Why Continuous Security Testing is a Must for Organizations Today

The global cybersecurity market is flourishing. Experts at Gartner predict that the end-user spending for the information security and risk management market will grow from $172.5 billion in 2022 to $267.3 billion in 2026.

One big area of spending includes the art of putting cybersecurity defenses under pressure, commonly known as security testing. MarketsandMarkets forecasts the global penetration testing (pentesting) market size is expected to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 13.7% from 2022 to 2027. However, the costs and limitations involved in carrying out a penetration test are already hindering the market growth, and consequently, many cybersecurity professionals are making moves to find an alternative solution.

Pentests aren’t solving cybersecurity pain points

Pentesting can serve specific and important purposes for businesses. For example, prospective customers may ask for the results of one as proof of compliance. However, for certain challenges, this type of security testing methodology isn’t always the best fit.

1 — Continuously changing environments

Securing constantly changing environments within rapidly evolving threat landscapes is particularly difficult. This challenge becomes even more complicated when aligning and managing the business risk of new projects or releases. Since penetration tests focus on one moment in time, the result won’t necessarily be the same the next time you make an update.

2 — Rapid growth

It would be unusual for fast-growing businesses not to experience growing pains. For CISOs, maintaining visibility of their organization’s expanding attack surface can be particularly painful.

According to HelpNetSecurity, 45% of respondents conduct pentests only once or twice per year and 27% do it once per quarter, which is woefully insufficient given how quickly infrastructure and applications change.

3 — Cybersecurity skills shortages

As well as limitations in budgets and resources, finding the available skillsets for internal cybersecurity teams is an ongoing battle. As a result, organizations don’t have the dexterity to spot and promptly remediate specific security vulnerabilities.

While pentests can offer an outsider perspective, often it is just one person performing the test. For some organizations, there is also an issue on trust when relying on the work of just one or two people. Sándor Incze, CISO at CM.com, gives his perspective:

“Not all pentesters are equal. It’s very hard to determine if the pentester you’re hiring is good.”

4 — Cyber threats are evolving

The constant struggle to stay up to date with the latest cyberattack techniques and trends puts media organizations at risk. Hiring specialist skills for every new cyber threat type would be unrealistic and unsustainable.

HelpNetSecurity reported that it takes 71 percent of pentesters one week to one month to conduct a pentest. Then, more than 26 percent of organizations must wait between one to two weeks to get the test results, and 13 percent wait even longer than that. Given the fast pace of threat evolution, this waiting period can leave companies unaware of potential security issues and open to exploitation.

5 — Poor-fitting security testing solutions for agile environments

Continuous development lifecycles don’t align with penetration testing cycles (often performed annually.) Therefore, vulnerabilities mistakenly created during long security testing gaps can remain undiscovered for some time.

Bringing security testing into the 21st-century Impact

Cybersecurity Testing

A proven solution to these challenges is to utilize ethical hacker communities in addition to a standard penetration test. Businesses can rely on the power of these crowds to assist them in their security testing on a continuous basis. A bug bounty program is one of the most common ways to work with ethical hacker communities.

What is a bug bounty program?

Bug bounty programs allow businesses to proactively work with independent security researchers to report bugs through incentivization. Often companies will launch and manage their program through a bug bounty platform, such as Intigriti.

Organizations with high-security maturity may leave their bug bounty program open for all ethical hackers in the platform’s community to contribute to (known as a public program.) However, most businesses begin by working with a smaller pool of security talent through a private program.

How bug bounty programs support continuous security testing structures

While you’ll receive a certificate to say you’re secure at the end of a penetration test, it won’t necessarily mean that’s still the case the next time you make an update. This is where bug bounty programs work well as a follow-up to pentests and enable a continuous security testing program.

The impact of bug bounty program on cybersecurity

By launching a bug bounty program, organizations experience:

  1. More robust protection: Company data, brand, and reputation have additional protection through continuous security testing.
  2. Enabled business goals: Enhanced security posture, leading to a more secure platform for innovation and growth.
  3. Improved productivity: Increased workflow with fewer disruptions to the availability of services. More strategic IT projects that executives have prioritized, with fewer security “fires” to put out.
  4. Increased skills availability: Internal security team’s time is freed by using a community for security testing and triage.
  5. Clearer budget justification: Ability to provide more significant insights into the organization’s security posture to justify and motivate for an adequate security budget.
  6. Improved relationships: Project delays significantly decrease without the reliance on traditional pentests.

Want to know more about setting up and launching a bug bounty program?

Intigriti is the leading European-based platform for bug bounty and ethical hacking. The platform enables organizations to reduce the risk of a cyberattack by allowing Intigriti’s network of security researchers to test their digital assets for vulnerabilities continuously.

If you’re intrigued by what you’ve read and want to know about bug bounty programs, simply schedule a meeting today with one of our experts.

www.intigriti.com

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/why-continuous-security-testing-is-must.html

Record DDoS Attack with 25.3 Billion Requests Abused HTTP/2 Multiplexing

Cybersecurity company Imperva has disclosed that it mitigated a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack with a total of over 25.3 billion requests on June 27, 2022.

The “strong attack,” which targeted an unnamed Chinese telecommunications company, is said to have lasted for four hours and peaked at 3.9 million requests per second (RPS).

“Attackers used HTTP/2 multiplexing, or combining multiple packets into one, to send multiple requests at once over individual connections,” Imperva said in a report published on September 19.

The attack was launched from a botnet that comprised nearly 170,000 different IP addresses spanning routers, security cameras, and compromised servers located in more than 180 countries, primarily the U.S., Indonesia, and Brazil.

CyberSecurity

The disclosure also comes as web infrastructure provider Akamai said it fielded a new DDoS assault aimed at a customer based in Eastern Europe on September 12, with attack traffic spiking at 704.8 million packets per second (pps).

The same victim was previously targeted on July 21, 2022, in a similar fashion in which the attack volume ramped up to 853.7 gigabits per second (Gbps) and 659.6 million pps over a period of 14 hours.

Akamai’s Craig Sparling said the company has been “bombarded relentlessly with sophisticated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks,” indicating that the offensives could be politically motivated in the face of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Both the disruptive attempts were UDP flood attacks where the attacker targets and overwhelms arbitrary ports on the target host with User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets.

CyberSecurity

UDP, being both connectionless and session-less, makes it an ideal networking protocol for handling VoIP traffic. But these same traits can also render it more susceptible to exploitation.

“Without an initial handshake to ensure a legitimate connection, UDP channels can be used to send a large volume of traffic to any host,” NETSCOUT says.

“There are no internal protections that can limit the rate of a UDP flood. As a result, UDP flood DoS attacks are exceptionally dangerous because they can be executed with a limited amount of resources.”

Source :
https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/record-ddos-attack-with-253-billion.html

IT threat evolution in Q2 2022. Non-mobile statistics

These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products and services received from users who consented to providing statistical data.

Quarterly figures

According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q2 2022:

  • Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,164,544,060 attacks from online resources across the globe.
  • Web Anti-Virus recognized 273,033,368 unique URLs as malicious. Attempts to run malware for stealing money from online bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 100,829 unique users.
  • Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 74,377 unique users.
  • Our File Anti-Virus detected 55,314,176 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Financial threats

Financial threat statistics

In Q2 2022, Kaspersky solutions blocked the launch of malware designed to steal money from bank accounts on the computers of 100,829 unique users.

https://e.infogram.com/_/xVIqEwzQRE40afesiEuD?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q2 2022 (download)

Geography of financial malware attacks

To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country and territory we calculated the share of Kaspersky users who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country or territory.

https://e.infogram.com/_/VAlc8RYhTGIEk24LI7Q3?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Geography of financial malware attacks, Q2 2022 (download)

TOP 10 countries and territories by share of attacked users

Country or territory*%**
1Turkmenistan4.8
2Afghanistan4.3
3Tajikistan3.8
4Paraguay3.1
5China2.4
6Yemen2.4
7Uzbekistan2.2
8Sudan2.1
9Egypt2.0
10Mauritania1.9

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000).
** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country.

TOP 10 banking malware families

NameVerdicts%*
1Ramnit/NimnulTrojan-Banker.Win32.Ramnit35.5
2Zbot/ZeusTrojan-Banker.Win32.Zbot15.8
3CliptoShufflerTrojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler6.4
4Trickster/TrickbotTrojan-Banker.Win32.Trickster6
5RTMTrojan-Banker.Win32.RTM2.7
6SpyEyeTrojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye2.3
7IcedIDTrojan-Banker.Win32.IcedID2.1
8DanabotTrojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot1.9
9BitStealerTrojan-Banker.Win32.BitStealer1.8
10GoziTrojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi1.3

* Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware.

Ransomware programs

In the second quarter, the Lockbit group launched a bug bounty program. The cybercriminals are promising $1,000 to $1,000,000 for doxing of senior officials, reporting  web service, Tox messenger or ransomware Trojan algorithm vulnerabilities, as well as for ideas on improving the Lockbit website and Trojan. This was the first-ever case of ransomware groups doing a (self-promotion?) campaign like that.

Another well-known group, Conti, said it was shutting down operations. The announcement followed a high-profile attack on Costa Rica’s information systems, which prompted the government to declare a state of emergency. The Conti infrastructure was shut down in late June, but some in the infosec community believe that Conti members are either just rebranding or have split up and joined other ransomware teams, including Hive, AvosLocker and BlackCat.

While some ransomware groups are drifting into oblivion, others seem to be making a comeback. REvil’s website went back online in April, and researchers discovered a newly built specimen of their Trojan. This might have been a test build, as the sample did not encrypt any files, but these events may herald the impending return of REvil.

Kaspersky researchers found a way to recover files encrypted by the Yanluowang ransomware and released a decryptor for all victims. Yanluowang has been spotted in targeted attacks against large businesses in the US, Brazil, Turkey, and other countries.

Number of new modifications

In Q2 2022, we detected 15 new ransomware families and 2355 new modifications of this malware type.

https://e.infogram.com/_/LLQNUsWe0kQuAyykdQ9p?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Number of new ransomware modifications, Q2 2021 — Q2 2022 (download)

Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans

In Q2 2022, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 74,377 users from ransomware attacks.

https://e.infogram.com/_/YAmZLBPilFKmsbsxFKpJ?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q2 2022 (download)

Geography of attacked users

https://e.infogram.com/_/oDrJKQvRPnVf4zT5I0kp?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q2 2022 (download)

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by ransomware Trojans

Country or territory*%**
1Bangladesh1.81
2Yemen1.24
3South Korea1.11
4Mozambique0.82
5Taiwan0.70
6China0.46
7Pakistan0.40
8Angola0.37
9Venezuela0.33
10Egypt0.32

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000).
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by Trojan encryptors as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country.

TOP 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans

NameVerdicts*Percentage of attacked users**
1Stop/DjvuTrojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop17.91
2WannaCryTrojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna12.58
3MagniberTrojan-Ransom.Win64.Magni9.80
4(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen7.91
5(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny6.75
6(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder6.55
7(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren3.51
8(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Encoder3.02
9PolyRansom/VirLockTrojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom / Virus.Win32.PolyRansom2.96
10(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Instructions2.69

* Statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products. The information was provided by Kaspersky product users who consented to provide statistical data.
** Unique Kaspersky users attacked by specific ransomware Trojan families as a percentage of all unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans.

Miners

Number of new miner modifications

In Q2 2022, Kaspersky solutions detected 40,788 new modifications of miners. A vast majority of these (more than 35,000) were detected in June. Thus, the spring depression — in March through May we found a total of no more than 10,000 new modifications — was followed by a record of sorts.

https://e.infogram.com/_/vZm5Z2G3sFuuIAqZGWRA?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Number of new miner modifications, Q2 2022 (download)

Number of users attacked by miners

In Q2, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 454,385 unique users of Kaspersky products and services worldwide. We are seeing a reverse trend here: miner attacks have gradually declined since the beginning of 2022.

https://e.infogram.com/_/ibd7ASo3u4ZaWhgBgbcF?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q2 2022 (download)

Geography of miner attacks

https://e.infogram.com/_/e5HYDOqPpDYZ08UMSsAM?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Geography of miner attacks, Q2 2022 (download)

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by miners

Country or territory*%**
1Rwanda2.94
2Ethiopia2.67
3Tajikistan2.35
4Tanzania1.98
5Kyrgyzstan1.94
6Uzbekistan1.88
7Kazakhstan1.84
8Venezuela1.80
9Mozambique1.68
10Ukraine1.56

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000).
** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country.

