service while sharing revenue with them.

In this attack, the threat actor consists of one of the most prevalent ransomware groups, specializing in access via third parties, while the targeted company is a medium-sized retailer with dozens of sites in the United States.

The threat actors used ransomware as a service to breach the victim’s network. They were able to exploit third-party credentials to gain initial access, progress laterally, and ransom the company, all within mere minutes.

The swiftness of this attack was unusual. In most RaaS cases, attackers usually stay in the networks for weeks and months before demanding ransom. What is particularly interesting about this attack is that the company was ransomed in minutes, with no need for discovery or weeks of lateral movement.

A log investigation revealed that the attackers targeted servers that did not exist in this system. As it turns out, the victim was initially breached and ransomed 13 months before this second ransomware attack. Subsequently, the first attacker group monetized the first attack not only through the ransom they obtained, but also by selling the company’s network information to the second ransomware group.

In the 13 months between the two attacks, the victim changed its network and removed servers, but the new attackers were not aware of these architectural modifications. The scripts they developed were designed for the previous network map. This also explains how they were able to attack so quickly – they had plenty of information about the network. The main lesson here is that ransomware attacks can be repeated by different groups, especially if the victim pays well.

“RaaS attacks such as this one are a good example of how full visibility allows for early alerting. A global, converged, cloud-native SASE platform that supports all edges, like Cato Networks provides complete network visibility into network events that are invisible to other providers or may go under the radar as benign events. And, being able to fully contextualize the events allows for early detection and remediation.

#2: The Critical Infrastructure Attack on Radiation Alert Networks#

Attacks on critical infrastructure are becoming more common and more dangerous. Breaches of water supply plants, sewage systems and other such infrastructures could put millions of residents at risk of a human crisis. These infrastructures are also becoming more vulnerable, and attack surface management tools for OSINT like Shodan and Censys allow security teams to find such vulnerabilities with ease.

In 2021, two hackers were suspected of targeting radiation alert networks. Their attack relied on two insiders that worked for a third party. These insiders disabled the radiation alert systems, significantly debilitating their ability to monitor radiation attacks. The attackers were then able to delete critical software and disable radiation gauges (which is part of the infrastructure itself).

Cybersecurity Breaches

“Unfortunately, scanning for vulnerable systems in critical infrastructure is easier than ever. While many such organizations have multiple layers of security, they are still using point solutions to try and defend their infrastructure rather than one system that can look holistically at the full attack lifecycle. Breaches are never just a phishing problem, or a credentials problem, or a vulnerable system problem – they are always a combination of multiple compromises performed by the threat actor,” said Etay Maor, Sr. Director of Security Strategy at Cato Networks.

#3: The Three-Step Ransomware Attack That Started with Phishing#

The third attack is also a ransomware attack. This time, it consisted of three steps:

1. Infiltration – The attacker was able to gain access to the network through a phishing attack. The victim clicked on a link that generated a connection to an external site, which resulted in the download of the payload.

2. Network activity – In the second phase, the attacker progressed laterally in the network for two weeks. During this time, it collected admin passwords and used in-memory fileless malware. Then on New Year’s Eve, it performed the encryption. This date was chosen since it was (rightfully) assumed the security team would be off on vacation.

3. Exfiltration – Finally, the attackers uploaded the data out of the network.

In addition to these three main steps, additional sub-techniques were employed during the attack and the victim’s point security solutions were not able to block this attack.

Cybersecurity Breaches

“A multiple choke point approach, one that looks horizontally (so to speak) at the attack rather than as a set of vertical, disjointed issues, is the way to enhance detection, mitigation and prevention of such threats. Opposed to popular belief, the attacker needs to be right many times and the defenders only need to be right just once. The underlying technologies to implement a multiple choke point approach are full network visibility via a cloud-native backbone, and a single pass security stack that’s based on ZTNA.” said Etay Maor, Sr. Director of Security Strategy at Cato Networks.