Vulnerable applications used by criminals during cyberattacks

Quarterly highlights

During Q2 2022, a number of major vulnerabilities were discovered in the Microsoft Windows. For instance, CVE-2022-26809 critical error allows an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code in a system using a custom RPC request. The Network File System (NFS) driver was found to contain two RCE vulnerabilities: CVE-2022-24491 and CVE-2022-24497. By sending a custom network message via the NFS protocol, an attacker can remotely execute arbitrary code in the system as well. Both vulnerabilities affect server systems with the NFS role activated. The CVE-2022-24521 vulnerability targeting the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver was found in the wild. It allows elevation of local user privileges, although that requires the attacker to have gained a foothold in the system. CVE-2022-26925, also known as LSA Spoofing, was another vulnerability found during live operation of server systems. It allows an unauthenticated attacker to call an LSARPC interface method and get authenticated by Windows domain controller via the NTLM protocol. These vulnerabilities are an enduring testament to the importance of timely OS and software updates.

Most of the network threats detected in Q2 2022 had been mentioned in previous reports. Most of those were attacks that involved brute-forcing  access to various web services. The most popular protocols and technologies susceptible to these attacks include MS SQL Server, RDP and SMB. Attacks that use the EternalBlue, EternalRomance and similar exploits are still popular. Exploitation of Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) is also quite common, as the susceptible Java library is often used in web applications. Besides, the Spring MVC framework, used in many Java-based web applications, was found to contain a new vulnerability CVE-2022-22965 that exploits the data binding functionality and results in remote code execution. Finally, we have observed a rise in attacks that exploit insecure deserialization, which can also result in access to remote systems due to incorrect or missing validation of untrusted user data passed to various applications.

Vulnerability statistics

Exploits targeting Microsoft Office vulnerabilities grew in the second quarter to 82% of the total. Cybercriminals were spreading malicious documents that exploited CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802, which are the best-known vulnerabilities in the Equation Editor component. Exploitation involves the component memory being damaged and a specially designed script, run on the target computer. Another vulnerability, CVE-2017-8570, allows downloading and running a malicious script when opening an infected document, to execute various operations in a vulnerable system. The emergence of CVE-2022-30190or Follina vulnerability also increased the number of exploits in this category. An attacker can use a custom malicious document with a link to an external OLE object, and a special URI scheme to have Windows run the MSDT diagnostics tool. This, in turn, combined with a special set of parameters passed to the victim’s computer, can cause an arbitrary command to be executed — even if macros are disabled and the document is opened in Protected Mode.

https://e.infogram.com/_/1dqpsnMqrH26rdzDOOht?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q2 2022 (download)

Attempts at exploiting vulnerabilities that affect various script engines and, specifically, browsers, dipped to 5%. In the second quarter, a number of critical RCE vulnerabilities were discovered in various Google Chrome based browsers: CVE-2022-0609CVE-2022-1096, and CVE-2022-1364. The first one was found in the animation component; it exploits a Use-After-Free error, causing memory damage, which is followed by the attacker creating custom objects to execute arbitrary code. The second and third vulnerabilities are Type Confusion errors associated with the V8 script engine; they also can result in arbitrary code being executed on a vulnerable user system. Some of the vulnerabilities discovered were found to have been exploited in targeted attacks, in the wild. Mozilla Firefox was found to contain a high-risk Use-After-Free vulnerability, CVE-2022-1097, which appears when processing NSSToken-type objects from different streams. The browser was also found to contain CVE-2022-28281, a vulnerability that affects the WebAuthn extension. A compromised Firefox content process can write data out of bounds of the parent process memory, thus potentially enabling code execution with elevated privileges. Two further vulnerabilities, CVE-2022-1802 and CVE-2022-1529, were exploited in cybercriminal attacks. The exploitation method, dubbed “prototype pollution”, allows executing arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of a privileged parent browser process.

As in the previous quarter, Android exploits ranked third in our statistics with 4%, followed by exploits of Java applications, the Flash platform, and PDF documents, each with 3%.

Attacks on macOS

The second quarter brought with it a new batch of cross-platform discoveries. For instance, a new APT group Earth Berberoka (GamblingPuppet) that specializes in hacking online casinos, uses malware for Windows, Linux, and macOS. The TraderTraitor campaign targets cryptocurrency and blockchain organizations, attacking with malicious crypto applications for both Windows and macOS.

TOP 20 threats for macOS

Verdict%*
1AdWare.OSX.Amc.e25.61
2AdWare.OSX.Agent.ai12.08
3AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j7.84
4AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac7.58
5AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o6.48
6Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b5.27
7AdWare.OSX.Agent.u4.27
8AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at3.99
9Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a3.87
10Downloader.OSX.Agent.k3.67
11AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa3.35
12AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ae3.24
13Backdoor.OSX.Twenbc.e3.16
14AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ax3.06
15AdWare.OSX.Agent.q2.73
16Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h2.52
17AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg2.42
18AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m2.41
19AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen2.08
20AdWare.OSX.Agent.gen2.01

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked.

As usual, the TOP 20 ranking for threats detected by Kaspersky security solutions for macOS users is dominated by various adware. AdWare.OSX.Amc.e, also known as Advanced Mac Cleaner, is a newcomer and already a leader, found with a quarter of all attacked users. Members of this family display fake system problem messages, offering to buy the full version to fix those. It was followed by members of the AdWare.OSX.Agent and AdWare.OSX.Pirrit families.

Geography of threats for macOS

https://e.infogram.com/_/sREMxK7Q3GvfvQe7t1Ql?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Geography of threats for macOS, Q2 2022 (download)

TOP 10 countries and territories by share of attacked users

Country or territory*%**
1France2.93
2Canada2.57
3Spain2.51
4United States2.45
5India2.24
6Italy2.21
7Russian Federation2.13
8United Kingdom1.97
9Mexico1.83
10Australia1.82

* Excluded from the rating are countries and territories  with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000).
** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country.

In Q2 2022, the country where the most users were attacked was again France (2.93%), followed by Canada (2.57%) and Spain (2.51%). AdWare.OSX.Amc.e was the most common adware encountered in these three countries.

IoT attacks

IoT threat statistics

In Q2 2022, most devices that attacked Kaspersky traps did so using the Telnet protocol, as before.

Telnet82,93%
SSH17,07%

Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices, Q2 2022

The statistics for working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.

Telnet93,75%
SSH6,25%

Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q2 2022

TOP 10 threats delivered to IoT devices via Telnet

Verdict%*
1Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b36.28
2Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b14.66
3Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ek9.15
4Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba8.82
5Trojan.Linux.Agent.gen4.01
6Trojan.Linux.Enemybot.a2.96
7Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc2.58
8Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p2.36
9Trojan.Linux.Agent.mg1.72
10Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.cw1.45

* Share of each threat delivered to infected devices as a result of a successful Telnet attack out of the total number of delivered threats.

Detailed IoT-threat statistics are published in the DDoS report for Q2 2022.

Attacks via web resources

The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create these sites on purpose; they can infect hacked legitimate resources as well as web resources with user-created content, such as forums.

TOP 10 countries and territories that serve as sources of web-based attacks

The following statistics show the distribution by country or territory  of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites hosting malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks.

To determine the geographic source of web attacks, the GeoIP technique was used to match the domain name to the real IP address at which the domain is hosted.

In Q2 2022, Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,164,544,060 attacks launched from online resources across the globe. A total of 273,033,368 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.

https://e.infogram.com/_/Mii35djEPWnjaHq4c2Ve?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Distribution of web-attack sources by country and territory, Q2 2022 (download)

Countries and territories where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

To assess the risk of online infection faced by users around the world, for each country or territory we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.

Note that these rankings only include attacks by malicious objects that fall under the Malware class; they do not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country or territory*%**
1Taiwan26.07
2Hong Kong14.60
3Algeria14.40
4Nepal14.00
5Tunisia13.55
6Serbia12.88
7Sri Lanka12.41
8Albania12.21
9Bangladesh11.98
10Greece11.86
11Palestine11.82
12Qatar11.50
13Moldova11.47
14Yemen11.44
15Libya11.34
16Zimbabwe11.15
17Morocco11.03
18Estonia11.01
19Turkey10.75
20Mongolia10.50

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000).
** Unique users targeted by Malware-class attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country.

On average during the quarter, 8.31% of the Internet users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one Malware-class web attack.

https://e.infogram.com/_/ZeKtZKpRpQBrBYKAEvcg?parent_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurelist.com%2Fit-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics%2F107133%2F&src=embed#async_embed

Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q2 2022 (download)

Local threats

In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules of Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users’ computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.).

In Q2 2022, our File Anti-Virus detected 55,314,176 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries and territories where users faced the highest risk of local infection

For each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries and territories.

Note that these rankings only include attacks by malicious programs that fall under the Malware class; they do not include File Anti-Virus triggerings in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country or territory*%**
1Turkmenistan47.54
2Tajikistan44.91
3Afghanistan43.19
4Yemen43.12
5Cuba42.71
6Ethiopia41.08
7Uzbekistan37.91
8Bangladesh37.90
9Myanmar36.97
10South Sudan36.60
11Syria35.60
12Burundi34.88
13Rwanda33.69
14Algeria33.61
15Benin33.60
16Tanzania32.88
17Malawi32.65
18Venezuela31.79
19Cameroon31.34
20Chad30.92

*  Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000).
** Unique users on whose computers Malware-class local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country.

Source :
https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q2-2022-non-mobile-statistics/107133/

IT threat evolution Q2 2022

Targeted attacks

New technique for installing fileless malware

Earlier this year, we discovered a malicious campaign that employed a new technique for installing fileless malware on target machines by injecting a shellcode directly into Windows event logs. The attackers were using this to hide a last-stage Trojan in the file system.

The attack starts by driving targets to a legitimate website and tricking them into downloading a compressed RAR file that is booby-trapped with the network penetration testing tools Cobalt Strike and SilentBreak. The attackers use these tools to inject code into any process of their choosing. They inject the malware directly into the system memory, leaving no artifacts on the local drive that might alert traditional signature-based security and forensics tools. While fileless malware is nothing new, the way the encrypted shellcode containing the malicious payload is embedded into Windows event logs is.

The code is unique, with no similarities to known malware, so it is unclear who is behind the attack.

WinDealer’s man-on-the-side spyware

We recently published our analysis of WinDealer: malware developed by the LuoYu APT threat actor. One of the most interesting aspects of this campaign is the group’s use of a man-on-the-side attack to deliver malware and control compromised computers. A man-on-the-side attack implies that the attacker is able to control the communication channel, allowing them to read the traffic and inject arbitrary messages into normal data exchange. In the case of WinDealer, the attackers intercepted an update request from completely legitimate software and swapped the update file with a weaponized one.

Observed WinDealer infection flow

The malware does not contain the exact address of the C2 (command-and-control) server, making it harder for security researchers to find it. Instead, it tries to access a random IP address from a predefined range. The attackers then intercept the request and respond to it. To do this, they need constant access to the routers of the entire subnet, or to some advanced tools at ISP level.

Geographic distribution of WinDealer victims

The vast majority of WinDealer’s targets are located in China: foreign diplomatic organizations, members of the academic community, or companies active in the defense, logistics or telecoms sectors. Sometimes, though, the LuoYu APT group will infect targets in other countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, India, Russia and the US. In recent months, they have also become more interested in businesses located in other East Asian countries and their China-based offices.

ToddyCat: previously unknown threat actor attacks high-profile organizations in Europe and Asia

In June, we published our analysis of ToddyCat, a relatively new APT threat actor that we have not been able to link to any other known actors. The first wave of attacks, against a limited number of servers in Taiwan and Vietnam, targeted Microsoft Exchange servers, which the threat actor compromised with Samurai, a sophisticated passive backdoor that typically works via ports 80 and 443. The malware allows arbitrary C# code execution and is used alongside multiple modules that let the attacker administer the remote system and move laterally within the targeted network. In certain cases, the attackers have used the Samurai backdoor to launch another sophisticated malicious program, which we dubbed Ninja. This is probably a component of an unknown post-exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat.

The next wave saw a sudden surge in attacks, as the threat actor began abusing the ProxyLogon vulnerability to target organizations in multiple countries, including Iran, India, Malaysia, Slovakia, Russia and the UK.

Subsequently, we observed other variants and campaigns, which we attributed to the same group. In addition to affecting most of the previously mentioned countries, the threat actor targeted military and government organizations in Indonesia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The attack surface in the third wave was extended to desktop systems.

SessionManager IIS backdoor

In 2021, we observed a trend among certain threat actors for deploying a backdoor within IIS after exploiting one of the ProxyLogon-type vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange. Dropping an IIS module as a backdoor enables threat actors to maintain persistent, update-resistant and relatively stealthy access to the IT infrastructure of a target organization — to collect emails, update further malicious access or clandestinely manage compromised servers.

We published our analysis of one such IIS backdoor, called Owowa, last year. Early this year, we investigated another, SessionManager. Developed in C++, SessionManager is a malicious native-code IIS module. The attackers’ aim is for it to be loaded by some IIS applications, to process legitimate HTTP requests that are continuously sent to the server. This kind of malicious modules usually expects seemingly legitimate but specifically crafted HTTP requests from their operators, triggers actions based on the operators’ hidden instructions and then transparently passes the request to the server for it to be processed just as any other request.

Figure 1. Malicious IIS module processing requests

As a result, these modules are not easily spotted through common monitoring practices.

SessionManager has been used to target NGOs and government organizations in Africa, South America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

We believe that this malicious IIS module may have been used by the GELSEMIUM threat actor, because of similar victim profiles and the use of a common OwlProxy variant.

Other malware

Spring4Shell

Late in March, researchers discovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965) in Spring, an open-source framework for the Java platform. This is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, allowing an attacker to execute malicious code remotely on an unpatched computer. The vulnerability affects the Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux applications running under version 9 or later of the Java Development Kit. By analogy with the well-known Log4Shell vulnerability, this one was dubbed “Spring4Shell”.

By the time researchers had reported it to VMware, a proof-of-concept exploit had already appeared on GitHub. It was quickly removed, but it is unlikely that cybercriminals would have failed to notice such a potentially dangerous vulnerability.

You can find more details, including appropriate mitigation steps, in our blog post.

Actively exploited vulnerability in Windows

Among the vulnerabilities fixed in May’s “Patch Tuesday” update was one that has been actively exploited in the wild. The Windows LSA (Local Security Authority) Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2022-26925) is not considered critical per se. However, when the vulnerability is used in a New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) relay attack, the combined CVSSv3 score for the attack-chain is 9.8. The vulnerability, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to force domain controllers to authenticate with an attacker’s server using NTLM, was already being exploited in the wild as a zero-day, making it a priority to patch it.

Follina vulnerability in MSDT

At the end of May, researchers with the nao_sec team reported a new zero-day vulnerability in MSDT (the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool) that can be exploited using a malicious Microsoft Office document. The vulnerability, which has been designated as CVE-2022-30190 and has also been dubbed “Follina”, affects all operating systems in the Windows family, both for desktops and servers.

MSDT is used to collect diagnostic information and send it to Microsoft when something goes wrong with Windows. It can be called up from other applications via the special MSDT URL protocol; and an attacker can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the application that called up the MSD: in this case, the permissions of the user who opened the malicious document.

Kaspersky has observed attempts to exploit this vulnerability in the wild; and we would expect to see more in the future, including ransomware attacks and data breaches.

BlackCat: a new ransomware gang

It was only a matter of time before another ransomware group filled the gap left by REvil and BlackMatter shutting down operations. Last December, advertisements for the services of the ALPHV group, also known as BlackCat, appeared on hacker forums, claiming that the group had learned from the errors of their predecessors and created an improved version of the malware.

The BlackCat creators use the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model. They provide other attackers with access to their infrastructure and malicious code in exchange for a cut of the ransom. BlackCat gang members are probably also responsible for negotiating with victims. This is one reason why BlackCat has gained momentum so quickly: all that a “franchisee” has to do is obtain access to the target network.

The group’s arsenal comprises several elements. One is the cryptor. This is written in the Rust language, allowing the attackers to create a cross-platform tool with versions of the malware that work both in Windows and Linux environments. Another is the Fendr utility (also known as ExMatter), used to exfiltrate data from the infected infrastructure. The use of this tool suggests that BlackCat may simply be a re-branding of the BlackMatter faction, since that was the only known gang to use the tool. Other tools include the PsExec tool, used for lateral movement on the victim’s network; Mimikatz, the well-known hacker software; and the Nirsoft software, used to extract network passwords.

Yanluowang ransomware: how to recover encrypted files

The name Yanluowang is a reference to the Chinese deity Yanluo Wang, one of the Ten Kings of Hell. This ransomware is relatively recent. We do not know much about the victims, although data from the Kaspersky Security Network indicates that threat actor has carried out attacks in the US, Brazil, Turkey and a few other countries.

The low number of infections is due to the targeted nature of the ransomware: the threat actor prepares and implements attacks on specific companies only.

Our experts have discovered a vulnerability that allows files to be recovered without the attackers’ key — although only under certain conditions — with the help of a known-plaintext attack. This method overcomes the encryption algorithm if two versions of the same text are available: one clean and one encrypted. If the victim has clean copies of some of the encrypted files, our upgraded Rannoh Decryptor can analyze these and recover the rest of the information.

There is one snag: Yanluowang corrupts files slightly differently depending on their size. It encrypts small (less than 3 GB) files completely, and large ones, partially. So, the decryption requires clean files of different sizes. For files smaller than 3 GB, it is enough to have the original and an encrypted version of the file that are 1024 bytes or more. To recover files larger than 3 GB, however, you need original files of the appropriate size. However, if you find a clean file larger than 3 GB, it will generally be possible to recover both large and small files.

Ransomware TTPs

In June, we carried out an in-depth analysis of the TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) (TTPs) of the eight most widespread ransomware families: Conti/Ryuk, Pysa, Clop, Hive, Lockbit2.0, RagnarLocker, BlackByte and BlackCat. Our aim was to help those tasked with defending corporate systems to understand how ransomware groups operate and how to protect against their attacks.

The report includes the following:

  • The TTPs of eight modern ransomware groups.
  • A description of how various groups share more than half of their components and TTPs, with the core attack stages executed identically across groups.
  • A cyber-kill chain diagram that combines the visible intersections and common elements of the selected ransomware groups and makes it possible to predict the threat actors’ next steps.
  • A detailed analysis of each technique with examples of how various groups use them, and a comprehensive list of mitigations.
  • SIGMA rules based on the described TTPs that can be applied to SIEM solutions.

Ahead of the Anti-Ransomware Day on May 12, we took the opportunity to outline the tendencies that have characterized ransomware in 2022. In our report, we highlight several trends that we have observed.

First, we are seeing more widespread development of cross-platform ransomware, as cybercriminals seek to penetrate complex environments running a variety of systems. By using cross-platform languages such as Rust and Golang, attackers are able to port their code, which allows them to encrypt data on more computers.

Second, ransomware gangs continue to industrialize and evolve into real businesses by adopting the techniques and processes used by legitimate software companies.

Third, the developers of ransomware are adopting a political stance, involving themselves in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Finally, we offer best practices that organizations should adopt to help them defend against ransomware attacks:

  • Keep software updated on all your devices.
  • Focus your defense strategy on detecting lateral movements and data exfiltration.
  • Enable ransomware protection for all endpoints.
  • Install anti-APT and EDR solutions, enabling capabilities for advanced threat discovery and detection, investigation and timely remediation of incidents.
  • Provide your SOC team with access to the latest threat intelligence.

Emotet’s return

Emotet has been around for eight years. When it was first discovered in 2014, its main purpose was stealing banking credentials. Subsequently, the malware underwent numerous transformations to become one of the most powerful botnets ever. Emotet made headlines in January 2021, when its operations were disrupted through the joint efforts of law enforcement agencies in several countries. This kind of “takedowns” does not necessarily lead to the demise of a cybercriminal operation. It took the cybercriminals almost ten months to rebuild the infrastructure, but Emotet did return in November 2021. At that time, the Trickbot malware was used to deliver Emotet, but it is now spreading on its own through malicious spam campaigns.

Recent Emotet protocol analysis and C2 responses suggest that Emotet is now capable of downloading sixteen additional modules. We were able to retrieve ten of these, including two different copies of the spam module, used by Emotet for stealing credentials, passwords, accounts and emails, and to spread spam.

You can read our analysis of these modules, as well as statistics on recent Emotet attacks, here.

Emotet infects both corporate and private computers all around the world. Our telemetry indicates that in the first quarter of 2022, targeted: it mostly targeted users in Italy, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, China, Germany and Malaysia.

Moreover, we have seen a significant growth in the number of users attacked by Emotet.

Mobile subscription Trojans

Trojan subscribers are a well-established method of stealing money from people using Android devices. These Trojans masquerade as useful apps but, once installed, silently subscribe to paid services.

The developers of these Trojans make money through commissions: they get a cut of what the person “spends”. Funds are typically deducted from the cellphone account, although in some cases, these may be debited directly to a bank card. We looked at the most notable examples that we have seen in the last twelve months, belonging to the Jocker, MobOk, Vesub and GriftHorse families.

Normally, someone has to actively subscribe to a service; providers often ask subscribers to enter a one-time code sent via SMS, to counter automated subscription attempts. To sidestep this protection, malware can request permission to access text messages; where they do not obtain this, they can steal confirmation codes from pop-up notifications about incoming messages.

Some Trojans can both steal confirmation codes from texts or notifications, and work around CAPTCHA: another means of protection against automated subscriptions. To recognize the code in the picture, the Trojan sends it to a special CAPTCHA recognition service.

Some malware is distributed through dubious sources under the guise of apps that are banned from official stores, for example, masquerading as apps for downloading content from YouTube or other streaming services, or as an unofficial Android version of GTA5. In addition, they can appear in these same sources as free versions of popular, expensive apps, such as Minecraft.

Other mobile subscription Trojans are less sophisticated. When run for the first time, they ask the user to enter their phone number, seemingly for login purposes. The subscription is issued as soon as they enter their number and click the login button, and the amount is debited to their cellphone account.

Other Trojans employ subscriptions with recurring payments. While this requires consent, the person using the phone might not realize they are signing up for regular automatic payments. Moreover, the first payment is often insignificant, with later charges being noticeably higher.

You can read more about this type of mobile Trojan, along with tips on how to avoid falling victim to it, here.

The threat from stalkerware

Over the last four years, we have published annual reports on the stalkerware situation, in particular using data from the Kaspersky Security Network. This year, our report also included the results of a survey on digital abuse commissioned by Kaspersky and several public organizations.

Stalkerware provides the digital means for a person to secretly monitor someone else’s private life and is often used to facilitate psychological and physical violence against intimate partners. The software is commercially available and can access an array of personal data, including device location, browser history, text messages, social media chats, photos and more. It may be legal to market stalkerware, although its use to monitor someone without their consent is not. Developers of stalkerware benefit from a vague legal framework that still exists in many countries.

In 2021, our data indicated that around 33,000 people had been affected by stalkerware.

The numbers were lower than what we had seen for a few years prior to that. However, it is important to remember that the decrease of 2020 and 2021 occurred during successive COVID-19 lockdowns: that is, during conditions that meant abusers did not need digital tools to monitor and control their partners’ personal lives. It is also important to bear in mind that mobile apps represent only one method used by abusers to track someone — others include tracking devices such as AirTags, laptop applications, webcams, smart home systems and fitness trackers. KSN tracks only the use of mobile apps. Finally, KSN data is taken from mobile devices protected by Kaspersky products: many people do not protect their mobile devices.  The Coalition Against Stalkerware, which brings together members of the IT industry and non-profit companies, believes that the overall number of people affected by this threat might be thirty times higher — that is around a million people!

Stalkerware continues to affect people across the world: in 2021, we observed detections in 185 countries or territories.

Just as in 2020, Russia, Brazil, the US and India were the top four countries with the largest numbers of affected individuals. Interestingly, Mexico had fallen from fifth to ninth place. Algeria, Turkey and Egypt entered the top ten, replacing Italy, the UK and Saudi Arabia, which were no longer in the top ten.