How Do Security Point Solutions Stack Up?#

It is common for security professionals to succumb to the “single point of failure fallacy”. However, cyber-attacks are sophisticated events that rarely involve just one tactic or technique which is the cause of the breach. Therefore, an all-encompassing outlook is required to successfully mitigate cyber-attacks. Security point solutions are a solution for single points of failure. These tools can identify risks, but they will not connect the dots, which could and has led to a breach.

Here’s Watch Out for in the Coming Months#

According to ongoing security research conducted by Cato Networks Security Team, they have identified two additional vulnerabilities and exploit attempts that they recommend including in your upcoming security plans:

1. Log4j#

While Log4j made its debut as early as December of 2021, the noise its making hasn’t died down. Log4j is still being used by attackers to exploit systems, as not all organizations have been able to patch their Log4j vulnerabilities or detect Log4j attacks, in what is known as “virtual patching”. They recommend prioritizing Log4j mitigation.

2. Misconfigured Firewalls and VPNs#

Security solutions like firewalls and VPNs have become access points for attackers. Patching them has become increasingly difficult, especially in the era of architecture cloudification and remote work. It is recommended to pay close attention to these components as they are increasingly vulnerable.

How to Minimize Your Attack Surface and Gain Visibility into the Network#

To reduce the attack surface, security professionals need visibility into their networks. Visibility relies on three pillars:

  • Actionable information – that can be used to mitigate attacks
  • Reliable information – that minimizes the number of false positives
  • Timely information – to ensure mitigation happens before the attack has an impact

Once an organization has complete visibility to the activity on their network they can contextualize the data, decide whether the activity witnessed should be allowed, denied, monitored, restricted (or any other action) and then have the ability to enforce this decision. All these elements must be applied to every entity, be it a user, device, cloud app etc. All the time everywhere. That is what SASE is all about.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter  and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2023/02/3-overlooked-cybersecurity-breaches.html

VMware Security Solutions Advisories VMSA-2021-0002

Advisory ID: VMSA-2021-0002
CVSSv3 Range: 5.3-9.8
Issue Date: 2021-02-23
Updated On: 2021-02-23 (Initial Advisory)
CVE(s): CVE-2021-21972, CVE-2021-21973, CVE-2021-21974
Synopsis: VMware ESXi and vCenter Server updates address multiple security vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-21972, CVE-2021-21973, CVE-2021-21974)

1. Impacted Products
  • VMware ESXi
  • VMware vCenter Server (vCenter Server)
  • VMware Cloud Foundation (Cloud Foundation)
2. Introduction

Multiple vulnerabilities in VMware ESXi and vSphere Client (HTML5) were privately reported to VMware. Updates are available to remediate these vulnerabilities in affected VMware products.

3a. VMware vCenter Server updates address remote code execution vulnerability in the vSphere Client (CVE-2021-21972)

Description

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. VMware has evaluated the severity of this issue to be in the Critical severity range with a maximum CVSSv3 base score of 9.8.

Known Attack Vectors

A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. 

Resolution

To remediate CVE-2021-21972 apply the updates listed in the ‘Fixed Version’ column of the ‘Response Matrix’ below to affected deployments.

Workarounds

Workarounds for CVE-2021-21972 have been listed in the ‘Workarounds’ column of the ‘Response Matrix’ below.

Additional Documentation

None.

Notes

The affected vCenter Server plugin for vROPs is available in all default installations. vROPs does not need be present to have this endpoint available. Follow the workarounds KB to disable it.

Acknowledgements

VMware would like to thank Mikhail Klyuchnikov of Positive Technologies for reporting this issue to us.

Response Matrix:

ProductVersionRunning OnCVE IdentifierCVSSv3SeverityFixed VersionWorkaroundsAdditional Documentation
vCenter Server7.0AnyCVE-2021-219729.8Critical 7.0 U1cKB82374None
vCenter Server6.7AnyCVE-2021-219729.8Critical 6.7 U3lKB82374None
vCenter Server6.5AnyCVE-2021-219729.8Critical 6.5 U3nKB82374None

Impacted Product Suites that Deploy Response Matrix 3a Components:

ProductVersionRunning OnCVE IdentifierCVSSv3SeverityFixed VersionWorkaroundsAdditional Documentation
Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server)4.xAnyCVE-2021-219729.8Critical 4.2KB82374None
Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server)3.xAnyCVE-2021-219729.8Critical 3.10.1.2KB82374None
3b. ESXi OpenSLP heap-overflow vulnerability (CVE-2021-21974)

Description

OpenSLP as used in ESXi has a heap-overflow vulnerability. VMware has evaluated the severity of this issue to be in the Important severity range with a maximum CVSSv3 base score of 8.8.