We would recommend the following to reduce your risk of being targeted:

  • Use a unique, complex password on your phone and do not share it with anyone.
  • Try not to leave your phone unattended; and if you have to, lock it.
  • Download apps only from official stores.
  • Protect your mobile device with trustworthy security software and make sure it is able to detect stalkerware.

Remember also that if you discover stalkerware on your phone, dealing with the problem is not as simple as just removing the stalkerware app. This will alert the abuser to the fact that you have become aware of their activities and may precipitate physical abuse. Instead, seek help:  you can find a list or organizations that can provide help and support on the Coalition Against Stalkerware site.

Source :
https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q2-2022/107099/

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems for H1 2022

H1 2022 in numbers

Geography

  • In H1 2022, malicious objects were blocked at least once on 31.8% of ICS computers globally.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
  • For the first time in five years of observations, the lowest percentage in the ‎first half of the year was observed in March.‎ During the period from January to March, the percentage of attacked ICS computers decreased by 1.7 p.p.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, January – June 2020, 2021, and 2022
  • Among regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked was observed in Africa (41.5%). The lowest percentage (12.8%) was recorded in Northern Europe.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, in global regions
  • Among countries, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked was recorded in Ethiopia (54.8%) and the lowest (6.8%) in Luxembourg.15 countries and territories with the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, H1 202210 countries and territories with the lowest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, H1 2022

Threat sources

  • The main sources of threats to computers in the operational technology infrastructure of organizations are internet (16.5%), removable media (3.5%), and email (7.0%).Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from different sources were blocked

Regions

  • Among global regions, Africa ranked highest based on the percentage of ICS computers on which malware was blocked when removable media was connected.Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malware was blocked when removable media was connected, H1 2022
  • Southern Europe leads the ranking of regions by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious email attachments and phishing links were blocked.Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious email attachments and phishing links were blocked, H1 2022

Industry specifics

  • In the Building Automation industry, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious email attachments and phishing links were blocked (14.4%) was twice the average value for the entire world (7%).Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious email attachments and phishing links were blocked, in selected industries
  • In the Oil and Gas industry, the percentage of ICS computers on which threats were blocked when removable media was connected (10.4%) was 3 times the average percentage for the entire world (3.5%).Percentage of ICS computers on which threats were blocked when removable media was connected
  • In the Oil and Gas industry, the percentage of ICS computers on which malware was blocked in network folders (1.2%) was twice the world average (0.6%).Percentage of ICS computers on which threats were blocked in network folders

Diversity of malware

  • Malware of different types from 7,219 families was blocked on ICS computers in H1 2022.Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from different categories was prevented

Ransomware

  • In H1 2022, ransomware was blocked on 0.65% of ICS computers. This is the highest percentage for any six-month reporting period since 2020.Percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked
  • The highest percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked was recorded in February (0.27%) and the lowest in March (0.11%). The percentage observed in February was the highest in 2.5 years of observations.Percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked, January – June 2022
  • East Asia (0.95%) and the Middle East (0.89%) lead the ransomware-based ranking of regions. In the Middle East, the percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked per six-month reporting period has increased by a factor of 2.5 since 2020.Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked, H1 2022
  • Building Automation leads the ranking of industries based on the percentage of ICS computers attacked by ransomware (1%).Percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked, in selected regions, H1 2022

Malicious documents

  • Malicious documents (MSOffice+PDF) were blocked on 5.5% of ICS computers. This is 2.2 times the percentage recorded in H2 2021. Threat actors distribute malicious documents via phishing emails and actively use such emails as the vector of initial computer infections.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents (MSOffice+PDF) were blocked
  • In the Building Automation industry, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious office documents were blocked (10.5%) is almost twice the global average.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious office documents (MSOffice+PDF) were blocked, in selected industries

Spyware

  • Spyware was blocked on 6% of ICS computers. This percentage has been growing since 2020.Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked
  • Building Automation leads the ranking of industries based on the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked (12.9%).Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked, in selected industries

Malware for covert cryptocurrency mining

  • The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious cryptocurrency miners were blocked continued to rise gradually.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious cryptocurrency miners were blocked
  • Building Automation also leads the ranking of selected industries by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious cryptocurrency miners were blocked.Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious cryptocurrency miners were blocked, in selected industries

The full text of the report has been published on the Kaspersky ICS CERT website.

Source :
https://securelist.com/threat-landscape-for-industrial-automation-systems-for-h1-2022/107373/

Akamai’s Insights on DNS in Q2 2022

by Or Katz and Jim Black
Data analysis by Gal Kochner and Moshe Cohen

Executive summary

  • Akamai researchers have analyzed malicious DNS traffic from millions of devices to determine how corporate and personal devices are interacting with malicious domains, including phishing attacks, malware, ransomware, and command and control (C2).
  • Akamai researchers saw that 12.3% of devices used by home and corporate users communicated at least once to domains associated with malware or ransomware.
  • 63% of those users’ devices communicated with malware or ransomware domains, 32% communicated with phishing domains, and 5% communicated with C2 domains.
  • Digging further into phishing attacks, researchers found that users of financial services and high tech are the most frequent targets of phishing campaigns, with 47% and 36% of the victims, respectively.
  • Consumer accounts are the most affected by phishing, with 80.7% of the attack campaigns.
  • Tracking 290 different phishing toolkits being reused in the wild, and counting the number of distinct days each kit was reused over Q2 2022, shows that 1.9% of the tracked kits were reactivated on at least 72 days. In addition, 49.6% of the kits were reused for at least five days, demonstrating how many users are being revictimized multiple times. This shows how realistic-looking and dangerous these kits can be, even to knowledgeable users. 
  • The most used phishing toolkit in Q2 2022 (Kr3pto, a phishing campaign that targeted banking customers in the United Kingdom, which evades multi-factor authentication [MFA]) was hosted on more than 500 distinct domains.

Introduction

“It’s always DNS.” Although that is a bit of a tongue-in-cheek phrase in our industry, DNS can give us a lot of information about the threat landscape that exists today. By analyzing information from Akamai’s massive infrastructure, we are able to gain some significant insights on how the internet behaves. In this blog, we will explore these insights into traffic patterns, and how they affect people on the other end of the internet connection. 

Akamai traffic insights

Attacks by category

Based on Akamai’s range of visibility across different industries and geographies, we can see that 12.3% of protected devices attempted to reach out to domains that were associated with malware at least once during Q2 2022. This indicates that these devices might have been compromised. On the phishing and C2 front, we can see that 6.2% of devices accessed phishing domains and 0.8% of the devices accessed C2-associated domains. Although these numbers may seem insignificant, the scale here is in the millions of devices. When this is considered, along with the knowledge that C2 is the most malignant of threats, these numbers are not only significant, they’re cardinal.

Comparing 2022 Q2 results with 2022 Q1 results (Figure 1), we can see a minor increase in all categories in Q2. We attribute those increases to seasonal changes that are not associated with a significant change in the threat landscape.

Fig. 1: Devices exposed to threats — Q1 vs. Q2 Fig. 1: Devices exposed to threats — Q1 vs. Q2

In Figure 2, we can see that of the 12.3% potentially compromised devices, 63% were exposed to threats associated with malware activity, 32% with phishing, and 5% with C2. Access to malware-associated domains does not guarantee that these devices were actually compromised, but provides a strong indication of increased potential risk if the threat wasn’t properly mitigated. However, access to C2-associated domains indicates that the device is most likely compromised and is communicating with the C2 server. This can often explain why the incidence of C2 is lower when compared with malware numbers.

Fig. 2: Potentially compromised devices by category Fig. 2: Potentially compromised devices by category

Phishing attack campaigns 

By looking into the brands that are being abused and mimicked by phishing scams in Q2 2022, categorized by brand industry and number of victims, we can see that high tech and financial brands led with 36% and 47%, respectively (Figure 3). These leading phishing industry categories are consistent with Q1 2022 results, in which high tech and financial brands were the leading categories, with 32% and 31%, respectively. 

Fig. 3: Phishing victims and phishing campaigns by abused brands Fig. 3: Phishing victims and phishing campaigns by abused brands

When taking a different view on the phishing landscape–targeted industries by counting the number of attack campaigns being launched over Q2 2022, we can see that high tech and financial brands are still leading, with 36% and 41%, respectively (Figure 3). The correlation between leading targeted brands when it comes to number of attacks and number of victims is evidence that threat actors’ efforts and resources are, unfortunately, effectively working to achieve their desired outcome.

Akamai’s research does not have any visibility into the distribution channels used to deliver the monitored phishing attacks that led to victims clicking on a malicious link and ending up on the phishing landing page. Yet the strong correlation between different brand segments by number of attack campaigns and the number of victims seems to indicate that the volume of attacks is effective and leads to a similar trend in the number of victims. The correlation might also indicate that the distribution channels used have minimal effect on attack outcome, and it is all about the volume of attacks that lead to the desired success rates.

Taking a closer look at phishing attacks by categorization of attack campaigns — consumers vs. business targeted accounts— we can see that consumer attacks are the most dominant, with 80.7% of the attack campaigns (Figure 4). This domination is driven by the massive demand for consumers’ compromised accounts in dark markets that are then used to launch fraud-related second-phase attacks. However, even with only 19.3% of the attack campaigns, attacks against business accounts should not be considered marginal, as these kinds of attacks are usually more targeted and have greater potential for significant damage. Attacks that target business accounts may lead to a company’s network being compromised with malware or ransomware, or to confidential information being leaked. An attack that begins with an employee clicking a link in a phishing email can end up with the business suffering significant financial and reputational damages.

Fig. 4: Phishing targeted accounts — consumers vs. business  Fig. 4: Phishing targeted accounts — consumers vs. business

Phishing toolkits 

Phishing attacks are an extremely common vector that have been used for many years. The potential impacts and risks involved are well-known to most internet users. However, phishing is still a highly relevant and dangerous attack vector that affects thousands of people and businesses daily. Research conducted by Akamai explains some of the reasons for this phenomenon, and focuses on the phishing toolkits and their role in making phishing attacks effective and relevant. 

Phishing toolkits enable rapid and easy creation of fake websites that mimic known brands. Phishing toolkits enable even non–technically gifted scammers to run phishing scams, and in many cases are being used to create distributed and large-scale attack campaigns. The low cost and availability of these toolkits explains the increasing numbers of phishing attacks that have been seen in the past few years. 

According to Akamai’s research that tracked 290 different phishing toolkits being used in the wild, 1.9% of the tracked kits were reused on at least 72 distinct days over Q2 2022 (Figure 5). Further, 49.6% of the kits were reused for at least five days, and when looking into all the tracked kits, we can see that all of them were reused no fewer than three distinct days over Q2 2022.

Fig. 5: Phishing toolkits by number of reused days Q2 2022 Fig. 5: Phishing toolkits by number of reused days Q2 2022

The numbers showing the heavy reuse phenomenon of the observed phishing kits shed some light on the phishing threat landscape and the scale involved, creating an overwhelming challenge to defenders. Behind the reuse of phishing kits are factories and economic forces that drive the phishing landscape. Those forces include developers who create phishing kits that mimic known brands, later to be sold or shared among threat actors to be reused over and over again with very minimal effort.

Further analysis on the most reused kits in Q2 2022, counting the number of different domains used to deliver each kit, shows that the Kr3pto toolkit was the one most frequently used and was associated with more than 500 domains (Figure 6). The tracked kits are labeled by the name of the brand being abused or by a generic name representing the kit developer signature or kit functionality.

In the case of Kr3pto, the actor behind the phishing kit is a developer who builds and sells unique kits that target financial institutions and other brands. In some cases, these kits target financial firms in the United Kingdom, and they bypass MFA. This evidence also shows that this phishing kit that was initially created more than three years ago is still highly active and effective and being used intensively in the wild.

Fig. 6: Top 10 reused phishing toolkits  Fig. 6: Top 10 reused phishing toolkits

The phishing economy is growing, kits are becoming easier to develop and deploy, and the web is full of abandoned, ready-to-be-abused websites and vulnerable servers and services. Criminals capitalize on these weaknesses to establish a foothold that enables them to victimize thousands of people and businesses daily.

The growing industrial nature of phishing kit development and sales (in which new kits are developed and released within hours) and the clear split between creators and users means this threat isn’t going anywhere anytime soon. The threat posed by phishing factories isn’t just focused on the victims who risk having valuable accounts compromised and their personal information sold to criminals — phishing is also a threat to brands and their stakeholders.

The life span of a typical phishing domain is measured in hours, not days. Yet new techniques and developments by the phishing kit creators are expanding these life spans little by little, and it’s enough to keep the victims coming and the phishing economy moving. 

Summary

This type of research is necessary in the fight to keep our customers safer online. We will continue to monitor these threats and report on them to keep the industry informed.

The best way to stay up to date on this and other research pieces from the Akamai team is to follow Akamai Security Research on Twitter.

Source :
https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/q2-dns-akamai-insights

CrowdWall, a tough Firewall for 50€ – Part 3: set up a canary device with CrowdSec

Using Orange Pi R1+, Netfilter, AdGuard and CrowdSec to preserve your security & privacy. The third part  is on how to set up a canary device that ‘tweets’ when unexpected events occur.

Welcome to the third and final part of our trilogy where the goal is to inspire and show you how to create a very efficient firewall to secure home network or your small business, which offers a serious level of security, at low cost.

The first part focuses on selecting hardware and installing the base OS.

The second part is dedicated to setting up firewall functionality, client VPN to protect your identity online, AdGuard for the entire network, DuckDNS if you don’t have a static IP as well as port knocking to close down your internet exposed services to anyone but you.

This third and final part is about how to secure your network even further with CrowdSec – how to set up a canary device that notifies you when unexpected events such as scanning occur; something you would typically never do yourself.

Part 3: Setting up a canary device with CrowdSec

The end goal of this third part is to show how CrowdSec can do cool stuff acting as a canary, but we need a few preliminary steps. We want to set up an alarming system so we know when a new system has been connected to our local network. That is a two-part thing consisting of installing ARP Watch and notifications via Pushover. After that we’ll talk about what CrowdSec can do in the sense of alarming you when odd things are happening on your network. First things first:

ARP Watch

To proceed further in securing ourselves, it would be cool to know whenever a new machine is connecting to the LAN. And since we can now get instant notifications with the above script, let’s send an alert every time a new device is detected in the LAN.

$ sudo apt-get install arpwatch

In the /etc/default/arpwatch file add lan0 (or whatever is the name of your LAN interface):

INTERFACES="lan0"

And create a file in /etc/arpwatch/lan0.iface (if lan0 is your LAN interface) to add some email addresses. Here, to reuse our pushover system, we can input the email address that is provided for your app in pushover. If you send an email to this address, it’ll be forwarded as a push notification to your phone.

$ cat | sudo tee /etc/arpwatch/lan0.iface

Paste:

IFACE_ARGS="-m xmmmm1fjoejf@pomail.net"

Where xmmmm1fjoejf@pomail.net should be replaced by the email address listed under your login. As usual, end with CTRL + D to return to your shell.

Setting up a notification system 

Pushover is an iOS and Android app that allows you to send plenty of notifications to your phone for free (around 7500 per app per month). You can obviously use it wherever you feel, for whatever reason. In the above crontab script you can, for example, notify yourself when the machine boots. But we may also want to know when a new mac address is registering in our network or if a port scan was fired from within the LAN area (which is quite bad news, see below section “Protecting yourself even from (w)LAN devices”

So, once you have set up your Pushover App and account online, you should have a user token and an app token:


Next, create an APP and locate your App token. 

Create a script to send yourself notifications:

$ cat > /usr/local/scripts/pushover.sh

cut/paste the script below, finish it with CTRL+D and issue the classical chmod:

$ chmod 755 /usr/local/scripts/pushover.sh
#!/bin/bash 

curl -s -F "token=YOUR_APP_TOKEN" -F "user=YOUR_USER_TOKEN" -F “title=$1” -F "message=$2" https://api.pushover.net/1/messages

Now to send yourself a message, you just need to type in:

$ ./pushover.sh "Most kittens" "Are too cute"

And you should get this on your phone screen:

Protecting yourself even from (w)LAN devices

One thing you cannot really trust, but nevertheless like to have, are connected speakers like Sonos, your voice assistants like Alexa or even your IP cameras or just your smartphone. All those IoT devices make our life easier but also come with a substantial amount of potential security issues.

I’ve tried several approaches here, but none is at the same time realistic in terms of daily usage and secure enough. Segregating all those machines in a sub-lan (or rather a sub-wlan for most of them) using a different vlanid and trying to limit the exposure to your secure devices is a complicated task and usually cripples the usability we all appreciate as well.

One simple example would be your Sonos speakers. You want them to connect to online streaming systems like Deezer or Spotify and be able to control them with your phone through airplay. At the same time, if (when) a hacker is able to upload a rigged firmware by breaching into Sonos systems, they can infect your local speakers and establish a local presence in your LAN, scan, harvest, invade, etc. The same is true of most voice assistants, IP cameras, smartwatch, smartphone, TV, and generally speaking of *any* IoT devices.

Now if you isolate them in a sub (w)LAN, you’ll not really be able to control them comfortably since anytime a friend comes over you’d have to add a rule to your firewall as well as probably other cumbersome modifications. 

So to be more realistic, I decided to proceed in a different way. Let’s not suspect those things right away but rather detect if (when) they start to behave suspicious. Apart from cameras that should not be able to access the Internet and send private video streams across the globe to god knows how, we can just monitor our IoT devices. Most of those devices could be let loose and if ever they are compromised a hacker will very likely use them to scan and compromise your network. 

There are other more complicated ways, like having different, firewalled vlans, tag packets, and using multicast forwarding, but beyond complication, you’re not always sure not to lose functionalities of some of your IoT devices. Also this method is more generic (although less protective).

Using CrowdSec to setup a Canary device

The concept is fairly old and simple. Coal miners during the 19th century used to bring a canary with them down the mine and if a gas leak would occur (which was odorless) it’d kill the canary and miners would evacuate, hopefully before a potential blast.

Nowadays, and in an IT context, a canary is a device that is stealthy sitting in your network that should bever be queried. It’s doing nothing, hosts no service and there is no reason in the world it should ever be poked. If it is accessed, that means something/someone in your network is scanning it and 99.999% of the time, this is bad news. 

If a hacker ever hijacks any of your IoT devices, no matter the method, it’s very likely that they’ll scan your LAN. In this case your canary should be triggered and alerting you. We have all the needed tools to do it already, either locally on the firewall we are building, or on a separate similar pi device with just one LAN interface. No matter how you choose to do it, CrowdSec will be a very useful tool to set up the canary and our pushover script can alert us. After all, our scenario is known : multiport scan and it already exists on the hub. The bouncer (the component that deals with the detect menace) also exists: we’ll simply use the one that triggers a script, here our script to send us a notification using pushover.

Remember we added those lines in our firewalling script:

define antilanscan        = { 22, 8080 } 

And in the Input section:

iif $lan tcp dport != $fwopenports log prefix "LAN SCAN:"  drop

Well, basically they say that if ports on the LAN interface are contacted on any other ports than 22:TCP and 8080:TCP (8080 is just an example), then someone is scanning you and you should drop the packets. But the trick here is that since we drop the packet, CrowdSec iptables multiscan scenario,  crowdsecurity/iptables-scan-multi_ports , will catch the signal.will catch the signal.

CrowdSec

CrowdSec will spot hacking attempts by looking at the logs generated on the OPI. If you intend to run more services than just those in this tutorial, remember to reconfigure it (either by running the installation wizard again or by adding it manually to /etc/crowdsec/acquis.yaml). If you choose the latter method make sure to install a suitable scenario either using cscli or by visiting https://hub.crowdsec.net

In one sentence, CrowdSec is crowd powered cyber security software. It’s an open source & free IPS system. It detects attacks in your logs, bans the IP and then shares the aggressive IP with the community so that everyone else is also protected against this aggressor. As well, your instance of CrowdSec benefits from the global sightings of the network.

While CrowdSec is available in Debian (but not Ubuntu) it’s highly recommended to add our own repo since the available package has been deprecated since last OS release. To do that follow the (easy) instructions at our documentation site. Once added, simply install the CrowdSec package and the nftables bouncer:

$ sudo apt-get install crowdsec 
$ sudo apt-get install crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables

Installing both packages with one command can be a bit of a hassle since we can’t control the order of which packages are installed. So to make sure that the agent is installed first, we do it like this. This ensures that the bouncer is added automatically to the CrowdSec agent.

The installer will pretty much do all the job for you. After installing add the netfilter log collection by issuing this:

$ sudo cscli collections install crowdsecurity/iptables
$ sudo systemctl reload crowdsec

(note: In spite of the name, the collection is also valid for nftables)

Ok we’re all set on that front. CrowdSec will create two nftables IP sets named crowdsec and crowdsec6, containing ipv4 blocklist for the first one and ipv6 for the latter. Basically those sets are automatically banned by the firewall bouncer daemon residing in memory. If someone agresses your machine and tries to port scan it, scan your web server or bruteforce your ssh / ftp or other accesses, not only will it get banned, but its IP will also be reported to the central CTI. In return, we do benefit for free from the knowledge of the Crowd as well and our IP sets are automatically filled with new dangerous IPs sent by the central API of CrowdSec. We defend, we partake and in return we are even better defended by all the other members. Neat.

You can obviously block those IP sets yourself wherever you feel. 

The configuration resides in /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml and is very straightforward:

mode: nftables
pid_dir: /var/run/
update_frequency: 10s
daemonize: true
log_mode: file
log_dir: /var/log/
log_level: info
api_url: http://localhost:8080/
api_key: 
disable_ipv6: false
deny_action: DROP
deny_log: true
deny_log_prefix: "crowdsec:"
iptables_chains:
  - input
  - output
  - forward

Note: you won’t need to edit the file; this is the default configuration.

So not only will your (potential) services be protected, but your firewall output will also generate bans for people trying to hack you, share their IP to protect everyone else and CrowdSec will send you dangerous IPs constantly to be blocked directly in your firewall.  One stone, three birds. Bingo!

Next, we need to set up the custom bouncer that comes with CrowdSec. Luckily it’s also available as binary package on arm-based devices running debian-based distros:

$ sudo apt install crowdsec-custom-bouncer

In its essence the custom bouncer simply executes a custom script whenever a scenario triggers.

Obviously, we’re using it to execute the pushover_crowdsec.sh script whenever a scenario triggers.

After installation, we need to edit the config file located in/etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-custom-bouncer.yaml:

bin_path: /usr/local/scripts/pushover_crowdsec.sh
piddir: /var/run/
update_frequency: 10s
cache_retention_duration: 10s
daemonize: true
log_mode: file
log_dir: /var/log/
log_level: info
api_url: http://localhost:8080/
api_key: 

You would only need to edit the bin_path item in the configuration file above as everything else, even registering the bouncer with the agent has been taken care of by the install script run automatically upon installation. 

Copy/paste the content of the script after this command to ensure  that the script is added to the file system correctly:

$ cat | sudo tee /usr/local/scripts/pushover_crowdsec.sh
#!/bin/bash

[[ `echo $2 | cut -f 1,2 -d"."` == "192.168" ]] && curl -s -F "token=" -F "user=" -F "title='LAN Scan'" -F "message=Scanned by $2" https://api.pushover.net/1/messages

Remember to chmod 755to make the script executable.

Now, anytime a scan would be initiated from the LAN, we are notified directly on our Phone. Our Canary is alive and kicking!

Conclusion

For a marginal budget, you can protect your family, your work and your privacy. All it takes is 50€ and a couple of hours. You’ll learn a lot, be autonomous and better protected. Doesn’t it sound like a fair investment of your time in 2022?

Source :
https://www.crowdsec.net/blog/crowdwall-part-3

CrowdWall, a Tough Firewall for 50€ – Part 2: The Software Stack

How to set up an effective firewall and preserve your security & privacy with Orange Pi R1+, Netfilter, AdGuard and CrowdSec.

Welcome to the second part of our trilogy where the goal is to inspire you to create a very efficient firewall to protect your remote work environment, family, or your small business, which offers a serious level of security, at a low cost.

Have you not yet read the first part that focuses on selecting hardware and installing the base OS it’s not too late. Find it here.