Known Attack Vectors

A malicious actor residing within the same network segment as ESXi who has access to port 427 may be able to trigger the heap-overflow issue in OpenSLP service resulting in remote code execution.

Resolution

To remediate CVE-2021-21974 apply the updates listed in the ‘Fixed Version’ column of the ‘Response Matrix’ below to affected deployments.

Workarounds

Workarounds for CVE-2021-21974 have been listed in the ‘Workarounds’ column of the ‘Response Matrix’ below.

Additional Documentation

None.

Notes

[1] Per the Security Configuration Guides for VMware vSphere, VMware now recommends disabling the OpenSLP service in ESXi if it is not used. For more information, see our blog posting: https://blogs.vmware.com/vsphere/2021/02/evolving-the-vmware-vsphere-security-configuration-guides.html

[2] KB82705 documents steps to consume ESXi hot patch asynchronously on top of latest VMware Cloud Foundation (VCF) supported ESXi build. 

Acknowledgements

VMware would like to thank Lucas Leong (@_wmliang_) of Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue to us.

Response Matrix:

ProductVersionRunning OnCVE IdentifierCVSSv3SeverityFixed VersionWorkaroundsAdditional Documentation
[1] ESXi7.0AnyCVE-2021-219748.8Important ESXi70U1c-17325551KB76372None
[1] ESXi6.7AnyCVE-2021-219748.8Important ESXi670-202102401-SGKB76372None
[1] ESXi6.5AnyCVE-2021-219748.8Important ESXi650-202102101-SGKB76372None

Impacted Product Suites that Deploy Response Matrix 3b Components:

ProductVersionRunning OnCVE IdentifierCVSSv3SeverityFixed VersionWorkaroundsAdditional Documentation
[1] Cloud Foundation (ESXi)4.xAnyCVE-2021-219748.8Important 4.2KB76372None
[1] Cloud Foundation (ESXi)3.xAnyCVE-2021-219748.8Important [2] KB82705KB76372None
3c. VMware vCenter Server updates address SSRF vulnerability in the vSphere Client (CVE-2021-21973)

Description

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains an SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) vulnerability due to improper validation of URLs in a vCenter Server plugin. VMware has evaluated the severity of this issue to be in the Moderate severity range with a maximum CVSSv3 base score of 5.3.

Known Attack Vectors

A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue by sending a POST request to vCenter Server plugin leading to information disclosure.

Resolution

To remediate CVE-2021-21973 apply the updates listed in the ‘Fixed Version’ column of the ‘Response Matrix’ below to affected deployments.

Workarounds

Workarounds for CVE-2021-21973 have been listed in the ‘Workarounds’ column of the ‘Response Matrix’ below.

Additional Documentation

None.

Notes

The affected vCenter Server plugin for vROPs is available in all default installations. vROPs does not need be present to have this endpoint available. Follow the workarounds KB to disable it.

Acknowledgements

VMware would like to thank Mikhail Klyuchnikov of Positive Technologies for reporting this issue to us.