This second part is focused on how to set up firewall functionality, setup client VPN to protect your identity online, setting up AdGuard for the entire network, DuckDNS if you don’t have a static IP as well as port knocking which is a cool way to close down your internet exposed services to anyone but you (or anyone else who knows the secret combination to enter). The third and final part will be about how to secure your network even more with CrowdSec – how to set up a canary device that ‘tweets’ when unexpected events like for instance port scanning occurs; something you would typically never do yourself.

It’s also being part of a larger project, CrowdSec, which is blocking Internet attacks and sharing IPs that launched them. You protect yourself and others at the same time. In essence, this comprehensive guide will show you how to:

  • Create security robust enough to resist even if passwords are compromised
  • Create a reliable hardware environment for your firewall
  • Install the OS on it and create a rock-solid Firewall to protect your activities
  • Add CrowdSec to protect your WLAN services you’d like to expose over the Internet and detect if any local IoT device is going rogue (e.g. cams, assistants, connected speakers, etc.)
  • Allow external access to DMZ-like services to control your home on distance and access your firewall
  • Add a VPN to protect your anonymity online
  • Add an anti-advertisement & anti-tracking system

Part 2: The Software stack

The firewall

It’s already in there, provided by the netfilter subsystem, which is integrated into the kernel. The nft (nftables) command is here to help us interact with the netfilter layer. The following script is commented so that you can easily modify it according to your needs and projects or even port it to iptables (nftable  predecessor). All scripts can be found here.

Out of the box, it handles:

  • Multiple internet connection with a dynamic routing table capable of sending packets to one or the other connection based on your rules (destination port, src or destination IP, protocols, etc.)
  • Protection against usual network shenanigans
  • Inbound, forward and outbound traffic filtering
  • CrowdSec integration to defend your exposed services and have a Canary to detect if your LAN is being scanned
  • Port knocking integration so that you can simply use a port knocking app to unlock access to your network from wherever you are.

Just cut/paste it from this doc:

$ cat | sudo tee /etc/nftables.conf

Here is the script to adapt and copy/paste:

#!/usr/sbin/nft -f

#Part 1: Setting statics
define wan                     = eth0
define lan                       = lan0
define vpn                      = tun0
define localhost            = lo
define vpn_net              = 10.8.0.0/24
define vpnserver           = tun1
define vpn_server_net  = 10.0.0.0/24
define machine1           = 192.168.0.2
define machine2           = 192.168.0.3
define antilanscan        = { 22, 8080 } #Part 8: Anti lan scan
define cameras             = { 192.168.0.4, 192.168.0.5 }
define icmp_v6          = { destination-unreachable, echo-reply, echo-request, nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-router-advert, nd-neighbor-advert, packet-too-big, parameter-problem, time-exceeded }

#Part 2: Reset nft tables
flush ruleset

#Part 3: NAT
table ip nat {
  chain prerouting {
    type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept;
      iif $wan tcp dport 2222 dnat to $machine1:22 # incoming connexion on port 2222 will be forwarded to 192.168.0.2  on 22
      iif $wan tcp dport 5001 dnat to $machine2      # sames port 5001 and 192.168.0.3 but this time port is 5001 to 5001, no change
  }
  chain postrouting {
    type nat hook postrouting priority 100; policy accept;
      oif $wan snat to 192.168.1.1
      oif $wan2 snat to 192.168.2.1
      oifname $vpn masquerade # snat to $vpnip
      oifname $vpnserver snat to 10.0.0.1
  }
}

#Part 4: Creating IP sets
table inet filter {

  set whitelist_candidates {
    type ipv4_addr . inet_service
    flags timeout
  }

  set whitelist {
     type ipv4_addr
     flags interval, timeout
  }

  set whitelist_portknockd {
     type ipv4_addr
     flags timeout
  }

  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority 0; policy drop;
      icmpv6 type $icmp_v6 accept
    #Part 5: Portknocking (next 4 lines)
      tcp dport 314 add @whitelist_candidates {ip  saddr . 18 timeout 2s}
      tcp dport 18 ip saddr . tcp dport @whitelist_candidates add @whitelist_candidates {ip  saddr . 939 timeout 2s}
      tcp dport 939 ip saddr . tcp dport @whitelist_candidates add @whitelist_candidates {ip  saddr . 101 timeout 2s}
      tcp dport 101 ip saddr . tcp dport @whitelist_candidates add @whitelist {ip saddr timeout 180s} log prefix "Portknocked: "
      ct state related,established            accept
      iif $lan tcp dport != $fwopenports log prefix "LAN SCAN:"  drop #Part 8: Anti lan scan
      ip saddr @whitelist                            accept
      ip saddr @whitelist_portknockd      accept
      iifname $lan                                       accept
      iifname $localhost                            accept
      iifname $vpnserver                           accept
      iifname $wan ip saddr != @whitelist                             drop
      iifname $wan ip saddr != @whitelist_portknockd       drop
      iifname $wan ct state invalid                                        log prefix "Invalid packet:" drop
      iif != lo ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8                                            log prefix "Fake localhost:" drop
  }

  chain forward {
    type filter hook forward priority 0; policy drop;
    #Part 6: Prerouting (next two lines)
      iifname $vpn meta l4proto udp ip daddr $machine1 udp dport 22 accept
      iifname $vpn meta l4proto tcp ip daddr $machine2 tcp dport 5001 accept
    #Part 4: Creating IP sets (next two lines)
      ip saddr @whitelist                       accept
      ip saddr @whitelist_portknockd accept
      iif $lan                                            accept
      iifname $vpnserver                      accept
      ct state established,related       accept
      ip saddr $cameras log prefix "Camera trying to exit:" drop
      ct state invalid log prefix "Invalid packet:" drop
  }

  chain output {
    type filter hook output priority 0; policy accept;
  }
}
#Part 7: Mangling
table ip mangle {
  chain prerouting {
    type filter hook prerouting priority -150; policy accept;
      mark != 0x0                                               meta mark set ct mark
      ip saddr $machine1 tcp sport 10001    meta mark set 0x2
      ip saddr $machine1 udp sport 10001   meta mark set 0x2
      ip saddr $machine1                                meta mark set 0x1
      ip saddr $machine2                                meta mark set 0x4
  }

  chain postrouting {
    type filter hook postrouting priority -150; policy accept;
      ct mark set mark
  }
}

After inserting it, save the file by pressing CTRL+D.

This version is a simplified version of the firewall script available from the repo above, but the most important part is here already. This nftables.conf file would not be enough by itself to handle several possible routes. Be sure to also use the ip rules script to create your routing tables, see below, section IP route.

NFtables (netfilter) Firewall details

  • Part 1 are basic variable definitions.
  • Part 2 resets all nft tables. (Used to take 10 lines with Iptables)
  • In part 3 (NAT) we are defining what happens to packets that are incoming and destined to another machine behind the firewall. They are dealt with very early in the filtering process, in a prerouting chain. The postrouting chain is about telling what IP should be used for translating IPs coming from various subnets.
  • The second table, filter, is part 4 that create IP sets. They are tables that contain IP addresses, sometimes with expiry dates. Three sets are created, one for potential candidates to whitelisting, the second for confirmed whitelisted IPs and the third will be used in conjunction with port knocking. The reason for creating two different whitelists of IPs is that the port knocking integrated in this NFT configuration (part 5) will only store the IP that knocked. Logical? No, not really. But CGNAT, used by telecom operators to run 4G networks, ruins it all and usually, it’s not a 1:1 IP translation but a range of IP that is used. So when your phone is port knocking 3 ports quickly, it’s usually with one IP but then when you connect on your SSH port, another IP is used. Luckily, they often sit in the same /24 range. The problem doesn’t exist with IPv6 obviously. So knockd will fill the second set with a range and the first one is still useful when you connect from elsewhere like a hotel. (I didn’t find any way to add a range to the set directly from an nft configuration file)
  • Part 6 is related to prerouting. It’s not enough to redirect the connection since the packet is passing two interfaces, we also need to accept this in the forward rules.
  • Part 7 is mangling. This is where we instruct the firewall to mark packets according to our own rules. 0x03 is the VPN server you host yourself and where you receive inbound traffic, 0x02 is the VPN client which you use to establish an outbound tunnel through a VPN provider. It’s through here you send the traffic of machine 1. In this example, we want machine1 to be using connection 2 when it’s starting a connection on port UDP or TCP 10001, otherwise it will be using connection 1. Machine 2 will always use your alt connection (here marked as 0x4) and machine 1, except for ports 10001 will use connection 1. This can be adapted with ports, source addresses, destination addresses, protocols, etc. (Note that the table has the highest priority and will be “executed” first, before all other rules). Use cases are easy here: you can send your professional workstation packets through a dedicated connection for example. Or send all your peer-to-peer traffic through a VPN or your TV IP through a VPN to avoid Geo limitations, etc. See the IP route section to understand fully how nft mangle + IP route cooperate here.
  • Part 8, Anti lan scan will be covered later on in this guide, but the global concept is to watch for unusual port scans, coming from our LAN-facing ethernet adapter, that would denote an IoT device being compromised or a hacker doing a lateral move in your network (classic in Ransomware scenario). We’ll have a canary setup here, see below for a more detailed description.

Obviously, all those rules are given as examples but it should be fairly easy for you to adapt them to your own context.

Port knocking

So this script handles port knocking by itself with the lines tagged in yellow, but the CGNAT problem forces us to have a fallback plan. We’ll use knockd to handle the matter on our machine.

But why is port knocking in the first place?

Well, take for granted that any application you expose might have an unknown security flaw. Or that your passwords are compromised. If the attacker doesn’t have access to the application port in the first place, even if he knows your pass or has a secret “headshot” 0 days exploit to launch, with port knocking he cannot even try in the first place, except if he uses the exact same IP as you do. This very heavily limits the risks of getting compromised. Also, using your 4G connection is far less risky than connecting to a Hotel (or public place) Wifi. But how to just allow a temporary connection from those locations? Well, port knocking is the (very underrated) key.

So before connecting to your machine, you will just launch a little app that will port “knock” your machine, nicely whitelisting the public IP you’re using and give you access to VPN, SSH, RDP, whatever you want.

KnockonD will do nicely on iOS, Knock on Ports for Android). It sends a stream of packets, in a certain order, to add your current IP address in a set that is whitelisted in the firewall. (Careful, some ISPs (like broadband carriers) are doing CGNAT, which can cripple this technique, but we’ll try to put a workaround together)

On the OPI you just need to run:

$ apt-get install knockd

And edit the configuration file (/etc/knockd.conf) as follows. Modify to your own port sequence:

[options]
        logfile = /var/log/knockd.log
        interface = eth0

[open]

sequence = 17:tcp,19:tcp,39:tcp,105:tcp seq_timeout = 10 command = nft add element inet filter whitelist_portknockd “{ `echo %IP% | cut -f1,2,3 -d “.”`”.0/24″ timeout 180s }” tcpflags = syn

[open2]

sequence = 443:tcp,25:tcp,53:udp,80:tcp,53:udp,80:tcp,443:tcp seq_timeout = 10 command = nft add element inet filter whitelist_portknockd “{ `echo %IP% | cut -f1,2,3 -d “.”`”.0/24″ timeout 180s }” tcpflags = syn

Two sequences here, one classic and another one that is compatible with heavily filtered networks that won’t allow you to access all ports freely. Both add not just your IP but your IP in a 24 range in the whitelisted set. This one is really made to address the pesky CGNAT problem.

IP Route

You also need a script that will create those multiple routing tables, and that will be able to use the marks we set in the script (part 7 in the nftables script).

Here is the script creating multiple routing tables, allowing different default routes for different usages. It’s also available from my GitHub:

Note: If you don’t have multiple wan connections like me, adjust accordingly by removing all occurrences of WAN2.

#!/bin/bash

### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides:                  multiroute
# Required-Start:        $network
# Required-Stop:        $network
# Should-Start:
# Should-Stop:
# Default-Start:            2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop:            0 1 6
# Short-Description:    Multiroute manager
# Description:              Manage multi-routing
### END INIT INFO

Set_variables()
{
   WAN="eth0"
   LAN="lan0"
   WAN2="eth2"
   VPN=`ifconfig|grep tun0`
   VPNSERVER=`ifconfig|grep tun1`
 [[ ! -z "$VPN" ]] && VPNIF="tun0" && VPN=1 && VPNCLIENTIP=`ip -o addr | grep -v inet6 | grep tun0 | awk '{split($4, a, "/"); print a[1]}'` &&  VPNCLIENTROUTE=`ip route show|grep -v inet6 | grep "tun0 proto" | cut -f 1 -d " "`
  [[ ! -z "$VPNSERVER" ]] && VPNSERVERIF="tun1" && VPNSERVER=1 && VPNSERVERIP=`ip -o addr |grep -v inet6 | grep $VPNSERVERIF |awk '{split($4, a, "/"); print a[1]}'` && VPNSERVERROUTE=`ip route show |grep -v inet6 | grep $VPNSERVERIF | cut -f 1 -d " " | head -1`
}

Env_Cleanup()
{
  ip rule del from all fwmark 1 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 2 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 3 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 4 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del lookup maincnx    2>/dev/null
  ip rule del lookup vpnclient  2>/dev/null
  ip rule del lookup vpnserver  2>/dev/null
  ip rule del lookup altcnx     2>/dev/null
  ip route flush table maincnx
  ip route flush table vpnclient
  ip route flush table vpnserver
  ip route flush table altcnx
  for i in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do echo 0 > "$i"; done # To avoid packet drop
}

Routing_Init()
{
  [[ $VPN ]] && echo -e "$ORANGE -> VPN IS UP (route: $VPNCLIENTROUTE, on dev: $VPNIF, ip: $VPNCLIENTIP) $END"

  ip route add table maincnx default dev $WAN via 192.168.1.2
  ip route add table maincnx 192.168.0.0/24 dev $LAN src 192.168.0.1
  ip route add table maincnx 192.168.1.0/24 dev $WAN src 192.168.1.1
  ip route add table maincnx 192.168.2.0/24 dev $WAN2 src 192.168.2.1
  [[ $VPN ]] && ip route add table maincnx $VPNCLIENTROUTE dev $VPNIF src $VPNCLIENTIP
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip route add table maincnx 10.0.0.0/24 dev $VPNSERVERIF src 10.0.0.1
  ip rule add from 192.168.1.2 table maincnx

  [[ $VPN ]] && ip route add table vpnclient default dev $VPNIF via $VPNCLIENTIP
  [[ $VPN ]] && ip route add table vpnclient $VPNCLIENTROUTE dev $VPNIF src $VPNCLIENTIP
  [[ $VPN ]] && ip route add table vpnclient 192.168.0.0/24 dev $LAN src 192.168.0.1
  [[ $VPN ]] && ip route add table vpnclient 192.168.1.0/24 dev $WAN src 192.168.1.1
  [[ $VPN ]] && ip route add table vpnclient 192.168.2.0/24 dev $WAN2 src 192.168.2.1
  ip rule add from $VPNCLIENTIP table vpnclient

  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip route add table vpnserver default dev $VPNSERVERIF via $VPNSERVERIP
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip route add table vpnserver 192.168.0.0/24 dev $LAN src 192.168.0.1
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip route add table vpnserver 192.168.1.0/24 dev $WAN src 192.168.1.1
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip route add table vpnserver 192.168.2.0/24 dev $WAN2 src 192.168.2.1
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip route add table vpnserver 10.0.0.0/24 dev $VPNSERVERIF src 10.0.0.1
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip rule add from $VPNSERVERIP table vpnserver

  ip route add table altcnx default dev $WAN2 via 192.168.2.2
  ip route add table altcnx 192.168.0.0/24 dev $LAN src 192.168.0.1
  ip route add table altcnx 192.168.1.0/24 dev $WAN src 192.168.1.1
  ip route add table altcnx 192.168.2.0/24 dev $WAN2 src 192.168.2.1
  ip rule add from 192.168.2.2 table altcnx

  ip rule add from all fwmark 1 table maincnx
  [[ $VPN ]] && ip rule add from all fwmark 2 table vpnclient
  [[ $VPNSERVER ]] && ip rule add from all fwmark 3 table vpnserver
  ip rule add from all fwmark 4 table altcnx
  ip route flush cache

  for i in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do echo 0 > "$i"; done # To avoid packet drop
  echo 1 | sudo tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward > /dev/null
}

case "$1" in

start)
  Set_variables
  [[ $VPN ]] && sleep 5 # Wait for VPN to be up if not yet started when the firewall script kicks in
  /usr/bin/logger -t "Multi route" "Starting" -p4
  /usr/bin/logger -t "Multi route" "VPN CLIENT DETECTED, ADDING RULES" -p4
  /usr/bin/logger -t "Multi route" "VPN SERVER DETECTED, ADDING RULES" -p4
  Env_Cleanup
  Routing_Init
  exit 0
;;

stop)
  Set_variables
  /usr/bin/logger -t "Multi route" "Stopped" -p4
  echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward > /dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 1 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 2 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 3 2>/dev/null
  ip rule del from all fwmark 4 2>/dev/null
  ip route flush cache
  exit 0
;;

restart)
  /usr/bin/logger -t "Multiroute" "restart initiated" -p4
  $0 stop
  sleep 1
  echo -e '\n'
  $0 start
;;

*)
  echo -e "$YELLOW Usage: /etc/init.d/multiroute.sh {start|stop|restart}$END"
  exit 1
;;

esac
exit 0

The script is an old-fashioned SysV init script that goes into /etc/init.d after you’ve made it executable with chmod 755 and will be executed during startup.

This script basically creates four different routing tables. So instead of having just one “default route” for all your machines, your firewall now has four different tables, each containing a set of specific routing rules. So if you mark a packet with 0x2, (see in the nftables configuration, the mangle part) the machine will ship it through the VPN connection. If you tag it with 0x4, it will use your alternate connection, say a 4G for example. The tag 0x3 will be for the VPN Server and the 0x2 for VPN client. It’s just magic how many opportunities this kind of IPtables / Nftables mangling system, coordinated with IP routing can open.

VPN

We speak here of a client VPN. A VPN that you subscribed to and want to be able to use in certain situations, or more precisely with certain packets. If you want to bypass a geographical lock from some TV broadcasters or Netflix or use some protocols rather on an anonymous connection than the usual one, or just to preserve your anonymity this is the way to do it.

Once you find your dream VPN provider, they will most likely give you files to set up your VPN connection, and usually, they are made for both Wireguard and OpenVPN. I will show you how to install and configure the latter.
You will just need to install OpenVPN, upload those files (usually a .conf file also embedding all certificates and a user.pass file with the credentials) in the /etc/openvpn directory, enable openvpn in /etc/default/openvpn and you should be able to connect.

$ sudo apt-get install openvpn
$ sudo sed -i '/#AUTOSTART="all"/s/^#//g' /etc/default/openvpn

A typical OpenVPN client configuration looks like this:

client
dev tun
proto udp
remote [OPENVPN SERVER IP] 1194
resolv-retry infinite
remote-random
nobind
tun-mtu 1500
tun-mtu-extra 32
mssfix 1450
persist-key
persist-tun
ping 15
ping-restart 0
ping-timer-rem
reneg-sec 0
comp-lzo no
log /var/log/openvpn.log
remote-cert-tls server
auth-user-pass /etc/openvpn/user.pass.vpn
route-nopull
verb 3
pull
fast-io
cipher AES-256-CBC
auth SHA512
script-security 2
up "/etc/init.d/firewall restart"
down "/etc/init.d/firewall restart"

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
[YOUR CERTIFICATE]
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

key-direction 1

#
# 2048 bit OpenVPN static key
#
[YOUR KEY]

CAUTION:
There is a minor security vulnerability here. Using the auth-user-pass /etc/openvpn/user.pass.vpn file is not ideal. This file contains your credentials for connection in plaintext to avoid providing them manually during initialization of the VPN. This plaintext isn’t encrypted and could expose your credentials if your firewall is ever seized or you become prone to a very critical vulnerability, like a 0day buffer overflow of some sort, would successfully compromise your firewall. On my end, I live with it, but you’ve been warned.

PS: The firewall is automatically reloaded when the VPN goes up or down to add the proper rules.

Create the directory for custom scripts

We need a directory to save custom scripts. Create /usr/local/scripts and sudo chown it to your current user for convenience.

DuckDNS

While we are at it, let’s make this machine easy for you to locate online. Should you have a dynamic IP address, just crash by DuckDNS, create yourself an account and register your IP and duckdns.org subdomain for free. Here is a little script to help you update it on a regular basis:

$ echo url="https://www.duckdns.org/update?domains=YOUR_DOMAINE&token=YOUR_TOKEN&ip=" | curl -k -o /var/log/duckdns.log -K -

The token is found under your login at duckdns.org after clicking the ‘>>> reCAPTCHA <<<’ button.

Use the script by saving it to e.g./usr/local/scripts/duckdns.shchmod 755 it and execute it every half an hour with a crontab like this:

$ crontab -e

$ crontab -e

It should look somewhat like this:

MAILFROM=[YOUR_SENDING_EMAIL]
MAILTO=[YOUR_RECEIVING_EMAIL]

#m   h  dom mon dow      command
17   *   *   *   *       cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
45  10   *   *   *       test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47   6   *   *   7       test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52   6   1   *   *       test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
30   *   *   *   6       /usr/local/scripts/duckdns.sh

Only the last line is added by us. The first lines are usually present default. YMMV.

Note: In order for the user who executes the duckdns.sh script to have permissions to write a log file in /var/log it needs to be part of the syslog group. This can easily be done by running sudo addgroup <user> syslog.

Adguard

Adguard is a really cool piece of software that is basically running a DNS that resolves all advertisement servers to 127.0.0.1 (resulting in many ads not being shown. Hooray!). You install it on your LAN and instead of connecting directly to 8.8.8.8 or your ISP DNS, you tell all your LAN users to rather use it.

If your request is not going toward an Ad server, it’s just resolved by the DNS you instructed Adguard to use. Otherwise, your client, say your mobile phone, will just ask this ad from 127.0.0.1 (himself), getting nothing in return. With this, a chrome plugin like Adblock as well as youtube Adblock and advertisement will be a thing of the past.

I highly recommend visiting their Github here. Installation is fairly easy:

$ curl -s -S -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/master/scripts/install.sh | sh -s -- -v

Note: The script will obtain root permissions and ask for those as needed.

Now we have a DNS relay running on localhost.

You can also just use the DNS servers of Adguard directly. These are present at 94.140.14.14 and 94.140.15.15.

If you want to finalize your setup of Adguard, just connect with a browser to the firewall (likely on 192.168.0.1 at this stage), on port 3000. It should look like this:

Adguard wizard

Use the wizard to set up Adguard and continue the tutorial.

Adding a DHCP server to finalize our LAN setup

Well, now that most of the tools are up & running, let’s have a DHCP running to give addresses to machines in the LAN, which your ISP box won’t do anymore since it’s on the other side of the firewall. While we are at it, we can now ship IP addresses with the local Adguard DNS to get rid of ads.

$ sudo apt-get install isc-dhcp-server
$ cat | sudo tee /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf

Copy/paste this (and end with CTRL+D):

deny declines;
log-facility local7;
authoritative;

subnet 192.168.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 {
  interface eth1;
  range 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.200;
  option routers 192.168.0.1;
  option broadcast-address 192.168.0.255;
  option domain-name-servers 192.168.0.1, 94.140.14.14; # Local adguard DNS proxy + online adguard DNS
  default-lease-time 259200;
  max-lease-time 604800;
}

host machine1 {
  hardware ethernet 00:11:22:33:AA:DD;
  fixed-address 192.168.0.3;
}

host machine2 {
  hardware ethernet 85:55:85:42:12;
  fixed-address 192.168.0.4;
}

Given as an example, I advise you to have static IPs directly like for machine 1 & 2 in this file if you can. This makes it easier to locate them later. We point the DNS to our local instance of Adguard and, as a backup also to their online DNS if our own is not replying fast enough.

So this was part 2 of our trilogy of how to install the CrowdWall. I hope you enjoyed reading it as much as I enjoyed writing it. Stay tuned for part 3 where things really start to get interesting once we add CrowdSec to the mix.

Source :
https://www.crowdsec.net/blog/crowdwall-part-2

CrowdWall: a Tough Firewall for 50€ – Part 1

How to set up an effective firewall and preserve your security & privacy with Orange Pi R1+, Netfilter, AdGuard and CrowdSec.