Response Matrix:

ProductVersionRunning OnCVE IdentifierCVSSv3SeverityFixed VersionWorkaroundsAdditional Documentation
vCenter Server7.0AnyCVE-2021-219735.3Moderate 7.0 U1cKB82374None
vCenter Server6.7AnyCVE-2021-219735.3Moderate 6.7 U3lKB82374None
vCenter Server6.5AnyCVE-2021-219735.3Moderate 6.5 U3nKB82374None

Impacted Product Suites that Deploy Response Matrix 3c Components:

ProductVersionRunning OnCVE IdentifierCVSSv3SeverityFixed VersionWorkaroundsAdditional Documentation
Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server)4.xAnyCVE-2021-219735.3Moderate 4.2KB82374None
Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server)3.xAnyCVE-2021-219735.3Moderate 3.10.1.2KB82374None
4. References

VMware ESXi 7.0 ESXi70U1c-17325551
https://my.vmware.com/group/vmware/patch
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/7.0/rn/vsphere-esxi-70u1c.html

VMware ESXi 6.7 ESXi670-202102401-SG
https://my.vmware.com/group/vmware/patch
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/6.7/rn/esxi670-202102001.html

VMware ESXi 6.5 ESXi650-202102101-SG
https://my.vmware.com/group/vmware/patch
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/6.5/rn/esxi650-202102001.html

VMware vCloud Foundation 4.2
Downloads and Documentation:
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-Cloud-Foundation/4.2/rn/VMware-Cloud-Foundation-42-Release-Notes.html


VMware vCloud Foundation 3.10.1.2
Downloads and Documentation:
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-Cloud-Foundation/3.10.1/rn/VMware-Cloud-Foundation-3101-Release-Notes.html


vCenter Server 7.0.1 Update 1
Downloads and Documentation:
https://my.vmware.com/web/vmware/downloads/details?downloadGroup=VC70U1C&productId=974
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/7.0/rn/vsphere-vcenter-server-70u1c-release-notes.html

vCenter Server 6.7 U3l
Downloads and Documentation:
https://my.vmware.com/web/vmware/downloads/details?downloadGroup=VC67U3L&productId=742&rPId=57171
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/6.7/rn/vsphere-vcenter-server-67u3l-release-notes.html

vCenter Server 6.5 U3n
Downloads and Documentation:
https://my.vmware.com/web/vmware/downloads/details?downloadGroup=VC65U3N&productId=614&rPId=60942
https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/6.5/rn/vsphere-vcenter-server-65u3n-release-notes.html

Mitre CVE Dictionary Links:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21972
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21973
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21974

FIRST CVSSv3 Calculator:
CVE-2021-21972: https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVE-2021-21973: https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CVE-2021-21974: https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

5. Change Log

2021-02-23 VMSA-2021-0002
Initial security advisory.

6. Contact

E-mail list for product security notifications and announcements:

https://lists.vmware.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/security-announce

This Security Advisory is posted to the following lists:  

security-announce@lists.vmware.com  

bugtraq@securityfocus.com  

fulldisclosure@seclists.org 

E-mail: security@vmware.com

PGP key at:

https://kb.vmware.com/kb/1055

VMware Security Advisories

https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories

VMware Security Response Policy

https://www.vmware.com/support/policies/security_response.html

VMware Lifecycle Support Phases

https://www.vmware.com/support/policies/lifecycle.html

VMware Security & Compliance Blog  

https://blogs.vmware.com/security

Twitter

Source :
https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0002.html

The Definitive Browser Security Checklist

Security stakeholders have come to realize that the prominent role the browser has in the modern corporate environment requires a re-evaluation of how it is managed and protected. While not long-ago web-borne risks were still addressed by a patchwork of endpoint, network, and cloud solutions, it is now clear that the partial protection these solutions provided is no longer sufficient. Therefore, more and more security teams are now turning to the emerging category of purpose-built Browser Security Platform as the answer to the browser’s security challenges.

However, as this security solution category is still relatively new, there is not yet an established set of browser security best practices, nor common evaluation criteria. LayerX, the User-First Browser Security Platform, is addressing security teams’ need with the downable Browser Security Checklist, that guides its readers through the essentials of choosing the best solution and provides them with an actionable checklist to use during the evaluation process.

The Browser is The Most Important Work Interface and the Most Targeted Attack Surface #

The browser has become the core workspace in the modern enterprise. On top of being the gateway to sanctioned SaaS apps and other non-corporate web destinations, the browser is the intersection point between cloud\web environments and physical or virtual endpoints. This makes the browser both a target for multiple types of attacks, as well as a potential source of unintentional data leakage.

Some of these attacks have been around for more than a decade, exploitation of browser vulnerabilities or drive-by download of malicious files, for example. Others have gained recent momentum alongside the steep rise in SaaS adoption, like social engineering users with phishing webpages. Yet others leverage the evolution in web page technology to launch sophisticated and hard-to-detect modifications and abuse of browser features to capture and exfiltrate sensitive data.

Browser Security 101 – What is It That We Need to Protect?#

Browser security can be divided into two different groups: preventing unintended data exposure and protection against various types of malicious activity.

From the data protection aspect, such a platform enforces policies that ensure sensitive corporate data is not shared or downloaded in an insecure manner from sanctioned apps, nor uploaded from managed devices to non-corporate web destinations.

From the threat protection aspect, such a platform detects and prevents three types of attacks:

  • Attacks that target the browser itself, with the purpose of compromising the host device or the data that resides within the browser application itself, such as cookies, passwords, and others.
  • Attacks that utilize the browser via compromised credentials to access corporate data that resides in both sanctioned and unsanctioned SaaS applications.
  • Attacks that leverage the modern web page as an attack vector to target user’s passwords, via a wide range of phishing methods or through malicious modification of browser features.

How to Choose the Right Solution#

What should you focus on when choosing the browser security solution for your environment? What are the practical implications of the differences between the various offerings? How should deployment methods, the solution’s architecture, or user privacy be weighed in the overall consideration? How should threats and risks be prioritized?

As we’ve said before – unlike with other security solutions, you can’t just ping one of your peers and ask what he or she is doing. Browser security is new, and the wisdom of the crowd is yet to be formed. In fact, there’s an excellent chance that your peers are now struggling with the very same questions you are.

The Definitive Browser Security Platform Checklist – What it is and How to Use It#

The checklist (download it here) breaks down the high-level ‘browser security’ headline to small and digestible chunks of the concrete needs that need to be solved. These are brought to the reader in five pillars – deployment, user experience, security functionalities and user privacy. For each pillar there is a short description of its browser context and a more detailed explanation of its capabilities.

The most significant pillar, in terms of scope, is of course, the security functionalities one, which is divided into five sub-sections. Since, in most cases, this pillar would be the initial driver to pursuing browser security platform in the first place it’s worth going over them in more detail:

Browser Security Deep Dive#

The need for browser security platform typically arises from one of the following:

— Attack Surface Management: Proactive reduction of the browser’s exposure to various types of threats, eliminating adversaries’ ability to carry them out.

— Zero Trust Access: Hardening the authentication requirements to ensure that the username and password were indeed provided by the legitimate user and were not compromised.

— SaaS Monitoring and Protection: 360° visibility into all users’ activity and data usage within sanctioned and unsanctioned apps, as well as other non-corporate web destinations, while safeguarding corporate data from compromise or loss.

— Protection Against Malicious Web Pages: Real-time detection and prevention of all the malicious tactics adversaries embed in the modern web page, including credential phishing, downloading of malicious files and data theft.

— Secure 3rd Party Access and BYOD: Enablement of secure access to corporate web resources from unmanaged devices of both the internal workforce as well as external contractors and service providers.

This list enables anyone to easily identify the objective for their browser security platform search and find out the required capabilities for fulfilling it.

The Checklist – A Straightforward Evaluation Shortcut #

The most important and actionable part in the guide is the concluding checklist, which provides, for the first time, a concise summary of all the essential capabilities a browser security platform should provide. This checklist makes the evaluation process easier than ever. All you have to do now is test the solutions you’ve shortlisted against it and see which one scores the highest. Once you have all of them lined up, you can make an informed decision based on the needs of your environment, as you understand them.

Download the checklist here.

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Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2023/01/the-definitive-browser-security.html

Is Once-Yearly Pen Testing Enough for Your Organization?

Any organization that handles sensitive data must be diligent in its security efforts, which include regular pen testing. Even a small data breach can result in significant damage to an organization’s reputation and bottom line.