Welcome to the first part of our trilogy where the goal is to inspire you to create a very efficient firewall to protect your remote work environment, family, or your small business, which offers a serious level of security, at a low cost.

This first part will be centered around the basics: choosing hardware and installing the operating system and doing basic configuration. Part two will be on how to set up firewall functionality, setup client VPN to protect your identity online, setting up AdGuard for the entire network, DuckDNS if you don’t have a static IP as well as port knocking which is a cool way to close down your internet exposed services to anyone but you (or anyone else who knows the secret combination to enter). The third and final part will be about how to secure your network even more with CrowdSec – how to set up a canary device that ‘tweets’ when unexpected events like for instance port scanning occurs; something you would typically never do yourself.

It’s also being part of a larger project, CrowdSec, which is blocking Internet attacks and sharing IPs that launched them. You protect yourself and others at the same time. In essence, this comprehensive guide will show you how to:

  • Create security robust enough to resist even if passwords are compromised
  • Create a reliable hardware environment for your firewall
  • Install the OS on it and create a rock-solid Firewall to protect your activities
  • Add CrowdSec to protect your WLAN services you’d like to expose over the Internet and detect if any local IoT device is going rogue (e.g. cams, assistants, connected speakers, etc.)
  • Allow external access to DMZ-like services to control your home on distance and access your firewall
  • Add a VPN to protect your anonymity online
  • Add an anti-advertisement & anti-tracking system

Needed skills

You should have basic knowledge of Linux and Shell. If you can download and install a Linux distribution by yourself, nothing should sound overly difficult.

Enough talk. Let’s get started!

Part 1: Choosing hardware and installing OS

Needed hardware

The CrowdWall is among the cheapest possible decent security setup you can get.

The components are correct but your networks will not be very isolated internally. The advanced version offers both better security and performance. The “expert” CrowdWall is made to protect a small business of tens of coworkers.

In the basic CrowdWall setup, you can also add cost-efficient Wifi Access Points like this Tenda (around 45€) or add a third Ethernet interfaceor Wifi connection (over USB).

Should you want to organize a large distribution of the CrowdWall, say equip all your remote working force with it, you can look at the GL Inet products line. They are nicely priced if you go for volumes and offer real good performances for the money.

Table 1: Possible variations

The Orange PI R1+ benefits from very interesting characteristics beyond its small price tag. It runs on a 1.5 GHzGhz SoC with 1 GB ram which is enough for the job. It also provides two ethernet ports, has marginal power consumption, and even provides a USB port and a GPIO. (The Rock Pi-E can also do the job nicely and offers a bigger GPIO but for slightly more money)

Photo 1, an Orange PI 1 R+, 2 & 3, its 3D printed case

If you don’t have an Orange PI R1+ other similar single-board computers can be used instead: Orange PI R1+ LTS (Same SOC, slower, low power RAM), NanoPi R2SNanoPi R4SROCK Pi E, or even a Raspberry Pi 3 or 4 with an extra ethernet plug. In the latter case, you probably want to use one connected via HAT. In either case, you won’t be able to use the same fancy case but would have to design your own or adapt mine.

Setting up your firewall

Going forward I will describe setting up using Orange PI R1+.

Physical setup

Just plug your Internet connection (usually the Box from your ISP) to the lower port (the one down, closest to the GPIO, on the above picture) and your LAN (usually your switch) to the left port above picture.

Plug the Orange Pi (from hereon ‘OPI’) to the Power supply, or if you want for redundant power supply, power up the OPI from the power bank and the bank from a regular power plug. This should give you some hours before the firewall shuts down and eventually give it time to notify you beforehand.

The physical setup should look like this:


Figure 1: The set-top box, local LAN & WAN setup, you can leave the Box Wifi for home & family use and dedicate the other Access Point to business.

Software initial setup

1/ At the time of writing the newest supported version of Armbian is Armbian 22.05 Jammy, based on Ubuntu 22.04 Jammy Jellyfish. It doesn’t matter too much if the version of Armbian you install on is based on Debian or Ubuntu as long as it’s a supported version. Download it here. Other Debian-based distros like https://dietpi.com/ should also work although this hasn’t been tested.

2/ Download a USB stick/SDcard flasher. Balena etcher is great for this. It’s very straightforward to use and runs on both Windows, Linux & macOS environments.

Remember we are on a headless device with no HDMI port, so we are going to use it in command-line (CLI) mode only. That being said you could get a serial TTY console, but the effort and complication is really not worth the time (unless you need it for debugging).

After flashing and booting your appliance you should connect it to the eth0/WAN ethernet plug (furthest away from the power connector). You will have to check your DHCP server which IP is assigned to your CrowdWall (it’s usually residing on the box you got from your internet provider). The default ssh login is root and the password is 1234. After connecting to it you will be walked through an installation wizard that will set you up with a personal user account and sudo.

The other ethernet interface will be called lan0. And for everything to work you will need to configure it.

Setting up lan0

Configure a static IP on lan0 by editing /etc/network/interfaces and adding the following:

auto lan0
iface lan0 inet static
address 192.168.0.1/24

Start lan0 with the new configuration by typing sudo ifup lan0. Verify that the lan0 interface is up by typing ip addr show lan0 in a terminal.

Setting up your Internet Box in DMZ mode (Full NAT)

No two providers have the same box, OS, hardware, interface etc. hence no universal cut/paste commands, or screenshots to help here.

The feature you’re looking for is usually named “DMZ IP”. Enabling this feature requires you to input a LAN IP address, which will be the one to which all the Internet traffic will be redirected, without filtering. This is essential if you later intend to accept connections from the Internet to your home by exposing some services, like your home automation, NVR / IP cameras, or even a VPN server.

There are other ways of doing this, like enabling ports one by one, probably in a “Network”, “NAT” or “Network Address Translation” tab, but this requires you to get into the box interface every time you need to update a port, it’s error-prone and less flexible.

Basically, where/when possible, one shouldn’t trust the ISP’s Box either. So if you can bypass it totally, do it. Often enough, specifically in an FDDI context, you can just use the little modem that connects to your fiber and connects with Ethernet to your box, and plug yourself right in instead of the ISP box. There are tutorials online, just Duckduckgo (same as Googling but with privacy) for “how to bypass [BOX PROVIDER NAME] box”.

Absolutely not mandatory and mainly interesting for paranoïd people, but if you can do it, this is an even safer setup, even though bringing back the TV and Phone feature (should you want them), could be slightly more complicated, but far from impossible for advanced users.

So this was part 1 of our trilogy of how to install the CrowdWall. Part 2 will continue with configuring your installation with essential firewall functionality like traffic filtering, anti-ad features, and much more. Stay tuned!

Source :
https://www.crowdsec.net/blog/crowdwall-tough-firewall-for-50e

Password Security and the Internet of Things (IoT)

The Internet of Things (IoT) is here, and we’re using it for everything from getting instant answers to random trivia questions to screening visitors at the door. According to Gartner, we were expected to use more than 25 billion internet-connected devices by the end of 2021. But as our digital lives have become more convenient, we might not yet have considered the risks involved with using IoT devices.

How can you keep yourself secure in today’s IoT world, where hackers aim to outsmart your smart home? First we’ll look at how hackers infiltrate the IoT, and then we’ll look at what you can do right now to make sure the IoT is working for you – not against you.

How hackers are infiltrating the Internet of Things

While we’ve become comfortable asking voice assistants to give us the weather forecast while we prep our dinners, hackers have been figuring out how to commandeer our IoT devices for cyber attacks. Here are just a few examples of how cyber criminals are already infiltrating the IoT.

Gaining access to and control of your camera

Have you ever seen someone with a sticker covering the camera on their laptop or smartphone? There’s a reason for that. Hackers have been known to gain access to these cameras and spy on people. This has become an even more serious problem in recent years, as people have been relying on videoconferencing to safely connect with friends and family, participate in virtual learning, and attend telehealth appointments during the pandemic. Cameras now often come with an indicator light that lets you know whether they’re being used. It’s a helpful protective measure, but not a failsafe one.

Using voice assistants to obtain sensitive information

According to Statista, 132 million Americans used a digital voice assistant once a month in 2021. Like any IoT gadget, however, they can be vulnerable to attack. According to Ars Technica, academic researchers have discovered that the Amazon Echo can be forced to take commands from itself, which opens the door to major mischief in a smart home. Once an attacker has compromised an Echo, they can use it to unlock doors, make phone calls and unauthorized purchases, and control any smart home appliances that the Echo manages.

Many bad actors prefer the quiet approach, however, slipping in undetected and stealing information. They can piggyback on a voice assistant’s privileged access to a victim’s online accounts or other IoT gadgets and make off with any sensitive information they desire. With the victim being none the wiser, the attackers can use that information to commit identity fraud or stage even more ambitious cyber crimes.

Hacking your network and launching a ransomware attack

Any device that is connected to the internet, whether it’s a smart security system or even a smart fridge, can be used in a cyber attack. Bad actors know that most people aren’t keeping their IoT gadgets’ software up to date in the same way they do their computers and smartphones, so they take advantage of that false sense of security. Once cyber criminals have gained access to an IoT device, they can go after other devices on the same network. (This is because most home networks are designed to trust devices that are already connected to them.) When these malicious actors are ready, they can launch a ransomware attack that brings your entire digital life to a halt – unless you agree to fork over a hefty sum in bitcoin, that is.

Using bots to launch a DDOS attack

Although most people never notice it, hackers can and do infect IoT devices with malware en masse, gaining control over them in the process. Having turned these zombie IoT devices into bots, the hackers then collectively use them to stage what’s called a botnet attack on their target of choice. This form of assault is especially popular for launching distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, in which all the bots in a botnet collectively flood a target with network requests until it buckles and goes offline.

How you can keep your Internet of Things gadgets safe from hackers

So how can you protect your IoT devices from these determined hackers? Fortunately, you can take back control by becoming just a little more cyber smart. Here are a few ways to keep your IoT gadgets safe from hackers:

  • Never use the default settings on your IoT devices. Although IoT devices are designed to be plug-and-play so you can start enjoying them right away, their default settings are often not nearly as secure as they should be. With that in mind, set up a unique username and strong password combination before you start using any new IoT technology. While you’re at it, see if there’s an option to encrypt the traffic to and from your IoT device. If there is, turn it on.
  • Keep your IoT software up to date. Chances are, you regularly install the latest software updates on your computer and phone. Hackers are counting on you to leave your IoT gadgets unpatched, running outdated software with vulnerabilities they can exploit, so be sure to keep the software on your IoT devices up to date as well.
  • Practice good password hygiene. We all slip into bad password habits from time to time – it’s only human – but they put our IoT security at risk. With this in mind, avoid re-using passwords and be sure to set unique, strong passwords on each of your IoT devices. Update those passwords from time to time, too. Don’t store your passwords in a browser, and don’t share them via email. A password manager can help you securely store and share your passwords, so hackers never have a chance to snatch them.
  • Use secure, password-protected WiFi. Cyber criminals are notorious for sneaking onto open, insecure WiFi networks. Once they’re connected, they can spy on any internet activity that happens over those networks, steal login credentials, and launch cyber attacks if they feel like it. For this reason, make sure that you and your IoT devices only use secure, password-protected WiFi.
  • Use multi-factor authentication as an extra layer of protection. Multi-factor authentication (MFA), gives you extra security on top of all the other measures we mentioned above. It asks you to provide one more credential, or factor, in addition to a password to confirm you are who you say you are. If you have MFA enabled and a hacker tries to log in as you, you’ll get a notification that a login attempt is in progress. Whenever you have the option to enable MFA on any account or technology, take advantage of it.

Protect your Internet of Things devices with smart password security

The IoT is making our lives incredibly convenient, but that convenience can be a little too seductive at times. It’s easy to forget that smart home devices, harmless-looking and helpful as they are, can be targeted in cyber attacks just like our computers and phones. Hackers are counting on you to leave your IoT gadgets unprotected so they can use them to launch damaging attacks. By following these smart IoT security tips, you can have the best of both worlds, enjoying your smart life and better peace of mind at the same time.

Learn how LastPass Premium helps you strengthen your password security.

Source :
https://blog.lastpass.com/2022/08/password-security-and-the-iot/