There are two main reasons why regular pen testing is necessary for secure web application development:

  • Security: Web applications are constantly evolving, and new vulnerabilities are being discovered all the time. Pen testing helps identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers and allows you to fix them before they can do any damage.
  • Compliance: Depending on your industry and the type of data you handle, you may be required to comply with certain security standards (e.g., PCI DSS, NIST, HIPAA). Regular pen testing can help you verify that your web applications meet these standards and avoid penalties for non-compliance.

How Often Should You Pentest?#

Many organizations, big and small, have once a year pen testing cycle. But what’s the best frequency for pen testing? Is once a year enough, or do you need to be more frequent?

The answer depends on several factors, including the type of development cycle you have, the criticality of your web applications, and the industry you’re in.

You may need more frequent pen testing if:

You Have an Agile or Continuous Release Cycle#

Agile development cycles are characterized by short release cycles and rapid iterations. This can make it difficult to keep track of changes made to the codebase and makes it more likely that security vulnerabilities will be introduced.

If you’re only testing once a year, there’s a good chance that vulnerabilities will go undetected for long periods of time. This could leave your organization open to attack.

To mitigate this risk, pen testing cycles should align with the organization’s development cycle. For static web applications, testing every 4-6 months should be sufficient. But for web applications that are updated frequently, you may need to test more often, such as monthly or even weekly.

Your Web Applications Are Business-Critical#

Any system that is essential to your organization’s operations should be given extra attention when it comes to security. This is because a breach of these systems could have a devastating impact on your business. If your organization relies heavily on its web applications to do business, any downtime could result in significant financial losses.

For example, imagine that your organization’s e-commerce site went down for an hour due to a DDoS attack. Not only would you lose out on potential sales, but you would also have to deal with the cost of the attack and the negative publicity.

To avoid this scenario, it’s important to ensure that your web applications are always available and secure.

Non-critical web applications can usually get away with being tested once a year, but business-critical web applications should be tested more frequently to ensure they are not at risk of a major outage or data loss.

Your Web Applications Are Customer-Facing#

If all your web applications are internal, you may be able to get away with pen testing less frequently. However, if your web applications are accessible to the public, you must be extra diligent in your security efforts.

Web applications accessible to external traffic are more likely to be targeted by attackers. This is because there is a greater pool of attack vectors and more potential entry points for an attacker to exploit.

Customer-facing web applications also tend to have more users, which means that any security vulnerabilities will be exploited more quickly. For example, a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in an external web application with millions of users could be exploited within hours of being discovered.

To protect against these threats, it’s important to pen test customer-facing web applications more frequently than internal ones. Depending on the size and complexity of the application, you may need to pen test every month or even every week.

You Are in a High-Risk Industry#

Certain industries are more likely to be targeted by hackers due to the sensitive nature of their data. Healthcare organizations, for example, are often targeted because of the protected health information (PHI) they hold.

If your organization is in a high-risk industry, you should consider conducting pen testing more frequently to ensure that your systems are secure and meet regulatory compliance. This will help protect your data and reduce the chances of a costly security incident.

You Don’t Have Internal Security Operations or a Pen testing Team#

This might sound counterintuitive, but if you don’t have an internal security team, you may need to conduct pen testing more frequently.

Organizations that don’t have dedicated security staff are more likely to be vulnerable to attacks.

Without an internal security team, you will need to rely on external pen testers to assess your organization’s security posture.

Depending on the size and complexity of your organization, you may need to pen test every month or even every week.

You Are Focused on Mergers or Acquisitions#

During a merger or acquisition, there is often a lot of confusion and chaos. This can make it difficult to keep track of all the systems and data that need to be secured. As a result, it’s important to conduct pen testing more frequently during these times to ensure that all systems are secure.

M&A also means that you are adding new web applications to your organization’s infrastructure. These new applications may have unknown security vulnerabilities that could put your entire organization at risk.

In 2016, Marriott acquired Starwood without being aware that hackers had exploited a flaw in Starwood’s reservation system two years earlier. Over 500 million customer records were compromised. This placed Marriott in hot water with the British watchdog ICO, resulting in 18.4 million pounds in fines in the UK. According to Bloomberg, there is more trouble ahead, as the hotel giant could “face up to $1 billion in regulatory fines and litigation costs.”

To protect against these threats, it’s important to conduct pen testing before and after an acquisition. This will help you identify potential security issues so they can be fixed before the transition is complete.

The Importance of Continuous Pen Testing#

While periodic pen testing is important, it is no longer enough in today’s world. As businesses rely more on their web applications, continuous pen testing becomes increasingly important.

There are two main types of pen testing: time-boxed and continuous.

Traditional pen testing is done on a set schedule, such as once a year. This type of pen testing is no longer enough in today’s world, as businesses rely more on their web applications.

Continuous pen testing is the process of continuously scanning your systems for vulnerabilities. This allows you to identify and fix vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by attackers. Continuous pen testing allows you to find and fix security issues as they happen instead of waiting for a periodic assessment.

Continuous pen testing is especially important for organizations that have an agile development cycle. Since new code is deployed frequently, there is a greater chance for security vulnerabilities to be introduced.

Pen testing as a service models is where continuous pen testing shine. Outpost24’s PTaaS (Penetration-Testing-as-a-Service) platform enables businesses to conduct continuous pen testing with ease. The Outpost24 platform is always up-to-date with an organization’s latest security threats and vulnerabilities, so you can be confident that your web applications are secure.

  • Manual and automated pen testing: Outpost24’s PTaaS platform combines manual and automated pen testing to give you the best of both worlds. This means you can find and fix vulnerabilities faster while still getting the benefits of expert analysis.
  • Provides comprehensive coverage: Outpost24’s platform covers all OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and more. This means that you can be confident that your web applications are secure against the latest threats.
  • Is cost-effective: With Outpost24, you only pay for the services you need. This makes it more affordable to conduct continuous pen testing, even for small businesses.

The Bottom Line#

Regular pen testing is essential for secure web application development. Depending on your organization’s size, industry, and development cycle, you may need to revise your pen testing schedule.

Once-a-year pen testing cycle may be enough for some organizations, but for most, it is not. For business-critical, customer-facing, or high-traffic web applications, you should consider continuous pen testing.

Outpost24’s PTaaS platform makes it easy and cost-effective to conduct continuous pen testing. Contact us today to learn more about our platform and how we can help you secure your web applications.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter  and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2023/01/is-once-yearly-pen-testing-enough-for.html

Windows Update Commands – USOClient, Powershell, WUAUCLT

The windows Update CLI commands are useful for troubleshooting Windows Update errors. And they are helpful when you need to automate the windows update tasks. In newer versions of windows, the WUAUCLT command has been deprecated and replaced with the usoclient. In this article we have included the options and syntax for using wuault, usoclient, and powershell to detect and install windows updates

WUAUCLT

The windows update command utility in windows is: WUAUCLT. This stands for Windows Update Automatic Update Client. This client has been deprecated in windows 10 and server 2016. Howeve,r it is still available through windows 7 and server 2012R2.

Below is a list of arguments you can pass to the WUAUCLT commands and a short explanation of what each argument does.
Search:

CommandDescription
/DetectNowDetect and download updates that are available (will vary by system settings)
/ReportNowTell the client to report its status back to the WSUS server
/RunHandlerComServer
/RunStoreAsComServer
/ShowSettingsDialogShow Windows Update settings dialog
/ShowWindowsUpdateShows the windows update dialog box or web page (depending on windows version)
/ResetAuthorizationwhen an update check occurs a cookie is stored that prevents a new update or check for 1 hour. So, you should use this to delete this cookie
/ResetEulasResets the accepted EULA’s
/ShowWUShows the windows update dialog on windows vista and above. Opens Windows update on XP
/SelfUpdateManagedScan for windows updates using WSUS
/SelfUpdateUnmanagedTriggers a windows update scan using the windows update website
/ShowOptionsOpen the windows update settings window
/ShowFeaturedOptInDialogShow Opt-In dialog for featured updates
/DemoUIShow the icons for windows update
/ShowFeaturedUpdatesOpen windows update dialog and shows the featured updates
/ShowWUAutoScan
/UpdateNowInstall updates now

Showing 1 to 17 of 17 entries

Examples

See below for some examples of running the wuauclt. All examples should be run from an elevated/administrative command prompt

If all you want to do is detect and install updates right now, you would run:

Wuauclt /dectectnow /updatenow

If it is refusing to install, you can run:

Wuauclt /resetauthorization

If you want to have the client report its status back to the WSUS server, you would run:

Wuauclt /reportnow

Powershell

Powershell will give you the most flexibility in installing windows updates. The other methods are fine for simply downloading and installing all updates. However, with the powershell cmdlets you can do things like get a list of updates, search for updates with a specific word in them, then only install those updates.

The first step is to download the powershell module here:
https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/2d191bcd-3308-4edd-9de2-88dff796b0bc

If you have Powershell verison 5, you can install the module from the gallery by running:

Install-module PSWindowsUpdate

Before you can run any commands, you need to import the windows update module:

Import-Module PSWindowsUpdate

You might need to install the Microsoft Update service. That can be done with this command:

Add-WUServiceManager -ServiceID 7971f918-a847-4430-9279-4a52d1efe18d

You can get a list of available cmdlets in the PSWindowsUpdate module with the following command:

Get-command -module PSWindowsUpdate

I have also included a list of commands below:

  • Add-WUOfflineSync
  • Add-WUServiceManager
  • Get-WUHistory
  • Get-WUInstall
  • Get-WUInstallerStatus
  • Get-WUList
  • Hide-WUUpdate
  • Invoke-WUInstall
  • Get-WURebootStatus
  • Get-WUServiceManager
  • Get-WUUninstall
  • Remove-WUOfflineSync
  • Remove-WUServiceManager
  • Update-WUModule

Examples

The most important cmdlet is Get-WUInstall . This will be apparent in the examples below

Download and install updates from Microsoft Update, then reboot:

Get-WUInstall –MicrosoftUpdate –AcceptAll –AutoReboot

**Note, I usually only reboot if required. For that reason, I don’t like to use the AutoReboot flag.

Check if a reboot is required

Get-wurebootstatus

List available updates on Microsoft Update

Get-WUInstall –MicrosoftUpdate –ListOnly

USOClient

The USO client is new to windows 10 and Server 2016. This replaces the wuauclt command in these Operating systems. I would recommend using powershell instead of this client when you are doing automation, since it will work on newer and older clients. However, this client is very simple to use. and is useful for one-off purposes. See the table below for all of the command arguments:
Show 102550100 entriesSearch:

startscanscan for updates
startdownloaddownload updates
startinstallinstall updates
RefreshsettingsRefresh settings if any changes were made
StartInteractiveScanOpen a dialog and start scanning for updates
RestartDeviceRestart computer to finish installing updates
ScanInstallWaitScan, Download, and install updates
ResumeUpdateResume installing updates on next boot

Showing 1 to 7 of 7 entries

PreviousNext

Examples

See below for some examples of how to use the USO client. All of these examples should be run in an administrative command prompt

Scan for updates

usoclient startscan

Download updates

Usoclient startdownload

Install updates

usoclient startinstall

Here are other related links

In case you would like to see some additional information, I hae included some links to good resources on these topics:

WSUS Server Cmdlets http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh826166.aspx

http://blogs.technet.com/b/heyscriptingguy/archive/2012/01/16/introduction-to-wsus-and-powershell.aspx

Powershell Execution Policy:http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee176961.aspx

Troubleshoot computers not in WSUS:
http://msmvps.com/blogs/athif/archive/2005/09/04/65174.aspx

Client Side Powershell Module:
http://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/2d191bcd-3308-4edd-9de2-88dff796b0bc

Powershell FAQ
http://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/2d191bcd-3308-4edd-9de2-88dff796b0bc/view/Discussions#content

Source :
https://www.idkrtm.com/windows-update-commands/